ERCCT Online Paper Series:

The Historical and Political Process of cross-Strait “economicization”

Hui-Chun Liu
PhD Candidate, Department of Geography, University College London

July 2019
– Young Scholars Workshop 2019 selected collections –

The CCKF-ERCCT wishes to express its gratitude to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taiwan, R.O.C.) for generously supporting the Europe-Taiwan Young Scholars Workshop.
The Historical and Political Process of cross-Strait “economicization”

Hui-Chun Liu¹

Abstract

A free trade zone has long been regarded as a facilitator to improve economic globalisation. However, its implication of the relationship between geopolitics and economic globalisation is hardly illuminated. This paper attempts to explore the complex processes of the economic integration between Taiwan and China and its implications. Taiwan’s engagement in China’s economy can date back to the late 1980s when a ban on investment and visits were lifted, Taiwanese businesspeople flocked to mainland China for operating manufacturing. Over the nearly four decades, Taiwanese businesspeople have depended on China’s economic rise so heavily that it has stirred up a heated debate whether economic interdependence has impacted Taiwan’s democracy and reshape the identity of Taiwanese. In this paper, I will highlight the historical and political ground of “economicization” between Taiwan and China. In addition, I will discuss the way “economicization” is embedded in China’s distinct political process — policy experimentation and its impact.

1. The historical and political ground of cross-Strait “economicization”

This section will illustrate the historical and political grounds of cross-Strait “economicization”. The eruption of Korean War in the 1950’s has accidently shaped the Taiwan’s state building and since then US and Taiwan have

¹ PhD Candidate at Department of Geography, University College London, UK.
Huichun.liu.15@ucl.ac.uk
established close partnership against the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan’s economy was not coupled with China till martial law was lifted in the late 1980. Over the nearly past four decades, Taiwan have actively engaged in China’s economy and thus the cross Strait relationship has been gradually normalised, especially in economy.

The process of “economicisation” is shaped not only by historical contexts but also by complex political interaction between Taiwan and China. In this long process of Taiwan’s engagement in China, it can be divided into four important periods based upon different partisan views on the issue of economy and national security. As a result, I differentiated four periods: (a) 1981-2001: Lee’s Administration (2) 2001-2008: Chen’s Administration (3) 2008-2016: Ma’s Administration (4) 2016: Tsai’s Administration onwards.

(a) Between 1981 and 2001: Reapproaching China

Taiwan was invaded and colonised by Dutch, Spanish and Han in the 17th century and in 1895 the Qing Dynasty of the last imperial China period ceded Taiwan to Japan. With the end of the World War II, the Chinese government reoccupied Taiwan. Yet It was a incredible historical twist that the Chinese Civil War between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Nationalist Party (also the Kuomintang, hereafter, KMT) erupted after the post World War II, the defeated Nationalist Party fled to Taiwan and inherited its original country name, the Republic of China (ROC) ruling Taiwan in 1949. After the end of the Civil War, the KMT was determined to enforce a strict ban in travel and investment cross the Strait for the sake of the security of the fragile regime and to adopt one-party rule for nearly forty years. During this era, the anti-Cold War alliance formed between the US and Taiwan has also created Taiwan’s economic miracle and facilitate its industrialisation, especially in electronics industry(Hsu, Gimm, & Glassman, 2018).

The KMT-led government symbolizing free China was then seen by the US as an indispensible partner in East Asia (H.-t. Lin, 2016; Tucker, 2009). Yet the
US and Taiwan relationship started to change as the US hoped to seek China to fight against the Soviet Union. In 1971 the ROC lost its seats in the United Nations and one year later the US President Nixon visited the PRC’s leader Mao Zedong in 1972 and. Despite the isolation of Taiwan, the ROC’s leader, Chiang Kai-Shek and its successor, Chiang Ching-Kuo, kept an uncompromising stance against mainland China. Chiang Ching-Kuo insisted three hardline policies, “No Approach, No talk and No Comprise” while in the meantime China was implementing its economic reforms dated back to the late 1980’s. This isolation cross the Strait changed fundamentally until Chiang Ching-Kuo lifted martial law in 1987. Taiwanese since then were free to visit their relatives in mainland China and to reengage in China’s economy with government-agreed investments.

It is claimed that China’s successful export-led economy hinges not only upon the imitation of Taiwan’s export zone model and but upon oversea Chinese networks, especially Hong Kong and Taiwan (Wu, 2019). The investment of Taiwanese businesspeople between 1991 and 2001 amounted 18.9 billion US dollars (Cross-Strait Monthly Report 2013), second to Hong Kong’s investment during this period. Guangdong Province is the primary investment destination then. In addition, it is common for Taiwanese businesspeople to make a detour through the third country to invest in China for the sake of bypassing Taiwan’s legal reviews. Thus, it is believed that the actual investment is higher than the investment in official publication.

The underground and grey-zone investment from Taiwan indicated that Taiwanese politicians concerned that excessive Taiwan’s investment would cause risks to Taiwan’s economic security and employment issues. Then-President Lee Teng-hui — Chiang Ching-kuo’s successor and Taiwan’s first elected president from the KMT — once called for “No Haste and Be Patient” to curb investment into China and initiated Southbound policy intended for economic engagement with Southeast Asia during his rule between 1997 and 2000. Yet these policies did not stop the investment from continually flowing in China.
In the 1990s, Taishang benefited from two major China’s policies; Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in coastal areas and the Fiscal Reform in 1994. Especially the latter, it is termed as “Chinese style Federalism” (Qian & Weingast, 1996)” or “local corporatism (Oi, 1992, 1995)”, which granted local governments to take an active role in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). The 1994 Fiscal reform has resulted in a fierce competition amongst local governments as it eliminates a considerable amount of local government’s revenue. In addition, the significance of an historical event should not be ignored. The discontent arising from the 1989 Tiananmen Square once resulted in a large scale of capital flight, especially for those in western countries. Paradoxically, an exodus of capital did not stop the inflow of investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Businesspeople from these two states become the earliest beneficiary since the 1989 Tiananmen Square.

Open door policy that Shenzhen was designated as SEZ in 1980 by Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) and followed by the enforcement of the “Regulations on Special Economic Zone in Guangdong Province ” in the same year. This is the reason for which Taiwanese businesspeople centered their investment in Guangdong, particularly in Shenzhen and nearby Dongguan. Many of them focused on low-end manufacturing, such as textile, shoe and metal(Keng, Schubert, & Lin, 2012).

SEZs are implemented in some designated areas in China, which has made coastal Guangdong transform from a remote fishing village to a world factory floor. In the early reform era, the administrative rank of Dongguan was at county level, and with its fasting economic growth it turned out to be a prefecture-level municipality. In addition, Dongguan Model is regarded as a primary example of how Taiwanese manufacturing takes shape in China. To put it simply, Taiwanese businesspeople running small-sized factories have relocated in China since the 1990s and depend upon close ties with lower-level local governments — town, county, and prefecture municipality. This model contradicts the logic of the Third-World modernisation theory that
sees the state as a consistent entity as Hsing argued (Hsing, 1998). In China’s case, the market reform opens a new way in which that local government officials share some power in decision making of economic activities (Walder, 1995). In this sense, China’s economic development is embedded with highly differentiated local characteristics and also changes with global capitalism in geographical expansion. On the next stage have agglomerated multi-national companies in the Yang-tze River areas, which has established another classic development model, Kunshan Model.

(b)Between 2000 and 2008: Taiwan’s investment in a globalised context

China and Taiwan joined World Trade Organisation (WTO) respectively in 2000 and 2001. Economic globalisation has improved the interconnection of manufacturing and trade between Taiwan and China since then. Although economic interdependence across the Strait is growing with trade normalised and practiced in a globalised context, cross-Strait relations in politics and ideology are unprecedentedly tense, especially between 2000 and 2008, a period when Taiwan’s pro-independence party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), took power.

The DPP was established in 1986, and the following year was lifted martial law. Prior to that, any forms of anti-KMT activities were strictly prohibited. The KMT initiated propaganda that attempted to stop any anti-KMT political force mobilise. The common political rhetoric in KMT’s propaganda, “Three-in-one Enemy”, referring to the nation’s threat — the CCP, Taiwan’s independence movement activists and the non-party personage — was prevailing then. In the period of martial law enforcement in Taiwan, many of Taiwan’s independence movement activists, comprised of overseas and domestic dissidents, later joined the DPP. This made the DPP hold a strong independent stance against Taiwan’s status quo. The DPP claims that the sovereignty of Taiwan belongs neither to the ROC nor to the PRC and calls for self-determination referendum to be an independent country recognised internationally.
Due to DPP’s stance against long-standing One China policy, the Chinese authorities were worried whether Taiwan would become independent by holding self-determination referendum after the Chen Shui-bien from the DPP was elected as president in 2000. Compared to his hardline predecessor, Lee Teng-huei, in Chen’s first term, he adopted a freer and softer attitude towards cross-Strait economic integration, which seemingly contradicts his party’s stark pro-independence stance. In 2001, President Chen carried out a set of policies redoing transport link, termed “Mini Three-Links”, sea-trade and postal service that had been halted for over four decades between Kinmen and Xiamen — two offshore islands respectively belong to Taiwan and Fujian Province of China. These measures are seen regard a preparation that a nascent completely free trade between Taiwan and China.

In addition, Chen also announced his cross-Strait economic policy, “Open Actively and Manage Effectively”, presenting he would handle cross-Strait economy pragmatically. Since the trend of economic globalisation is irreversible, all that he could do is to lift restrictions on the outflow of capital as well as technological output and to strengthen regulations on the protection of technological advancements. Despite that, Chen’s government had a fierce debate over whether the ban on investments in China’s semi-conductor manufacturing should be lifted (Yang & Hung, 2003).

In cross-Strait politics, in his early first term, President Chen accepted “One China, Respective Interpretations” policy, which indicates that mainland China and Taiwan are an inseparable Chinese country while the ROC and PRC both consider itself the only representative government of China. Nonetheless, both sides started to feel antagonistic especially when Chen publicly stated, “both Taiwan and China are a country on its side. Cross-Strait tension increased with this statement spreading widely in Taiwan society. Chen was accused of practicing ‘de-sinicisation’ (qu zhongguo hua) in educational and cultural policy and of refusing to revise its party doctrine that Taiwan’s statehood should be
determined through independence referendum.²

Chen's second term also marks the starting point of 'economic united front strategy'. In 2005, a year right after Chen started to serve his second term, Hsu Wen-Long, a pro-independence Taiwanese entrepreneur and the founder of Chi-Mei Electronics, publicly made a statement, anti-Taiwanese independence, which astonished Taiwan society.

In the same year, there were two historical landmarks. One is 'Peace Tour' of Taiwan’s Pan-Blue campaign, a pro-unification coalition made up of the KMT, People First Party (PFP) and New Party (NP); the other is the enactment of Anti-Secession Law by the Chinese NPC. Lien Chan, the chairman of the KMT, visited China’s President, Hu Jingtao, together making a public statement against Taiwan’s independence in the Lien-Hu Gazette. This historical meeting has formed KMT’s pro-China image and later evolved a more delicate political discourse. To put it simply, KMT’s mainstream view is that maintaining cross-Strait peacemaking is to have more economic interaction with China and to address the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty ambiguously (Su, 2008). I will discuss this ambiguity later in the next section.

Despite the continued political tension across the Strait, China became Taiwan’s biggest trade partner. Many of Taiwanese business people build their headquarters and R&D (research and design) laboratory in Taiwan, export semi-finished products to China, complete production in China and sell in the US. Taiwan’s largest export industry to China is electronic components manufacturing, which depend upon China’s workers to complete products assembling.

According to Taiwan’s official statistics, Taiwan’s investment in China accounted for over 50 percent of the total outbound investment between 2002 and 2006. This figure nearly doubled the outbound investment between 1995

² The Chinese authorities’ accusation was usually critiqued that its statement is over-simplified. It overlooked the effect of Taiwan’s democratisation since the late 1990. The democratisation has become important to the rise of civic nationalism (Hughes, 2013).
and 2001. The ratio of Taiwan’s export to China trade took up nearly 40 percent of the total outbound trade in 2005, much higher than South Korea, 27% and Japan, 17% (Cross-Strait Trade and Investment Impact Evaluation Report, 2007). This represents that Taiwan’s export-led industry primarily benefited from China’s cheap labour and the US consumer market, especially consumer electronics, such as laptops, mobiles and other sorts of digital devices. In 2016, among top twenty manufacturing enterprises in China, six enterprises were based in Taiwan (ibid.).

In this era, this shift of Taiwan’s investment in China from textile and metal industry to electronics marked the Taiwan’s industrial restructuring from low-end products to high technology manufacturing. Taiwan’s electronics companies agglomerated in the Yangtze River Delta, mostly in Kunshan and Suzhou. Kunshan was a poor county in the late 1990, but government officials learned Taiwan’s economic success — export-led economy — by building long-term personal networks with Taiwanese business people (Chien, 2007; Chien & Ho, 2011). Other scholars have also explained the way in which Taiwanese electronics industry are embedded in global economy by adopting “Global Production Network” analysis. This highlights Taiwanese business people’ active role, especially its capability of outsourcing through a highly flexible network amongst firms (Hamilton & Cheng-shu, 2017) or “strategic coupling” ability that (Yeung, 2016).

Yet economic interconnection between Taiwan and China does not necessarily mean a liking for political integration as some scholars have observed (Kastner, 2006; S.-S. Lin, 2016). As is presented in the public survey (see figure 1), the percentage of the population who recognise themselves Taiwanese rose from 36.9% to 48.4% between 2000 and 2008. In addition, people with dual identities, recognizing themselves as Taiwanese and Chinese, were the majority up to 49.3 percent of the population in 1996. Yet the proportion of people who regard themselves as Taiwanese and Chinese declined gradually, roughly equal to the proportion of people holding singular Taiwanese identity.

However, as scholars have observed, what characterises Taiwanese identity
and how to interpret identity change are yet to clarified. Is being Taiwanese similar to what nationalism refers to? The scholarship of nationalism has developed a wide range of theories but what can be characteristic of Taiwanese nationalism seems an unsolved puzzle. More importantly, dual identities imply that Taiwanese political identity change is far more complicated than what nationalism theory have presented so far.

Figure 1. Public Opinion Survey Data – Taiwanese and Chinese Identity (1992-2018)

Source: Data Archives, Election Study Center of National Cheng-Chi University

(3) 2008-2016: the normalisation of cross-Strait economy and trade

Ma Ying-Jiou, who represented the KMT, ran for Taiwan’s presidential election and successfully took power in 2008. Compared to his predecessor, President

---

3 In some preliminary research, studies on Taiwanese identity have a wide range of finding and explanation. For example, Nai-Teh Wu, “Mianbao yu Aiqing: Chutan Taiwan Minzhong Minzu Rentong de Biandong” [Love or Bread: A Preliminary Study of the Identity Change in Taiwan], Taiwan Zhongzhi Xuekan [Taiwanese Political Science Review] 9:2 (2005), pp.5-39. It is noting that most of much of the research argues that identity change indicates identity is not a fixed entity but a long-term process shaped by complex factors. Yet the scholarship on which method is adequate for the measurement of identity has no consensus. To put it generally, in Taiwan’s case, class, ethnicity, generation and engagement in China’s society are key factors that shape individual identity.
Ma recognised the “92 Consensus” — a fictitious term created by Su Chi⁴ and CCP as a basis of cross-Strait relationship.

According to Su’s interpretation, the core spirit of the “92 Consensus” is to recognise that Taiwan and China are one country, and Taiwan’s sovereignty belongs to China. Yet what China indicates have different interpretations. The KMT has a differentiated view on “One China” policy that has been recognised internationally. That is to say, the KMT considers that the Republic of China (ROC) is the only representative government in the world rather than the People Republic China (PRC). The self-recognition has shaped Taiwan as “geopolitical absurdity”.

In Ma’s terms, he was devoted to facilitating cross-Strait economic interactions by two means. One is to lift the ban of mutual investments and the other is to sign trade agreements with China. These two means of economic integration intend to build a common market across the Strait.⁶ The KMT’s China policy is to establish an interactive framework to tie Taiwan’s trade and economy with China more closely. After the KMT took office in the Legislative Yuan and Ma won the President in 2008 in the meantime, cross-Strait economic interaction was gradually formalized.

An economic agreement, Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), across the Strait was signed in 2010. The Ma administration claimed the ECFA would make Taiwan’s export industry benefit from tariff cuts.⁷ The

---

⁴ Su Chi is a scholar in international relations and started to serve in Lee’s government in 1990. According to Su, the 1992 Consensus was created by himself to address cross-Strait relationship. Regarding the complete historical account of the “92 Consensus” and its implications, please see Su (2008) “Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China: A Tail Wagging Two Dogs” (Su, 2008).

⁵ See https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/07/taiwans-status-geopolitical-absurdity/593371/

⁶ The original idea of cross-Strait common market was proposed by Vincent Shaw, who served as Ma’s Vice President between 2008 and 2012. In 2001, he proposed an initiative to build a common market as the EU’s single market. Regarding his complete work on this proposal, please see https://www.crossstrait.org.

⁷ Regarding the implications of ECFA and its policy, Taiwan’s government made website to explain its implication of the ECFA. See http://www.ecfa.org.tw
ECFA is meant to provide a general legal framework that allows rooms for both sides to initiate talks over further agreements on respective industries. In the early spring of 2014, the Ma administration announced the negotiation of cross-Strait service trade agreement (CSSTA) progressed well and was about to sign the CSSTA with China shortly.

Yet a numerous non-governmental organisations that involved in social movements for the long run doubted this abrupt decision, including the transparency of the trade deal, over-dependency on China’s economy and the loss of Taiwanese job opportunities. They formed a solid ally to mobilise an imminent anti-CSSTA movement. Dramatically, on the 18th March of 2014, student protesters broke into the hall of the Legislative Yuan and then occupied in the street right after a KMT’s legislator in haste passed the review regarding the CSSTA in a committee regardless of the boycott of the opposition party, the DPP. The student demonstrations ignited the discontent that the civil society had after Ma’s China policy was implemented. This movement, termed the Sunflower Movement, terminated the CSSTA and the rest of trade agreements with China. In addition, it further provoked a fear of Taiwan’s gradual loss of economic autonomy if Taiwan depends upon China’s market and its flooding investments.

There has been a continually debate over what effects “China’s economic united front strategy” would have in Taiwan’s society (Ho, 2019). More importantly, this movement prompted China’s government to adjust its Taiwan policy towards a more comprehensive approach aimed at Taiwan’s younger generation.

By naming “China Factor”, Taiwanese scholars has depicted how a cross-Strait bloc made up by Taiwanese politicians and Taishang has impacted Taiwanese society, including politics, economy and culture (J.-m. Wu, 2016). This bloc has privileged Taiwanese capitalists especially for those whose factories are based in China, as well as middle class who work for China-based manufacturing shop floors (Lin & Hu, 2011). According to Lin and Hu (2011), the factor that determined Taiwanese political preferences has
gradually become class and rather than ethnicity. The more economic interaction between Taiwan and China there is, the wider gap between the poor and the rich there is.

In this respect, after the Sunflower Movement erupted, the Chinese President Hu Jintao announced that future Taiwan policy should be aimed at caring for four groups of people: people running medium and small-sized enterprises, residing in the middle or southern part of Taiwan (these regions are traditionally regarded as pro-DPP constituencies), earning low and middle income and young people. These policies are termed as “Three Middles, One Youngsters" (san zhong yi qing).

Although cross-Strait trade talks ceased after the 2014’s Sunflower Movement, the Chinese authorities promised to grant unilateral privilege to Taiwanese investment in Fujian Province. Fujian Province can implement what service industry the CSSTA granted to open by taking advantage of cultural and social bonds with Taiwan. According to the original texts of the CSSTA, China’s side open 80 categories of service industry to allow for Taiwanese investments, primarily centred including banking, conference service, and telecommunication. This unilateral policy decision is usually interpreted as China’s ceding in economy (Rang li) to gain Taiwanese political support. The ideology behind China’s ceding is based upon an assumption: economic interdependency between two rivalry countries can reduce political conflicts and then maintain long-term political stability. In other words, if Taiwanese who benefit from China’s economic ceding policy, they will be inclined to keep gaining benefits and will not make a choice that irritates the Chinese authorities, for example, supporting Taiwan’s independence or voting any political party that supports independence. The ideology has dominated China’s Taiwan policy and also influenced the way in which China’s central state determines Fujian’s developmental pathway. For example, in 2015,

---

Fujian Province launched a free trade pilot zone aimed at building a closer economic interaction with Taiwan. In other words, whatever economic project initiated in Fujian in recent years has been seen as something with Taiwanese characteristics.

Prior to Fujian’s free trade zone establishment, in Hu’s administration, China once proposed an idea to initiate “West Side of the Strait Economic Zone” (Hai-Xi jing ji te qu) to strengthen trade links between Fujian and Taiwan. In 2009, a pilot zone was initiated in Pingtan — an offshore island situated outside Fujian Province — and termed Pingtan Comprehensive Pilot Zone. This zone aimed to implement pioneering experimentations by establishing a co-governance model that unprecedentedly authorised Taiwanese as deputy government officials for policymaking in local politics. This power-sharing political experimentation still goes on although it has also caused controversies and challenged the issue of sovereignty and citizenship in Taiwanese society.

By drawing upon following China’s Taiwan policy trajectories, I will attempt to discuss whether Fujian Provinces passively responds to central state’s policies. The implementation of Fujian free trade zone and Pingtan comprehensive pilot zone are not simply intended for economic gains but also concerns political and social impacts, especially for the sake of improving integration.

For the Chinese authorities, they were stunned by the large-scale student demonstrations as previous cross-Strait agreements in Ma’s term were peacefully and successfully signed. On the other hand, the Chinese authorities consider that Taiwan’s economy will benefit from an open and more integrated trade deal with China. Thus, the state press criticised that the student demonstrations that strongly opposed the CSSTA intended to “politicise” economic interaction with China and this trade deal was supposed to “be free from any forms of political ideology”.

Please see http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-04/11/content_2657702.htm
In this manner, after the Sunflower Movement, the Chinese authorities attempted to address young Taiwanese “anti-China” sentiments. CCP’s tactics is to gain young Taiwanese’ support by privileging them economically as they has treated Taishang over the past three decades. Encouraging young Taiwanese to engage in China’s economic development has become a new tactic for the Chinese government. In 2015, the first Cross-Strait Youth Start-up Base (CSYSB) was launched in Xiamen’s free trade zone, which represented that China’s economic united front policy reached a new benchmark. In the next section, I will continue to demonstrate the latest cross-Strait economic interaction after President Tsai took power in 2016.

(d) 2016-onwards

In 2016’s Taiwan’s presidential and legislative election, Tsai Ing-Wen, nominated as DPP’s presidential candidate, won the election and her party also gained the majority in the legislative council for the first time. Due to DPP’s independent stance presented in its party doctrine, although Tsai herself is seen as a non-establishment DPP politician — replacing a strong independent claim by promising to “maintain status quo” as her predecessor did, the Chinese authorities bypassed formal channel of communication with Tsai’s government and built more ties with Taiwan civil society.

In addition to establishing start-ups bases in major cities, China actively enacted a more comprehensive policy to attract Taiwanese. In 2018, China initiated a set of policies, termed as 31 preferential policies. Six months later, China announced 31 preferential policies and issued Taiwanese residence permits. The policies indicate that Chinese authorities actively incorporate Taiwanese who work, study and reside in China into a new scope of citizenship governance by recognizing Taiwanese migrant workers as “nationals”.

In Tsai’s Administration, she reinitiated “New Southbound” policy initiated in Lee’s Administration in the 1990s, and aimed for closer economic and diplomatic interaction with Southeast Asia countries. In addition, Tsai also
implemented a set of economic policies to encourage outbound Taiwanese investment back to reinvest in Taiwan. This represents that Tsai intends to alter economic overdependence on China.

2. Conclusion: the Justification of “Economisation”

China usually justifies economic integration with Taiwan by deploying both free market logic and “good will” logic. Free market logic, in this context, means that the lift of trade barrier and prioritising mutual profits is the only concern when it comes to cross-Strait economic integration. Any political ideology should be excluded from the negotiation of trade deals as people who involve cross-Strait trade hold value neutrality without presenting any ideology. The neutralization of discursive practices intends to depoliticise any trade deals with China and to highlight the positive sides of economic integration.

As I have presented what the ceding logic indicates above, it represents China’s good will as what China gives more than it takes. All of Fujian’s regional development strategy and concerning policies are in a hat of “privileging Taiwan” (Huitai). In this way, Taiwanese are not supposed to refusing such a good will; otherwise, this may destroy the peace making across the Strait. However, rarely is presented that using economic means for the purpose of united front work in a scholarly debate except some academic works (Wu, 2019; Y.-S. Wu, 2016).

References


Ho, M.-s. (2019). *Challenging Beijing’s Mandate of Heaven: Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement and Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement:* Temple University Press.


Hughes, C. R. (2013). Negotiating national identity in Taiwan: Between nativization and de-sinicization *Taiwan’s Democracy* (pp. 61-84): Routledge.


