China: New Patron of Taiwan’s Local Factions?
The Transition of Taiwan’s Patron-Client System

By Qin, WANG
(PhD student in Institute of National Development, National Taiwan University)

Taiwan's factional politics has always been an indispensable part in Taiwan's political operation. When Kuomintang (KMT) moved to Taiwan, this Leninist Party lacked of link with the grassroots of society. For maintaining political ability and ruling the society effectively, the KMT had cooperated with the local elites and their social organizations and networks and established patron-client system. During the past Authoritarianism Era, as Chen Ming-tung (1995: 261) said, the KMT, as a hierarchy, constructed local factions mainly through clientelism, and manipulated the state apparatus through factions, and then mobilized and controlled the whole community, including political and civil society. This mode of operation was still valid after democratization, but after Taiwan's first Party Alternation in 2000 and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power, the new government had ability and motivation to turn over the pattern of local factions. As a result, the importance of local factions declined and many local factions swung to support DPP. Now local factions had become the focus of KMT-DPP competition. Thus, if someone wants to understand the logic of Taiwan’s politics, he/she must know the relationship between local factions and political parties, its electoral mobilization ability, as well as its impact on the daily political operation.

It’s certainly the focus of China’s Taiwan policy. As reunification with Taiwan has always been the goal of China, Chinese government had
adjust its Taiwan policy because its militarily threatening policy had been proved to be of no effect and they found that Taiwan’s local factions is undoubtedly the best starting point if they wanted to reunify with Taiwan peacefully. In the past, Chinese government both "placed hopes on the Taiwan people " and "placed hopes on the Taiwan Authorities ," but after the realization of Taiwan's democratization, public opinion had played an important role in Taiwan’s political process and therefore Chinese government paid more and more attention to the people of Taiwan, and took many preferential measures to Taiwanese, hoping to improve Taiwanese recognition and identity for China and reunification. All these measures were used to strengthen the interaction between Chinese government and civil society and the grass-roots community in Taiwan, especially grass-roots network and organizations . As cross-strait civilian interaction had become increasingly frequent , all of these measures have deeply changed Taiwan local factions and its patron-client system, and many local factions which had ever been the client of KMT now served as the agent of China .

**Literature Review**

There are many viewpoints about Patron-clientelism and most of these opinions agree that the concept is about relationship network between political actor and its agent in gross-roots society. So Patron-client dyad, narrowly defined, is an informal, particularistic, exchange relationship between actors of unequal power and status. As a somewhat broader operating principle, clientelism reflects an extensive distrust of impersonal authority; a tendency to rely on the activation of diffuse primary relationships in order to accomplish assorted social, economic, and political goals; and, most important, a posture of personal dependency on superiors within the status hierarchy. (Kaufman,1977:113)

As for the factions ,it refers to a kind of multiple interpersonal
networks, which include binary alliance as the basic unit, and this alliance want to obtain and distribute the resources from the public sector or quasi-public sector. (Chen, 1995: 13) This network appear everywhere, and many important public position which play an important role in local political activities, such as city and county executives and delegates, township chief and delegates, director and supervisor of the agricultural and fishing and water commission organization, and credit union, are all the important members of the local factions. (Wang & Huang, 2001: 118) If defining factions more broadly, we can find that many KMT-owned business, state-owned business, as well as various types of foundations and community groups, all have certain characteristics of local factions, and play the role which are played by local factions.

As for the mode of operation of clientelism, there are three kind of mechanisms for patrons to support clients, including resource exchange, cultural relations, and violence. The first mechanism, the interaction between the patron and the client, is based on different patterns of resource exchange, the patron provide resources, including instrumental, economic and political resources, and the client promise to be loyal to the patron. The second mechanism is that the client supports the patron because of loyalty, friendship, duty, trust, and emotion between them. The third mechanism is that, when the client’s compliance begins to erode, the patron often uses violence or threats to maintain this dominance relationship, which include force, threat, and recover the existing interest owned by the client at present. (Wang, 2006: 107-8)

As we see, the first mechanism is the most important operational mechanism in the Authoritarianism Era, and the KMT monopolized various economic and political resources, which can be used to exchange for political loyalty of the local factions by KMT to consolidate its authoritarian rule. There are four major economic privileges which can be used to exchange for political loyalty of local
factions by KMT, including regional exclusive charter by government, privileged credit from provincial bank, public sector procurement, as well as economic benefits from local public powers. (Chu, 1989: 139-60)

After democratization, the relationship between local factions and party politics had changed, and the KMT’s hegemony was replaced by multi-party system, and then the KMT is no longer the only alliance object of local factions. At the same time, because of the fierce competition among political parties, the KMT had deepened its dependence on local factions, although the election mobilization capacity of local factions had been declining. (Hsu & Chen, 2004: 212, 223)

However, although the relationship between the local factions and political parties changed and local factions began to be loyal to different parties, but the attitude of the KMT and the DPP for local factions is different. Although the DPP also wanted to absorb local action, but at the same time it took measures to undermine the local factions, including protracting bribery investigation (Hsu & Chen, 2004: 223), and the proposal to cancel the township chief elections and appoint them by local government as an alternative. (Wang, 2001: 118) This means that the DPP was more likely to undermine the political influence of local factions, rather than absorbed them.

It’s noteworthy that, all of above-mentioned studies of local political parties and factions overlooked another important phenomenon, the China factor. Although the importance of local factions began to decline, but it’s still attractive, especially for China who always wants to reunify with Taiwan, and because economic and cultural exchanges between China and Taiwan strengthened increasingly, there were more and more opportunities for China to improve its influence for Taiwan's politics and it was able to intervene the operation of Taiwan’s political life through local factions. In fact, all the measures, the KMT using in the past, was able to be used by China, either, who
can also establish connection with local factions through economic resources, cultural connections and even threats of violence, as well as constructing a new patron-client system. And this is precisely the major change in Taiwan society in recent years, for example, famous businessman Hsu Wen-long issued a statement to support reunification at the request of Chinese government, on the occasion that Chen Shui-bian was elected the President at the second time. That was a good case implying that China could use threatening to exert its influence as the above-mentioned third way. By Ma Ying-jeou era, there are more economic and cultural measures which can be used by China to get the support from the grass-roots society in Taiwan, including agricultural and private sector procurement by visiting delegation to Taiwan, Chinese tourist, as well as the well-known Tainan milkfish contract, which all can be regarded as the above-mentioned first and second way. By using such measures, China had achieved certain good results. Maybe these practices will convert Taiwan local interest group into China-dominated patron-client system, and that is the focus of this article.

But in recent research, Taiwan local factions research and China’s Taiwan policy research are divided, and researchers are not aware of both can be combined. But actually, we can find the transitions of factional politics in Taiwan and China factor’s influence, from patron-client theory perspective.

“Political agents” mode or “new patron-clientelism”?

In all studies about China’s penetration to Taiwan, the most popular argument is that Wu Jieh-min (2015: 6-7) proposed “political agents” mode and the concept “local collaborators of China factors”, who argued, China through the cross-Straits political and business
network influence Taiwan society by cross-Strait political and business capital, while on the final part of the implementation of this influence, China need the help from the network of local collaborators play a role within Taiwan society. Wu Jieh-min (2015: 7) argued that, the local collaborators cultivated by China are the political agents of China in Taiwan.

This mode of operation include the following forms:

The first is common communication platform of the KMT and the CPC, which many scholars (Dong Li-wen, 2013; Chen Ming-tung, 2013; Wu Jieh-min, 2015: 9) named united front platform. For different focus, these platforms can be divided to 5 forms, including Cross-strait Trade and Culture Forum, which is generally known as KMT-CPC forum(國共論壇) and focuses on exchanges of trade and culture between China and Taiwan; Cross-strait Entrepreneur Summit, also known as the Purple Mountain Summit(紫金山峰會), which mainly focuses on entrepreneurs on both sides, includes a number of business elite participants, and the convener of the two sides are senior members of the leadership in charge of the economy in China and Taiwan government; Boao Forum for Asia(博鰲亞洲論壇), many Taiwanese businessmen and top politicians attend because it’s a good chance to meet directly with China’s top leaders; Strait Forum(海峽論壇), which focuses on civil society and SMEs, in recent years, because of the new situation since the 318 Student Movement, which vigorously invites youth to participate the forum; Cross-strait Peace Forum(兩岸和平論壇), focusing on cross-strait academic dialogue on political issues, even covering some scholars from Green Camp of Taiwan, but only holding a session.

The second is the KMT Leadership Mission to China. Former KMT Chairman Lien Chan(連戰), Wu Poh-hsiung(吳伯雄), and Eric Chu(朱立倫), have visited China many times and meet with Chinese top leaders mainland. Except Eric Chu, who took into account the social
atmosphere of dissatisfaction with the KMT and didn’t not organize businessmen accompanying with him, Lien Chan and Wu Poh-hsiung both had led many businessmen to visit China, especially after retiring. In addition, there are many the vice-chairman level visiting mission. Such these visiting missions all visit several provinces and municipalities in China and KMT play the important role for the communication and cooperation between the local governments and Taiwanese entrepreneur in this process.

The third is the ARATS (海協會) and the SEF (海基會), including the ARATS and the SEF communication and consultation mechanisms and mutual visits. During Chen Shui-bian era, the communication between the ARATS and the SEF was shut down. After Ma Ying-jeou became president, the communication then recover contacting and negotiation, and during 8 years the ARATS and the SEF signed 23 agreements, and the leaders of the two organizations also held eleven high-level talks. Except that, the SEF held normal visit to China more frequently, such as the SEF chairman Lin Join-sane (林中森) visit China for up to 42 times in 3 years and 8 months of its tenure, almost once a month. By this kind of normal visit, the two organizations can process many problems faced by Taiwanese businessmen in the mainland of China in a timely manner, resolve disputes, and improve the investment environment.

The fourth is the vast number of Taiwanese businessmen and the organizations they created. Taiwanese businessmen in China organized the Taiwan Business Association in their investment places and set up a national "The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland" (全國台灣同胞投資企業聯誼會) in Beijing, although the top leader in charge appointed by Taiwanese entrepreneurs, but more of the Secretary-General are Chinese officials, which is a special model of cooperation between officials and businessmen. Through these Taiwanese association, Chinese government can better link these Taiwanese businessmen and
maintain the daily interaction. In addition, there are also many Taiwanese industry associations established in Taiwan, and they set up offices in various cities in China. Actually these organizations can also play important role for contacting with Taiwanese businessmen and Chinese government.

It should be focused that, the main agent of the above-mentioned intermediate form is the KMT, and during Ma Ying-jeou's reign its influence also grow mostly. But with Tsai Ing-wen coming to power, China also need to look for new agents in the DPP government, and as Wu Jieh-min\(^1\) pointed out, there are some opportunists within the DPP who are developing business relations with Beijing, and want to be new agent replacing the KMT.

China do contact and communicate with Taiwanese political, business, academia elite and Taiwanese entrepreneurs via these platforms and organizations, and form a relationship of interest coexistence. However, the goal of China is not just to establish the cooperative relations with the above-mentioned groups, but also hope that they can help to influence Taiwan society, which requires participants in these groups returned to Taiwan and exert influence. There are many form mainly including that,

The first is through the news media influencing public opinion. Kawakami (2015:17) lists four models, namely the acquisition of Taiwan media by Taiwan Businessmen, and intervention the content of coverage and the speech; all levels of Chinese government report in Taiwan, through product placement for newspapers and television; to exert pressure on the news and political talk shows by buying a variety of entertainment shows or TV series; routinized communication between Chinese government and the media, which lead to reporters' self-censor. Kamikawa (2015:18) further analyzed

\(^{1}\) quoted from Wu Jieh-min’s interview by Initium Media, Gong Ke, 2016, Pay close attention to how Beijing agency transfer, Initium Media, https://theinitium.com/article/20160323-taiwan-Wu-Jie-Min01/ -
the skill of local collaborators, that is, through the internal organization of the system to review relevant comments, with the requirements of the Chinese government, and even within the organization to expand “China concerns” automatically, so that the Chinese government can get maximum publicity value with lower cost.

The second is the business united front model that is to put pressure on Taiwan government by Taiwanese businessmen who have extensive economic interests in China Mainland, or to affect the electoral process. Wu Jieh-min (2015: 11) cited the 2012 presidential election as an example, at that time business elites had expressed their support for the 1992 consensus, to illustrate how the business impact the election, in addition to China also mobilize Taiwanese people to go back to vote for Ma Ying-jeou through the Taiwan business association system. Moreover, in the field of public policy, many businessmen are also actively lobbying the government and the opposition, asking them to open wider, and with the cross-strait also cooperation party for cross-strait agreement as soon as possible, Wu Jieh-min (2015: 11) referred to China government convince to adopt the trade agreements signed by China and Taiwan through China’s Taiwan businessmen association system, as well as directly through Taiwan-affairs related officials. However, China’s exerting influence for Taiwan is far more than the above-mentioned groups of Taiwan, he ignored the most important actors who are financial sector continuing on lobbying in the Legislative Yuan, and the DPP could not ignore that, too. In fact the DPP also decided to accept the Service Trade Agreement under pressure of financial factor². But later the Sunflower Student Movement broke out, avoiding this result being achieved.

² From author’s interview with the DPP’s core staff on December 2013. The staff said at that time DPP could not stop Service Trade Agreement because the financial sector’s lobbying pressure was too large. DPP decided to propose several amendments when voting one by one symbolically, but not fierce resistance.
There are more means to exert influence through the business model which of course are not limited to Wu Jieh-min listed, including Chinese tourists to Taiwan, milkfish for lease, purchase by internet buyers, and other forms. Obviously, the China factor has penetrate into the fields of tourism, agriculture, fisheries and fruits, which has a stronger link to grassroots society than those industrialized large enterprises, even every enterprise or cooperatives are a local spud (樁脚), playing key role in local elections, by these groups to influence elections and local politics perhaps has a more direct effect.

There is also the role of Chinese capitals to Taiwan. In spite of many limitations by Taiwan government to Chinese investment, there are still a large number of Chinese enterprises willing to invest in Taiwan, Huang Chien-chun (2015: 12) thinks that Chinese enterprises investment in Taiwan is the necessary process the CCP is bound to deepen its influence in Taiwan. Although relatively small scale, Huang (2015: 14) still summarizes a new integration model after Chinese entrepreneurs investing Taiwan, in which Chinese entrepreneurs established the cross-strait capital network through joint ventures, equity participation or acquisition. There are many examples, such as Beijing Holdings Limited (BHL 京泰集團) and Nice Group(耐斯) organized a joint venture in Taiwan, marketing their own brand by channels each other; Shanghai Fuxing Group(復星集團) participated the shares of Taiwan Ludwig Bakery(維格餅家), so that the latter products can enter the Chinese market; Jiangsu Yueda Textile Group(悅達紡織) participated the shares of Taiwan Latitude(南緯), which is to introduce its technology to develop Europe and America and China markets; Zhejiang’s cleaning brand NICE Group(納愛斯) bought out Taiwan wonderful cleaner brand Magic Amah(妙管家) in order to enhance the added value of their products. These four models can be described as typical example of Chinese enterprises infiltration to Taiwanese companies, or working with. However, because the analysis focused on legal investment in Taiwan, he underestimated the size of Chinese enterprises’
investment in Taiwan, but also missing a lot more subtle patterns.

Commonwealth Magazine investigated Chinese investment for six months and clearly depicts various manifestations. In addition to the only legitimate path through Investment Commission, MOE(投審會), there are four additional investment ways in legal gray areas, including hiding identity so as to invest the project Taiwan is not open; offshore companies of the Cayman Islands and Bermuda mode; investment through garage account; multi-level reinvestment mode (Lu, Lau & Yan, 2016: 85). The impact of Chinese enterprises investment in Taiwan, is not only to get a lot of advanced technology of Taiwan’s industry, but also get in access to many government BOT tenders, in order to establish partnerships with local governments, and affect the daily lives of the people of Taiwan. The most typical case is Beijing’s largest state-owned holding company of Beijing BHL through two investment companies to obtain Nanzih of Kaohsiung and Luodong of Ilan’s sewage treatment projects, but on the surface they still maintain the identity of Taiwan enterprises, respectively, by Lushanlin(綠山林) and Dongshanlin(東山林) companies to come forward to participate. As the Kaohsiung City government officials said³, Chinese enterprises through the government to undertake this type of project, can take plenty of underground pipeline information, including major pipeline, Taipower(台電), water and other important tubings.

Of course, the main function of this business model is currently exchanges and cooperation, it has not been a direct impact on government decision-making except for a small number of lobbying, and some business model with direct links with Taiwan grassroots has not completely changed local politics in Taiwan. Huang Ching-hsien (2013: 23) compared the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections and found that in all of the places which benefit from Chinese tourists to Taiwan, namely Puli(埔里) of Nantou(南投) Sun

³ From the interview with the director of Kaohsiung City Hall Water Resource Division, Tsai Chang-chan. In Commonwealth,2016,Vol(594), 84-6.
Moon Lake (日月潭) and Chiayi Alishan (嘉義阿里山), and other places including Kukeng of Yunlin (雲林古坑) of orange procurement, Dalin of Chiayi (嘉義大林) of Oncidium procurement, Hsuehchia of Tainan (台南學甲) of milkfish in deed, Ying-an of Kaohsiung (高雄永安) of grouper procurement, there are not any significant changes of the original blue-green situation, but the support for KMT reduced. As Chinese enterprises in Taiwan, it is more difficult to make the immediate impact for Taiwan Society.

It is a paradox, on the one hand there is a dense cooperation between the China and Taiwan, which means Chinese effect have already penetrated into every corner of Taiwan through a variety of ways, but on the other hand, this influence does not translate into vote for these political agents in Taiwan, namely the KMT, even in 2016 lost power. As a result, are all of China's efforts useless?

We need to clarify the causal relationship in detail, between the increasing influence of China to Taiwan and more vote to the KMT. In particular, what is the role played by Taiwan's political agents of China? And what is the purpose of the agents to seize power, to help China to affect Taiwan, or just emphasize on its self-interest but hurt the Chinese policy intentions? In addition, whether these agents’ role should contain winning elections, or just help China as a intermediary in Taiwan?

The problem of "political agents" perspective is that, although it reveals Chinese economic penetration mechanism, it focuses on "social center theory" (Hsu, 2012; Fan, 2012; Wu, 2012, 2015) and this view stressed that China needs to rely on the help from those local collaborators who work together in order to penetrate its influence to Taiwan society. But the problem is that Chinese Mainland has a strong national ownership, at the same time, although Taiwan's society’s movement energy is abundant, but it has not yet completely replaced the capacity of the state, that is, the state and society
interactive process still plays an important role. More importantly, although the ability of penetration in the authoritarian era are declining, it does not mean that its role will be replaced by society, may it will be replaced by another State actors, that is, China as a national body can play a similar role. If Chinese government determined to replace the KMT, it will become the new patron of the local factions, regardless of whether these so-called political agents, especially the KMT win the election, all of which having only instrumental value, and can not be the only target, because it’s most important for China completing construction of a new patron-client system.

The Possibility of China Construction of New Patron-Client System

As mentioned earlier, in authoritarian era the KMT often control the local factions by economic privileges, which can also be seen in the corresponding operating mode of interaction between local factions and China. To analyze the involvement of China factor in Taiwan’s local factions, we need to sort out all the changes from cross-strait exchange beginning, which can be divided into three stages, including the era of Chen Shui-bian, the era of Ma Ying-jeou, and the era of Post-Sunflower Movement and Tsai Ing-wen term. Because each stage of different political and economic situation, China's buy-out mechanism also changed, but its penetration had been gradually deepened. Then this article will list a few examples at different eras, trying to analyze the possibility of China construction of new patron-client system.

During the first stage, cross-strait relationship was still in the way of unidirectional civil interaction, Taiwan ’s enterprises and personnel can freely go to China but Chinese people not. Therefore, there were no other measures but only preferential to Taiwanese investment
which were Chinese government able to use and China only depended on Taiwan businessmen to exert influence on Taiwan. Big changes happened after 2005, when KMT Chairman Lien Chan visited China, who established mechanisms for cooperation between the Communist Party of China and KMT. By this mechanism, China’s profit for Taiwanese people can be distributed by the KMT, and the demand of Taiwanese people could also be conveyed to China by the KMT. KMT had become the mediator between China and Taiwan society.

The second stage is the era of Ma Ying-jeou. There was a significant improvement in cross-strait relations, and cross-strait civilian exchanges become more convenient and frequent, and official interaction between both sides also began and signed 27 protocol or agreement, which means China was able to interact directly with the local society in Taiwan and they could construct cooperation network. At the same time, the KMT’s role had not been weakened, because the KMT controlled many of local factions, and the penetration of China to Taiwan society still needed time. So in the era of Ma’s Government, China still relied on the KMT to strengthen links with the local society. But when Sunflower Student Movement occurred, Taiwan society began to be dissatisfied to cross-strait political and business alliance that monopolized the profit of cross-strait peaceful relationship, and therefore they began to resist this interactive mode. Then the third stage started. And Chinese government also found that there were many limitations just relying on KMT’s co-operation. So they began to interact directly with the local society and the youth, and hoped that China’s benefit could be directly enjoyed by the grassroots society. In other words, the interaction mode had changed between Taiwan and China, and many of local factions who supported KMT originally began to move closer to China, and became the direct agent of China in Taiwan.
The third stage will still include the era of Tsai Ing-wen. Because Tsai refused to accept the 1992 consensus, or even one-China principle, which all are seen as the most important political foundation by Chinese government, China may interrupt the official interaction between both sides. While China has begun to master the operation of networks of local factions, they have ability to interact directly with the Taiwanese people through the network. At the same time, the KMT 's role should not be ignored, who can still be used as the partner in political life in Taiwan. Therefore, this article will analyze and predict, on the basis of existing research results, the relations between the KMT and the local factions, as well as cooperation between the KMT and China in future.

**The First, Chen Shui-bian Era**

In Chen Shui-bian era, the cross-strait relations was mainly opposition and conflict. Taiwan government still controlled Chinese people and officials to Taiwan very strictly, and only a small number of cultural and commercial exchange between China and Taiwan, and only a small number of overseas Chinese tourists could be allowed to Taiwan for sightseeing. It means that China’s influence could not be able to get directly into the Taiwan society, but only rely on political agents. On 2005 KMT chairman Lien Chan visited China, and negotiated with Chinese President Hu Jintao, and then they established a direct interaction with China top leaders, Lien Chan and his political allies got the right to handle cross-strait direct interaction affairs, so both for economic and trade interests of Taiwan businessmen who want from the China government , and China’s economic interest for Taiwanese local people, all of which need through KMT. Before that, it was mainly individual KMT politicians communicate with China, the most typical example is the KMT Legislator John Chiang who negotiated with Chinese government for cross-strait charter flights. In October 2002, John Chiang put forward a proposal in the Legislative Yuan which is “Taiwan Businessmen Spring Festival Charter Flights ”, and he got 140 legislators to
countersign this proposal. But his proposal was boycotted by the MAC, Mainland Affairs Council（陸委會）, he decided to personally go to Beijing and negotiated with the relevant authorities of government and airlines, and then reached a number of conclusions, Chinese government had also given full of cooperation, and ultimately the first cross-strait direct flights succeeded (Chen & Tu, 2005). In 2005, Tseng Yung-chuan and John Chiang once again went to Beijing for getting another cross-strait charter flights, but compared with the first negotiation, another organization had played a more active role, which is Taipei Airline industry and Air Transport Association, who got re-authorized delegate of MAC, and they had right to negotiate about technical issues in Macao with China’s relevant authorities, which led to a second charter flights (Lin, 2005). This means that China needed the help from KMT on the one hand, and maybe also wanted to help KMT create a cross-strait political achievements, but on the other hand they also actively seeked to communicate directly with Taiwan’s industry, and to start consultations with Taiwan government through the industry.

But after 2005, Lien Chan visited China, this kind of two-pronged approach of Chinese government was limited to a certain extent, taking into account the partnership with Lien Chan, some of plans originally intended to communicate directly with local communities in Taiwan were also held in abeyance. The most typical example is the cross-strait agricultural cooperation. Before the cross-strait agricultural exchanges had not yet started, both DPP and Taiwan grassroots peasant organizations were interested in promoting Taiwan's agricultural exports to China, and in November 2004, to Hsu Hsin-liang（許信良）, former chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party, invited 21 important persons of Taiwan agricultural sector, and formed a “cross-strait agricultural exchange delegation”（兩岸農業交流訪問團）to visit Beijing and Shanghai, whose members include the chairman or director of Farmer Associations（農會）from Yilan, Yunlin, Chiayi, Tainan, Kaohsiung,
Pingtung and other places. They got access to meet with Vice Premier of the State Council Hui Liangyu (回良玉), and communicated with the Taiwan Affairs Office, Ministry of agriculture, Ministry of Commerce, General Administration of Customs and General Administration of Quality Supervision and Inspection and some other related sectors’ leader, to strengthen cross-strait agricultural cooperation and exchange of cross-strait agricultural trade. (Chiao, 2015: 48-52) Although Hsu ‘s visit had not immediately started the exports of Taiwan fruit, he also opened the prelude for visiting China of Taiwan Agriculture Organizations. In June 2005, Agricultural Delegation of Taiwan Province Farmer Association (台灣省農會) visited to Beijing, who wanted negotiate with Chinese government for many details about Taiwan fruit exported to China, and then made a number of consensus. But the KMT wanted to monopolize the market of Taiwan fruit export to China, even they had close relationship with FA system, they still wanted to dominate the process by themselves. As Chiao’s description (2015:121), after Taiwan Province Farmer Association Delegation’s visit, the director of the KMT Central Committee Mainland Affairs Division, called Chang Jung-kung (張榮恭) told to the leaders of TPFA that the next job will be deal with by KMT and the role of Taiwan Province Farmer Association was ruled out in the subsequent negotiation process. In fact, because of its direct channels of communication with China’s top leaders, the KMT indeed had a stronger policy lobbying power, and on the meeting Hu Jintao and Lien Chan, China promised to resolve the problems of Taiwan agricultural products exported to China, and the Taiwan Affairs Office also accordingly announced the preferential policy that 22 of Taiwan fruits with zero tariff.

As can be seen by the above two cases, although there were Chen Shui-bian government’s restrictions on China, Chinese government still wanted to cooperate directly with the political and social organizations in Taiwan, and they took a lot of attempts, but the KMT showed in this process a strong desire to dominate, considering the
importance of KMT-CPC cooperation, China government also agreed the KMT to intervene mainly to deal with related matters. Therefore, in Chen Shui-bian era, we can only say that China government started the linkage with Taiwan society, but did not create real partnership, not to mention the construction of patron-client system.

**The Second, Ma Ying-jeou Era before 318 Student Movement**
After Ma Ying-jeou came to power, cross-strait interaction had entered a new stage. Many Chinese officials who originally can not enter Taiwan now could pass through to visit Taiwan with the name of civil society organization, and many leaders of several provinces and municipalities in China can also directly visit Taiwan with their official capacity. Although the consultation and implementation of the cross-strait agreement still needs cooperation of Ma’s government, Chinese officials had already the convenience of cross-strait exchanges to communicate directly with Taiwan society, and the most typical example is undoubtedly the purchase policies by Chinese government and all level of local government.

As previously mentioned, the rural fruit cooperatives was the important object during authoritarian era by the KMT for its patron-client system, and after the DPP came to power they also wanted to eliminate local infrastructure of KMT through the southern pro-green grass-roots organizations, to form a new fruit production and marketing alliances, so as to achieve the purpose of weakening Taiwan’s Farm Associations System (Chiao, 2015: 94). But with the official launch of cross-strait agricultural exchanges, China cracked DPP’s penetration to local factions, through procurement policies, in particular through local farmers’ associations system and fruit cooperatives systems to buy fruit. Officially launched in 2006 for the first time bananas procurement policy, then there are two policies for the procurement of bananas and oranges. (Coke Jun, 2015: 139-41) And of course larger purchasing by China government started after Ma Ying-jeou came to power, on the one hand by the cross-strait
interaction platforms, such as the Boao Forum, China and Taiwan both sides reaching a purchase intent, and on the other hand is group purchasing policy by the missions of leaders of provinces and municipalities of China.

But as Chiao (2015: 155) observed, because of the implementation bias of the procurement policy, the whole process became Agriculture Comprador’s opportunity to earn huge profits, and thus the general farmers did not benefit from this process. And because many agricultural purchase commitments had not been put into place, the social effects they wanted to win over Taiwan's grassroots therefore greatly reduced. For this perspective, China’s efforts to construct the new patron-client system with Taiwanese farmers had not been easy, and although the curtain had been opened, progress was slow and frustrating.

**The Third, Ma Ying-jeou Era after 318 and Tsai Ing-wen Era**
The deepening of cross-strait exchanges had made the cross-strait relations become gentle on the one hand, and on the other hand it also made a lot of people in Taiwan feel uneasy, worry that Taiwan will lose its independence because the both sides will closely link with each other; and the fact that special interest groups monopolize the cross-strait peace bonus during the process of cross-strait interaction brings a sense of deprivation relative to other people, then the Sunflower Student Movement outbreak under such a context, and this kind of fear in the heart of Taiwanese people was transferred to China government clearly. In this regard, China has timely adjusted its policies for Taiwan, and made a decision to invite more youth people to participate in cross-strait interaction platform, especially on the Strait forum which focus on the exchange of grass-root community, China government invite many young people for different parties and many youth entrepreneur delegates, hoping that they can win over the hearts and minds of young people in Taiwan.
And for avoiding monopoly on the cross-strait peace bonus by the KMT as political agents of China, Chinese government also gradually reduce direct assistance to the KMT. In 2014 local elections, Chinese government did not encourage Taiwan businessmen to return home to vote, such as the 2012 elections, and it also did not provide cheap flight tickets for Taiwanese people to return to Taiwan. At the same time, Chinese government had strengthened direct interaction with local politicians. A typical example is Lee Chuan-chiao (李全教), who is the president of Tainan City Council. Lee Chuan-chiao has many business in China, especially in Pingtan Comprehensive Experimental Area (平潭綜合實驗區) in Fujian Province which is the biggest special zone for Taiwanese investment in China, and his main political ally also get a lot of franchises in some provinces in China, and at the same time, Lee Chuan-chiao also directly involved in Tainan milkfish for deed, and the fishermen are his supporter 4. That means China change its mode of interaction with grassroots communities by the help of the KMT, and now China directly win over local political figures by providing franchise ownership and cross-strait economic and trade cooperation opportunities, which can be regarded as the construction of new patron-client system into a good success.

Unfortunately, with the Speaker of Li Quan to teach because it involves bribery be stripped speaker positions, infiltrating to the Mainland to Taiwan local factions also suffered a setback, obviously, mainland construction of new patronage - efforts attendants system still struggling.

As Tsai Ing-wen came to power; it is difficult for China to maintain its old mode with direct access to Taiwan society through the government’s cooperation, because Tsai’s new government will intervene the communication between China and grassroots community. And Chinese government also made a decision that suspending official interaction between China and Taiwan, which accordingly made China lose the opportunity to interact directly with

---

4 From the interview with local politicians in Tainan, on Mar, 2016.
the Taiwan society. In a word, if Chinese government wants to continue to strengthen the penetration to Taiwan society, the only way is to invite Taiwanese local elite and young people to the China, and again seek the KMT’s cooperation, but of course its effect will be greatly reduced.

Summary

By reviewing the cross-strait interaction process from Chen Shui-bian era to Tsai Ing-wen era, we can see that China have been hoping to interact directly with Taiwan society and Taiwanese people, but because of government restrictions, direct penetration was very difficult so as that China need only to rely on the KMT as political agents until Ma Ying-jeou came to power. However, the KMT also has its own interests, especially the politicians have their own interests which may be different from China’s policy, leading to the China’s Taiwan policy ineffective, and even lead to a rebound of the Taiwanese people. Therefore, the most important goal of the China’s Taiwan policy should be direct contact with grass-roots community, while the KMT is only partner China had to choose under heavy restrictions, but not to rely on.

As that, the Sunflower Student Movement may be also good for China although it interrupted the cross-strait communication process. Because the reputation of the Kuomintang, especially Lien Chan et al., fell down, and their political influence also declined substantially, they can’t intervene and even monopoly the communication between China government and Taiwan local society. Of course, it doesn’t mean that the direct communication between China and grass-root society will sail smoothly, because of strict limitation of the DPP government, and Chinese government still need cooperation of the KMT. In Tsai Era, the triangle communication of CPC, KMT and DPP will be in new situation.
References


Chen, Ming-tung. 2013, Taiwan’s China Agenda, in DPP China Division ed., 2014, Files of DPP China Affairs Committee and China Policy Conference. 陳明通，2013，台灣的中國議程，載於民進黨中國事務部編，2014，民進黨中國事務委員會暨對中政策擴大會議文件彙編。


Kawakami. 2015. The Political Penetration under Market Mechanism: China’s Influence Mechanism in Taiwan’s Media Industry, Taiwan Sociology Institute Newsletter No.83, 17-20. 川上桃子，2015，市場機制下的政治滲透：台灣媒體產業中的中國影響力機制，台灣社會學會通訊第 83 期，17-20。


Huang, Chien-chun. 2015. Troy or Economic Running Water? The Path of Chinese Capital to Invest Taiwan and the Network of Political and Business Collaboration, the Taiwan Society Institute Newsletter No. 83, 12-16.


Lin, Hsu-hui. 2005. KMT Snatching Achievement of Cross-Strait
林修卉，2005，兩岸春節包機國民黨大演收割族，新台灣新聞
週刊，vol（460）。

Lyu, Kuo-chen, Lau, Kuang-ying & Yan, Pei-hua. 2016. 6 kinds of
Chaos for Chinese Investment to Taiwan. Commonwealth,
Vol(594).呂國禎、劉光瑩、嚴珮華，2016，陸資前進台灣六大
投資亂象，天下雜誌，vol（594）。

Conflict: A Study of Seven Latin American Countries.” in James M.
Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in
Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,

Wang, Chin-Shou. 2006. “Judicial Independence Reform and the
Breakdown of the Kuomintang Clientelism in Taiwan”, the
Taiwanese Political Science Review, 10(1). pp. 103-62.

王金壽，2006，台灣司法獨立改革於國民黨侍從主義的崩潰，
台灣政治學刊第十卷第一期，103-62。

Wang, Huei-huang & Huang, Huai-de, 2001. “Economic security,
Family, Factions and the State: Political and Economic
Foundation of Local Factions by System Theory Perspective”, in
Yung-Ming Hsu, Huang Chi ed., Level-of-Analysis Effects

pp.117-81.王輝煌、黃懷德，2001，經濟安全、家族、派系與國
家：由制度論看地方派系的政治經濟基礎，載於徐永明、黃紀主
編，政治分析的層次，台北：韋伯文化，117-81。

Publishing.吳介民，2012，第三種中國想像，新北：左岸。

Wu, Jeh-min. 2015. The Local Collaboration Mechanism of China
Factors: a Framework, Taiwan Sociology Association Newsletter, Vol(83), 4-11。吳介民，2015，中國因素的在地協力機制：一個分析架構，台灣社會學會通訊第83期，4-11。