Final Conference: The EU, Regional Integration and Conflict Resolution

14 November 2014
European Parliament
Room Altiero Spinelli, A3G-2
Ardennestraat 2
Brussels
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1. Agenda

09.00-09.15  Welcome Coffee

09.15-09.30  WELCOME AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE PROJECT
Nathalie Tocci and David-Maria Sassoli

09.30-10.30  PANEL 1 – EUROPEAN REGIONAL CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION POLICY
Chair: Eleonora Poli
Speakers: Eva Scherwitz
          Giovanni Faleg
Discussants: Richard Whitman
            Gerrard Quille
            Luk van Langenhove

Open Discussion

10.30-10.45  Coffee Break

10.45-11.45  PANEL 2 – REGIONAL CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
Chair: Federica Bicchi
Speakers: Justine Luis
          Herah Azhar
Discussants: Angela Liberatore
            Yahia Zoubir
            Amnon Aran
            Rosemary Hollis

Open Discussion

11.45-12.45  PANEL 3 – REGIONAL CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN THE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Chair: Giovanni Faleg
Speakers: Giulia Piccolino
Stephanie Minou
Discussants: Toni Haastrup
Yahia Zoubir
Gianmarco Scuppa
Donatella Rostagno

Open Discussion

12.45-13.45 Lunch Break

13.45-14.45 PANEL 4 – REGIONAL CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN LATIN AMERICA
Chair: Eva Scherwitz
Speakers: Kai Lehmann
Octavio Forti Neto
Cinthia Haddad
Discussants: Gian Luca Gardini
Andrés Malamud
Fernando Iglesias

Open Discussion

14.45-15.00 Coffee Break

15.00-16.00 PANEL 5 – REGIONAL CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN ASIA
Chair: Cheng Chwee Kuik
Speaker: Moosung Lee
Yeikyoung Kim
Discussants: Si-Hong Kim
Jin-Woo Choi
David Capie

Open Discussion

16.00-16.30 CONCLUSIONS
Thomas Diez

16.30-17.30 Light Cocktails and Amuse-Bouches
2. Directions

Important Meeting points November 14:

8:45 am  Lobby Thon Hotel, to walk together to the European Parliament

7.30 pm  Lobby Thon Hotel, to walk together to the Bistro L’Ogenblik

8 pm    Informal meeting at Bistro L’Ogenblik/ adress: Galerie des Princes, 1, 1000 Brussels

The Thon Hotel EU
Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 75
B-1040 Brussels
Phone : +32 (0)2 204 3911
E-Mail: eu@thonhotels.be
How to get from the Hotel to the European Parliament
Regional conflicts are a core global challenge in that they threaten international peace and affect global actors either because of economic and strategic interests or because of challenges to normative claims. The European Union (EU) has been seen as a normative power able to help transform such conflicts. A prominent strategy in this has been the promotion of regional integration through various forms of support for regional integration projects and strategies, from the Andean Community to the African Union. REGIO-CONF aims at assessing this strategy by comparing EU involvement in different cases in the Mediterranean, Africa, Central and South America and East Asia. In doing so, it enhances our understanding of a crucial part of EU external policy, contributes to the debate about sustainable peace strategies, and puts forward policy recommendations about how to assist the transformation of regional conflicts more successfully.

Our research builds on the following two-step model:
We further argue that the EU can promote integration (and thus indirectly contribute to conflict transformation) either actively or passively, and both instrumentally and normatively. Our papers build on the idea that there are three pathways of EU influence: compulsion, social learning, and model setting.

**Some of our preliminary findings are as follows:**

- EU influence depends on credibility. This in turn requires a committed presence, no retreat into pure bilateralism, not reducing integration to market integration, and not privileging the EU’s own economic short-term interests.

- EU influence is enhanced if its regionalisation policies are aligned with other great powers such as the US. However, in some cases local actors turn to the EU because it offers an alternative to US strategy.

- EU influence further depends on local windows of opportunity. The EU is not normally the direct cause of regionalisation and conflict transformation, but it is important to provide a context in which such processes can unfold.

The EU needs to take into account the greater variety of regionalisation approaches, engage more actively with local actors and be open to learn from others, for instance in how to deal with multiple regional memberships.
4. Case Studies

4.1. PANEL I – European Regional Conflict Transformation Policy

Eva Scherwitz PhD,
Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen, Institute of Political Science

Giovanni Faleg PhD,
Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI)

Eleonora Poli PhD
Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI)

In the aftermath of World War II, the promotion of regional integration (RI) served as a basis for European reconciliation and for the pursuit of regional peace and prosperity. In this vein, the promotion of European RI model was used by the EU as a way to channel conflict transformation (CTR) in other world regions. The EU has been assisting and actively supporting a variety of (sub-) regional integration processes in Asia, Africa, the MENA and Asia. It has done so by (financially or morally) supporting the development of regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Mercosur, or the African Union (AU) and financing wide-ranging initiatives like the European Mediterranean Partnership or the Union for the Mediterranean.

To date, the overall impact of such RI efforts have been rather limited. Stagnating regional organizations have proven ineffective and have not been able to encourage their members to convey more effort into political integration in the way the EU had hoped.
As a result, the EU has adjusted its approach towards RI. From championing a full-scale regional integration, the EU has also begun to embrace softer RI strategies by also developing alternative CTR projects.

**Main Findings**

- Financial incentive-setting and the sharing of best practices used towards all world regions, e.g. via financing the African security architecture or experience-sharing in handling of maritime border disputes in the South China Sea;

- Efforts of direct EU model setting for regional CTR have been abandoned. Reasons behind this are 1) EU’s perceived lack of leverage as an important regional model, 2) competition posed to the EU model by other big players (such as China in the Asian and African cases) and 3) perceived (recent) lack of interest of regional partners in the EU model;

- In all four regions the paths of influence used by the EU reflect a certain level of adaptation in relation to RI and CTR strategies;

- It remains reluctant and cautious with regard to Latin American, Asian and African regional conflicts by choice; But for different reasons:
  
  **Africa:** EU frustrated with lack of regional commitment of its partners;
  
  **Asia:** EU aware of particular ASEAN way of integration;
  
  **Latin America:** EU sees no real regional conflict and therefore experiments with alternative approaches to pressing challenges (drugs, inequality);
**MENA:** EU does not believe in RI-CTR possibility, EU has internally not agreed on a regional CTR response which it could promote; external inhibiting factors (perceived rejection of regional CTR by Arab countries)

- The EU perception of its own role towards regional CTR now follows a new paradigm: ‘less regional CTR efforts are really more suited to the current worldwide shape of regional integration’.
4.2 PANEL II – Regional Conflict Transformation in the Mediterranean

Supervisor and head of MENA project group:
Prof. Marco Pinfari
The American University in Cairo (AUC),
Department of Political Science

4.2.1 Israel-Palestine – One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?

Hirah Azhar
The American University in Cairo (AUC),
Department of Political Science

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict provides, in theory, good grounds for encouraging regional integration as a strategy for conflict transformation: the conflict is regional in nature and Europe’s geographical proximity and past colonial involvement in the region make the EU a useful framework for the region to emulate. As the Palestinians’ biggest donor and Israel’s largest trading partner, the EU also enjoys a position of influence that, unlike the United States, remains relatively untarnished by accusations of bias. Moreover, instability in the region and the interests of key regional stakeholders in the conflict – including a large diaspora of Palestinian refugees – have also served to make regional integration a potentially useful conflict transformation approach. In reality, however, the EU has not pursued a tangible regional integration strategy to help transform the conflict. It has consistently demonstrated an unwillingness to match actions to its rhetoric of promoting regional integration in the Mediterranean on the one hand and calling for the adoption of a two state solution in accordance with international law, on the other. Nevertheless, the intentional and unintentional use of certain pathways of influence, indicate the EU’s growing reliance on its neofunctionalist approach towards conflict transformation. This has included a rather subdued but consistent promotion of regional cooperation to foster understanding, dialogue and civil society cooperation between both the Israelis and Palestinians as well as other regional actors.
Main Findings

- EU rhetoric has strongly pushed a normative agenda since Oslo, but policy towards the southern neighbourhood has become increasingly reactive. EU involvement in the conflict has accordingly been downgraded to conflict management;
- While the EU has pursued closer relations with existing regional organizations (e.g. Arab League) and supports a regional solution to the conflict, this has not translated into conflict transformation because of the absence of Israel from all existing regional organisations;
- The EU’s own regional integration initiatives have exhibited a strong bilateral shift. Though the UfM functions on an intergovernmental level and largely avoids high politics issues, however, initiatives like the Gaza water desalination project indicate a willingness to address conflict-related issues through a regional forum;
- Significant use is made of the compulsory pathway, although in largely bilateral terms. Compulsion has not led to a positive transformation of the conflict, however;
- The social learning pathway has garnered more attention recently, especially by promoting civil society dialogue in the region, but this has yielded mixed results;
- Interest in the model setting pathway, as demonstrated by the 1994 Paris Protocol and Netanyahu’s interest in pursuing ‘economic peace’, has been exclusively Israeli;
- The pathways are seen as enabling a changed context through integration, but not for the objective of peace. Palestinian actors accuse the EU (along with the Israelis and Americans) of pursuing normalisation without peace and paying for Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories. Israel does not consider the EU a suitable replacement for the US as a primary mediator;
- The EU should condense its parallel policies into an intentional and coherent approach and establish reliable partners for peace in the region, most importantly in the civil society.
4.2.2 The Maghreb – One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?

Justine Louis
The American University in Cairo (AUC),
Department of Political Science

At the time the Maghreb unceremoniously commemorates the 20th anniversary of the closing of the borders between Algeria and Morocco, relations between the two Maghrebi pivotal states are plunged to rock bottom and the Western Mediterranean region sadly remains the least-integrated region in the world. This quasi-absence of regional integration demonstrates, beyond the North African countries’ difficulty to cooperate, that the efforts Europe invested in the promotion of Maghrebi integration have so far not succeeded.

More than any other external actor, the EU has enjoyed an unrivalled relationship with its Southern Mediterranean neighbours due to the historical ties some European member states like France and Spain share with the region. However, this special relationship seems to be a double-edged sword for the EU. While it places Brussels in a unique position to understand its southern neighbours, the interests these member states still retain in the region prevent the EU from adopting a coherent approach. This has created a dichotomy between the EU declared goals and its actions therefore diminishing its influence in the region.

Strong advocate of multilateralism, Brussels has mainly implemented its Maghrebi policies bilaterally and on issue areas that were topping the EU agenda more than those of the local actors. Moreover, the EU official ‘neutrality’ and possible added value to the resolution of the Western Sahara conflict, which is considered as one of the major impediments to Maghrebi integration, is increasingly being challenged.
Main Findings:

- The increasingly bilateral nature of the EU-Maghrebi relations has intensified with the European Neighbourhood Policy and created a hub-and-spoke trading system to the detriment of intra-regional trade;
- Eastern Mediterranean issues have monopolized the Euro-led regional initiatives’ agenda, pushing the Maghreb sub-region into the background and leaving the local actors to think that they have never been the principal targets of these initiatives;
- The EU has not linked the promotion of Maghrebi integration to the transformation or the resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. Its non-involvement in the dispute is a commendable exception to the way the EU has generally dealt with territorial conflicts in its neighbourhood that can be explained by the influence France and Spain retain on the policies to be adopted in their former colonies;
- Brussels’ policies in the Maghreb have been dominated by the security concerns of Southern European member states. The focus on migration has not only indirectly contributed to fomenting tensions between Morocco and Algeria but seems at odds with Europe’s objectives to liberalize trade and develop infrastructures in the Maghreb;
- The EU has mainly relied on compulsion to implement its policies but its use has been selective and spread confusion among the local actors;
- Social Learning has had a positive impact on regional cooperation and demonstrates that the less institutionalized the initiatives in the Maghreb, the better they work. Hence, despite a strong emphasis on security issues and its smaller format, the 5+5 Dialogue is considered the most successful cooperative venture ever launched between the European and the Maghrebi partners;
- The neutrality of the EU in the Western Sahara conflict has been called into doubt by the Algerians and the Sahrawis, especially after the Sahel Crisis and the 2013 Fisheries Partnership Agreement concluded between the EU and Morocco. Similarly, the Moroccans now consider that the EU has become closer to the Moroccan position on the conflict.
4.3 PANEL III – Regional Conflict Transformation in the Sub-Saharan Africa

Supervisor and head of Africa project group: Prof. Lorenzo Fioramonti
University of Pretoria, Department of Political Sciences and Research Unit for Euro-African Studies

4.3.1 The EU and Regional Integration in West Africa: what Effects on Conflict Resolution and Transformation?

Giulia Piccolino PhD and Stephanie Minou
University of Pretoria, Department of Political Sciences and Research Unit for Euro-African Studies

Since the ‘90s, West Africa has been confronted to numerous security crisis. While these challenges initially took the form of major insurgencies, such as those experienced by Sierra Leone and Liberia, more recently the region has seen a rise of non-conventional security threats, including Islamic terrorism. Major crisis are ongoing in Northern Nigeria (Boko Haram insurgency) and Northern Mali (Tuareg insurgency).

West Africa is relatively advanced when it comes to regional cooperation. The main regional institutions are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA).

Both ECOWAS and UEMOA have promoted the liberalization of intra-regional trade and the free circulation of people across the region. ECOWAS has invested itself in several conflict management and resolution initiatives, including conflict prevention, mediation and peace support operations. In spite of this, ECOWAS has been unable to intervene effectively in Mali and Nigeria, because of the insistence of national authorities of treating the crisis as internal matters and the mismatch between the political region and the regional conflict complex.
The EU is a major partner to ECOWAS and UEMOA. The main framework for cooperation with the region is the Cotonou Agreement of 2000. The EU aims at promoting regional integration in West Africa through:

- Development aid for regional cooperation negotiated as part of the Cotonou Agreement;
- The recently concluded Economic Partnership Agreement;
- Political dialogue with ECOWAS;
- Aid specifically aiming at supporting regional peace and security initiatives, including the African Peace Facility.

**Main Findings:**

- In spite of existing initiatives, economic integration is weak for structural reasons and has limited impact on conflict transformation;
- ECOWAS conflict management policies have contributed to curbing violence, but the organization is relatively unprepared to face unconventional security threats;
- The EU exercise its influence on West Africa to a large extent through compulsion (provision of incentives and sanctions). Regional institutions in West Africa have also mimicked the EU model in many respects;
- Several issues have however reduced the influence of the EU on the region:
  - Inconsistencies by the part of the EU itself, driven among others by the post-colonial relationships of member states with the region;
  - A neoliberal understanding of regional integration, particularly with respect to the Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations;
  - The mismatch between the EU model and West Africa’s structural conditions, resulting in a gap between the formal embrace of EU-inspired norms and practices and the actual functioning of West Africa cooperation. EU capacity building aid seems to have had little impact in narrowing this gap.
The Great Lakes and the EU: A Regional Approach to Conflict Transformation

Sonja Theron
University of Pretoria, Department of Political Sciences and Research Unit for Euro-African Studies

The Great Lakes region in Africa has been plagued by an intractable conflict for approximately two decades. Countries in this region have suffered regular conflicts often sparked or fuelled by processes that cross state borders, including interference by neighbouring states, refugee flows and the illicit trade of natural goods. The origins of the conflict are the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which spilled over to the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo, whose eastern regions remain in conflict today. As such, it has become increasingly clear that a regional approach is necessary to address this conflict. In light of this several regional bodies have taken a greater interest in the region. More specifically, the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) was inaugurated in 2007 (with the support of both global and continental bodies) as a forum through which the root causes of the conflict would be addressed. It was thus through the ICGLR that negotiations on the recent M23 crisis were able to take place. Other regional bodies such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) have also seemed to address the conflict through various means, including peacekeeping and mediation. Nevertheless, while some states in the region are moving towards a more stable political and economic situation (particularly those that form part of Eastern Africa), others remain fragile and underdeveloped, and a more coherent regional policy that addresses the complexities of the region is necessary.
Main Findings:

- While the AU, ICGLR and SADC have had steady success in short-term conflict resolution, attempts at finding long-term solutions have struggled to get off the ground;
- Regional decisions often have limited impacted on the population, due to constraints of political will, capacity and weak institutions;
- Informal regional processes (including social and economic networks) often bear more legitimacy in the eyes of the population and may contradict formal efforts at conflict resolution;
- An over-reliance on external funds constrains African regional organisations and fuels distrust between African and European officials.
- The primarily pathways through which the EU has influenced the region are through compulsion and model-setting;
- While the European Union has rhetorically highlighted the need for a regional approach to the conflict, policy needs to be more comprehensive to ensure coherence amongst various EU delegations and with Brussels Headquarters.
4.4 PANEL IV – Regional Conflict Transformation in Latin America

Supervisor and head of Latin America project group:
Prof. Kai Lehmann
University of São Paulo, Institute of International Relations

4.4.1 The EU, Regional Conflicts and the Promotion of Regional Cooperation: A Successful Strategy for a Global Challenge? – Honduras Case Summary

Prof. Kai Lehmann and Octavio Forti Neto
University of São Paulo, Institute of International Relations

After decades of interstate and civil conflicts, today, Central America is a region without major wars, marked by territorial stability and, at times, robust economic growth. However, the region suffers from often severe political and social instability as well as high rates of poverty and endemic levels of violent crime. Within this context, Honduras stands out as being the most violent country on earth outside war zones whilst also being plagued by endemic levels of corruption. Significant parts of its territory are in the grip of gangs linked to the drugs trade. The military coup of 2009 against the democratically elected president Manuel Zelaya was merely the most obvious illustration of this instability.

There is, then, a broad problem of constructing viable, democratic states in the aftermath of long-lasting conflicts. This problem is reflected by the difficulty in constructing effective regional institutions for tackling the considerable common problems the region faces. To this end, the European Union has been very active in promoting institution building within the context of the Central American Integration System (SICA) with which the EU has a comprehensive Association Agreement.

However, the EU has been criticized from several sides for not doing enough to engage civil society actors, concentrating its efforts, instead, on
reforming state – and regional structures which have, according to some, no interest in being reformed and are of no relevance to large parts of the population. Equally the EU has been accused of not following a coherent approach to the region, at times seeking to promote Human Rights and democracy and, at times, focusing merely on the maintenance of ‘stability’. The factors which sustain the patterns outlined above have not been addressed.

**Main findings**

- The EU had an important and much appreciated role as a peace actor during 1980s which has been key in maintaining territorial stability;
- The region, as a whole, has struggled to construct viable states in the post-conflict scenario, facing endemic corruption, the corrosive influence of gangs and the drugs trade and, as such, the inability to establish an effective presence across all of the respective national territories;
- The EU has sought to promote both national and regional institution building, as well as the rule of law, respect for Human Rights, democracy and sustainable development;
- This effort is particularly pronounced in Honduras after the 2009 military coup and the EU has attested ‘significant progress’ on the part of the government in re-establishing a democratic system;
- These conclusions have been vehemently disputed by several civil society actors and analysts, which have accused the European Union of sustaining an illegitimate government and political system through its projects and financial support;
- The EU should do more to engage with actors at ‘mesa’ level, i.e. those that have contacts both downwards into areas without effective authority and upwards to the state.
4.4.2. The EU, Regional Conflicts and the Promotion of Regional Cooperation: A Successful Strategy for a Global Challenge? – Colombia Case Summary

Prof. Kai Lehmann and Cinthia Pestana Haddad
University of São Paulo, Institute of International Relations

The conflict in Colombia is the longest running civil conflict in the world. Its origins can be traced to the 19th century and a complex set of interrelated factors, of which the political culture of violence, the weakness of the Colombian state, limited political participation and unequal access to land and resources have been identified as crucial.

The main Colombian Rebel group – The Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) – can be traced to protest movements of peasants and indigenous groups during the 1930s, evolving into a formidable organization which, in 1964, declared its aim to overthrow the government. The ensuing civil war intensified during the 1990s with significant regional implications, straining political relations between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, causing a refugee crisis, especially on the Ecuadorian – Colombian border whilst also turning Colombia into a key location for the international drugs trade.

The role of regional organizations has been limited by, first, the geopolitical realities of the Cold War; second, a clear sense that the conflict is an internal affair for the Colombian people and, third, by difficulties to build regional consensus about political and security matters. Only during the 1990s did the EU - and organizations such as the OAS - become more actively involved, leading to local ‘peace building initiatives’, such as the EU-sponsored ‘Peace Labs’ and humanitarian work, especially with refugees. Yet, regional organizations have been largely absent from the current peace negotiations between the government and FARC in Cuba.
Main findings

- EU is seen as an important actor, but mainly on trade, rather than security or ‘peace matters’;
- Key actions of the EU are taking place on a bi-lateral, rather than a regional, basis. Regionalism is not seen as an instrument of peace;
- One key result of this bilateral approach has been the recent Trade Agreement between EU and Colombia (as well as Peru) includes clauses on issues directly linked to the root-causes of the conflict, but doubts have been raised about the effectiveness of enforcement of these clauses;
- Within the context of this bilateral approach, EU influence is, at best, variable with even EU diplomats describing Venezuela as ‘difficult’;
- EU has been criticized for not understanding – and not being willing or able to adapt to- the local circumstances within which it is acting, especially on the Ecuadorian-Colombian border in its support for Colombian refugees;
- Key demand from local actors: Make learning a mutual process, become more flexible;
- Overall conclusion: EU important, but mainly in issues of trade. Needs to be aware of the limits of its own power;
- Great unknown: Possible EU role in any post-conflict scenario in the event of a peace deal?
4.5 PANEL V – Regional Conflict Transformation in Asia

Supervisor and head of Africa project group:
Prof. Moosung Lee
Department of Political Science and Diplomacy
Myongji University

4.5.1 Regional Cooperation and Regional Conflicts – The Case of North Korean Nuclear Crisis

Prof. Moosung Lee
Department of Political Science and Diplomacy
Myongji University

When the North Korean nuclear issue constitutes a grave source of regional insecurity, the EU has endorsed a policy of regional cooperation and integration aiming at conflict transformation. Notwithstanding some evidence of positive contributions in terms of short-term compulsory impact and long-term model-setting implications, this paper basically argues that the EU’s endeavours have been undermined for three reasons. The ontological-security seeking activity is the first foremost impediment. The persistent preference of global actors, such as the US, has also been argued as problematic. Last but not least, the EU’s oscillation between multilateralism and bilateralism due to its lack of will and power has also generated some self-contradictory effects.

Main finding

Nature of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis:
- A consequence of the ontological security-seeking activity of North Korea;
- The fear and anxiety of North Korea’s self-identity by security actions of external forces;
- The nuclear crisis has a regional repercussions.
**Regional frameworks dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis in which the EU’s presence is either direct or indirect:**

- EU as an executive member of the KEDO, but its impact is marginal;
- EU presence within the frameworks ARF, ASEM, APT, but their impact is also indirect.

**Compulsory pathway**

- EU’s impact is implicit or marginal (in spite of its membership in KEDO; or ARF; ASEM);
- In Track 1.5 diplomacies, there are efforts for spill-over effects, but marginal.

**Social learning and changing context impact**

- There are moves to reduce the degree of abject others, but it is a simple learning;
- The EU’s role in inducing social learning among conflict parties is minimal;
- Reverse social learning: the EU admit the importance of accompanying both bilateralism and multilateralism;
- There are limits of transforming conflictive context into a cooperative one.

**Model-setting effect**

- EU is seen as a reference point: From Gorbachev to Park, Geun Hae
- There are efforts for regional cooperation/integration based on a mix of both functionalism (EU model) and intergovernmentalism (OSCE)
- The EU has not been seen as model to emulate, but its norm is worthwhile to pay attention

**Conclusion**

- EU impact minimal;
- Due to impact of global actor that is obvious;
- Rigid routines of North Korea continues for some time to come;
- But it is still hard to ignore long-term implications: the EU as a reference point.
4.5.2 Regional Cooperation and Regional Conflicts – The Case of the South China Sea Disputes

Yeikyoung Kim PhD
Myongji University, School of Sciences, Department of Political Science and Diplomacy

The EU’s attempt to embed the territorial dispute regarding the South China Sea within the institutional frameworks is related to its strategic interest to ensure unrestricted navigation of Asia’s waterways. Against this backdrop, the EU has a strong interest in deeper regional integration—in particular in continuing to support current processes of ASEAN integration—and the consolidation of habits of political cooperation among the region’s major players. Supporting evidence can be found in its participation in the major regional fora through its dialogue and cooperation with ASEAN, its participation in the regular EU-ASEAN ministerial meetings, ARF, ASEM process, and its accession to TAC. The present study investigates the process of the EU’s influence inside and outside of the regional cooperation and integration, and analyzes the impacts (compulsion, social learning, changing context, and model-setting) of regional integration and conflict transformation.

Main Findings

Compulsion:

- The degree and nature of compulsory effects has not been noticeable;
- China has opposed to largely discuss the South China Sea territorial issue within the multilateral frameworks;
- ASEAN members are quite welcome the EU involvement, but they do not expect much from the role of EU because of its limited leverage;
- The EU cannot ignore both internal and external challenges caused by pushing ahead with conditional sanctions/incentives within regional integration frameworks in Asia.
Social Learning and Changing Context:
- Social learning effects apparently happen in the region;
- China and ASEAN claimants acknowledged the importance of dialogue and interaction to mitigate regional conflicts;
- The EU has played a certain role in inducing the change of local actors’ perception toward regionalism, especially, through track-two diplomacy;
- The EU has encouraged ASEAN and China to build this foundation through the agreement of the Code of Conduct (COC);
- But the consultation on COC as a new formal rule will take a considerable time;
- Because China still prefers to bring up the issue bilaterally than in multinational forums.

Model Setting:
- The model setting effects encompassing hard-security issues such as the South China Sea territorial disputes are still questionable;
- China hesitates to embed this issue within the regional framework as it is perceived as a “western-dominated” system;
- ASEAN has approached regionalism with different premises from the EU model and this is true as long as the organization upholds its so-called ASEAN way
- Nevertheless, the EU’s impact as a model has also been identified, exporting its norms of peaceful resolution of conflicts or preventive diplomacy mechanisms through inter-regional meetings.
5. Working Papers

**Working Paper 1:**
Thomas Diez, Nathalie Tocci, Eva Scherwitz and Giovanni Faleg (2013): *The EU, Regional Conflicts and the Promotion of Regional Integration: Setting The Framework of Analysis.*

**Working Paper 2:**

**Working Paper 3:**

**Working Paper 4:**

**Working Paper 5:**

**Working Paper 6:**

**Working Paper 7:**

**Working Paper 8:**

**Working Paper 9:**
## 6. Contact List: RegioConf Project Partners

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Email</th>
<th>Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Thomas Diez</td>
<td><a href="mailto:thomas.diez@uni-tuebingen.de">thomas.diez@uni-tuebingen.de</a></td>
<td>Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen, Institute of Political Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tübingen, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eva Scherwitz PhD</td>
<td><a href="mailto:eva.scherwitz@uni-tuebingen.de">eva.scherwitz@uni-tuebingen.de</a></td>
<td>Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen, Institute of Political Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tübingen, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathalie Tocci PhD</td>
<td><a href="mailto:n.tocci@iai.it">n.tocci@iai.it</a></td>
<td>Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rome, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Faleg PhD</td>
<td><a href="mailto:g.faleg@iai.it">g.faleg@iai.it</a></td>
<td>Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI)</td>
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<td>Rome, Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eleonora Poli PhD</td>
<td><a href="mailto:e.poli@iai.it">e.poli@iai.it</a></td>
<td>Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Rome, Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof. Kai Lehmann</td>
<td><a href="mailto:kailehmann2002@yahoo.co.uk">kailehmann2002@yahoo.co.uk</a></td>
<td>University of São Paulo, Institute of International Relations</td>
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<td>São Paulo, Brazil</td>
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<tr>
<td>Octavio Forti Neto</td>
<td><a href="mailto:octaviofortineto@gmail.com">octaviofortineto@gmail.com</a></td>
<td>University of São Paulo, Institute of International Relations</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>São Paulo, Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinthia Pestana Haddad</td>
<td><a href="mailto:cinthiaph@hotmail.com">cinthiaph@hotmail.com</a></td>
<td>University of São Paulo, Institute of International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>São Paulo, Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Lorenzo Fioramonti</td>
<td><a href="mailto:lorenzo.fioramonti@gmail.com">lorenzo.fioramonti@gmail.com</a></td>
<td>University of Pretoria, Department of Political Sciences and Research Unit</td>
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<td>for Euro-African Studies</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pretoria, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Giulia Piccolino PhD</td>
<td><a href="mailto:giulia.piccolino@yahoo.it">giulia.piccolino@yahoo.it</a></td>
<td>University of Pretoria, Department of Political Sciences and Research Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sonja Theron</td>
<td><a href="mailto:sonjatheron@yahoo.com">sonjatheron@yahoo.com</a></td>
<td>University of Pretoria, Department of Political Sciences and Research Unit for Euro-African Studies Pretoria, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephanie Minou</td>
<td><a href="mailto:stephaniehapper@yahoo.fr">stephaniehapper@yahoo.fr</a></td>
<td>University of Pretoria, Department of Political Sciences and Research Unit for Euro-African Studies Pretoria, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Marco Pinfari</td>
<td><a href="mailto:mpinfari@aucegypt.edu">mpinfari@aucegypt.edu</a></td>
<td>The American University in Cairo (AUC), Department of Political Science Cairo, Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirah Azhar</td>
<td><a href="mailto:hera.azhar@gmail.com">hera.azhar@gmail.com</a></td>
<td>The American University in Cairo (AUC), Department of Political Science Cairo, Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justine Louis</td>
<td><a href="mailto:justinelouis@aucegypt.edu">justinelouis@aucegypt.edu</a></td>
<td>The American University in Cairo (AUC), Department of Political Science Cairo, Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Moosung Lee</td>
<td><a href="mailto:lms1221@mju.ac.kr">lms1221@mju.ac.kr</a></td>
<td>Myongji University, School of Sciences, Department of Political Science and Diplomacy Seoul, South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeikyoung Kim</td>
<td><a href="mailto:yeikyoung@hanmail.net">yeikyoung@hanmail.net</a></td>
<td>Myongji University, School of Sciences, Department of Political Science and Diplomacy Seoul, South Korea</td>
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