Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM): An Evolving East-West Security Regime?
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1. Introduction

In the introductory chapter of a major volume on "U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation", the editors summarize the perspective from which the contributors have addressed their subject:

"The starting point of this study is the hypothesis that the United States and the Soviet Union perceive that they have a strong interest in managing their rivalry in order to control its costs and risks. This shared interest ... is coupled with a more diffuse recognition of two other goals: namely, the desirability of developing over time a more cooperative, orderly, and stable U.S.-Soviet relationship, and regional and global institutions and arrangements that create some additional order in the international system from which the two superpowers benefit at least indirectly. However, although the United States and the Soviet Union may subscribe to these longer-range goals, they have rather amorphous and somewhat divergent conceptions of what the norms, "rules" and modalities of a more cooperative relationship and a better structured international system should be." (George et al., 1988, p. 3)

What these authors have assumed about the overall U.S.-Soviet security relationship can be stated with equal force with respect to East-West security relations in Europe. Not only do the U.S. and the Soviet Union abide by the "broad injunctions" to "limit competition to avoid war" and to "respect spheres of influence" in Europe, as Joseph S. Nye (1987) has pointed out; equally important, their European allies, including the two Germanys, to this day, have few, if any incentives, and lack the capabilities, to challenge these superpower security arrangements in and for Europe. This does not mean that European countries do not occasionally disagree with superpowers' strategies toward European security, nor does it exclude that European countries take the initiative in proposing, and lobbying for, additional measures of East-West security cooperation which had not been at the top of the agenda of one or both of the superpowers. What is implied here can be stated as the proposition that the security arrangements in and for Europe seem to depend on the hegemonic rivalry or cooperation, as the case may be, between the two superpowers and that the European countries remain subordinate actors even
though they enjoy various degrees of residual autonomy and of influence on the superpowers (especially through alliance decision-making).

One example of East-West security cooperation in Europe in which several European countries took a special interest, and which was not given very high priority status by the U.S. and which had received mostly rhetorical support by the Soviet Union, has been the project of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) originally launched at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975 and significantly expanded at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in 1986. This project of East-West security cooperation in Europe can be said to have evolved into a specific security "regime" for several reasons to be examined in greater detail later on (cf. sect. 4 infra): First, the norms and rules of the CSBM-regime appear to be complied with by the states involved in an almost routine manner - not only because of short-term calculations of prudential behavior but out of a long-term interest in creating convergent expectations about what are permissible military activities and what are not. Secondly, the CSBM-regime, while not addressing itself to the hypothetical objective threat arising from military capabilities to wage a war, has at least the potential of reducing, if not overcoming the threat of surprise attack and, thus, of contributing to the stabilization of East-West security relations. Furthermore, a successfully implemented CSBM-regime might give rise to the question whether prevailing assumptions, in East and West, about the strategic intentions of the other side continue to be valid or need to be re-assessed. However, the "behavioral" approach toward constraining the option of using military force in conflict management as represented by CSBM runs the risk of being stymied if it is not followed up by "structural" changes, to be engineered in a piecemeal fashion, at the level of military postures (including force structure and military doctrine). Thus, one has to consider the positive, or negative, interaction between the effectiveness of a CSBM-regime and the quest for, or the failure to move toward, conventional arms control (including theater nuclear and dual capable weapons).
The present study reflects both a theoretical and a practical, policy-oriented interest: On the one hand, it seeks to explore the applicability of "regime analysis" to the collective management of East-West security relations, especially in Europe; on the other hand, it seeks to determine whether or not agreement on, and implementation of, CSBM has indeed led to the formation of a security regime from the Atlantic to the Urals affecting, however modestly, policy-makers' expectations about the nature and salience of certain aspects of their adversary's behavior.

2. International Regimes and the Study of International Governance

2.1. "International Anarchy" and the Puzzle of Cooperation

The traditional view of International Relations holds that the politics of international relations should be conceptualized in terms of an anarchic, decentralized self-help system of states seeking to maximize their relative security and welfare; states, in turn, are defined as unitary, rational actors driven by the pursuit of power and wealth. Since this model view of international politics is based on the assumption of an all-pervasive security dilemma, International Relations research in this tradition has an in-built bias for investigating competitive strategies which are based on independent national decision-making and, at the same time, oriented toward the maintenance of national independence. Thus, this traditional view of International Relations is not easily reconciled to the fact of institutionalized cooperation between states (often involving transnational cooperation of various sorts and intensities), i.e. voluntary cooperation with a wide time-horizon regulated by ex-ante set norms and rules. To be sure, "anarchy" also allows for cooperation among competitors but includes the restriction that it is of an ad-hoc nature or that it helps forming a temporary alliance against a third party. However, institutionalized cooperation between states for the collective handling of problems or conflicts turns our attention away from the model of "international anarchy" to one of "international governance", i.e. to how states manage collectively to rule themselves without setting up "international (supranational) government". Consequently, the coexistence of
patterns of state behavior as diverse as strategic competition and institutionalized cooperation suggests that International Relations research needs to keep an open mind to accommodate the rival (and, at the same time, complementary) analytic perspectives of "international anarchy" and of "international governance".

For a long time, i.e. from the 1880s until the 1950s, international governance became equated with the creation and the activities of intergovernmental organizations. Partly as a result of the growing disillusionment with the United Nations in the wake of the "Cold War", partly flowing from the seemingly successful efforts, in Western Europe, at forming a political community, which were expected to be emulated in other world regions, international, especially regional integration was held to form the core of international governance. Yet, the high hopes invested, by scholars and political practitioners alike, in regional integration schemes as a way of expanding "supranationalism" in international politics proved to be premature, to say the least. Nevertheless, analysts of International Relations could not close their eyes to the persistence and growth of institutionalized cooperation among states in a wide variety of issue areas and ranging from bilateral to all kinds of multilateral projects. To capture the essential meaning of these efforts of states at ruling themselves collectively by consensus rather than by force and to avoid the teleological connotations of previous interpretations of "international governance" the notion of International Regime was introduced in the mid-1970s (Ruggie, 1975) and gained wide acceptance in the study of international governance during the 1980s (Krasner, 1983; 1985; Keohane, 1980; 1984).

Despite the vast amount of research generated under the auspices of the "regime analysis" of international relations, the practitioners of this approach only reluctantly considered its applicability to security issues and tended to shy away altogether from extending their field of interest from West-West and North-South relations to encompass East-West relations, too. There is little doubt that unexamined assumptions about the essence, or the core, of "the East-West conflict" and the pervasive methodological holism in research on East-West relations perceived as the "Great Contest" have contributed to almost dismissing the
perspective of international governance as a valid analytical focus of this segment of International Relations research. However, to correct this imbalance and to move away from the holistic notion of "the East-West conflict" which tends to obscure the diversity of interaction patterns which emerged especially in Europe, it will be suggested that, at least for heuristic, if not for substantive reasons, East-West relations need to be looked at as a set of patterned interactions spread across several issue areas and centered on a variety of objects of contention some of which lend themselves to regulation by institutionalized cooperation whereas others do not or not very much. Our general assumption therefore is that the perspective of international governance cannot be excluded from research on East-West relations and that the search for international regimes in East-West relations may not be as futile as the "Great Contest"-image appears to predict.

2.2. International Regime Defined

The concept of international regime, which now lies at the heart of International Relations research from the perspective of international governance, has become an important, though not easily applied analytical tool. Recent "state-of-the-art" surveys (Haggard and Simmons, 1987; Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986; Young, 1986) have amply demonstrated the difficulties involved in arriving at a satisfactory definition which is capable of delimiting and differentiating a domain of scientific inquiry. Following Haggard and Simmons (1987, p. 492) we are confronted with "contending definitions of international regimes, which range from patterned behavior, to convergent norms and expectations, to explicit injunctions". The argument against a broad definition of "international regime" is convincingly stated by the same authors who emphasize that it "runs the risk of conflating regularized behavior with rules, and almost certainly overestimates the level of normative consensus in international politics" (p. 493). Their reluctance to embrace the influential definition proposed by Krasner (1983, p. 2) results from its complexity involving four terms (principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures) several of which are, at times, difficult to distinguish from one another. Moreover, since Krasner's de-
finition allows for both explicitness and implicitness of normative regulation, he faces practical difficulties in deciding whether more or less stable behavior patterns result from normative constraints or are to be explained by other factors. A narrow definition of international regime may therefore be desirable to avoid the pitfalls briefly indicated. Again finding much merit in Haggard/Simmons' approach regimes are defined as "agreements among states which aim to regulate national actions within an issue-area. Regimes define the range of permissible state action by outlining explicit injunctions" (p. 495). Moreover, Haggard/Simmons argue plausibly that their definition has the advantage of allowing a sharper distinction between the concepts of regime, cooperation, and institution. "Regimes are examples of cooperative behavior, and facilitate cooperation, but cooperation can take place in the absence of established regimes. ... Regimes aid the 'institutionalization' of portions of international life by regularizing expectations, but some international institutions such as the balance of power are not bound to explicit rights and rules." (Haggard and Simmons, 1987, p. 495).

2.3. Do International Regimes Matter?

International regimes have been said to constitute the core of international governance which, in turn, can be conceived as setting such normative-institutional limits to the realm of international anarchy as have been agreed to by states. However, the interest in international regimes does not exhaust itself by determining their role in the organization of international relations but extends to ascertaining their consequences for the processes and outcomes of international policy-making. In other words, do international regimes make a difference for the collective management of international problems or conflicts in both procedural and substantive terms?

Since international regimes are defined by referring to a normative consensus about what states are (not) permitted to do in a given issue-area, regime participants can be expected to refrain from the use or threat of force while dealing with the issue or conflict the regulation of which is intended by the regime.
Leaving aside the hypothetical possibility of a collective security regime, which would actually stipulate the use of force as the mandated collective response to a collective situation called "aggression", international regimes seem to presuppose and, at the same time, to foster "negative peace", i.e. the stable expectation that force is not a usable instrument for achieving one's objective in an issue-area. However, whether or not, or to what extent, international regime and "negative peace" are two sides of the same medal remains an open question not to be answered by definition but through empirical research. While this question pertains, in principle, to international regimes in all kinds of issue-areas, it would be the discovery of international security regimes which should provide the most telling insights into this linkage between international regimes and the promotion of "negative peace".

The consequences of international regimes for the strengthening of peaceful international relations need not be restricted to "negative peace", though. One may also ask whether or not, or to what extent, international regimes are linked to reducing "structural violence" or to facilitating "just peace" among nations. This question has been raised, directly or indirectly, in much of the regime literature dealing with North-South issues. At first sight, it appears to be of far lesser concern to the analysis of international regimes in East-West relations since the structural feature of asymmetry does not show up here as clear-cut across all issue-areas as it does in North-South relations. Nevertheless, it may not be entirely misplaced to consider the two main dimensions of "just peace" in the context of analyzing East-West regimes, i.e. the enhancement of "procedural justice" and of "distributive justice" by institutionalized East-West cooperation for the collective management of problems or conflicts in the fields of security, economy, ideology, ecology, etc. Since questions of this nature have not yet elicited much interest in the International Relations literature on East-West issues it must suffice here to state:

(I) that East-West regimes could have a direct bearing on the achievement of objectives of procedural justice as expressed, e.g. in the rule of representativity; and
(2) that the concept of justice as fairness in the sense used by John Rawls (1971) and Charles Beitz (1979) might be too demanding a standard for evaluating the consequences of East-West regimes but that criteria such as furthering equal security and equal opportunity in international relations might not.

3. Regime Analysis and the Study of East-West Relations

3.1. From Macroscopic to Microscopic Conflict Analysis

In a research monograph on "International Regimes in East-West Relations" Efinger, Rittberger and Zürn (1988) develop an alternative to the prevailing approach to the study of East-West relations. Instead of viewing "the East-West conflict" as an a-priori totality and of trying to explain the course of events in East-West relations exclusively as determined by the - variously interpreted - nature of this conflict totality, these authors seek to explore the fruitfulness of an approach which focuses on the very issues, or objects of contention, which are contested by "East" and "West". While not denying that differences of power capabilities, political status, and socioeconomic systems may be of considerable relevance to the understanding of East-West relations, it is argued that they should not be assumed, individually or in some combination, to be of paramount importance; rather, it is held that, depending on the type of issue, or object of contention, the specific mode of managing collectively the issue or conflict may vary considerably. Thus, whereas the macroscopic emphasis on "the East-West conflict" invariably ends up with the starkly polarized discussion about threat perceptions and the ways of countering them, the microscopic approach begins by des-aggregating the assumed conflict totality and by distinguishing between conflict, i.e. a positional difference over goals or means of achieving goals, and conflict management, i.e. the variety of ways to deal with such positional differences. Based on a conceptual model of the conflict process and providing a differentiated explication of "conflict management" the microscopic approach introduces the distinction between unregulated conflict management ranging from ad-hoc cooperation to the use of force, regulated conflict management including conflict termina-
tion, and conflict resolution. It is the area of conflict management by regulation where the study of East-West relations can put the concept of international regime to good use.

3.2. "Regime-Conduciveness" of Different Types of Issues and Conflicts

There is nothing novel to the effort to explain the nature and outcome of policy-making processes in terms of issue-area characteristics. Functionalisists distinguished long ago between "high politics" and "low politics" and used this distinction to account for sector-specific international integration in "technical" issue-areas. In a more generalized version, Theodore Lowi (1964) argued that "policy determines politics" implying that political processes and their outcomes vary across issue-areas depending, inter alia, on their characteristic features. It is suggested that, in line with the emphasis on the microscopic conflict analysis of East-West relations, the task of identifying and explaining "East-West regimes" will be facilitated by turning to hypotheses which state that certain qualities of an issue, or object of contention, induce the actors involved to select one mode of collective issue or conflict management rather than another.

In the literature on international regimes this approach has provoked a debate about the opportunities for, and the constraints on, regime formation and maintenance in the issue-area of international security. Jervis (1983) has pointed out the various obstacles to international security regimes and Gross Stein (1985) has refined this analysis. Efinger, Rittberger and Zürn (1988, p. 104 ff.) have tested two issue-area typologies for the hypothesis that security issues are much less likely to elicit collective cooperative responses than do economic or other "welfare"-related issues and found this hypothesis confirmed. However, their finding has to be qualified in two ways: First, security was not dealt with as a comprehensive, indivisible issue-area of East-West relations but again desaggregated into identifiable objects of contention. Secondly, security issues were not found to deny, in toto, their collective management by institutionalized coope-
ration: rather, some other conditions apparently need to be met for security regimes to emerge, and to be maintained, in East-West relations.

We agree with George et al. (1988, p. 13 f.) that "a comprehensive security regime, one that would deal with all or most aspects of the competition and rivalry affecting the security interface of the two superpowers, is not feasible" and hold that this proposition is valid for East-West security relations in their entirety. The same applies to what follows: "... we reject the premise that a security regime is an either-or proposition: that there will either be a comprehensive security regime or none at all, and that viable, useful cooperative security arrangements are not possible unless they are parts of a comprehensive security regime. We believe it is more useful to regard the security dimension of U.S.-Soviet relations as embracing many issues, some of which can be decoupled from each other and become the focus for efforts to contrive mutually acceptable cooperative arrangements."7

For the analysis of the conditions under which the formation of security regimes in East-West relations can be expected to occur both Efinger, Rittberger and Zürn (1988, ch. 5) and George (1988) have developed a typology of conflicts and of security issues, respectively, from which they derive hypotheses about their varying degrees of "regime-conduciveness".

Efinger, Rittberger and Zürn build their typology on the distinction between "dissensual" and "consensual" conflicts and differentiate these categories further: "Dissensual" conflicts do not only relate to value incompatibilities but also to dissensus about means; "consensual" conflicts can be divided into "conflicts about absolutely assessed goods" and into "conflicts about relatively assessed goods".8 In general, "dissensual" conflicts pose greater difficulties to being managed collectively by cooperation than "consensual" conflicts. However, within both broad categories conflicts about means and conflicts about absolutely assessed goods are more cooperation-prone or "regime-conducive"
than conflicts about values and conflicts about relatively assessed goods, respectively. The following diagram summarizes the relationships just indicated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Conflicts</th>
<th>Degree of Regime-Conduciveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Values ----------------------------</td>
<td>very low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissensual -------------------------</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means ------------------------------</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatively Assessed Goods -----------</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensual -------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolutely Assessed Goods</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A preliminary test of the hypotheses derived from this fourfold conflict typology reveals that they seem to hold up against empirical evidence from East-West relations. (Efinger, Rittberger and Zürn, 1988, p. 112 ff.) The crucial point here, however, is to ask how this typology may help account for the formation of East-West security regimes. We expect security issues to fall either in the category of conflicts about relatively assessed goods or in the category of conflicts about means. Both the theoretically developed conflict typology and the preliminary test suggest that security issues which take the form of conflicts about means are more "regime-conducive" than other security issues. As a note of caution it should be added that the empirical test of the conflict typology indicates that conflicts about means stand about a fifty-fifty chance of being managed collectively by cooperation.

George develops his typology of security issues around the two dimensions of:

(1) "tightness" or "looseness" of mutual dependency/vulnerability with respect to a given issue; and of
(2) the "centrality" or "peripheral" nature of the issue's importance to the country's overall security concerns. George hypothesizes that security issues reflecting tightness of mutual dependence and being of central importance to a country's overall security concerns show the greatest potential for being managed collectively by cooperative arrangement whereas least cooperation should be expected when states cope with security issues where mutual dependence is loose and the importance to a country's overall security concerns is peripheral. The interrelations posited by George's theoretical analysis can be represented graphically as follows:

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mutual Dependence/ Vulnerability with Respect to Issue</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Peripheral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tight</td>
<td>1 high potential for cooperative arrangements</td>
<td>2 intermediate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loose</td>
<td>3 intermediate</td>
<td>4 low potential for cooperative arrangements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Having developed the conceptual and theoretical analysis of international regimes in East-West relations with special reference to the issue-area of security and having pinpointed the possibilities of accounting for the formation of East-West security regimes, we may now turn to considering the question whether or not, or to what extent, CSBM in Europe have come to represent an East-West security regime.

4. CSBM - a Security Regime in and for Europe?

"Confidence- and Security-Building measures (CSBM) can be defined as those arrangements having the following characteristics:
they deal with the operations of military forces, not with their capabilities;
at a minimum they provide a framework for exchanging information about the nature of military operations;
they should encourage nations to act during normal times in a way that would serve to eliminate causes of tension and reduce the dangers of misunderstanding or miscalculations;
they should promote habits of cooperation among adversaries;
preferably, they should serve to reinforce stability or restore equilibrium during period of intense international confrontation;
agreement on such measures is based on the assumption that the nations involved desire to avoid conflict, but since this assumption could change it is important that such a cooperative security regime should contain measures of verification necessary to deter or detect deception." (Goodby, 1988, p. 147)

The case of CBM of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and, more importantly, of CSBM as agreed upon at the Stockholm CDE-conference (1986) can be said to regulate an admittedly small segment of national action in the area of military security; they contain explicit injunctions which circumscribe the range of permissible state action as regards the movements of military forces in peacetime, the notification of such movements, the invitation of observers, and the admission of on-site inspections to verify a state's compliance with the provisions of the regime. An overview of the regime's crucial set of rules including a comparison of Helsinki CBMs and Stockholm CSBMs is given below:
At the most elementary level, the CSBM-regime seeks to operationalize, in a very limited way, the twin normative principles underlying post-World War II security policy: the general prohibition of the use or threat of force for settling disputes between states (Art. 2, para. 4 UN Charter) and the lawfulness of military self-defense, either individually or collectively undertaken (Art. 51 UN Charter). It does so by furthering standards of international behavior relative to the use of military forces in peacetime which enhance convergent expectations of mutual self-restraint. More specifically, by making peacetime movements of military forces in Europe more transparent and, possibly in the future, by putting (lower) ceilings on the size of those forces as well as by placing geographical restrictions on their movements CSBM serve to stabilize the security situation in Europe in at least three ways: they decrease the likelihood of conventional surprise attack by one alliance against the other, they raise the

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone of application</th>
<th>Helsinki CBMs</th>
<th>Stockholm CSBMs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European territory, extending 250 km into the USSR and Turkey</td>
<td>The whole of Europe, extending 250 km into Turkey, and the adjoining sea and air space</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of commitment</th>
<th>On a voluntary basis</th>
<th>All provisions are politically binding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities covered</th>
<th>Confined to manoeuvres (incl. movements at parties’ discretion)</th>
<th>Agreed military activities, incl. exercises, movements and transfers of troops from outside the zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notification thresholds</th>
<th>25 000 troops</th>
<th>Ground forces: 13 000 troops or 300 battle tanks</th>
<th>Amphibious landings: 3 000 troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior notification period</th>
<th>At least 21 days, no annual calendar</th>
<th>At least 42 days, with annual calendar and 2-year forecast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observation threshold</th>
<th>None specified</th>
<th>Ground forces: 17 000 troops</th>
<th>Amphibious landings: 5 000 troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observation regime</th>
<th>Rudimentary</th>
<th>Detailed specification of host country obligations and observer rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constraining provisions</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Time constraints: activities with 40 000 and &gt;70 000 troops not permitted unless they are notified 1 and 2 years in advance, respectively</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verification provisions</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Each state must accept up to 3 obligatory on-site inspections per year (from different states), from the ground, air or both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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* However, in practice it was understood that the provision for notification of troops above 25 000 amounted to an obligation.

obstacles to military intervention particularly by one alliance member against another, and they improve the conditions for achieving crisis stability.

It bears repeating that CSBM do not substantively interfere with independent national or alliance defense policy-making. Yet, they contain rules about permissible activities of military forces in peacetime which aim at reassuring the states participating in the regime about their "defensive" character and, thus, seek to forestall exaggerated perceptions of military threat which, in turn, if acted upon, may render the security situation more volatile.

The CSBM-regime is also different from an arms control regime because it takes the level and quality of armaments as well as the size of military forces as given. Instead it endeavours to control threat perceptions arising from "objective" comparisons of military capabilities by facilitating interpretations of military postures which also take the declared "defensive" intentions of either side into account. As the compliance with the rules of the CSBM-regime stabilizes itself at a high level, its function of restraining threat perceptions and of allowing for less rigid interpretations of each other's intentions will take a more prominent place. However, one may well be skeptical about the long-range effectiveness of a CSBM-regime if it is not accompanied by steps toward conventional arms control, i.e. reductions of troop strength and military "hardware" as a sign of corroborating the declaration as well as the attribution of "defensive" intentions.

5. Toward an Explanation of the CSBM Regime

Research on international regimes has always aspired to theory-building. At one point, it almost appeared as if it had found a master key for unlocking the secrets of regime formation and regime change in the "Theory of Hegemonic Stability". However, it turned out very quickly that the task of accounting for international regimes could not escape theoretical eclecticism. Thus, proceeding from the well-known distinction between levels of ana-
ysis the following attempt at explaining the CSBM-regime draws on three categories of independent variables (Efinger, Rittberger and Zürn 1988, p. 138; cf. also Haggard and Simmons, 1987):

(1) issue-area characteristics;
(2) systemic or structural constraints;
(3) subsystemic variables.

5.1. Issue-Area Hypotheses

Returning to the conflict typology outlined above (cf. sect. 3.2.) we begin by examining what kinds of conflicts are being dealt with by the CSBM-regime. In general, the CSBM-regime can be viewed as addressing itself primarily to a conflict about means but also as touching on other dimensions of the conflict typology. More specifically, the CSBM-regime is based on the premise that all participating states agree on the value of confidence-building as a stepping-stone to improved security; its "regulatory function", however, consists in mediating between widely divergent conceptions of what "confidence" actually is supposed to mean as well as between strongly opposed preferences for ways and means to build confidence.

On the Western side, especially among NATO countries, confidence-building is identified with removing mistrust and fear which arise from the uncertainty about the intentions of a heavily armed adversary. To reduce this uncertainty and, thus, to build confidence in the "defensive" intentions of the adversary, CSBM are conceived in such a way as to increase the disincentives for using military power for aggression, intervention or hostile pressures. Western countries, therefore, emphasize transparency, "concrete" restraints, and verification.

Member states of the Warsaw Treaty, particularly the Soviet Union, link confidence-building to the halting of the arms race and to disarmament, on the one hand, and to confirming the political-territorial status quo, on the other. Beside expressing strong preferences for declaratory measures WTO countries have put forward proposals which aim at denying a military posture to
NATO which is part and parcel of its strategy of "flexible response" but which WTO countries consider a threat to their security.

Despite these differences between NATO and WTO countries (leaving aside the special concerns of the N+N countries) a - certainly not yet fully developed - CSBM-regime has proved feasible because the dissensus concentrated on means. The CSBM-regime would thus seem to corroborate the proposition derived from the above conflict typology that conflicts about means are amenable to regulation by institutionalized cooperation. However, since we could not possibly claim to have presented an exhaustive causal explanation of the CSBM-regime, we take up another issue-area related hypothesis about the likely formation of East-West security regimes (cf. George, 1988 and sect. 3.2. above).

According to George's typology of relevant issue-area characteristics (cf. p. 12 supra) in the field of security the issue(s) addressed by CSBM would have to be located in cell 2: Some of the core issues, such as the threat of surprise attack and of the first use of nuclear weapons, indicate a condition of high mutual vulnerability and tight mutual dependence. However, the expected contribution by CSBM to enhance overall security is generally seen as of peripheral rather than central importance since they do not affect the military capabilities as such and thus leave intact the instruments for settling disputes by force. Thus, George's typology would lead one to expect a CSBM-regime of limited scope and effectiveness.

This analysis of the CSBM-regime based on George's theoretical reasoning about incentives for East-West security cooperation which flow from a certain combination of issue-area characteristics cannot be considered as being fully satisfactory either. As George admits himself, the discriminatory power of the typology is quite limited, and "deviant cases" may further reduce its explanatory usefulness. Even though issue-area hypotheses do shed some light on the potential for regime formation inherent in one type of issue, or object of contention, and absent in an-
other, it seems prudent to scrutinize the formation of the CSBM-regime from theoretical perspectives which operate at the systemic level of analysis.

5.2. Systemic or Structural Causes of the CSBM Regime

5.2.1. The first set of systemic or structural hypotheses about international regime-formation or regime change focuses on the distribution of power (in the sense of control over resources) either in the international system as a whole or in a spatially delineated subsystem ("overall power structure") or in an issue-area of international politics ("issue area structure"). The most prominent expression of this kind of theorizing about international regimes has been the "Theory of Hegemonic Stability". In its most simplified version this theory holds that the existence of a liberal hegemonic state ("Great Power" or "World Power") and its interest in building and maintaining a world order based on contract rather than coercion are a sufficient condition for the formation of stable regimes in one or more issue-areas of international politics.

Applying this kind of theorizing to the security situation in Europe faces the difficulty of having to allow for the existence not of one but of two "hegemonic powers" (the U.S. and the Soviet Union), characterized, moreover, by mutually exclusive social systems and ideologies, either one of which has control over a large part of the military resources pertinent to European security. If the CSBM-regime is to be explained in terms of "power structure", such an approach would then require that the duopolistic position of the superpowers in Europe and the asymmetric interdependence between them and their allies in the field of security can be identified as giving rise to the CSBM-regime.

Studies of the CSCE process including the CDE-conference have pinpointed the gate-keeper role of the superpowers: In the final analysis, they exercise control over what gets in and what comes out. That is not to argue that they monopolize deliberations and negotiations. Moreover, they are indeed sensitive to initiatives, proposals, arguments, etc. of their respective allies as well as,
secondarily, of N+N countries and even of the other superpower's allies. As the follow-up conference in Madrid has shown neither one of the two superpowers would take the risk of having the CSCE process collapse even though each had the power to do so. The reluctance of the two superpowers to decommit themselves from the CSCE process may have been influenced by the "bloc-transcending multilateralism" of the smaller countries and "middle powers" in Europe (cf. Meyer, Ropers and Schlotter, 1987, p. 140). However, this "bloc-transcending multilateralism" is more clearly discernible in areas of "low politics" than of "high politics". Put differently, the overwhelming "issue area power" of the two superpowers in the field of European (military) security makes any CSBM-regime highly dependent on whether or not it is compatible with the distribution of power in this area. Therefore, we may infer that these "structural" constraints would support a CSBM-regime whose rules can be evaluated as stabilizing the prevailing (military) power configuration.

5.2.2. The analysis of the CSBM-regime in terms of "power structure" again points up more clearly the regime's limitations than its causes. However, the above reference to "bloc-transcending multilateralism" in the CSCE-process suggests that certain institutional factors may have helped militarily more vulnerable countries in Europe than the two superpowers to push CSBM up high on the agenda of the CSCE process and to keep it there even when the superpowers, individually or jointly, did not display much interest in reaching progressive agreement on this subject.

From among a variety of such institutional factors suffice it to mention the consensus principle for reaching decisions in the CSCE process. By guaranteeing smaller countries and "middle powers", irrespective of alliance membership or of N+N status, an effective measure of participation in the processes of conference decision-making,12 their more immediate concerns about reducing their relatively higher military vulnerability could assert themselves more strongly thus furthering the adoption of mutually binding rules aimed at limiting the opportunities for "military unilateralism". Against this background the "Madrid mandate" of 1983 and its successful implementation through the CDE-conference 1986 are more easily comprehensible. In addition, the timing of
both the Stockholm CDE-conference and of the next CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna which was scheduled to begin in November 1986 reinforced the institutional pressures for reaching progressive agreement on CSBM (cf. Goodby, 1988, p. 152).

5.3. Subsystemic Variables

As we have seen in the preceding sections issue-area related hypotheses and systemic variables defined in terms of "power structure" or in terms of institutional "auto-dynamics" contribute to our understanding of the scope of the CSBM-regime as it has evolved especially since the Madrid follow-up conference (1980-83) and expanded since the Stockholm CDE (1984-86). There seems to exist a gap, however, in explaining more fully the reaching of an agreement, by the superpowers in particular, on the CSBM-regime as the outcome of the CDE-conference. The support lent to the establishment of a CSBM-regime by the militarily more vulnerable states in Europe has already been mentioned. Yet, they could not have achieved this outcome even though most of them would have preferred a much stronger CSBM-regime (Goodby, 1988; Schenk, 1987).

The U.S. modified her approach toward the Stockholm conference on CSBM in the course of 1984. Playing down the previously emphasized "linkage" between CSBM and Human Rights (see Peters, 1987, p. 224), the Reagan Administration began to show greater interest in reaching at least one or the other modest agreement on East-West security issues to satisfy domestic concerns about a spiralling arms race, which were heightened during the presidential election campaign, and to accommodate those alliance members which had implemented the NATO double-track decision against massive internal opposition. Prompted, too, by the concessions which the new Gorbachev leadership offered at the negotiating table the Reagan Administration concluded in 1985/86 that NATO countries did not give away much of what constitutes their defense posture in exchange for making Soviet and Warsaw Pact military activities in Europe less secretive.
Changes in Soviet policy toward concrete CSBM also contributed heavily to generating the Stockholm accord. A first modification occurred toward the end of the 1970s when the Soviet Union began to move away from a position of indifference to one of developing a programme for CSBM of her own (Boysen, 1987a). Whereas this revised Soviet approach toward CSBM emphasizing "declaratory" measures could not have been reconciled easily with the proposals for CSBM advocated by NATO and most N+N countries, a second major shift in the Soviet approach toward CSBM in 1985/86 facilitated reaching an agreement. This shift found its most spectacular expression in agreeing to on-site inspections which then Foreign Minister Gromyko had still rejected in 1984. Moreover, the Soviet Union accepted many of the "concrete" measures proposed by the other participants in the CDE-conference without insisting on having most of her own proposals for "declaratory" measures incorporated in the Final Document (Goodby, 1988, pp. 155-158).

The willingness to compromise and to agree to the formation of a partial security regime, such as the CSBM-regime, may be interpreted in the broader context of the Gorbachev leadership's groping for redefining the international role and strategy of the Soviet Union. CSBM are clearly compatible with the "new political thinking" about foreign policy and international relations since they can be seen to operationalize, in a small way, the meaning of "common" or "equal" security and to give expression to the notion of Europe as a "common home". In addition, agreeing to the CSBM-regime, in the new Soviet view, made good sense as a means to promote a long-term accommodation with the U.S. in the field of security. Whether or not this long-term accommodation can be conceived as a consistently pursued goal of the Gorbachev leadership and whether or not it is intimately linked to the Gorbachev leadership's modernization program would require a discussion beyond the scope of this study.

Summing up this section we conclude that all of the aforementioned variables help shed some light on the conditions of reaching agreement on the Stockholm CSBM. Although none of them can account fully for the establishment of this regime, some variables seem to have greater explanatory power than others. Our analysis indicates that issue-area related hypotheses and sub-
systemic explanations contribute most to our understanding of why this CSBM-regime came into being. Conversely, systemic variables were of lesser importance except for pinpointing the "structural" constraints on the scope and effectiveness of an East-West security regime. Altogether the causal analysis of the evolving CSBM-regime still remains in a stage of infancy and needs to be refined by subsequent work.

6. Impact of the CSBM Regime on the Security Problematique in Europe

The scholarly literature on CSBM, and the public debate about them, are filled with varying assessments about their consequences for, and effects on, the security problematique in Europe. This security problematique is epitomized by over four decades of war prevention through nuclear deterrence coupled with the awareness that any "para bellum"-strategy of war prevention may ultimately end in catastrophe. It is this ambivalence about (nuclear) deterrence and the quest for less militarized approaches to peacekeeping resulting therefrom which set the framework for studying the impact of CSBM on the security problematique in Europe by paying particular attention to those dimensions which are generally considered crucial to reducing the danger of war: perceptions of military threat and level of armaments.

6.1. CSBM and Perception of Military Threat

Critics of CSBM (Boysen, 1987a; Nerlich, 1982; Windel, 1986) contend that their relevance to Western concerns about military security is almost nil. They remain unconvinced that CSBM do reduce measurably the danger of surprise attack (on the part of WTO forces). While Boysen and Windel hold that the military options of WTO forces will not be affected significantly by CSBM, Nerlich sees even the possibility of a counterproductive effect of false confidence.

In the Peace Assessment Studies of three West German research institutes it has been argued instead that the expanded range of military activities to which stringent rules of notification, observation and inspection apply is bound to diminish the
opportunities of an adversary to launch a conventional surprise
attack without much advance warning (Meyer, Ropers and Schlotter,
1987, p. 144 ff.; Ropers and Schlotter, 1988, p. 41 f.).
Zielinski (1985) agrees with this view and holds that already the
Helsinki CBM had contributed to an improved security climate in
Europe.

Compared with the Helsinki Accord's provisions on CBM the im-
provement of the Stockholm Agreement regarding CSBM can be seen
in that they satisfy more strongly the criterion of military
significance. More specifically, the CSBM agreed upon in Stock-
holm appear to approximate more clearly the goal of reducing
alarmist threat perceptions and of eliminating tension-generating
military behavior in peacetime. Analysts emphasize that the
Stockholm CSBM are more likely to enhance the transparency and
calculability of the overall military situation in Europe.
Furthermore, the vastly expanded measures of verification and
inspection are held to render any effort at concealing prepara-
tions for military attack or intervention less likely to succeed.
Thus, it is only consistent with the agreement on these CSBM that
the Stockholm Final Document (para. 15.) contains an unambiguous
verdict on intervention even in within-bloc relations which,
after Prague 1968, the so-called Brezhnev doctrine sought to
justify for the Socialist countries (Borawski, Weeks and
Thompson, 1987, p. 658 f.). However, it is obvious that the
Stockholm Agreement on CSBM represents a compromise and that
Western, especially NATO objectives of imposing even stronger
operational restraints on WTO forces could not be achieved
(Darilek, 1987, p. 348). Still, looking at the CBM-/CSBM-negotia-
tions as a long-term process it seems difficult to deny their
restraining consequences on military planning and behavior.

The evaluation of CSBM by political elites in the fields of for-
ign and security policy-making can be taken as a good indicator
of the CSBM-regime's impact on the security problematique in
Europe. West German Foreign Minister Genscher greeted the outcome
of the CDE-conference as follows: "They (the CSBM - the authors)
make available additional information about the military forces
of the participants. They improve gauging the overall military
situation. Deviations from routine behavior will be more clearly
In the view of this top foreign policy-maker, the Stockholm CSBM contribute to achieving several of the main goals of West German security policy, viz., to render the behavior of states in Europe more calculable in general, to reduce the risk of exposure to surprise attack and to "coercive diplomacy", and to improve the conditions for making progress in arms control. (Ibid., p. 993)

In an official assessment of the Stockholm Agreement President Reagan expressed the view that the conscientious implementation of its provisions would contribute to reducing the risk of war in Europe and to improving European security and East-West relations in general (U.S. Department of State, 1986, p. 416). Furthermore, President Reagan also pointed out that much of the contents of the Final Document was based on Western proposals. He added that it remained to be seen whether further progress could be achieved on all parts of the agenda of the CSCE-process, especially in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms. (Ibid.)

One cannot fail noticing that even in the generally positive evaluations of the Stockholm Agreement by the governments of the F.R.G. and of the U.S. their differences in emphasizing one or the other function of the CSCE process in general and of the CDE in particular stand out. The West German government attempted to promote its CDE policy as part and parcel of a comprehensive East-West dialogue based on a "realistic" notion of détente. In this way it sought to assume the role of a pacesetter for improving East-West relations despite the ongoing local or regional conflicts outside Europe and the decision to deploy the INF systems. The U.S. government, on the other hand, preferred a narrow military-technical approach to the CSBM-negotiations, yet "politicized" them at the same time by establishing a "linkage" between security cooperation and Soviet concessions in the field of human rights. Thus, the Reagan Administration appeared, at least for a while, more interested in slowing down the reaching of new East-West agreements in Europe than in facilitating the decision-making both within the Western alliance and in the CDE-negotiations.
The Stockholm Agreement on "militarily significant", "politically binding", and "verifiable" CSBM has been welcomed by all participating states. Even the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries which for a long time insisted on less concrete and more declaratory measures are very much in favor of this agreement. An appraisal of the results of the Stockholm Conference was given in a statement by General Secretary Gorbachev, in which he said: "The Soviet leadership takes a positive view of the results of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe ... Stockholm showed that even in a complex situation it is possible to agree on security questions if there is the necessary political will and desire." 15

Nevertheless, to put these assessments of CSBM in perspective it should be noted that NATO considers "conventional stability talks" and the elimination of asymmetries favoring the Warsaw Pact as crucial to denying, to the WTO forces, the option of carrying out a successful invasion of Western Europe. However, despite much recent emphasis on the "invasion capability" of the WTO forces there are clear indications that the CSBM-regime, in operation for more than a year and showing no lack of compliance, 16 has already left its mark on the military security perceptions of Western political elites.

6.2. CSBM and Prospects for (Conventional) Arms Control

Almost all positive assessments of the Stockholm Accord point to the interrelationship between CSBM and (conventional) arms control in and for Europe. To quote again Foreign Minister Genscher: "The outcome of Stockholm represents an important stage. It is now imperative to make progress in other arms control fora and to exploit every opportunity for achieving substantive results." (Ibid., p. 994) And he added: "Stockholm proves that the time has become ripe for cooperative solutions to arms control issues." (Ibid., p. 993) In the scholarly literature, too, many authors stress the necessity of establishing linkages between the evolution of the CSBM-regime and providing new directions to arms control negotiations (cf. Barton, 1984, Birnbaum, 1985b, Lodgaard, 1986). However, it does not follow that this linkage will come
about quasi-automatically. Rather, one can discover at least two perspectives on what should be given priority during the next stage of policy-making for European security.

One view holds that the continuing CSCE-process and its in-built gradualism offer every incentive to seek further improvements of CSBM with respect to both expanding their scope and sharpening specific regulations. One step in this direction would consist in further lowering the threshold of notification for military exercises, on the one hand, and for establishing quantitative ceilings for troops, battle tanks, amphibious landings and parachute assaults participating in them, on the other. Also, the lead time for notifying certain military activities could be extended. Furthermore, the quota of passive on-site inspections could be raised to strengthen the verification part of the CSBM-regime (considering the far-reaching verification measures agreed upon in the INF-Treaty). Finally, the scope of CSBM could be expanded decisively by closing several loopholes and by mandating information exchange about the deployment of military forces (Lodgaard, 1987, Borawski et al., 1987, Schenk, 1987). Even though there is undoubtedly much room for a more fully developed CSBM-regime in Europe, one should not assume an unlimited incrementalism to be at work continually opening up new horizons for CSBM.

Another view stresses the complementarity of CSBM and of negotiations about the "hardware" of military confrontation in Europe. The failure of MBFR-negotiations during the last 15 years, the experiences gained from the CSCE-process, and changes in the positions on conventional arms control by countries as important as France and the Soviet Union seem to justify that a modified framework for negotiations will be established which provides for an institutionalized parallelism between "conventional stability talks" (CST) and efforts to further strengthen the CSBM-regime (Darilek, 1987, Mahncke, 1987). It appears that the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting is about to agree on a mandate for a second phase of the CDE. This mandate will probably concentrate on sharpening and extending the CSBM agreed to at Stockholm. Pre-negotiations about holding "Conventional Stability Talks" also taking place in Vienna point toward agreement on their format and
agenda taking into account the continuation of the CDE-negotiations. Thus, CST will focus, first of all, on reducing conventional armaments and ground forces with a view toward establishing common, i.e. lower ceilings. Irrespective of the substantive interconnection between conventional and short-range nuclear weapons the latter category will be dealt with, if at all, outside this forum. The question of including naval and air forces represents a complicating factor in finalizing the CST mandate. As the division of labor between CDE and CST is shaping up more clearly so is the range of participants in the two negotiating processes: Whereas CDE will encompass all states which have so far participated in the CSCE process, CST will be confined to alliance-to-alliance negotiations leaving the door open to involving the N+N countries, in a manner yet to be determined at a later stage (Bruns, 1988).

A novel element in both tracks of dealing with the security problematique in Europe could be the inclusion of an item concerning military doctrines. Even if one admits that military doctrines are not susceptible to negotiations (in the traditional diplomatic sense of elaborating a consensual text stipulating rights and obligations of the parties involved), an informed debate about the fundamentals and operative principles of military doctrines in these or other diplomatic settings would be another sign of promoting "empathy" in East-West relations. So far the initiative taken by the Warsaw Pact countries at their meeting in Berlin (East) on May 28 - 29, 1987 (cited in Europa-Archiv, 42:14 (1987), p. 392-394), i.e. to hold East-West talks about the defensive (re-)orientation of military doctrines, has not been responded to officially by NATO countries. The NATO summit in Brussels, March 2 - 3, 1988 (cited in NATO-Brief, 36:2 (1988), p. 32-35), did not tackle this issue; however, it appears safe to assume that, after lengthy consultations within various NATO bodies, the Western countries will not forego this opportunity of probing Soviet "new thinking" in defense matters.

Summing up this brief discussion of how the CSBM-regime matters to East-West security in Europe, its impact can be determined as stabilizing the convergent expectations that there is no imminent danger of war and that alarmist perceptions of military threat
are not only unjustified but themselves a source of destabilizing influences on the overall security situation. Furthermore, the evolution of the CSBM-regime provides a lesson for the usefulness of "disjointed incrementalism" by moving ahead in one track (confidence-building) without losing sight of the risks of immobility in the other (arms control).

7. Conclusion

The analysis of international regimes has been a major innovation in the International Relations literature during the last decade. However, it has mainly been directed toward studying institutionalized forms of cooperation and conflict management in the relations between the capitalist nations of the West and in "North-South" relations. Moreover, the substantive focus of regime analysis has been on economic and welfare issues. Security issues have been held to be less amenable to international regulation through regime formation. As a result, East-West relations have rarely been considered as a field for "regime analysis". Besides, the study of international regimes has been one-sided yet in another respect. For, although the maintenance and change of international regimes has been discussed in the literature in some detail, the question of how they emerge has been neglected.

Against this background the purpose of our study is twofold: On the one hand, it seeks to explore the applicability of "regime analysis" to the collective management of East-West security relations, especially in Europa. This also includes some consideration of how international regimes come into being. On the other hand, and more specifically, it attempts to determine whether the agreement on, and the implementation of, CSBM can be understood as an evolving security regime in Europe.

Our analysis has shown, first of all, that East-West security regimes are possible given a theoretical point of view which substitutes a microscopic approach stressing the issue area-oriented analysis of objects of contention for the holistic interpretation of the "East-West conflict"; moreover, we have pointed out that CSBM do actually work.
Secondly, the thorough discussion of several approaches toward explaining the establishment of a CSBM-regime in Europe has confirmed the expectation that issue area-related hypotheses and subsystemic explanations are superior to systemic variables in accounting for the emergence of security regimes in East-West relations. Whether this hypotheses can be regarded as a general explanation of East-West security regimes, however, remains to be examined by further case studies.

The special character of CSBM as an international regime does not lie in the creation of a legal framework comparable to national law, but in their provision of a kind of "quasi-law" in the form of mutually agreed-upon "rules of the game" or "code of conduct", which allow for a certain measure of confidence that the rules will generally be complied with, and which contribute to the convergence of actor expectations. CSBM are collective arrangements about the function and use of military power in peacetime. They are designed to confirm non-aggressive intentions of all states and therefore build stable expectations concerning their military activities. However, CSBM do not substantially restrain the sovereignty of states to choose their own national defense policy. Therefore, they can be classified as a pragmatic contribution to peacefully managing the classical "security dilemma" based on both the proscription of the threat or use of force and the right to military self-defense.

CSBM provide for some central prerequisites of international security regimes which exceed the norms of a merely declaratory no-use-of-force-convention. They are capable of strengthening at least a few aspects of "negative peace", i.e. they lessen the likelihood of a conventional surprise attack as well as intra-bloc intervention, and they enhance crisis stability. International regimes are relevant in that they increase the exchange of information between the participants simply because they generate regular interactions. Moreover, they involve the creation of a network used to gather and exchange special information, build up over time a considerable measure of peace-promoting "routine behavior" which, in the view of the political elites on both sides, is obviously different from purely unilateral actions.
The case of C(S)BM according to the CSCE Final Act (1975) and, in a more sophisticated way, according to the relevant provisions achieved at the CDE at Stockholm (1986) is an important example of the potential peace-conducive effects of international regimes.

In the long-range perspective of a true confidence-building security structure in Central Europe based on "non-offensive defense" and conventional stability, CSBM are nothing more but a first, admittedly small step. The Stockholm agreement, at least, has shown that CSBM are an important item on the agenda of European security policy and that, under certain circumstances, the persistence and expansion of this security regime seems possible and may even facilitate the conventional arms control process, i.e. an arrangement constraining offensive military capabilities. In summary, the CSBM-regime constitutes a stabilizing element in the still highly militarized security situation in Europe.
1 Before 1981 the term "Confidence-Building Measures" (CBM) was used to refer to the measures agreed to in the Helsinki Final Act (1975). The term "Confidence and Security-Building Measures" (CSBM) was introduced into the CSCE-process (especially by Yugoslavia) to describe the qualitative differences between the relevant provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the measures proposed at the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting (1980-83).

2 Viotti and Murray (1980), Caldwell (1981) and Jervis (1983) have been notable exceptions.


4 In the International Relations literature, the concept of international regime was introduced to analyze the institutionalization of policy coordination and cooperation among states to manage economic and technological interdependence problems (Ruggie, 1975). Typical cases of international regimes in these issue areas have been the international trade regime (Lipson, 1983; Finlayson and Zacher, 1983), the international monetary regime (Keohane and Nye, 1977, Pt. II; Cohen, 1983), and the regime of ocean uses (Keohane and Nye, 1977, Pt. II). In the area of international security the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been a good example of an issue which has been dealt with by establishing an international regime (Smith, 1987).

5 Haggard and Simmons' decision to confine the regime concept to multilateral agreements does not seem to be necessary even though bilateral regimes will probably remain an exception.


7 This argument is echoed by Nye (1987, p. 375 f.). He argues that regime analysis runs the risk of vagueness and tautologies if it is applied to the overall U.S.-Soviet or, even more so, to the overall East-West security relationship. Instead, he emphasizes that regimes are a matter of degree; and East-West relations are more usefully considered as "a mosaic of subissues in the security area, some characterized by rules and institutions we would call a regime and others not". Thus, it follows that the analysis of security regimes in East-West relations rests on the understanding that those regimes which do exist represent partial rather than comprehensive and evolving rather than fully developed arrangements. We, therefore, disagree with Jervis (1983) and Caldwell (1981) who favor a more categorical approach toward using the concept of security regime, i.e. tying it to the notion of comprehensiveness in particular.

8 Cf. Aubert (1963) and Kriesberg (1982, ch. 2).

9 We use here the concept of arms control in a narrow sense in order to keep arms control measures and confidence- and security-building measures conceptually and analytically distinct. If we followed the more general definition of arms control proposed by Schelling and Halperin (1961, p. 2) who
include "all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it", CSBM would lose its status as a diplomatic option for promoting security cooperation circumventing, at least provisionally, the thornier questions of force levels and force structures.

10 Cf. the seminal article of Keohane (1980) who focused, however, on economic regimes only.

11 Although the N+N (Neutral and Non-Aligned) countries were quite successful in their insistence that some CBM should be included in the Helsinki Final Accord, these same countries lost some of their earlier bargaining power during the Stockholm CDE-negotiations about CSBM. This loss resulted from the reluctance of a few of them, notably Switzerland, to endorse the concept of operational restraints on their military forces which they considered to be an unwarranted infringement on their militia-based defense policy. These reservations continue to be expressed in the negotiations on a mandate for the next phase of CDE during the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting. (Gärtner, 1988, ch. 3; Schenk, 1987).

12 The opportunities for participating effectively in the decision-making processes of CDE were certainly much wider than in bloc-to-bloc negotiations such as MBFR, let alone in the bilateral arms control negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Based on this finding we could claim that the CDE decision-making process satisfies criteria of "positive peace" at least on the procedural dimension (cf. p. 8) since both process and outcome of CDE reflect a high degree of representativity (and of compromise) as regards the input provided by the three main groupings of participating states (NATO, WTO, and N+N).

13 According to Strobe Talbott (1984, cited in Goodby, 1988, p. 171) the Reagan Administration originally regarded the negotiations on CSBM for a long time as 'arms control junk food'.

14 The decisive turn in the Reagan administration's view of the CDE came to the fore in President Reagan's address to the Irish Parliament on June 4, 1984. In this address President Reagan declared: "If discussions on reaffirming the principle not to use force, a principle in which we believe so deeply, will bring the Soviet Union to negotiate agreements which will give concrete, new meaning to that principle, we will gladly enter into such discussions." (cited in Goodby, 1988, p. 151).

15 Cited in Rachmaninov (1986/87, p. 76).

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