Democracy Promotion in the Middle East:
A comparison of US and EU rhetoric and policies
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I. Introduction

Democracy promotion as a goal of foreign policy can be traced back to US President Woodrow Wilson’s call for the League of Nations in order “to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles” (Heckscher 1956: 277; Dalacoura 2005: 963). While this continued to be a reason (at least rhetorically) for especially the United States to intervene in the European theater in World War II, during the Cold War democracy promotion was put on hold in the “third world” according to the much-repeated witticism “He’s a bastard, but at least he’s our bastard” attributed to several US presidents about various notorious autocratic allies.¹ Although democracies in Western Europe – particularly Germany – and Japan were erected and consolidated with the support of the United States, this push to democratize was not carried over into those parts of the world in which US influence was contested by the USSR (Southeast Asia, the Middle East, or Latin America, for example). The logic behind this reluctance to push for democracy was partially based on a purported dichotomy of democratization and stability, supported by a theory propagated by Samuel Huntington that authoritarian, and particularly military, regimes, were more stable during transition periods than if elected regimes tried to take power at the beginning of a transition toward democracy (Huntington: 1968). A statement made by Henry Kissinger before the US undermined the elected Allende regime in Chile in June of 1970 aptly summarizes the foreign policy priority of containment over democracy promotion during the Cold War: “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist because of the irresponsibility of its own people” (Kissinger quoted in Smith 2000: 66). After the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the dangers associated with political instability during the Cold War – namely, that a country aligned with the United States would realign with the Soviet Union – disappeared.

The history of the EU’s democracy promotion programs is naturally much shorter, as the EC/EU has only existed as an entity attempting to make a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for less than twenty years. Individual states,

¹ This quote is attributed to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Richard Nixon, and Henry Kissinger, among others.
however, have been promoting democracy in a variety of ways for just as long as the United States. Great Britain and France’s mandates in the Middle East after World War I, in which they set up certain aspects of democratic government such as partially-elected legislative councils (Husseini 1932: 23), are one example. The European Community’s major push for democracy came – just as with the United States – after the fall of the USSR, when it suddenly became possible for East European states to reform their authoritarian governments.

Although both the United States and states of the European Union had thus had experience with democracy promotion before the 1990s, it was during this period, the so-called “third wave” of democratization, that both rhetoric and programs began to gain momentum (Cox, et.al. 2000: 2). In the European Union this included the Maastricht Treaty in which the CFSP was established with the option to impose diplomatic or economic sanctions “to influence policies […] disrespectful of the rule of law or democratic principles” (EU Commission website for external relations, CFSP 2009). The United States’ foreign policy also became more focused on democracy promotion after the election of President Bill Clinton. While campaigning for the US presidency in 1992, Bill Clinton criticized then-President George H. W. Bush’s “ambivalence about supporting democracy […] and [claimed that] his eagerness to befriend potentates and dictators has shown itself time and again. [He] simply does not seem to be at home in the mainstream pro-democracy tradition in American foreign policy” (Clinton as quoted in Friedmann 1992). With these accusations, Bill Clinton was positioning himself to take an active role in promoting democracy around the world when he came into office, a role that he subsequently fulfilled.

Despite government-sponsored programs such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) set up under US President Reagan in 1983, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) under US President George W. Bush, or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP / Barcelona Process) and European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) as European programs to promote democracy, there is a widely-held perception that a gap exists between the rhetoric of democracy promotion and the actual programs themselves. In particular the United States is perceived by many as demonstrating an especially large divergence between its rhetoric and actual policy in the Middle East when it comes to democracy promotion. The cases of Jordan and Egypt – both
staunch allies of the United States in the region and both autocratic – are just two examples used to point out the hypocrisy of the United States’ quest for democracy (Sharp 2006a).

It is this gap between the rhetoric and policy of democracy promotion that I intend to investigate in the following paper. Many papers investigating democracy promotion of one actor or the other in the region pick out single examples of hypocrisy or consistency in policy and rhetoric to make their cases. As will be described in the state of the art, there has not yet been a systematic investigation not looking to prove a certain point about one of the actors but merely to make a systematic appraisal of the situation. This is where I propose to step in.

A discussion started by Ian Manners in 2002, namely that of Normative Power Europe (NPE), will be used as the framework for my paper. Manners suggested that the EU is an actor capable of forming perceptions of the normal in the international context, thus making it able to influence forms of government and actions of other countries (Manners 2002: 239). The relevance for the debate on democracy promotion is that, as a normative power, the EU should be expected to show more consistency between norms expressed rhetorically and policies. It is therefore from this discussion on NPE that I have drawn the hypothesis to be tested:

Due to its self-understanding as primarily a normative power, the EU will show more consistency in between its rhetoric and policies of democracy promotion than the United States.

The first step is to systematically examine the differences between the rhetoric and policies of the two actors regarding democracy promotion in the Middle East. Are there actually differences between the rhetoric and policies of the United States and EU? If so, what are these differences? Do they lie in the aspects that are emphasized? Are the actors perhaps operating with diverse implicit definitions of democracy? Are the discrepancies perhaps not in the aspects that are emphasized but in the design of the programs to implement the policies? And is it actually the case that the gap between rhetoric and policy is larger in the United States than in the European Union when it comes to democracy promotion in the Middle East? The issue of consistency is closely related with that of credibility. The implication of a greater divergence in US rhetoric and policy, besides the fact that it would verify the hypothesis, is that the European Union would then likely be a more credible actor in the region and therefore its programs would be more likely to be received positively.
To answer these questions, I have divided the paper into 6 sections. In the first section I will cover the background including the state of the art, theory, methodology, and the definitions and criteria I have selected for researching the aforementioned questions. In the second section, I will analyze the rhetoric and policy of the United States according to the chosen criteria. This will be followed by the third section in which I will examine the rhetoric and policy of the European Union. After completing these empirical investigations in a fourth section, I will reflect on methodological and other issues which arose during the course of the research and, in the final section draw conclusions and discuss the implications for NPE.

At the end of this process, I will reach the conclusion that the democracy promotion rhetoric and policies of the United States are no more divergent than those of the EU, contrary to what would be expected by the NPE argument. Possible explanations for this result will be suggested, although the space and time allotted for this paper prohibit further investigation.

II. Background

a. State of the art

Before assessing the specific literature on the gap between EU and US rhetoric and policy of democracy promotion in the Middle East, I will first place my paper within the larger research field of democracy promotion in general. One debate on this topic precedes all further discussions by asking not how, but whether democracy promotion should take place at all. Some scholars believe that the northern industrial democracies (those states most involved with democracy promotion) should not promote democracy for ethical reasons because it is an imposition of a Western system on the rest of the world (for a summary of arguments cf. Schraeder 2003: 25), while others argue along more pragmatic lines that other elements of foreign policy (e.g. economic and/or security interests) should be prioritized (Robinson 1996). Those who argue for ethical reasons that democracy should be promoted believe that it is an end in itself, a universal good that is also reflected by the fact that international law now recognizes democracy as an ‘entitlement’ (Franck 1994). Those supporting its spread on the basis of pragmatic arguments maintain that democracy is a means to an end, whether that end be peace (based on the democratic peace theory (Pace 2009:
a more prosperous international system, greater protection of human rights, or more global social equality (Schraeder 2003: 31).

Once it has been established that democracy should – for whatever reason – be promoted, another question is one which asks whether internal or external actors should be the ones promoting it. While “[t]he traditional consensus concerning this ‘internal-external’ debate is that domestic factors are decisive” (Schraeder 2003: 23), Philippe C. Schmitter, one of the most noted scholars arguing for the importance of internal actors, was also one of the first to pose the question of whether external factors might be more significant than he originally thought – a view that gained support after the democratic transitions in Eastern Europe (Schmitter 1996: 27f). Laurence Whitehead then gave the most thorough treatment to this debate by pointing to the processes of contagion (the spreading of an idea within a geographical region), explicit acts of intervention (such as in Germany and Japan after World War II), and consent (in which international and domestic actors work together to spread democratic norms from below) as support for the significance of external actors (Whitehead 1996). Peter Burnell also demonstrated that the international context can have a direct as well as an indirect effect (Burnell 2006).

After determining that external actors can play a role in democratizing another country, the next debate involves deciding on the methods to be used. A country or international organization could use instruments ranging from relatively uncontroversial and non-coercive to very controversial including the use of force (Schraeder 2003: 26). The instruments could include classic diplomacy (Beigbeder 1995), foreign aid (Burnell 2000; Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Radelet et al 2005), political conditionalities (Crawford 1997), economic sanctions (Hendrickson 1994/5), covert intervention (Forsythe 1992; James and Mitchell 1995), paramilitary intervention (Schraeder 1992), or military intervention (Peceny 1999).

The next question is that of effects: Ethier (2003), for example, compared conditionality and incentives of democracy promotion strategies in terms of the results. Kelley (2004) compared conditionality and socialization-based methods in terms of their effectiveness. De Zeeuw (2005) showed that the lack of focus on institution-building has limited the impact of international democracy assistance (2005: 481). As pointed out by Jünemann and Knodt (2008: 10), most literature in the field of democracy promotion asks what the impact of the policies has been, but the question of how political systems transform in the first place is still understudied.
My research paper falls primarily into the debate about the instruments used. I will ask which instruments of democracy promotion are discussed in the rhetoric of the EU and US, and which are actually used? Jünemann and Knodt (2008: 10) note that “a systematic comparative analysis [on the strategies and instruments of external democracy promotion] which focuses on the external promoter and compares different states and regions by examining its interests, instruments, or strategies does not yet exist” (Jünemann and Knodt 2008:11). Although much has been written on the post-World War II cases, the EU as an independent actor in this regard has only been studied recently. Richard Youngs published a key study in 2002 on EU democracy promotion policies and spent one chapter focused on the Mediterranean region. However, studies conducted before 2004 on the EU do not include the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), now one of the most important channels the EU has for regulating relations with its neighbors. The aforementioned edited volume by Jünemann and Knodt (2008) looks at the EU in all areas of the world and takes the ENP into consideration, but they did not include the United States.

For the United States, Carothers and Ottoway (2005) edited a volume examining democracy promotion strategies by the US in the Middle East, but in neither the Youngs (2002) nor the Jünemann and Knodt or Carothers/Ottoway (2005) studies was there any significant element of systematic comparison in terms of the “exporting” state. Schraeder (2002) edited a collection of articles on the rhetoric / policy divide of several actors including the EU and the United States, but this was done neither in a systematic way, nor was the focus on the Middle East. While Dalacoura (2005) gave a concise critique of U.S. democracy promotion policies in the Middle East since 11 September 2001, she was assessing the impact of the policies and not comparing them with the European Union. Kopstein (2006), on the other hand, compared the strategies of the United States and European Union as bottom-up as opposed to top-down, but his article was too brief to go into great detail on the policies, and the topic of rhetoric was barely touched upon.

In contrast to the aforementioned analyses, my paper will focus on two actors, the EU and US, in one region, the Middle East. Specifically, I will be examining the rhetoric – policy gap in democracy promotion in the case of both actors. A paper recently co-authored by Richard Youngs and Tamara Cofman Wittes (2009) touches on the difference between rhetoric and policy of the EU and US in terms of democracy promotion in the Middle East but in a very brief manner. I wish to expand
on their paper by systematically analyzing both the rhetoric and policy of the EU and US.

b. Framework for hypothesis: Normative Power Europe

The debate on Normative Power Europe (NPE) has its roots in the late twentieth century, when Francois Duchêne claimed that civilian power – as opposed to military power – was a way for states to gain influence in international relations (Duchêne 1972). Hedley Bull countered by saying that a civilian power is ineffective and lacks “self-sufficiency in military power” (Manners 2002: 237; Bull 1982). In 2002, Ian Manners then introduced the idea of Europe as a “normative power,” meaning that it had the ability to influence what was considered normal in international relations (Manners 2002). Manners stated that a combination of historical, political, and legal factors had “accelerated a commitment to placing universal norms and principles at the center of its relations with […] the world” (Manners 2002: 241). These norms included that most relevant for this paper, namely: democracy (TEU, art. 6).

The debate continues on what kind of power the EU is, but in 2006 Bicchi proposed criteria for deciding in which fields the EU acted as a normative power and in which as a civilian power. Reflexivity, in other words the ability of the EU to critically examine its foreign policy and adapt it to the effects the policy is expected to have, and inclusivity, the ability of non-members to influence the EU foreign policy process, were the two criteria she proposed (Bicchi 2006: 288f). If both are present, then it is a field in which the EU operates as a normative power. If only one is present, then the EU should be considered a civilian power. In our case of democracy promotion, both criteria are clearly met. In terms of reflexivity, the EU has published several papers critical of its policies of democratization in the Middle East, and has gone through many phases of adaptation (Barcelona Process, European Neighborhood Policy, and Union for the Mediterranean) to try to create an effective policy of democratization. The EU has also been very inclusive in its policies with the Middle East: the states have worked together with the EU on their individual action plans, and numerous fora provide an opportunity for the countries to voice their opinions on aspects of EU policies such as promotion of civil society or human rights. Using these criteria, we can place the field of democracy promotion squarely into the category in which the EU is expected to act as a normative power.
The importance of the EU’s self-identification as a normative – rather than primarily military or civilian – power is that it results in the EU being willing to act against its own material interests in order to uphold a norm. Manners demonstrated this in his description of the EU’s role on the issue of the death penalty in that there was no obvious material gain for the EU in its push to abolish capital punishment and there were occasionally even “costly consequences for its interventions” (Manners 2002: 253). The fact that the EU is willing to do this has implications for its democracy promotion policies. Both the United States and the European Union have similar rhetoric on the topic: both promote issues such as human rights, free and fair elections, and many other elements as essential to a democracy. Both also have similar material interests in the region: securing a continuous supply of oil and natural gas, reducing illegal immigration (although this problem is much greater and more immediate for the EU), increasing trade, and fighting terrorism. With similar material interests as well as similar normative interests, one might expect both to act in a similar manner in the region.

The NPE argument purports the opposite and claims that the EU is willing to act against its own material interests in order to uphold its norms because “its aims are linked to universal goods rather than being in the narrowly defined self-interest of the EU” (Diez and Pace 2007: 1). According to the tenets of the Normative Power Europe (NPE) argument, therefore, the EU should be willing to concede at least some of the material interests listed above for the sake of promoting the norm of democratization. As the reason behind the gap between rhetoric and policy is usually assumed to be that the actor may desire one outcome or path as expressed in rhetoric, but because of conflicting interests will tend to choose the policy that benefits its material interests the most, one would expect the United States to follow this path and act in ways which contradict its rhetoric. Because the EU as a norm-driven power, however, and even acts against its material interests for the sake of the normative interests, one can extrapolate that the EU’s rhetoric and policy should be more consistent than those of the United States.
c. Methodology

i. Democracy

To begin researching the topic, I first will provide definitions for my central subject matters, that is, democracy, democracy promotion, rhetoric, and policy. The many and varied definitions and operationalizations of democracy range from minimalist to nearly all-inclusive. A minimalist definition such as Vanhanen’s (1984: 28ff) includes only three factors: the possibility of a change in government through elections, a minimum of party competition (which he defines as the opposition parties getting a combined total of at least 30% of the votes), and a minimum of the total population must be enfranchised (at least 10% is his requirement). A more narrow definition of what constitutes a modern democracy is Robert Dahl’s seminal description of a “polyarchy:” “1) Control over governmental decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials, 2) elected officials are chosen and peacefully removed in relatively frequent, fair and free elections in which coercion is quite limited, 3) practically all adults have the right to vote in these elections, 4) most adults also have the right to run for the public offices for which candidates run in these elections, 5) citizens have an effectively enforced right to freedom of expression, particularly political expression, including criticism of the officials, the conduct of the government, the prevailing political, economic, and social system, and the dominant ideology, 6) they also have access to alternative sources of information that are not monopolized by the government or any other single group, and finally, 7) they have an effectively enforced right to form and join autonomous associations, including political associations, such as political parties and interest groups, that attempt to influence the government by competing in elections and by other peaceful means” (Dahl 1989: 233). Other elements of a democracy definition could include uncertainty about how the election will end (Przeworski 1991: 49), a higher requirement for participation (Ray 1995: 102; Doyle 1986: 1164), guaranteed civil liberties / human rights for all citizens (Jaggers and Gurr 1995), or a minimum of corruption (Freedom House). Finally, the definition can be made even narrower to include market economies or juridical rights for citizens (Doyle 1986: 1164).

With these many and varied criteria for defining a democracy, it is entirely possible that the EU and US work with different implicit definitions. This could have relevance for the study because if one actor works with a very minimalist understanding of a democracy (for example Vanhanen’s), then that actor will
understand democracy promotion to be promotion of free and fair elections in which the opposition party gets a certain amount of votes, at least 10% of citizens are allowed to vote, and there a possibility that the government will change. In other words, an actor operating with this understanding of democracy will focus only on elections, participation, and oppositional political parties. With such a definition, it is possible that an actor would have an easier time matching rhetoric with policy, as there are only three elements to focus on. If, on the other hand, an actor understands democracy to include elements such as human rights, freedom of the press, and institutional checks on the executive, then it is clear that, for this actor, democracy promotion will mean promoting these elements, as well. In this case, it might be more difficult for the actor to make policy consistent with rhetoric because the rhetoric is so broad as to make it difficult for the policy to cover all areas completely. Because it is possible for actors to have different perceptions of what constitutes a democracy and thus democracy promotion, and because this would be relevant for my study, I will not set a particular definition as “the” definition of democracy. Instead, I will include several criteria which could be used to define democracy so as to allow for different democracy definitions on the part of an actor. If the two actors are indeed working with less than the broadest definition, this will become apparent when a particular actor never talks about human rights or freedom of the press in the context of democracy promotion, for example.

ii. Democracy promotion

With no concrete definition of democracy, the definition of democracy promotion must also intentionally be left vague as to the exact instruments. For that reason, I will use the following definition:

Democracy promotion includes “all strategies and instruments which are intended to contribute to a democratization or democratic consolidation of a third country, regardless of whether the strategies or instruments are carried out by a single state, a supranational/international organization, or by private actors” (Jünemann 2007).

Not only does this definition allow for a comparison between a single state and an international organization (as the EU is in foreign policy matters), it also includes the aspect of intent. Intent allows a differentiated analysis of the two actors in the study, as it is entirely possible that each has a different understanding of democracy. If this is the case, then how they speak about democracy promotion and what actions they
take to promote it will be fundamentally different. Because the central questions of this study are how the approaches are different and to what extent rhetoric and policy diverge, whether the two actors operate with the same understanding of democracy is irrelevant. When considering the rhetoric and policy of each actor, I will therefore classify actions as falling into the category of democracy promotion if the actor explicitly deems them to be such. While researchers often differentiate between democracy assistance and democracy promotion (democracy assistance typically represented positive measures and democracy promotion allowing for economic sanctions and/or military measures), for this study I have chosen to encompass all measures, as stated in the definition, under the term “democracy promotion.”

iii. Rhetoric

The next two definitions to be set are rhetoric and policy. According to the American Heritage dictionary, rhetoric is verbal communication or discourse. In this study I will include the following in my rhetorical analysis:

\textit{any act of speech or written document intended to present a position to the public or wider policy community.}

Included in this will be speeches, the typical choice for rhetorical analyses, but also documents such as the U.S. National Strategy on Combating Terrorism (NSCT), the European Security Strategy (ESS), and government PR websites intended to inform the public. A complete list of documents and speeches analyzed can be found in Appendix A.

Because many academics, think-tank policy experts, parliamentarians, politicians, and others may make speeches referring to democracy promotion, I have decided for the sake of this brief study to limit both the time and scope of analysis. The timeframe I have selected for analysis are the years 2001-2008. I have selected this time span primarily because a new impetus for democracy promotion came with the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, DC on 11 September 2001. In addition, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP or the Barcelona Process) continued during this time and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was started. The main disadvantage to this time frame is that, in the United States, there was no change of administration. The analysis will therefore give a fairly precise picture of the divergence or convergence of rhetoric and policy under President George W.
Bush but not of “U.S. rhetoric and policy” as a whole, if the abstract is even able to be separated from individual administrations.

Besides limiting the timeframe, I have also limited what speeches and documents I will analyze. For speeches, I will analyze only those presented by the highest government representatives in the area of foreign policy. In the U.S. this will be the President, Secretary of State, and National Security Advisor. The EU is more complicated, as the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, can be seen as the key actor delivering the rhetoric of EU foreign policy, but the Council of the European Union is where the initiatives for foreign policy (second pillar) come from, and these initiatives are then typically turned into policy by the European Commission. While policy programs in the United States are usually introduced in speeches, in the EU they are typically announced in Commission papers or communications from the Council to the Commission or vice versa. For this reason, I have chosen to use the speeches of HR Javier Solana and the Commission papers and communications between the Council and the Commission to evaluate the rhetoric of the EU. I will not, however, examine second-hand analyses from think tanks or academics, as I do not consider these to be rhetoric emanating from the respective governments.

### iv. Policy

In the context of democracy promotion in this study, I will consider policy to be:

*substantive assistance to (not merely rhetorical support of) governments of or groups in third countries for the express purpose of promoting institutions, ideas, or programs considered to be essential elements of democracy.*

In determining what exactly is considered an “essential element of democracy,” the rhetoric and policy documents will be examined. If, for example, human rights are repeatedly emphasized in speeches as being an essential element of democratic reforms, then policies designed to strengthen human rights will be considered part of democracy promotion. Because bureaucratic processes to administer foreign assistance programs are typically required to provide public records of how budgets provided for such assistance is spent, I will rely partially on reports from institutions such as the State Department or the European Commission to determine how assistance has been directed. As the budget and performance reports are written by
the actors themselves, there is a danger that they will emphasize the points which converge with their rhetoric and leave out or downplay those aspects which diverge from the rhetoric. For this reason, I will also consider descriptions of relevant policies given by reliable sources (such as academics and think tank analysts).

While the United States is indisputably a single actor on the world stage, one could argue that the European Union is not (yet). The states of the European Union have made it their expressed goal to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), however, and made this goal legally binding in the Maastricht Treaty of 1993. Since then, they have developed common policies such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). As I will demonstrate, both the United States and the European Union have attempted to develop consistent, comprehensive, and effective policies for promoting democracy in the Middle East. The two actors can thus be treated as relatively equivalent units for examination in this study. But because there are differences in the decision-making processes, I will need to look at different individuals when examining rhetoric. The President of the Council of the European Union, for example, does not have as much say in foreign affairs as the President of the United States. In turn, the Council of the European Union – which initiates legislation on foreign policy issues – has no direct equivalent in the United States. I have justified my choices for rhetorical analysis in the section below on rhetoric.

A second methodological issue specific to EU foreign policy is that, unlike the United States, each member of the European Union also has a distinct and separate foreign policy towards third countries which may or may not include democracy promotion. The German political institutions (Stiftungen), for example, are very active in democracy promotion in many parts of the world, and programs such as the British government’s Arab reform strategy, Denmark’s Wider Middle East Initiative for democratic reform, Sweden’s governance allocations for the MENA program, Spain’s new strategy for democracy promotion projects, and France’s enhanced democracy promotion plan are also underway. It would be naïve to assume that the EU operates with no consideration of such programs already undertaken by its member states or that it purposefully duplicates these programs. I have decided to deal with this problem by drawing an – albeit somewhat arbitrary – line between the EU and member states. I will take individual member states’ programs into consideration if and only if the EU mentions them explicitly in its rhetoric or policy.
By leaving out these programs in most cases, however, I am essentially testing a “hard case” scenario. Were I to include each individual member states’ programs, then the chances that EU rhetoric and policy would draw even closer together than shown by the current analysis would be greater. In leaving them out, I am forcing the EU to stand alone with its programs, a condition that does not exist in the real world. To give a hypothetical example for clarification: It is possible that the Council President speaks of increasing emphasis on women’s civil society groups. Denmark and Germany might then redirect some of their funding to align with this new priority. As a result, when it comes to EU policy, the EU might decide not to increase funding for its own programs in these areas because Denmark and Germany have done so. In my study this would point to a divergence in EU rhetoric and policies (speaking of a focus on women’s groups but not increasing funding for the same) even though, in actuality, the policy of the EU simply took the individual member states into consideration. That is why my study will be a “hard test” for the EU.

v. Procedural Methods

For my basic procedure in analyzing rhetoric and policy, I have chosen to follow the methods described by Krumm et al (2009: 338ff, see Table 1). Although his original phases (shown in Table 1 below) allowed one step for creating a category system, he later adds that one often “starts with a relatively rough deductive system of categories that is refined by inductively creating new or specifying old categories” (Krumm et al 2009: 340, translation my own). I have already described the material selected, and my main unit of analysis will be sentences within the documents and speeches, although I may occasionally be required to classify a sentence into several categories. As clarification, I will search for keywords (see description of clusters below) but then look at the context of the word in the sentence, extracting the entire sentence for my analysis if the context is appropriate for my research.

Table 1: Phases of content analysis (Krumm et al 2009: 338, translation my own)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases of content analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Selection of material, setting of unit of analysis and coding units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Creation of a category system and category definitions, code training, pre-tests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Run through and coding of the material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Category-based evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Comprehensive context analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Reporting of results</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The category system I have chosen is based on several definitions of democracy, varying from minimal to very broad. The presumption is that each actor works with an implicit understanding – or definition – of democracy and bases its actions in democracy promotion on this understanding. In order to include as many possible understandings of democracy as possible, I have selected a wide variety of definitions, creating the following clusters with the operationalization listed below. To decide which keywords to search for in each of the clusters, I read several of the texts to see which words were typically used in the contexts (e.g. election or vote when free elections were discussed in the rhetoric).

For the policy criteria, I briefly reviewed the policies of the United States and Europe in order to develop informed questions for each cluster. When doing so, I attempted to create five general categories of questions for each cluster, although some clusters required more questions and not all four questions applied to all clusters. The first general question asks about the link between rhetoric and policy in terms of assistance. How much assistance was deemed necessary, and how much was actually given? The second general question asks about the budget. While it is not possible to isolate every cluster in the budget, the amount of money flowing into certain programs can be an indication of the priority level of the program. This aspect should be viewed with a bit of caution, however, as the amount of money does not necessarily indicate the import of the program. An excellent program might need very little monetary support from the government while a program requiring millions of dollars might only be a drop in the bucket in another area. But the budget can give a general idea as to what programs are deemed worthy of investment, and it is of particular interest to this study if the rhetoric promises an increase in funding in a certain area. If the increase occurs, then rhetoric and policy are consistent, if not, then it indicates a divergence. A planned place in the budget is also an indication that a particular element is a priority. If it is found that there are no programs or specific budgetary allowance for participation, for example, then it can be assumed that it is not a priority in the US or EU’s policy.

The third general question asks about the kinds of programs implemented in the cluster. It is possible that particular programs are promised in the rhetoric, and it is thus necessary to look at what kinds of programs are actually implemented to determine whether the rhetoric is consistent with policy. The fourth general question for nearly all clusters is whether there were consequences ("sticks" or at least a
reduction of the “carrots”) if the Middle Eastern country reneged on its promises in a certain cluster. If a country promised to improve the independence of the media, for example, and accepted funding for such from the US/EU but then proceeded to heavily censor the media or promote self-censorship by jailing those who publish articles voicing unfavorable opinions of the government, what did the EU/US do? The final question asked in each cluster was whether there were any policies that seemed to contradict the stated goals in the cluster. If the United States promised to fight corruption but then allowed USAID workers to bribe officials where necessary, for example, that would point to a great divergence between rhetoric and policy.

a. Free country-wide elections (Coppedge/Reinicke 1990: 63f; Freedom House)

Operationalization for rhetoric: Search for keywords “elect*” (for elect, election, elector, electing, and elected) and “vote”

Operationalization for policy:
1) Does the US/EU give election assistance to the extent promised in the rhetoric?
2) Is it possible to isolate election assistance in the respective budgets? If so, to what extent does the US/EU provide funding for election assistance?
3) What types of policy programs for election assistance have been implemented?
4) What have been the consequences for countries which held elections not up to international standards?
5) Were there any policies that seemed to contradict the stated goals?

b. Freedom to organized parties and associations (Coppedge / Reinicke 1990: 63f; Freedom House)

Operationalization for rhetoric: Search for keywords “party,” “parties,” “association,” “organization,” “NGO,” and “civil society.”

Operationalization for policy:
1) Does the US/EU give support to civil society to the extent promised in the rhetoric?
2) Is it possible to isolate civil society assistance in the budget? If so, to what extent does the US/EU provide funding for civil society?
3) What types of policy programs for civil society assistance have been implemented?
4) What have been the consequences for countries which have dealt with civil society in a heavy-handed manner after promising to give them more freedom?
5) Were there any policies that seemed to contradict the stated goals?

c. Access to sources of information other than those provided by the government (Coppedge/Reinicke 1990: 63f)

*Operationalization for rhetoric:* Search for keywords “media,” “press,” and “journalist.”

*Operationalization for policy:*
1) Does the US/EU give support to independent media outlets and/or journalists to the extent promised in the rhetoric?
2) Is it possible to isolate assistance to independent media in the budget? If so, to what extent does the US/EU provide funding for these outlets/journalists?
3) What types of policy programs for free media assistance have been implemented?
4) What have been the consequences for countries which have repressed the media or journalists after promising to give them more freedom?
5) Were there any policies that seemed to contradict the stated goals?

d. Institutional checks on the executive (Jaggers/Gurr 1995 (Polity)). (i.e. strong judicial and/or legislative powers)

*Operationalization for rhetoric:* Search for keywords “court,” “judge,” “judici*” (for judicial and judiciary), “parliament,” “institution,” and “rule of law.”

*Operationalization for policy:*
1) Does the US/EU give support to other branches of government to the extent promised in the rhetoric?
2) Is it possible to isolate assistance for an independent judiciary or more powerful parliament in the budget? If so, to what extent does the US/EU provide funding for these governmental branches?
3) What types of policy programs for strengthening an independent judiciary and/or legislature have been implemented?
4) What have been the consequences for countries in which the executive has taken powers away from the other branches in the course of reforms even while promising to give them more power?
5) Were there any policies that seemed to contradict the stated goals?

e. Participation (Vanhanen 2003: 49)

*Operationalization for rhetoric:* Search for keyword “participation.”
Operationalization for policy:

1) Does the US/EU give support to programs encouraging participation to the extent promised in the rhetoric?
2) Is it possible to isolate assistance for participation in the budget? If so, to what extent does the US/EU provide funding for these programs?
3) What types of policy programs for encouraging political participation have been implemented?
4) What have been the consequences for countries which have restricted participation even more?
5) Were there any policies that seemed to contradict the stated goals?

f. Human rights (Guaranteed civil liberties for all citizens) (Coppedge/Reinicke 1990:63f; Jaggers/Gurr 1995 (Polity))

Operationalization for rhetoric: Search for keywords “human rights.”

Operationalization for policy:

1) Does the US/EU support human rights to the extent promised in the rhetoric?
2) Is it possible to isolate assistance for human rights in the budget? If so, to what extent does the US/EU provide funding for these programs?
3) What types of policy programs for improving human rights have been implemented?
4) What have been the consequences for countries which have committed serious human rights violations?
5) Were there any policies that seemed to contradict the stated goals?

g. Government free of wide-spread corruption (Freedom House)

Operationalization for rhetoric: Search for keywords “corrupt*” (for corrupt and corruption) and “transparency.”

Operationalization for policy:

1) Does the US/EU support transparency to the extent promised in the rhetoric?
2) Is it possible to isolate assistance to anti-corruption programs in the budget? If so, to what extent does the US/EU provide funding for these programs?
3) What types of policy programs for fighting corruption have been implemented?
4) Were there any policies that seemed to contradict the stated goals?
To collect the data for analyzing the rhetoric of the actors in the United States, I first accessed the White House archives from the Bush presidency between 2001 and 2008. All of his speeches, press conferences, and Congressional addresses can be found in these archives as transcripts. Because a direct search of the speeches is not possible, I was forced to manually select which texts I would use. I did this by first scanning the titles of all the material. If a title seemed appropriate or even too vague to know whether the subject matter might be appropriate for the study (e.g., “President Launches “Lessons of Liberty”” on 30 Oct 2001), I opened the speech and quickly scanned it to ensure the material was actually relevant. If it was, I then copied the text into a Microsoft Word document. Using the Microsoft Word “find” tool, I then searched the Word documents for the keywords listed under the operationalization of the clusters for rhetoric above. For each hit, I read the context to ensure relevance and copied and pasted the keyword and context into separate Word documents set up for each cluster. (See Diagram 1)

Diagram 1: Process of rhetorical analysis

To assess the divergence between rhetoric and policy in each area, I created four categories to allow for a more systematic classification. In absolute divergence,
it is assumed that the aspects emphasized in rhetoric have nothing to do with the policies implemented. In *great divergence*, the aspects emphasized in rhetoric are typically turned into policy programs, but these have little to no financial or political support. Political leaders rarely bring them up in bi- or multilateral discussions. Another event falling into the great divergence category would be that a partner in the Middle East backs out of, ignores, or clearly acts against an agreed upon policy (for example arresting opposition leaders after promising to hold free and fair elections and accepting funds for training election monitors) but the reaction is limited. In the category *little divergence*, the aspects emphasized in rhetoric are typically turned into policy programs. These receive adequate funding, and political leaders continually bring them up in bi- or multilateral discussions. If a partner state goes against standing polices, there is a moderate to harsh reaction. Finally, in the category *no divergence*, rhetoric is transferred literally into policy. These policies then receive strong political support from both sides and are financially supported and actively pursued. Both the *absolute divergence* and *no divergence* categories are to be thought of as ideal categories, as it is highly unlikely that politicians will make absolutely no effort to turn rhetoric into policy, just as it is nearly impossible for them to turn their rhetoric directly into policy without taking political, economic, and other mitigating factors into consideration.

When determining which clusters fall into which categories, the five general questions posed above will be the guidelines. The table below (Table 2) gives an idea of how the answers to the questions will determine which category the cluster falls into; if at least two questions fall into little divergence (and the rest in no divergence), I will rate the cluster as having little divergence. If at least two questions fall into great divergence (with the rest in little), then the cluster will fall into the category of great divergence. As it is impossible to go through all of the possible answer combinations here, I will address them as they come up in the empirical sections.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Degree of Divergence</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>Great</th>
<th>Absolute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assistance given to the extent promised in rhetoric?</td>
<td>Assistance given just as promised in rhetoric</td>
<td>Some assistance given, but not as much as promised</td>
<td>Little assistance given in cluster area</td>
<td>No assistance given in cluster area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much money was budgeted?</td>
<td>Observers agree that budget is adequate</td>
<td>Budget is less than promised, but close</td>
<td>Great difference between promised and budgeted amounts</td>
<td>No money given for cluster area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What types of programs were implemented?</td>
<td>Types of programs discussed in rhetoric were implemented exactly</td>
<td>Most programs discussed were implemented</td>
<td>A few programs discussed were implemented</td>
<td>No programs discussed were implemented</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What kinds of consequences were there for deviant behavior?</td>
<td>Serious consequences (e.g. sanctions, souring of relations)</td>
<td>Moderate consequences (e.g. reduction of aid)</td>
<td>Little consequences (e.g. critique but nothing tangible)</td>
<td>No consequences (relations continue as before, matter is not discussed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were there contradictory policies?</td>
<td>No contradictory policies</td>
<td>Minor contradictions in policies</td>
<td>Serious contradictions in policies</td>
<td>Policies that directly work against the stated goals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I will test for these categories by first evaluating the rhetoric to develop a theoretical policy program one would expect if there were no divergence. In other words, if the rhetoric were translated directly into policy, what should one expect? On this basis, I will examine actual policy in order to estimate the extent to which it differs from the ideal “no divergence” policy. This will be done using the table above (Table 2) for guidance. With the clusters of elements of democracy listed above, I will now proceed to analyze the rhetoric and policy of the United States and the European Union. Following each section will be a classification of that element according to the divergence scale.
III. United States of America

During the time span of 2001-2008, the United States government clearly viewed democracy as a system of government that must be spread because, as stated by then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “the ideal of democracy is universal” (Rice 2005a).² The Bush administration mentioned the promotion of democracy itself or its elements in over 100 speeches, press conferences, fact sheets, and radio addresses during this timeframe, and these are what I will examine in the rhetorical analyses in the following section. In addition to rhetoric, the Bush administration initiated the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Freedom Agenda (later renamed the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative) to the G-8, and included “governing justly and democratically” as one of its strategic goals in foreign policy, listed second only to “peace and security.” These, then, will be the firsthand sources I will evaluate in addition to secondhand analyses of academics and other policy experts.

A particularity in analyzing the rhetoric of the United States is that “freedom” and “liberty” are often used as synonyms for democracy. This can be seen, for example, in the way President Bush offers proof that people want “liberty.” When asked whether they do, he answers “absolutely – look at the 12 million people who voted in Iraq. Or look at the people who went to the polls in Lebanon” (Bush and Rice 2006a). In 2007, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley described promoting freedom as “supporting the rights of all people to choose their leaders and enjoy basic civil liberties” (Hadley 2007); in other words, promoting freedom means promoting elections and human rights. This is also indicated in his 2006 proclamation on Human Rights Week in which he writes:

“Just over six decades ago, the future of freedom seemed bleak, with only a small number of democracies around the world. Today, citizens of over 100 nations enjoy the blessings of democracy, and freedom is taking root in places where liberty had been unimaginable. The United States will continue

² One potential problem for analyzing the rhetoric of the US president and secretaries of state starting in 2001 is that each US administration edits the official government websites to correspond with current policy goals. Both the White House and State Department websites as they were on the day President George W. Bush left office have been preserved online as historical material, however, making it possible to access this information and view the speeches and descriptions of programs that are to be included in the rhetorical analysis in this study.
to support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every
nation” (Bush 2006a)

This makes it clear that freedom, liberty, and democracy are used
interchangeably in the rhetoric of the United States. Therefore, in the following
analysis of the US, I will consider them to be equal.

a. Free country-wide elections (Coppedge/Reinicke 1990: 63f; Freedom
   House)

It is without doubt that the United States believes elections to be an essential
element of democracy. This is indicated by statements that elections are a first step to
democracy (Rice 2002a; Bush 2004c; Bush 2005e; White House 2005b), that
Bahrain’s first parliamentary elections in nearly 30 years were a sign of it “making the
transition to democracy” (Bush 2002s), or, as stated above, that “promoting freedom
means supporting the rights of all people to choose their leaders” (Hadley 2007). It is
not the only element of democracy, however, and the Bush administration often
referred to it as a first step, saying that “just holding an election is not democracy”
(Rice 2002a), or that “elections are not sufficient, in and of themselves, to transition a
nation to a free and democratic political system” (Hadley 2007).

The Bush administration uses its rhetoric of elections in the context of
democracy promotion in essentially three ways. The first is to emphasize progress
made in countries in which the US has intervened directly, in particular Iraq and
Afghanistan but also the Palestinian territories. The second rhetorical use of elections
is to make a distinction between “good,” i.e. elected, leaders and “bad,” i.e. not
elected, leaders. This is closely related to the third use, which is to commend or
discredit countries based on whether they hold elections and, if so, whether they are
free and fair.

An example of the first use was President Bush’s statement that the national
elections in Afghanistan planned for 2004 would enable Afghanistan to face its
economic and security challenges “as a free and stable democracy” (Bush 2003i). Once the elections occurred, they were deemed to be “a standing rebuke to cynicism
and extremism, and a testimony to the power of liberty and hope” (Bush 2004c). In
the case of Iraq, as well, the number of Iraqis who cast votes was held up as an
indication of the outstanding work the United States and its allies had done to bring
democracy to the region (White House 2005b; Bush 2005f; Bush and Rice 2006a; Bush 2006e).

The designation of a group or person as an “elected” government, body, or leader is, in the rhetoric of the Bush administration, always a positively connoted title and is typically used when distinguishing between “good” and “bad” (from the perspective of the United States) leaders or groups. When referring to the situation in Lebanon, for example, Hezbollah was often deemed to be a terrorist, rogue, or extremist organization trying to hinder or usurp the “elected leaders” (Bush 2006e), and the same was true for al-Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan (Bush 2006g; Bush 2008e; Bush 2008h).

When the first parliamentary elections in almost 30 years were held in Bahrain, they were welcomed by a presidential statement calling Bahrain “an important example of a nation making the transition to democracy” (Bush 2002s). Morocco, Jordan, Oman, and Kuwait were also praised for either holding elections or expanding the right to vote to include more citizens (Bush 2003d; Bush 2003i). In Syria, however, the elections were used to discredit the government by deeming them to have been “a meaningless exercise” (Bush 2007c). While Condoleezza Rice called the Iranian government “elected” in 2003 when the reform-minded Khatami was president, in the context she is criticizing it for not living up to the promises it made to the people during the election campaign and instead “allowing an un-elected few [presumably the Supreme Leader and Council of Guardians, KN] to continue to frustrate the aspirations of the Iranian people” (Rice 2003c). After the election of the much more conservative and polemic Ahmadinejad, the elections in Iran were essentially called a farce with fixed outcomes and thus the government no longer deserved the designation “elected” (Hadley 2007, also cf. Rice 2005a).

If the policies of the United States were to fall into the category of “no divergence,” one would expect that promotion of free and fair elections would take place as one part of democracy promotion. As they are often said to be the “first step,” free and fair elections should be at the top of the agenda and receive the most political and financial support (working under the assumption that, after the first step is completed, attention and money can be focused on the second step). Because elected leaders are considered to be “good,” relations with elected leaders should be expected to be better than those with unelected leaders, and elected governments should get more support (financial, technical, and/or military) than those which are unelected.
When looking at actual policies, however, this is not entirely the case. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice held a controversial and somewhat confrontational speech at the American University of Cairo preceding the presidential elections in Egypt in 2005 in which she demanded that “Egypt’s elections, including the Parliamentary elections, must meet objective standards that define every free election” (Rice 2005a). To assist in the process, the United States funded election monitoring efforts (Freedom and Democracy Report 2008: Egypt). However, “the United States was slow to raise objections when […] Egyptian security forces beat demonstrators and barred voters from polls during elections later in 2005” (Youngs and Wittes 2009:7). The government officials did not speak out in criticism even though the extent of the abuses was known to the US government, as shown by the fact that the Human Rights and Democracy report released by the State Department for 2005-2006 described the situation in the following way:

“The referendum on the constitutional amendment to allow for multi-party presidential elections was tainted by low turnout and violence by government supporters. Critics of the amendment cited the inclusion of barriers to meaningful participation by opposition parties and independents, including continued restrictions on the licensing and operation of Islamist parties. Parliamentary elections in November and December were marred by low turnout, vote buying, rigging, and violence by the ruling National Democratic Party, which maintained its dominance in national politics with an overriding majority in the People's Assembly and the partially elected Shura (Consultative) Council” (Human Rights and Democracy report 2005: Egypt)

This hardly reflects the demands placed on the government of Egypt by the United States, and yet the actions were not harshly criticized. Not only was there no criticism, but the Bush administration refused to implement the conditionality on aid to Egypt that Congress had required (Youngs and Wittes 2009: 9).

In preparation for the 2007 elections for the upper house of parliament and the referendum on the national constitution and the 2008 local elections, the United States funded programs supporting international and local NGOs to improve the electoral process. Both the elections and the referendum in 2007 were “widely recognized and reported as flawed, in large measure because of the credible election monitoring analyses and reporting by local civil society actors, who, with U.S. assistance, continue to advocate for improvement of electoral processes in anticipation of parliamentary and presidential elections in 2010 and 2011” (Freedom and Democracy Report 2008: Egypt).
The United States also worked in other Middle Eastern countries to support elections. In Lebanon, the United States worked in coordination with the EU to ensure that the elections were observed, and afterwards – when the Western parties were not entirely happy with the gains accrued by the pro-Syrian factions, both the United States and France increased aid for democratic reforms (Youngs and Wittes 2009: 13). The United States increased its aid to Morocco by 50 percent between 2005 and 2008, including programs for electoral assistance, and in 2007 there were relatively free and fair parliamentary elections (Youngs and Wittes 2009: 9). Electoral assistance was also given to Jordan before the parliamentary elections in 2007, including training for election monitoring and support for female candidates – 55 of whom won municipal seats (Advancing Freedom and Democracy Report 2008: Jordan). In Qatar, the US provided technical assistance to the Permanent Election Committee and funded exchange programs for election officials to learn about the US electoral system (Advancing Freedom and Democracy Report 2008: Qatar). In the years 2002-2003, for example, the “synergies for electoral development” program, provided with $625,000 to “support and consolidate political reforms in the Gulf through a regional strategy of technical assistance to nascent election administration institutions,” existed to support elections (State Department 2003a). In Syria, no assistance was given, and “following the April 2007 parliamentary elections and May 2007 presidential election, both of which were considered by international and local human rights advocates to be neither free nor fair, the United States issued public statements that drew international attention to the highly flawed electoral process” (Advancing Freedom and Democracy report 2008: Syria). The United States began implementing an extensive reform of the electoral system in Yemen which was to be in place by the 2009 parliamentary elections (ibid: Yemen). To summarize, although the United States had placed explicit conditions on the elections in Egypt, when the Egyptian government did not live up to these expectations, the United States expressed only mild criticism. Even though the elections in Yemen were no freer than those in Syria, the elections in Yemen were hailed as a good first step on the way to democratic reforms while those in Syria were deemed to be a farce and condemned.

In the State Department 2008 Fiscal Year Performance Report, one finds that the programs under the strategic goal of “governing justly and democratically” are rated with only a 66% success rate – one of the lowest program ratings given in that year. In the fiscal year 2008, the strategic goal was given only approximately 6% of
available funding; the only goals receiving less were providing humanitarian assistance (5%) and promoting international understanding (3%). The strategic goal is divided into four primary sub-categories: rule of law and human rights, good governance, political competition and consensus-building, and civil society. Elections fall into the third category, which with its 0.97% of the budget received the least amount of funding of all programs in the strategic goal. Thus, despite the fact that US rhetoric emphasized elections as the first step to democracy, the funding of electoral reforms or election assistance did not reflect this priority. With only around 6% of the funding, it could hardly be seen as an area of top priority.

Due to claims from reputable newspapers that it had used government funding to support Fatah over Hamas in the Palestinian elections in 2006, the United States can hardly be said to have been a neutral player supporting democracy (Sharp 2006b: 3). Almost immediately after the elections the US Congress started legislation requiring aid to the Palestinians to halt until it was clear that the Palestinian Authority (PA) had cut all connections with anyone tied to terrorism. Instead of praising the elections, as was done in Bahrain, Egypt, Algeria, and other countries where the elections were rated as far less fair and free, the United States spearheaded an international campaign to isolate Hamas in the hopes of getting it to submit to the conditions placed on cooperation with the EU and US.

To answer the five general questions, the assistance promised in rhetoric was given to some extent (little divergence); the money budgeted was much less than would be expected for such a high-priority area (great divergence); the programs implemented were the kinds indicated in the rhetoric (no divergence); there were few to no consequences for deviant behavior in “friendly” countries (great divergence); and the policies toward Hamas following the free and fair elections there seriously contradicted the stated goals of the United States to promote democratic elections throughout the region (great divergence). With three questions being shown to be greatly divergent, the United States rhetoric and policy in the area of elections can be said to be greatly divergent.

b. Freedom to organize parties and associations (Coppedge / Reinicke 1990: 63f; Freedom House) / civil society

In its rhetoric, the United States stresses the importance of civil society both in the form of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or in political parties. As then
National Security Advisor Rice stated, one of the reasons the United States has a strong democracy is that there is “a strong civil society that supports democratic institutions. […] That kind of institution very often does not exist in new, fledgling democracies. And so what we talk about when we talk to people about building democracy, is that you have to have institutions that protect basic freedoms and basic dignities. But you also have to have a support structure for democracy of the kind that civil society provides” (Rice 2003c). In press conferences with President Bush, both President Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan stressed their commitment to building up civil society in their respective countries (Bush 2004a; Bush 2004b).

To support organizations or individuals attempting to promote democracy in their countries, the Freedom Defenders Award was created in 2007. This award was intended to recognize “a foreign activist or NGO that has demonstrated outstanding commitment to advancing liberty and courage in the face of adversity” (White House 2007a). The United States recognizes in its rhetoric that democracy cannot be imposed from outside. In the words of President Bush (2008f), “aiding the rise of strong and stable democracies requires the efforts of much more than Washington, D.C. It requires the efforts of other governments, and non-organizational [sic] – non-governamental organizations, and people around the world.” At the same time, it is emphasized that civil society in the Middle East needs help from outside (Bush 2002b; Bush 2004a; White House 2007a; Bush 2008f).

The policy expected to come out of this rhetoric would be such that funds should be provided to organizations that promote civil society in Middle Eastern countries. In addition, the U.S. government would be expected to push for more rights and freedoms for non-governmental organizations to meet, organize, and acquire funding both domestically and internationally.

Until 2005, the State Department gave more detailed records of money spent on democracy and human rights projects in the Middle East. Between 2002 and 2003, over $1 million was spent on training Middle East democracy activists and educating trade union leaders (State Department 2003a). In 2003-2004, over $1.5 million was given for strengthening women’s advocacy groups in Jordan, strengthening Algerian NGOs in order to monitor the human rights situation, and promoting women’s rights in the Maghreb (State Department 2004b). 2004-2005 brought the first budget decrease in this area during the Bush administration, with funding of trade union journalists in the Middle East and programs to assist networks for democratic
reformers in the region totaling slightly less than $1 million (State Department 2005c).

Beginning in fiscal year 2007, the United States State Department separated its performance reports into strategic priorities and, within the strategic priorities, certain categories were selected. In the strategic priority “governing justly and democratically,” civil society was listed as a distinct category, although this was not divided up by region. It can therefore be said that the United States spent a total of $540,775 on “civil society” from the total $24,678,051 spent on foreign assistance (2.2%) in FY 2007. In fiscal year 2008, the estimate was $436,085 out of $22,067,296 (1.9%) (State Department 2007b: 110). Not only does this indicate a low priority for civil society projects, the decrease in funding is not the direction expected for support of a supposedly core institution of democracy. Because the budget includes democracy programs throughout the world and not just in the Middle East, one must assume that the projects in the Middle East received only a portion of the budgeted funds.

Aside from the budget, there is also evidence that the United States diverges from its rhetoric when it comes to supporting civil society. As pointed out by Youngs and Wittes (2009:8), “In Egypt, the European Union and the United States have funded projects to support the internal management and capacity of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), without making an issue of laws restricting civil society’s freedom to operate or even to accept foreign funds.” In another example, even after Algeria banned the NGO Freedom House from operating in its borders after the presidential elections in 2004, the US government offered an explicit endorsement of Bouteflika, who had been “reelected with an improbably high vote of over 80 percent” (ibid).

Turning to the guideline questions, they can be answered in the following way: The United States did have many programs to develop civil society in the region (no divergence); despite promises for adequate funding, the budget actually slightly decreased (great divergence); the types of programs implemented largely followed the rhetoric (no divergence); there were almost no consequences for deviant behavior, something particularly noticeable in Egypt, but also in Algeria (great divergence); and, finally, the only policy which seemed to contradict the stated goal was that of supporting Egypt despite the government’s harsh treatment of civil society (little divergence). The categorization of this cluster is therefore slightly complicated, as
two questions can be answered with “no divergence,” two with “great divergence,” and only one with “little divergence.” While this is a borderline case, I would argue that the two questions answered with “no divergence” are significant enough so as to temper the questions answered with “great divergence,” especially as one of the great divergence questions was that of the budget. While the budget was decreased, that does not necessarily mean that the funding was inadequate, as noted in the section on methods. Because of this, I will rate this category as having little divergence.

c. Access to sources of information other than those provided by the government (Coppedge/Reinicke 1990: 63f)

The United States has called an independent media “one of the most fundamental bases of democracy” (Rice 2001a), one of the “important support elements of democracy” (Rice 2003c), one of the civic institutions of successful societies (Bush 2003i), and one of “democracy’s parallel institutions” (Hadley 2007). While it is made clear that an independent media and freedom of the press are essential elements of democracy, how exactly this should be promoted in other countries is not specifically mentioned in the rhetoric, making it difficult to project expected policies for comparison with actual policies.

What can be said is that, in 2007, President Bush asked Secretary Rice “to direct every U.S. Ambassador in an un-free Nation to seek out and meet with activists for democracy and human rights” (White House 2008c). The media is included in this, as can be seen by the fact that it is then noted that the President had met personally with dissidents including independent journalists. In 2008, the White House released a fact sheet “Promoting Human Rights Worldwide” (White House 2008e) in which the efforts of the government to promote freedom of the press were publicized. These included helping “users of new media to overcome censorship, report abuses, and advocate for freedom,” working “with a network of non-governmental organizations to develop anti-web-censorship software and technical tools,” and increasing the budget for these projects from $441 million in FY 2001 to over $670 million in FY 2008. Specific projects included training Middle Eastern journalists to use fact-based reporting (State Department 2003a; State Department 2004b), providing funds for documenting human rights in Iran (State Department 2005c), improving networking and freedom of the press by bringing together trade union officials from several Middle Eastern countries (State Department 2005c), and
creating a small-grants fund for independent media outlets in the region (ibid). One dark spot on the US record, though, was the censorship of some newspapers and television channels – including Al-Jazeera – in Iraq during the interim period (NY Times 2009). Clampdowns on media before the 2005 Egyptian elections and 2007 elections in Morocco did not bring about criticism by the United States (Youngs and Wittes 2009: 9), however.

The assistance promised in this area was given (no divergence); the budget was increased (no divergence); the programs implemented were those promised by rhetoric (no divergence); in a few cases, however, there were no consequences for deviant behavior (little divergence); finally, the policies of the US in Iraq of closing newspapers and television stations directly contradicts its calls for an independent media, but otherwise its policy was consistent (little divergence). In the cluster of an independent media, therefore, the rhetoric and policy can be deemed to have little divergence.

d. Institutional checks on the executive (Jaggers/Gurr 1995. (i.e. strong judicial and/or legislative powers)

Institutional checks on the executive are considered to be an essential part of democracy according to the United States. This can be seen in the myriad mentionings of the importance of strengthening independent and accountable democratic institutions, including parliaments and the rule of law. A “balance of power” was emphasized as one of the key new elements of a future Palestinian state (Bush 2002l), and a “separation of powers” is identified as one of the elements of American democracy that protects our basic freedoms (Rice 2003c). An independent judiciary is considered to be one of democracy’s parallel institutions (Hadley 2007) that should also be promoted in fledgling democracies. While the term “rule of law” is not specifically defined in the rhetoric, from the usage it seems to be equivalent to equality before the law and an independent judiciary. It is deemed to be an essential element that is a criterion for funding from the Millennium Challenge Account (Bush 2002c), a part of successful societies (Bush 2003i), one of the only ways to obtain freedom and peace (Bush 2004c), and one of the successful elements growing in Afghanistan (Bush 2006m). Independent institutions such as the legislative and judicial branches checking the power of the executive are not to be the first steps,
however. Instead, it is said that elections are the first step that “accelerate the establishment of other democratic institutions” (Hadley 2007).

Based on this rhetoric, one can expect the United States to place a particular emphasis on judicial reform, although reforms strengthening parliamentary power should also play a role. Ensuring equality before law (even or especially for members of the executive) and judicial independence should be given a high priority, although perhaps not as high as some of the other democratic elements already discussed such as elections.

Between 2002 and 2005, several programs designed to strengthen the judiciary in the Middle East were financed by the State Department. The first was a follow-up project on judicial reform in Morocco meant to amend the Penal Procedure Code (State Department 2003a); in 2003-2004, local and international NGOs in Egypt were given funds to make them more effective at promoting the rule of law by training them in substantive and procedural human rights law (State Department 2004b); a third project was conducted between 2004-2005 to open a law clinic in Morocco focusing on human rights and public interest law (State Department 2005c); and a final project funded by the US government in this time frame trained Moroccan judges to implement the new Family Code giving women more rights (State Department 2005c). The NED also provided a grant to the Musawa Palestinian Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and Legal Profession in 2006 in order to improve lawyers’ ability to defend the rule of law by providing professional training (NED 2008).

In FY 2007, when the State Department detailed its budget to include a category called “rule of law and human rights,” the agency spent $531,976 on this category out of a total of $24,678,051 ($2,141,343 for governing justly and democratically). In FY 2008 the estimate was $396,138 out of $22,067,296 ($1,376,768 for governing justly and democratically). (Department of State 2007b) This means that the amount spent on rule of law and human rights made up approximately ¼ of the total for promoting democracy around the world. While it would have been more useful for this study if rule of law had been listed separately from human rights, even a combined total is still an indicator that these issues are considered to be of import to the U.S. government.

The assistance promised in the rhetoric for this cluster was given to a great extent, although many of the rule of law projects did not explicitly work on building
an independent judiciary or parliament (little divergence); the budget is difficult to judge because it is combined with human rights, so no direct answer to this question will be given; the programs implemented were lacking in that there were few designed to build up an independent legislative branch with more powers (little divergence); although few leaders gave up competencies to parliaments or courts, there were no consequences for inaction, but inaction cannot necessarily be judged as deviant behavior – for this reason, no direct answer can be given to this question, either; finally, there were no policies that directly contradicted the stated policy goals (no divergence). For these reasons, it can be concluded that there is little divergence in US rhetoric and policy concerning institutional checks on the executive.

e. Participation (Vanhanen 2003: 49)

The United States stresses democratic participation for all people in the Middle East with a particular emphasis on women. It describes how human rights are protected by the “participation of the governed” (Bush 2005a) and how those allowed to participate in the political system marginalize extremists to end radicalism (Bush 2005b). One of the charges brought against Syria was that it denied the “Lebanese people their right to participate in the democratic process” (Bush 2006q) and that “an integral part of [the freedom] agenda is making sure that all participants in society have got an equal voice” (Bush 2008b). The emphasis on women could be heard in Bush’s statement on the elections in Bahrain in 2002 in which women were allowed to participate (Bush 2002s) and in his praise of the Moroccan president’s efforts to encourage the parliament to extend rights to women because “the future of Muslim nations will be better for all with the full participation of women” (Bush 2003i). From this rhetoric, one could expect policies to follow which support states trying to extend participation to all citizens, particularly women. Participation does not receive as much rhetorical attention as topics such as elections, human rights, or checks on the executive, however, and might therefore be expected to receive less funding than these aspects of democracy promotion.

In fact, the State Department had two programs running between 2004 and 2005 which directly encouraged political participation. One took place in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Yemen and worked on promoting political and electoral participation and visibility of citizens with disabilities, and the other focused on the political participation of women in Egypt (State Department 2005c). NED programs
also trained citizens throughout the Middle East on how to participate in the political system. During press conferences the issue was sometimes mentioned, but when aberrations occurred or when no progress was made on the issue, there was no indication that the United States pressed the matter.

The assistance promised was given, although not in all countries of the region (little divergence); the budget in this area is not clear and can therefore not be given a direct answer; the types of programs were consistent with rhetoric (no divergence); there were few consequences for deviant behavior (little divergence); finally, there were no policies that contradicted the stated goals of greater political participation (no divergence). It can therefore be concluded that the United States government shows *little divergence* on the aspect of participation.

*f. Human rights (Guaranteed civil liberties for all citizens)*

*(Coppedge/Reinicke 1990:63f; Jaggers/Gurr 1995 (Polity))*

The protection and promotion of human rights is highlighted as one of the key goals of the Bush administration. The link between human rights and democracy was established in several speeches given by members of the administration. Then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice characterized a “paradigm of progress” as being made up of “democracy and freedom and human rights” (Rice 2002a); President Bush said “there can be no human rights without human liberty” (Bush 2005a); President Bush and Secretary Rice listed the three basic conditions for a vibrant society as “human rights, human decency, [and] the power of the people to determine the fate of their governments” (Bush/Rice 2006a); In a fact sheet discussing how democracy and freedom are to be promoted throughout the world, it is stated that democracy “is the only way to achieve human rights” (White House 2007a); again in 2008 the fact sheet described promoting freedom (i.e. democracy) as “the only way to achieve and permanently protect human rights” (White House 2008c); and finally, President Bush described the role of free nations to be “to put pressure on the arms of the world’s tyrants and strengthen the prisoners who are striving for their liberty,” which includes speaking “out against human rights abuses by tyrannical regimes like those in Iran, Sudan, and Syria…” and speaking “candidly about human rights with nations with whom we’ve got good relations, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia…” (Bush 2008h).
While the relationship between human rights and democracy is not precisely defined by the rhetoric, it is clear that the two are closely intertwined. Human rights cannot exist in the absence of democracy according to President Bush even if he does not say whether a democracy can exist without human rights. In terms of policy promises made in rhetoric, the United States and European Union pledged to “[increase] practical and financial support to enhancing human rights…” in the BMENA declaration of 2004 (White House 2004a). President Bush also promised to “encourage reform in other governments by making clear that success in our relations will require the decent treatment of their own people” (Bush 2005a). Condoleezza Rice also clearly stated that the policy of the Bush administration was going to be different than that of previous regimes in the area of human rights. She said that promoting human rights will be difficult because “it flies in the face of previous policy, which basically says stability is more important than form of government” (Bush/Rice 2006a).

From this rhetoric, one could expect the United States to consistently pressure regimes in the region to halt abuses of human rights and initiate and/or implement laws protecting the rights of all citizens. In addition, conditionality of aid and other privileges brought with good relations should be tied to the human rights record of the governments. When blatant violations of rights occur, the “candid” discussions lauded by President Bush should become audible to the public in the form of threatened sanctions or the soliciting of international pressure for the abuses to end.

If the amount of aid given to each country is compared with Freedom House’s assessments of each country as free, partly free, or not free (see Table 3), however, we find that, of the top five recipients of foreign aid which are also ranked by Freedom House (Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, Iraq, and Morocco), three of the five – Egypt, Pakistan, and Iraq – were continuously ranked as not free between 2000 and 2008 (see Table 4). The other two, Jordan and Morocco, are both ranked as partly free. The only country whose rank improved during this time – Pakistan’s rating went from not free to partly free in 2009 – was threatened with aid cuts by the United States (Reuters 2008).
Table 3: Freedom House rankings 2000-2009 (Freedom House 2009)

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Table 4: United States Foreign Aid Summary for MENA region (Federation of American Scientists 2003, 2006) in millions of dollars

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2001</th>
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<th>2004</th>
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<td>2,700</td>
<td>2,624</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>.5</td>
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<td>.05</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.02</td>
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The Bush administration did indeed put pressure on the Egyptian government in 2002 to release a democracy activist and dual US-Egyptian citizen, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, by threatening to withhold an aid request to Congress, and Secretary Rice cancelled a visit to Egypt in 2005 when a prominent opposition politician, Ayman Nour was arrested. When Nour was rearrested and convicted in a “sham trial,” however, and “when Egyptian security forces beat demonstrators and barred votes from polls during elections later in 2005,” the United States government said little (Youngs and Wittes 2009:7). Even though Secretary Rice’s statement cited above that the US would no longer pursue stability at the cost of supporting non-democratic regimes that commit human rights violations was given in Cairo, it was Rice herself who “quietly waived congressionally-imposed human rights restrictions placed on American military aid to Egypt” (ibid).

Although the United States began to criticize the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia after September 11th and a bilateral dialogue was set up in which a working group was set up to deal with human rights concerns, the pressure diminished after the terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia in 2004. Even though human rights abuses and serious restrictions of women’s and opposition rights existed, the US signed significant arms deals with Saudi Arabia (ibid: 8).

Two final issues to be raised in this section on human rights are the incident at the prison in Abu Ghraib and the policy of renditions by the US government of terror suspects held in US custody to countries in which it is highly likely that they will be tortured.3 While the US government tried to pass off Abu Ghraib as an isolated incident, its credibility was undermined simply because of the fact that it had used Saddam Hussein’s past human rights violations as one of the rationales for invading Iraq. The discovery of the abuses in the prison demonstrated a gap between rhetoric and policy and dealt a blow to the already-suffering credibility of the United States. On the subject of renditions, despite the fact that the United States Congress codified Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) into law, and despite the fact that this prohibits the United States from rendering suspects to countries in which they will likely face torture, there are indications that between 100 to 150 suspects have been rendered to foreign countries – many to Egypt – since 11 Sept 2001 (Human Rights Watch 2005).

3 I have purposely chosen not to discuss Guantanamo Bay here, as I do not consider the treatment of prisoners in US custody to be a policy toward the MENA region.
It is known to the United States government that security prisoners in particular are regularly tortured by the Egyptian security forces, as noted in the State Department’s Human Rights report (State Department 2005b). The interest of the United States in these renditions was not simply to know that terrorists were behind bars. According to Human Rights Watch, “U.S. officials appear for the most part to have relied on their Egyptian counterparts to conduct interrogations and report any new information to them. ‘If we are getting everything we need from the host government, then there's no need for us to [conduct interrogations],'” [a] former U.S. government official [whose name was withheld on request] told Human Rights Watch. ‘There are some situations in which the host government can be more effective at getting information’” (Human Rights Watch 2005). In other words, the United States rendered the suspects to Egypt with full knowledge of the likelihood of torture in order to profit from the information gathered through these interrogations.

When reviewing the policies of the United States in the area of human rights, one finds several inconsistencies. Going through the five guiding questions, the assistance promised in the rhetoric was generally given (little divergence); the budget is difficult to extract from rule of law, but it is clear that aid was not linked to human rights records in any way (greatly divergent); the programs implemented were those indicated by the rhetoric (no divergence); when serious human rights violations occurred, there were usually either reprimands or threatened sanctions, although nothing was ever actually done (little divergence); the answer to the final question is that the policies of renditions and continued support of governments known to commit human rights abuses contradicted stated goals of human rights policy (great divergence). In light of the sometimes major inconsistencies with rhetoric, the human rights rhetoric and policies fall into the category of great divergence.

g. Government free of wide-spread corruption (Freedom House)

Fighting corruption and the need for transparency and accountability are most often mentioned in US rhetoric when the topic is a potential Palestinian state. Transparency is considered to be one of the principles “critical to freedom and prosperity” for the Palestinians (Bush 2002h, cf. also Bush 2002l; Rice 2003c; Bush 2004c; Hadley 2007). The Bush administration also promised conditionality on aid depending on whether corruption is fought, indicated by the program of the
Millennium Challenge Account which is to increase aid to nations that fight corruption (White House 2007b), by the assurance from President Bush that “we won’t be putting money into a society which is not transparent and corrupt” (Bush 2002l), and by his statement that “the challenge for future presidents and future Congresses will be to ensure that America’s generosity remains tied to the promotion of transparency and accountability and prosperity” (Bush 2008h). Translated into policy, this would mean that the US would be expected to make aid contingent on a country’s success in fighting corruption, and that efforts should be particularly focused on the Palestinian territories.

When comparing levels of corruption as measured by Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index with foreign aid levels per country given by the United States (see Tables 4 and 5), however, it becomes apparent that corruption is not the highest priority. The most prominent example is Egypt: It is ranked 13th in the region and 115th in the world for corruption, and yet, out of all countries in the world and also the region, it receives the second highest amount of foreign aid from the United States – second only to Israel. In fact, the only country in the top 5 of both lists is Jordan. It has the 5th lowest corruption ranking in the region (although it is 47th in the world) and receives the 4th highest amount of US foreign aid.

The United States does provide funds for projects aiming to fight corruption. This includes NED programs such as that run by the Center for International Private Enterprise in cooperation with Transparency International, which aims to develop strategies to implement the Business Principles for Countering Bribery in the Middle East and North Africa. Another example is Transparency Morocco’s efforts to raise anti-corruption awareness amongst local youth and fight corruption in Morocco’s educational system (NED 2008). These programs together total less than $200,000, however, indicating that fighting corruption is not a high priority in democracy promotion. In summary, therefore, one can say that the US policy in the area of corruption shows great divergence. Not only does most of the foreign aid to the region go to some of the most corrupt countries, but there are no anti-corruption programs specifically focused on the Palestinian territories even though the Palestinian Authority (before the 2006 elections) were constantly called on to fight corruption in order to further democratization. In Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen, the United States does pursue various programs to
fight corruption, however, and in Morocco and Tunisia fighting corruption is one of the top policy priorities (State Department 2008a).

Table 5: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for the MENA region (Transparency International 2008)

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<th>Regional Country Rank</th>
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<th>CPI Score 2008</th>
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<td>47</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>126</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Yemen</td>
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<tr>
<td>147</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>178</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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</table>

In summary, the questions can be answered in the following way: the assistance promised in the rhetoric was often missing, as there were few programs clearly designed for fighting corruption (great divergence); even though it was promised that aid money would be made contingent on tighter anti-corruption policies, this was not the case (great divergence); the rhetoric would have indicated a focus on the Palestinian territories for anti-corruption programs, but this was not the case (great divergence); the question of deviant behavior was left out of this cluster since it is difficult to make out exactly what deviant behavior would be in this context; for the final question, there were no policies that seemed to contradict the stated goals (no divergence). It can therefore be said that the United States shows a great divergence in its rhetoric and policy on the issue of corruption, as the great emphasis on fighting corruption in the Palestinian territories are not followed up by programs, and aid is in no way correlated to the level of perceived corruption in a country.
h. Results for United States

Although the United States government under President Bush stated in its rhetoric that “it is the responsibility of those who enjoy the blessings of liberty to help those who are struggling to establish free societies” (White House 2007a), the actual policies diverged from this principle. In four of the seven aspects of democracy promotion investigated, little divergence was found (see Table 6), while the other three aspects displayed a great divergence between rhetoric and policy. Striking is the fact that great divergence was found in the areas of elections and human rights, two of the aspects of democracy most emphasized by the United States in its rhetoric. The question then arises as to whether a large amount of rhetorical attention increases the likelihood of a great divergence between rhetoric and policy because it is more difficult for policy to be in line with rhetoric when expectations rise due to rhetorical emphasis of a subject matter. This possibility will be explored in the conclusions for the empirical sections of the paper. The results for the United States are thus clear, and I will now turn my attention to the European Union.

Table 6: Results for the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy area / cluster</th>
<th>Level of divergence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>Great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Little</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Media</td>
<td>Great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checks on the Executive</td>
<td>Little</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Little</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>Great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Little</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

IV. European Union

The first observation about the European Union in terms of its rhetoric and policy of democracy promotion in the Middle East is that there are fewer rhetorical instances than in the United States. Although the number of speeches and papers analyzed was greater for the US (110 for the US and 84 for the EU), the length of the EU material analyzed was longer (395 pages for the US and 506 for the EU with the same font and page size), but despite the greater length, the elements of democracy
promotion were mentioned less by the EU than by the US. This will be discussed in more detail section V comparing the two actors.⁴

Although the EU is considered to have been very successful in bringing democracy to the Eastern European states after the fall of the Soviet Union, it has been argued by many that this was due to the carrot of membership. When dealing with the Middle East, this is not (yet) an option, leaving the EU to search for other incentives such as fewer restrictions to the EU market or increased aid. Despite a more restricted choice of incentives, it has been argued that promoting democracy as a key theme of EU foreign policy is still significant because it “could contribute to creating a European identity and thus further the European integration process” (Olsen 2002: 132).

Similarly to the United States, European “ministers and policy makers have regularly asserted a link between terrorism and political repression” (Youngs 2005: 234), signaling a linkage between promoting democracy and promoting security. This is important insofar as promoting democracy in the past was often associated with instability and a decrease in security. Democracy is, according to the EU “inherently valuable and universally desirable;” not only this, but the EU is “morally obliged to foster those values in all our international partners” (Ferrero-Waldner 2006). This is apparently not only an opinion found at the highest levels of the EU, as “one opinion poll by the German Marshall Fund in 2005 suggested that Europeans are even more supportive of democracy promotion than Americans” (Kopstein 2006: 96). If both the elites and public appear to want to push democracy promotion in the EU’s external relations, and if it is a way in which the Europeans believe they can create a common identity and further the integration process, then we should expect to see many policy programs in this area. Not only this, but the rhetoric and policy of the EU should line up more closely than in the United States according to the hypothesis extrapolated from the NPE arguments in the introduction. With these expectations, I will now proceed to the analysis of the clusters.

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⁴ The country-specific action plans included in the ENP present a unique classification challenge as, on the one hand, they are not legally binding documents and, in most cases, do not present concrete policies or projects. On the other hand, however, the European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), which finances projects running under the auspices of the ENP actions plans, is clearly policy as described in my definition. Because there were country reports prior to the action plans, I have decided to include the country reports in my rhetorical analysis and consider the action plans and national indicative plans (which indicate how the ENPI funds are to be distributed) as policy.
a. Free country-wide elections (Coppedge/Reinicke 1990: 63f; Freedom House)

Just as was the case with the government of the United States, the EU believes elections to be a “fundamental pillar of democracy” (Ferrero-Waldner 2003) and sees the elections in Iran as an element of democracy “not present in many other Middle Eastern countries, though the election process still leaves much to be desired” (Solana 2008d). The EU also demanded “free, fair and peaceful elections” of Pakistan (Solana 2008r) before the 2008 elections. The EU – just as the United States – sometimes contrasts allies such as Palestinian Authority President Abbas with organizations such as Hamas by calling Abbas “elected” and leaving out this adjective for Hamas (Solana 2006a). To emphasize the importance of the elected leader, Javier Solana stated that “the Palestinian leadership will have been destroyed if one considers the elected head of the Palestinian Authority as ‘irrelevant.’” On the other hand, when the fighting between Fatah and Hamas broke out in the summer of 2007, Solana criticized Israel by commenting that “arresting elected representatives was not helpful” (Solana 2007i), indicating that even Hamas – deemed a terrorist organization by the EU at the time – was to be awarded some legitimacy because of its status as an elected government.

The election observation missions of the EU are considered important parts of its policies, mentioned specifically in the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights program as “very practical signs of the EU’s worldwide commitment to human rights and democracy” (Ferrero-Waldner 2006). The election observations are even to serve as “an important tool to assess progress achieved and recommend further improvements” (European Commission 2003a), and it is recommended that “activities in the election field should be considered in a more systematic and global manner in Mediterranean countries […] as a continuous and global effort to improve election frameworks in partner countries” as opposed to short-term projects (ibid).

From this rhetoric, one could expect the EU to maintain good relations with elected governments, just as with the United States. In addition, because of the emphasis on election observation and continuous work in the area of elections, one could expect long-term projects funded by the EU in this area. On the final question of consequences, from its rhetoric one could expect the EU to be more flexible than the US, as its criticism of the Iranian elections ended with the comment that “an imperfect democracy is better than none” (Solana 2008d).
The election support programs of the EU are many and varied, ranging from election observer missions (EOMs) set up to monitor and thus legitimize an election to election assistance missions which provide technical and/or material support for the process. The programs also go beyond this, however, to include educational programs such as mock elections in schools, training of native election monitors, and training of journalists to report on elections. As recommended by the Council, a few projects extend(ed) over longer periods of time such as the “Egyptian Democratic Status Watch” which started in December of 2006 for the duration of 36 months to build capacity for election observation in civil society and raise awareness of the right to political participation. The majority of election support programs were funded by the EU for 12 months, however.

While the EU did indeed observe several elections in the region, there were inconsistencies relevant to this study. Even though the turnout in the Moroccan parliamentary election was very low, for example, the EU congratulated the results, despite the fact that this indicated that “Moroccan citizens had abandoned the democratic process as a means to effect meaningful policy change” (Youngs and Wittes 2009: 8f). In addition, the slide back into a form of police state in Egypt since 2006 has been met with very few consequences by the EU. While the Danish government phased out assistance, the EU concluded its action plan in 2007, which included “additional aid allocations and trade access. In addition, the European Union offered the Mubarak regime a separate energy accord” (Youngs and Wittes 2009:8). Although elections in Algeria have not met international standards, they have continually been praised by the EU and it has stepped up aid “instead of cutting aid to a military dictatorship” (Olsen 2002: 141).

After Hamas won the elections in the Palestinian territories in 2006, the EU withdrew funding from the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the hope of moving Hamas to accept its three conditions for partnership: renunciation of violence, recognition of Israel’s right to exist, and acceptance of all previous agreements between the PLO and Israel. While the EU set up a fund to ensure that Palestinians would not go without desperately needed water, energy, or hospitals, the money did not go through the PA. Muriel Asseburg deems the EU approach to have been counterproductive for democratization and state-building, as “institutional reform efforts aimed at democratization have been thrown into reverse in order to reassert the office of the president over that of the prime minister” (Asseburg 2007: 1). Even though Hamas
won as a result of free and fair elections – observed by the EU –, the EU did not congratulate the Palestinian people on a step toward democracy, as it had with the Algerians in elections that were much less fair. Instead, they reversed their policies of institution building and cut off funds that had previous supported the government.

On the first question for assessing the divergence of rhetoric and policy, the assistance promised in rhetoric to observe elections and ensure they are free and fair was fulfilled to some extent with some elections remaining unobserved, however (little divergence); there are no concrete numbers for the budget; the types of programs were as promised in the rhetoric, as long-term programs besides the shorter-term election observing missions were also conducted (no divergence); the consequences for elections that were not free or fair were minimal or non-existent, as the EU took the position that a little democracy is better than none – this indicates a great divergence between the rhetoric of the importance of elections and then the acceptance of manipulated elections (great divergence); the reaction to the election of Hamas seriously contradicted the EU’s rhetoric of the importance of elections, and the withdrawal of aid may have been consistent with anti-terrorism rhetoric and policies, but not with that of election or democracy promotion policies (great divergence). In the issue area of elections, then, the EU rhetoric and policy are found to be greatly divergent.

b. Freedom to organized parties and associations (Coppedge / Reinicke 1990: 63f; Freedom House) / Civil society

The EU also recognizes “a flourishing civil society [as] a key feature of a healthy democracy” and proclaims much support for it in the region (Solana 2002e; EC 2004c; EC 2003a). According to a communiqué between the Commission and the Council and Parliament, there are a number of measures to be taken to support civil society in the Middle East. These include modifying the legal or administrative frameworks to be in line with international commitments on NGOs, strengthening the capacity of NGOs through practical training, networking between European NGOs and those in the region, linking local NGOs to international networks, coordinating the NGOs with international organizations, and linking MEDA allocations to progress in the field (EC 2003a; EC 2002a). One could therefore expect these to have been turned into policy programs with, as the last recommendation suggests, aid conditionality based on progress.
The EU has indeed funded many programs for civil society in the region in all of the areas listed above. “Practicing Democracy from the Village up to the Capital: Promoting Participatory Democracy by Strengthening Local Communities” was a program in Egypt, for example, working on creating legislation to protect NGOs. An example of training was done in Algeria with the Program of Up-dating and Training for Associations (PROMAN-FORA) to help them better manage legal, financial, and operational aspects of NGO life. Internet networks were set up to improve dialogue both amongst in-country NGOs and between in-country NGOs and their international or European counterparts, and many other programs designed to strengthen specific aspects such as women’s or children’s rights, labor rights, or rural rights were funded.

Conditionality is an aspect that is lacking, however, as described by Michele Dunne (2005 as cited in Youngs and Wittes 2009: 8): “In Egypt, the European Union and the United States have funded projects to support the internal management and capacity of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), without making an issue of laws restricting civil society’s freedom to operate or even to accept foreign funds.” As noted in the country reports, there are several countries which have restrictions on the amount of foreign funds NGOs can receive or other restrictions which hinder the work of the EU programs. Despite this, there seem to be no consequences or pressure on the governments to loosen regulations.

In answer to the questions, the assistance given was less extensive than promised in the rhetoric (little divergence); there was no concrete budget information; the types of programs implemented were as indicated in the rhetoric, but no conditionality was attached (little divergence); there were no consequences for deviant behavior (great divergence); there were no policies which contradicted the stated goals in this area of democracy promotion (no divergence). The end result for the cluster of civil society is thus that there is little divergence in the rhetoric and policies of the EU.

c. Access to sources of information other than those provided by the government (Coppedge/Reinicke 1990: 63f)

The EU places little emphasis on an independent media in its rhetoric. While the conditions of the media are mentioned in each country report, little is said or written in other speeches or documents. Instead of being recognized as an element of democracy in its own right, the EU often combines an independent media with other
aspects of democracy such as human rights, elections, or even an independent judiciary. This can be seen in the Tunisian country report, in which the rule of law, developing the media, and modernizing justice is combined into one category which receives 30€ million (EC 2004c). All other mentions of an independent press take place in the context of bettering human rights conditions (EC 2004c; EC 2004c; EC 2004a).

The programs of the EU reflect this, as well. Journalists are trained to cover elections, and provide fair coverage of trials and human rights abuses. A few projects, including one in Pakistan, train journalists specifically to strengthen democracy and the rule of law by professionally training the media, but the majority focus on how the media can aid other aspects of democracy. As was the case with the United States, when the Egyptian and Moroccan governments clamped down on the press before the elections in 2005 and 2007 respectively, the EU did not do so much as to threaten the governments with consequences.

Because very little was said in EU rhetoric about an independent media, the lack of assistance given in this area does not indicate a divergence between rhetoric and policy (no divergence); there was no budget information on this issue; one major problem was that the programs in the area were not designed to make the media independent but instead to further human rights issues – a matter for another cluster (great divergence); when restrictions were imposed against the press, there were no consequences from the EU (great divergence); there were, however, no contradictory policies (no divergence). In summary, then, the EU rhetoric and policy on the issue area of an independent media shows great divergence.

d. Institutional checks on the executive (Jaggers/Gurr 1995 (Polity)). (i.e. strong judicial and/or legislative powers)

When responding to criticism of the European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) that it focuses more on democracy than on human rights, Ms. Ferrero-Waldner stated that she finds “it unhelpful to separate the two […]. How can human rights be upheld without the other components of a democratic system, including the rule of law and an independent judiciary?” (Ferrero-Waldner 2006) Criticism of the MENA area by the EC includes the comment that, in many of the countries, “a powerful executive branch exerts significant control and is subject to inadequate checks and balances from the legislative and judicial branches” and that
“legal and judicial systems lack sufficient independence” (EC 2003a). The EU places much rhetorical weight on the importance of an independent judiciary, criticizing countries in which it is compromised and praising them when measures are taken to ensure the judiciary’s independence from the executive (EC 2004d; EC 2004c; EC 2004a). Just as an independent judicial branch is considered essential, an independent legislative branch is as well. Here, also, there is critique when the powers of parliaments are restricted and praise when moves are made to grant them more power. Parliamentary cooperation is considered a key aspect of the Barcelona Process (EC 2004d), and it is recommended that a Euro-Med Parliamentary Assembly be created to better the contacts between the parliamentarians of the EU and the Mediterranean partners (COREPER 2002). In 2008, Javier Solana endorsed contacts between the European Parliament and the Iranian parliament because “an imperfect democracy is better than none and it is right that we should engage with Iranian parliamentarians” (Solana 2008d).

One of the major reasons that the European Union places such faith in institutions was elucidated by Solana in 2007:

“For more than half a century now, Europe’s everyday existence has been rooted in peace and stability. These are not the product of a balance of power, as they were in the past. Rather, they have emerged from stable laws and institutions, able to withstand the ravages of political conflict” (Solana 2007h).

The particular European experience with war and peace thus goes a long way toward explaining why the EU places such an emphasis on institutions such as parliaments and independent courts in its democratization efforts. Kopstein comments that “European warnings about the single-minded U.S. focus on big events such as elections to the detriment of institution building are probably worth heeding” (Kopstein 2006: 94) in light of the European historical experience. This, then should be one area in which the EU and US differ greatly. One would expect the EU to place a heavy emphasis on building up independent judiciaries and parliaments in the Middle Eastern countries, particularly those bordering the Mediterranean, where the EU influence is the greatest. Since the EU seems to believe stable and independent institutions to be the key to peace, one would expect programs in this area to be the most extensive both in terms of time, personnel, and funding.

The EIDHR has funded several programs focusing on the judiciary or legislature, for example training Algerian judges, lawyers, and NGOs to organize as a
network in order to fight human rights violations effectively, providing more access to justice for vulnerable groups in Algeria, establishing an “Egyptian Legislative Reform Forum” (ELRF) bringing together different governmental and non-governmental figures to promote legislative reform, promoting judicial reform in Iran regarding the administration of and access to justice, reinforcing the professionalism of the members of the judiciary in Morocco, and improving the access to justice for vulnerable groups in Tunisia. While these program are surely worthwhile, none of them promote the independence of the judicial or legislative branches. Instead, the focus is more on reform to protect human rights and to prosecute those who have violated others’ rights.

In the ENP action plans of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and other states, the EU has, however, placed ensuring, maintaining, and further enhancing the independence of the judiciary as a top priority. In addition, the new governance facility set up for the Mediterranean area from the MEDA budget by the ENPI (the financial instrument of the ENP) has judicial independence as one of its goals. 43% of the funds set aside for new financial mechanisms in the context of the ENP were for the governance facility. Although the EU has begun to link other work to parliaments in its external relations, “this new focus remains largely absent in the Middle East. Nearly all parliamentary work takes the form of training for actual or would-be women parliamentarians” (Youngs 2005: 242).

The assistance promised in the rhetoric was given not in the form of EIDHR programs, but as an incentive through the governance facility (little divergence); the budget was more than adequate, with 43% of the funds going toward the facility which has as one of its goals strengthening judicial independence (no divergence); while the programs through EIDHR were not of the type expected from the rhetoric, the ENPI is to finance the types indicated in the speeches and papers (little divergence); there were no instances of deviant behavior found to test consequences; finally, there were no policies which contradicted the independence of the judiciary or parliaments. The cluster of checks on executive power thus falls into the category of little divergence in terms of rhetoric and policies.

e. Participation (Vanhanen 2003: 49)

The cluster with the fewest rhetorical remarks made by the EU was participation. In the documents searched, there were only 11 mentions of participation
in the sense of democracy promotion, although it is mentioned as something that will strengthen democracy. At the Paris Summit in 2008, the EU governments reiterated their commitment “to strengthen democracy […] through expansion of participation in political life” (Final Declaration of the Paris Summit of the Barcelona Process 2008). Based on the few mentions and even fewer concrete policy suggestions in the rhetoric, one would expect the subject of participation to get little attention by the EU. On the contrary, however, there are many programs to increase political participation, particularly of women and young adults through education programs such as the “Tools for Democracy and Human Rights Education” program run in several governorates in Jordan which simulated elections and took students to visit local parliamentarians. In Egypt, for example, programs for both active and passive political participation were run, and a program was also funded to increase female participation in public life by mobilizing local public opinion for women judges. In the area of participation, then the rhetoric is inconsistent for a surprising reason: there are more extensive programs than would be expected by the rhetoric.

Answering the questions therefore proves more difficult than in the other clusters: the assistance given was much greater than promised in the rhetoric (little divergence); no information on the budget was given in the rhetoric, so there is no answer for this question; the types of programs implemented were much more extensive and varied than the rhetoric would have led to believe (little divergence); there were no indications of deviant behavior and thus no chance to observe reactions; finally, there were no policies which contradicted the stated goals for participation (no divergence). As this study seeks to capture only the level of divergence in the clusters of democracy promotion and not whether the policies are more or less active than the rhetoric would bring one to assume, the cluster of participation must be judged as having little divergence.

f. Human rights (Guaranteed civil liberties for all citizens) (Coppedge/Reinicke 1990:63f; Jaggers/Gurr 1995 (Polity))

Just as with stable institutions, the protection of human rights holds a special place in Europe’s self-identity and desire to bring peace and stability to its bordering regions. Javier Solana stated that “Human rights will remain at the heart of [the European Union’s] role because human rights are at the core of European integration.
Our attachment to human rights is not an abstract one; it was forged in the bitter experiences of the last century” (Solana 2002e). Besides being an important element of the EU’s self-understood role in the world, the promotion of human rights is considered to be inexorably linked to democracy, as indicated in Benita Ferrero-Waldner’s speech cited above that

“respect for human rights is one of the foundations of democracy, and democracy is necessary to develop and protect human rights. How can human rights be upheld without the other components of a democratic system, including the rule of law and an independent judiciary? And how can a democratic system work without paying attention to the rights and freedoms of everyone, including disaffected groups and minorities?” (Ferrero-Waldner 2006).

For the EU, then, a democracy cannot exist without protection of human rights, and protection of human rights cannot fully occur outside of a democracy.

The conferences in the context of the Barcelona Process have been pointed out by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) as an opportunity to discuss human rights with the partner countries. The dialogue should “give partners on both shores the opportunity to state the difficulties they encounter in implementing legal instruments on human rights […] so as to increase its effectiveness and deepen the Euro-Med Partnership in this area” (COREPER 2002). Preceding one of the Euro-Med meetings, the commission made several strong recommendations on the subject of human rights such as matters pertaining to arrests and imprisonments without due process, unsatisfactory treatment of prisoners, extrajudicial killings by authorities, application of the death penalty, or restrictions on freedom of expression and association. After these were not followed, however, it again wrote before the next meeting “while recognizing the sensitivity of such questions, the Commission considers that the integrity of the partnership requires that these issues be addressed at the Valencia meeting” (EC 2002a). In other words, despite the controversial nature of the matters in question, the Euro-Med Partnership cannot maintain its credibility if the issues are not seriously discussed. When French President and then EU Council President Nicolas Sarkozy suggested an “upgrade” of the Barcelona Process as a “Union for the Mediterranean” at a Paris Summit in 2008, the governments promised to continue to support respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. In the aftermath, the Commission recommended that an open discussion on legislative and regulatory reform be started in these areas (EC 2008c).
From its rhetoric, then, one would expect the EU to place a high priority on the promotion of human rights in the region. Because the Commission considers the integrity of the Euro-Med Partnership to rest on the open and serious discussion of issues including human rights abuses, dialogues should have been reformed so as to discuss controversial topics such as the death penalty and torture of prisoners. Consequences should be apparent if human rights violations occur, as “nothing excuses or justifies [human rights’] denial or compromise anywhere” (Solana 2002e). Because democracy is just as necessary for human rights as vice-versa, the democracy components of the EIDHR should be just as strong as the human rights component. After all, there would be no use building up human rights in an authoritarian system in which any progress could be reversed instantly if the head of state so desired. As a final point, the Commission noted that “since 1992, the EC has included in all its agreements with third countries a clause defining respect for human rights and democracy as essential elements in the relationship” (EC 2003a). One would thus expect respect for human rights and democracy to be a contingency for all agreements made with the EU.

When looking at the programs funded by EIDHR, it becomes apparent that human rights are indeed a key element of the EU’s external relations. Nearly half of all programs either deal with general human rights issues or specific issues such as women’s rights, anti-torture programs, children’s rights, refugees’ rights, and prisoners’ rights. Raising the awareness of human rights is another emphasis of the policies, including programs which educate children and women of their rights according to international and national law. In Algeria this took the form of a “human rights bus” which travelled through the region of Kabylie in an awareness campaign. Programs were even started in Iran to increase awareness for the rights of children and in Syria to build capacities in human rights organizations. As a final program, the EU sponsors a Mediterranean Masters Degree in Human Rights and Democracy with the purpose of educating future generations of human rights defenders.

Not everything that the EU does is in line with what it purports in its rhetoric, however. Even though it places so much emphasis on human rights, “the proposed human rights plans are an offer, not a stipulation; so far, only Morocco and Jordan have shown interest” (Youngs 2005: 240). When Algeria seemed reluctant to submit itself to the human rights and democracy conditions of the EU, the EU “offered Algeria a new energy partnership without the democracy stipulations of an ENP
(which an energy-rich and thus emboldened Algeria has refused to sign)” (Young and Wittes 2009:8). Even the European Commission criticizes its fora originally intended to promote a dialogue on human rights, stating that

“The regional political dialogue (Senior Officials Meetings of the Barcelona Process) already includes Human Rights and democratization as a regular agenda item. However, this tends to consist mainly of general presentations by Member States or Mediterranean partners of their national Human Rights policies and does not lead to a discussion of substance. On the contrary, it can serve as a pretext to avoid serious discussion.” (EC 2003a)

Here it is clear that the forum created with the purpose of helping to move countries toward legislation protecting human rights is not doing what the EU claims it should.

Another matter also mentioned with the US is that of renditions. This issue becomes slightly more complicated in the EU because the EU has tried to emphasize that it was the member states who worked with the United States. In February of 2009, the European Parliament (EP) denounced European governments who aided the CIA in carrying out the rendition flights and stated that “EU member states bear a particular share of political, moral and legal responsibility for the transportation and detention of those imprisoned in Guantanamo and in secret detention facilities” (EP 2009). Although the EP thus tried to pass the blame to the member states, in truth the EU has had an agreement with the US since 1998 that US flights can stop in transit at EU airports. On 22 Jan 2003 in Athens, this was renewed with the note in the minutes that “Both sides agreed on... increased use of European transit facilities to support the return of criminal/inadmissible aliens” (Statewatch 2005). While the exact definition of who is a “criminal / inadmissible alien” and to where they should be returned is unclear, it is precisely this lack of clarity and the collusion of many EU member states that has shed a negative light on the EU itself. Although the EU – i.e. its member states – has committed itself to the highest standards of international human rights, it violated these in either allowing or even aiding in these extraordinary renditions in which it was known that the suspects would likely be tortured.

The guiding questions can be answered as follows: the assistance promised in rhetoric was given (no divergence); the money budgeted exceeded expectations, but there was no conditionality placed on the aid in regards to human rights (little divergence); the programs implemented were those expected by rhetoric, although strategically important countries were offered agreements in which a human rights dimension was left out (little divergence); there were few consequences for deviant
behavior, particularly noticeable considering the emphasis placed on human rights by the EU (great divergence); and, finally, even though the EU was not as directly involved in the extraordinary renditions of terror suspects as the US, the renditions could not have taken place without the consent of the EU and its member states, a fact that hurt its credibility in the matter of human rights (great divergence). For these reasons, the policy and rhetoric of the EU on the issue of human rights in terms of democracy promotion can be deemed to show great divergence.

g. Government free of wide-spread corruption (Freedom House)

Although corruption is noted as a serious problem for some countries of the region – it is “perceived as one of the main causes of [Morocco’s] economic backwardness,” for example (EC 2004b) – it is not a focus of EU rhetoric. Although anti-corruption measures are mentioned in a few documents (EC 2004e; Solana 2002f), the most prominent reason for the measures seems to be to “ensure transparency of public procurement operations [and to] develop conditions for open, fair and competitive award of public contracts” (EC 2004e). It seems, then, that the EU wishes to fight corruption not primarily for the sake of the countries involved or because it is a step toward democracy (in fact, corruption is not mentioned once in direct connection with democracy in any of the documents analyzed for rhetoric), but simply because it is worried its own aid money to the region will end up in the wrong hands. It could therefore be expected that anti-corruption measures will go hand-in-hand with an increase in aid or in countries which receive aid but where corruption is viewed to be a major problem.

In several, though not all, of the ENP action plans for the countries in the region, the EU placed corruption as one of the priorities under the headings of public finances or rule of law. Programs for training public officials on anti-corruption measures or implementing a national anti-corruption strategy are proposed in addition to increasing transparency on public procurement operations. Despite the fact that corruption is allegedly one of the main reasons for Morocco’s economic backwardness, it “is cited regularly by Washington and Brussels as a model for Arab political reform, and has been rewarded for its limited reforms with significant increases in aid from Europe and the United States (including a 28 million euro reward in 2007 from the European Commission’s Governance Facility)” (Youngs and Wittes 2009: 8-9). While the governance facility (mentioned earlier in the section on
checks on the executive) is designed to reward countries which make progress on governance issues, Morocco’s corruption rating has not improved during the time. Rewarding money to a state which does not have sufficient anti-corruption measures in place could certainly be considered an inconsistency.

Little assistance was promised in the rhetoric of the EU, so the programs mentioned in the action plans and governance facility can be considered consistent with the rhetoric (no divergence); no concrete information on the budget was available; the types of programs went above and beyond the public procurement measures expected from the rhetoric (no divergence); no consequences could be seen for deviance on anti-corruption measures, however, although the only instance where that could clearly be seen was with Morocco (little divergence); the policy of providing monetary rewards for countries even though the corruption levels remain high is an indication that this policy might counteract the policies of democracy promotion and anti-corruption which are the goals of the EU (little divergence). In summary, the rhetoric and policies on corruption can be considered as showing little divergence.

The results for the European Union are varied. We find three clusters rated as having great divergence while the other four showed little divergence between rhetoric and policy (See Table 7). General comments that did not fit into any of the clusters include that the total amount of funding for the EIDHR was halved to 7€ million between 2001 and 2003, and between 2004 and 2007 was only increased by 4.5€ million. “In the year after September 11, the EU gave over twenty times more money for the preservation of historical sites in the Middle East than for democracy building” (Youngs 2005: 240). While the year after September 11th might be too early to look for budget indicators – the budget would have been set before the attacks – it is telling that the budget cuts then occurred until the end of 2003 and have not yet been restored to their pre-9/11 levels. Another inconsistency in overall EU democracy promotion is that aid increases often went to “decidedly non-democratizing states, not to reformers. In 2004-2005, the European Commission’s Governance Facility provided Syria with 100 million euros, Egypt with 360 million euros, and Tunisia with 185 million euros” (Youngs and Wittes 2009:9). This demonstrates that “neither the EU as a whole nor its member states individually have shown a willingness to use
any form of membership conditionality or even aid conditionality to reshape the political landscape of the region” (Kopstein 2006: 92-3).

In terms of the defense of normative goals, the aid given for democracy promotion is nothing in comparison to the money given for immigration control, anti-terrorism cooperation, and security cooperation (Youngs 2005: 240). All of this indicates that democratization in the Middle East is not the highest priority for the EU. Before throwing out the NPE hypothesis stated in the introduction, however, we must first compare the empirical results of the EU and the US. It may be the case that the EU still acts more consistently than the United States, thereby making it impossible to falsify the NPE hypothesis.

Table 7: Results for the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Area / Cluster</th>
<th>Level of Divergence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>Great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Little</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Media</td>
<td>Great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checks on the Executive</td>
<td>Little</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Little</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>Great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Little</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. Conclusions from empirical sections

As mentioned in the introduction to section IV on the European Union, although the number of speeches / papers was greater for the US (110 for the US and 84 for the EU), the length of the EU material analyzed was longer (395 pages for the US and 506 for the EU with the same font and page size). Despite the greater length, the elements of democracy promotion were mentioned less by the EU than by the US (See Table 8). One proposed reason for this was given by Richard Youngs (2005: 237):

“In the general presentation of their aims, European policies have been couched in discourse very different from that guiding current U.S. strategy. Europeans have most commonly eschewed a directly instrumental presentation of democracy’s virtues, advocating political reform as part of a general process of social and economic modernization. [...] One European diplomat responsible for devising his government’s new Middle East reform policy suggests that a “neutral cover” has been sought for gaining access to
influence the broad direction of political change in the region, admonishing what he judges to be the United States’ fixation with the end result of regime change.”

This, then could explain why there were fewer “hits” when searching the documents of the European Union. Although the more moderate rhetoric of the EU and the general tendency to avoid terminology of democracy promotion made my searches more difficult, there was – in most cases – a comparable number of hits for the clusters for the EU and the US. Leaving checks on the executive aside for the moment – the reason will be explained in section VI - , one sees that elections produced by far the most hits for the United States. In the European Union, the largest number was for human rights – totaling more in this area than the US.

Table 8: Number of mentions in the rhetoric

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checks on the Executive</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Media</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One major difference between the actors was that the rhetoric of the EU was in general more moderate than the US, promising less and keeping the promises vaguer than the US. This made the evaluation of rhetoric for expectations to apply to the policy more difficult, but there were enough comments to still make it possible. The budget analysis was also not possible in most cases for the EU because “while the United States explicitly apportions nearly a third of its relatively small Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) budget for democracy assistance, the vast majority of European governments still do not compile single “democracy” aid budgets. The guiding logic is almost one of wanting “to do democracy promotion” without actually saying it is being done – a situation many European officials judge to be the inverse of U.S. intentions” (Youngs 2005: 241). While the budgets of EIDHR, MEDA, and the
ENPI could be examined, it was difficult to pull together an explicit “democracy” budget from these figures.

The EU rhetoric may have been vaguer than that of the United States, but the end result was, in the end, nearly the same. Both actors displayed a great divergence in rhetoric and policy in the clusters of elections and human rights – and this despite (or because of?) the fact that these were the areas of highest activity. In the case of the United States, the rhetoric on elections was simply too strong and, in some respects, too idealistic to be realized easily. The responses of both the EU and the US to Hamas’ election victory in the Palestinian territories in 2006 also went a long way toward increasing the divergence between rhetoric and policy in the area of elections. While the actions taken might be understandable considering the nature of Hamas’ rhetoric and the actions of its militant wing, the rhetoric of the US and EU demands the recognition of free and fair elections and respect of the will of the Palestinian people. The EU tried to walk a tightrope of continuing to give aid to the Palestinian people without giving aid to the PA, but this aid fell under the rubric of human rights, not elections.

One difference between the US and EU was that the US had a “little divergence” result for an independent media compared to the EU’S “great divergence,” and the US showed a “great divergence” in corruption compared to the EU’s “little divergence.” This second difference might be attributed to the clear aid flows from the United States, which allowed for a comparison of aid to corruption ratings. The EU’s limited rhetoric on corruption combined with its more comprehensive anti-corruption programs gave it an edge on the US in this area. In comparison, the US did far more for developing an independent media, coming up with awards to recognize achievements and publicizing meetings with journalists. For the EU, this was an area in which it said little and did even less – restricting the majority of its programs for journalists to activities meant more to protect human rights than to develop an independent media.

The differences in these two areas essentially balance each other out, leaving us with the same results for the EU as for the US: three areas with great divergence and four with little divergence; not what was expected from the hypothesis. Before turning to this hypothesis and the conclusions to be drawn from the results, I will first reflect on some of the problems that arose during the course of my research.
VI. Reflection

Throughout my research, several issues came up which would either have exceeded the scope of this paper or they arose too late in the process to be able to retrace my steps and start anew. I would like to touch on these issues in this section, including the possibility of indirect policies of democracy promotion, the anomaly of the cluster “participation” in the EU empirical section, the awkward combination of the legislative and judicial branches in the “checks on the executive” cluster, and several other minor points.

The first methodological problem with this study is that it does not consider indirect policies of democracy promotion. I specifically stated in the methods section that I would only examine policies explicitly designed to promote democracy in the Middle East. While this was necessary to limit the scope of the research, it does not reflect reality entirely accurately. If explicit democracy promotion is considered to be counter-productive in some cases because it would destabilize the country or region or because it might make a particular regime even more recalcitrant and cause it to repress any indigenous democracy movements, then the EU and US sometimes choose more indirect methods. Because it has not been proven whether integration into the world market aids democratization processes or vice-versa, free trade agreements might be considered democracy promotion. This was a tool I did not examine in this study.

I realized there was another methodological problem only when counting the exact number of hits for each cluster while writing section V, when I discovered that the number of hits for “checks on the executive” far exceeded the emphasis either actor seemed to place on the issue area. After reflecting on the reason for this, I decided that the problem lay in combining the legislative with the judicial branches, leading to a greater number of key words to search for and a greater number of hits. Were I to revise the paper, I would separate the two so as to more accurately represent the importance placed on the issue by the two actors.

When analyzing the cluster “participation” for the EU, I was surprised to find that, while the EU said little on the matter, there were a large number of programs to facilitate political participation in the region. When creating my divergence scale, I had been working under the assumption that the actors would proudly speak of their work in the region, not considered the possibility that a divergence in rhetoric and
policy could actually mean that there was little rhetoric and many programs. Unable to recalibrate my entire scale without rewriting the majority of the paper, I rated the section on “participation” as it was according to my scale: a little divergence between rhetoric and policy. Although this meant I was consistent within the paper, I do understand that this does not accurately represent the reality, as the US also had a result of “little divergence” on this issue – because its programs did not live up to its rhetoric. This result may be slightly misleading, but the fact is that I was attempting to measure the divergence between rhetoric and policy without regard for which was “more active.”

When looking at the policy of two very active actors on the international scene over the course of eight years in only four months with a page limit, it is natural that the material brought into the paper must be limited. While I tried to be as conscientious as possible when researching the policies in the issue areas, it is entirely possible – and even likely – that I overlooked a policy decision or event that would have been relevant for one of the areas. However, because I started out with the hope that the EU’s rhetoric and policy would be more consistent than that of the US but turned up with a different result, I hope to avoid accusations of selecting policies and rhetoric based on a research bias.

My original proposal included looking at the rhetoric of the EU by examining High Commissioner Solana’s speeches as well as the speeches of the Council presidents. Due to difficulties in collecting data and the lack of relevant data in the Council president speeches which I could find, I decided to substitute the Council/Commission communiqués and Commission papers for the Council president speeches. For a time I also considered examining the speeches in the European Parliament, but decided against this because of the lack of influence the Parliament has over foreign policy matters. I found it to be important that the EU actors whose rhetoric I examined also had competencies to form policy, otherwise the comparison between the US and EU might not be as equal as I desired. Although the methodological issues could be resolved with more time and/or space, I must leave them as is and will now turn to the conclusion.
VII. Conclusion

As was seen in section V, the hypothesis to be tested, namely that:

*Due to its self-understanding as primarily a normative power, the EU will show more consistency in between its rhetoric and policies of democracy promotion than the United States.*

was shown to be false. The EU was no more consistent in its rhetoric and policy than was the United States. The question then arises as to why this is the case. Is the EU not actually a normative power? Is the idea of a “normative power” idealistic in its notion that a country or organization is willing to act against its material interests in order to pursue normative goals? While it is not possible to investigate these questions here, I propose another solution to the puzzle: The idea of NPE rests on the self-conception of the actors. Because the EU identifies itself as an actor whose duty it is to shape the norms of international relations, it will act this way. The EU is not alone in this identity, however. As indicated by many speeches by members of the US government throughout history, the United States also sees itself as a country with the moral duty to spread the norms of democracy and human rights, even if this goes against its material interests.

I suggest that the real difference between the EU and the United States lies not in the rhetoric/policy divide, which this paper has shown to be equal for both actors, but instead in the effects of those policies and rhetoric. As argued by Manners (2004), the EU’s status as a normative but not military power makes other countries more willing to accept norms emanating from the EU. “It is unfeasible that either Turkey or Russia [in the examples of the norms of “equality” and “sustainable development” in the context of constitutional law and the Kyoto Protocol] would be as receptive to norm diffusion if they believed that EU “battlegroups” or combat forces would soon be peacemaking in Kurdish areas or Chechnya” (Manners 2004: 13). Perhaps the next step would then be to determine whether the policies of the EU are more effective than those of the US and try to link this effectiveness to the military power or lack thereof of the external actors. That would be beyond the scope of this paper, however, which has made the contribution of demonstrating that there is no difference between the levels of divergence in the rhetoric and policy of the European Union and United States as regards democracy promotion in the Middle East.
VIII. Literature


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Peceny, Mark (1999): *Democracy at the Point of Bayonets*, University Park: Pennsylvania State UP.


Siemes, Thomas (2009): ““Mare nostrum”? Frankreich, die EU und die Union für das Mittelmeer,” *Dokumente*, 02/09: 23-27.


Government Documents:


Appendix A: Speeches and documents analyzed for rhetoric

United States:


Bush, George W. / Rice, Condoleezza (2006a): “President Bush and Secretary of State Rice Discuss the Middle East Crisis,” Crawford, TX, 7 Aug 2006.


European Union:


