Arms Control and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union
Regime Robustness and International Socialization
Realism and Institutionalism: Competing Assumptions About Security Cooperation

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<td>ACR</td>
<td>Arms Control Reporter</td>
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<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Forces in Europe</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Community of Independent States</td>
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<td>CSBM</td>
<td>Confidence and Security-Building Measures</td>
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<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>FAZ</td>
<td>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</td>
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<td>FR</td>
<td>Frankfurter Rundschau</td>
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<td>HLWG</td>
<td>High Level Working Group</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IHT</td>
<td>International Herald Tribune</td>
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<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces</td>
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<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
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<td>NNWS</td>
<td>Non-Nuclear Weapon State</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NWS</td>
<td>Nuclear Weapon State</td>
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<td>NZZ</td>
<td>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</td>
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<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Talks or Treaty</td>
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<td>SZ</td>
<td>Süddeutsche Zeitung</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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1. Introduction

During the Cold War phases of the East-West confrontation the collapse of the Soviet Union would probably have caused a feeling of triumph or relief in the West. For two connected reasons this feeling was not dominant in 1991:

1) In the course of its domestic and foreign policy change the Soviet Union had turned from a rival to a partner of the West. The Gorbachev-Ševardnadze leadership was respected and trusted by Western governments. Existing security arrangements were strengthened. More importantly, the arms race was turned into a process of controlled cooperative arms reduction by treaties on INF, strategic systems, and conventional forces.

2) The dissolution of the Soviet Union seemed to endanger these successes: Ethnonationalistic and territorial conflicts which had already developed between the Soviet republics now threatened to multiply and to escalate - including the use of the extensive Soviet arsenals. It was doubtful if and to what extent the successor states would feel bound to the Soviet treaty obligations in the area of arms control and reduction. Finally, with over a dozen new states coming into existence, it was expected that political coordination in Europe would become much more difficult.

These fears were balanced by the hope that the existing arms control agreements would prove sufficiently robust not only to survive the collapse of the Soviet Union but also to bind the new states to the rules and regulations contained in these agreements. Correspondingly, the West followed a strategy of integration: The successor states were to become part of existing international security institutions as quickly as possible in order to commit them to the international arms control norms and to cooperative conflict management.

On the one hand, the problem posed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union to international security regimes deserves to be analyzed because it is part of one of the most pressing political challenges produced by the emergence of a "New Europe" after the end of the East-West confrontation: How can international institutions be preserved in spite of the disintegration of states in Eastern and Eastern Central Europe? And how can the processes of state-building in these regions be prevented from undermining international security? On the other hand, the fear of an escalation of ethnonationalistic conflict and the hope to contain it through international institutions coincide to a great extent with the assumptions of two theoretical schools in International Relations which represent the core of academic argument in the discipline:

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1 For their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper I would like to thank Gunther Hellmann, Peter Mayer, Michael Zürn, and the TAP editors.
Realism and Institutionalism (cf. Keohane 1988 and 1989, ch. 1). The "pessimistic" view that regimes will be seriously endangered by the developments on the territory of the former Soviet Union corresponds with the Realist analysis of international cooperation and institutions, the "optimistic" one that regimes will endure and help to preserve international cooperation with the (Neoliberal) Institutionalist approach.

Both the political and the academic context lead to the main questions of this study: 
*Have international arms control regimes proved robust after the dissolution of the Soviet Union? And: How did they produce a given degree of robustness?* The concept of "regime robustness" serves to determine to what extent international regimes have been able to survive and control the political transformation of Eastern Europe and to what extent the different expectations of Realism and Institutionalism have been confirmed.

At the beginning, I will define some categories which allow to measure the robustness of international security cooperation (section 2) and formulate competing hypotheses about the robustness of international regimes vis-à-vis the dissolution of the Soviet Union which correspond to the assumptions of four Realist and Institutionalist approaches: hegemonic stability theory, Neorealism, utilitarian and normativistic Institutionalism (section 3). I will then examine the evolution of the four most important international arms control agreements between the Soviet Union and the Western states during the one year and a half which have passed since the Soviet Union has begun to disintegrate in the aftermath of the unsuccessful 1991 coup d'état: the non-proliferation, the strategic arms reduction, and the European conventional arms reduction as well as operational arms control regimes (section 4). One aspect of the analysis will be regime constancy: How were the regimes as such affected by the collapse of one of their main participants? The other, and more important, dimension of regime robustness is regime compliance: Have the existing international regimes been complied with and maintained order in the process of transition? And if so, why? The results of this analysis will allow to evaluate the robustness of the international arms control and reduction regimes as well as the explanatory power of the two competing theoretical approaches in the field of regime theory (section 5). The study will be concluded by a dynamic "socialization model" of regime robustness which integrates several hypotheses and the mechanisms they postulate.

2. Robustness of Regimes: Criteria and Categories

*International regimes* are a specific class of international institutions. They consist of explicit rules for an issue-area of international relations which the participating states
regard as valid prescriptions for their behavior. According to Krasner (1983: 2) international regimes contain principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures:

"Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice."

The subject of this study is regime robustness. It means the (more or less well developed) disposition of international regimes to survive, ensure rule compliant behavior of the participating states, and attain the regime goals even in case of major shocks. The dissolution of an indispensable regime participant like the Soviet Union certainly constitutes a case in point. However, when stating that regimes "ensure compliant behavior" one should keep in mind that regimes are structures, not organizations capable of acting. They can be said to be robust only in the sense that international actors are motivated more strongly by the norms and rules of international regimes than by other considerations or in the sense that actors who support and defend the regime are able to make other actors in the issue area comply.

The robustness of international regimes can be understood as having two distinct dimensions: regime constancy and regime compliance. *Regime constancy* refers to the regime components, i.e. principles, norms, rules, and procedures. In order to measure regime constancy it is necessary to determine what kind of change an external shock has produced in these components. I will call a regime

(a) rigid if all regime components remain unchanged;
(b) flexible if principles and norms remain unchanged but rules and procedures are modified, i.e. adapted to the new situation;

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2 This seems to be the "new consensus" in the research community according to Keohane (1993) and Rittberger (1993). On the one hand, this definition excludes implicit agreements and mere "paper regimes". On the other hand, it does not require rule-consistent behavior, thus leaving the relationship between regimes and state behavior open to investigation and theory.

3 This definition differs from Youngs's usage of "robustness" as a characteristic of the social-choice mechanisms which regimes employ and as one among many factors determining the effectiveness of international institutions (1992: 178).
(c) **unstable** if principles and norms change, i.e. if the regime loses its former identity.⁴

Often external shocks call for an adaptation of the regime rules and procedures to new conditions in order to ensure that it attains its goals. In that case flexibility should be judged as a higher degree of robustness than rigidity.

*Regime compliance* refers to the behavior of regime participants. In order to measure this dimension one has to look at the extent to which the regime participants, here: the successor states of the Soviet Union, comply with the principles, norms, rules, and procedures of the regime after the shock, here: the dissolution of the Soviet Union. An international regime will be described (in the order of decreasing robustness) as

(a) **strong** if participants act in compliance with the principles, norms, rules, and procedures of the regime after the shock;

(b) **weak** if participants comply with the principles and norms but violate rules and procedures of the regime;

(c) **hollow** if participants comply (opportunistically) with rules and procedures but violate the principles and norms and thus act against the "spirit" of an agreement;

(d) **dead** if participants violate all components of a regime or withdraw altogether from a regime in the aftermath of the shock.

A number of measurement problems arise at this point. I suggest that deviating behavior be counted as a violation of the regime only if it is durable or repeated, in other words: a systematic violation. It is furthermore difficult to measure the quality of a multilateral interaction by looking at the behavior of individual actors: For instance, how many and which states have to violate regime rules or neglect regime procedures in order to turn it into a weak regime? Certainly, the answer also depends on the importance of the state in question; e.g. if Estonia did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the regime would be affected less severely than in the case of a Russian cancellation of the treaty. As a general rule, I will regard as significant those violations which prevent the regime from attaining its goals. Let us now turn to the general assumptions about regime robustness as suggested by the Realist and Institutionalist approaches to the analysis of international cooperation.

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⁴ The difference between flexible and unstable regimes corresponds to Krasner's (1983) distinction between "change within the regime" and "change of the regime".
3. Realism and Institutionalism - Assumptions about Security Cooperation after the End of the Soviet Union

It should be mentioned beforehand that the Realist as well as the Institutionalist positions on the stability of international institutions have been developed in the analysis of international economic - not security - relations and do not explicitly cover the rare case of the dissolution of one of the participating state actors. However, it should be possible to develop hypotheses based on the general assumptions of both approaches. Moreover, there is not just one Realist and one Institutionalist approach. Both schools have developed various strands of reasoning which differ with regard to the conditions of robustness and therefore can be looked at separately. In the following, I will distinguish the general Realist approaches of "hegemonic stability theory" and "Neorealism" and the Institutionalist approaches of "utilitarian Institutionalism" and "normativistic Institutionalism".

(1) Realist authors like Kindleberger, Krasner, and Gilpin put forward the theory of hegemonic stability. In a nutshell, it says that stable international regimes only come into existence if they are in the interest of a hegemonic state and will exist only as long as this state disposes of the power to enforce, or otherwise guarantee, compliance with norms and rules among the regime participants. One could, of course, easily object that already the origins of international arms control regimes in East-West relations contradict this theory since they were formed under the condition of near military parity and not hegemony. However, looking at the Soviet Union only, it could be argued that the central Union authorities - and thus a much stronger organization than a hegemon - made sure that norms and rules of international regimes like the notification of manoeuvres and the destruction of weapons were complied with in the individual republics. Now that this central power has ceased to exist, one would expect that the newly independent states do not feel bound by the treaties of the dissolved union any longer unless a new (regional) leader establishes

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5 Compare Young's (1986: 118ff.) parallel distinction of three behavioral models of international actors: status maximizers (relative gains), utility maximizers (utilitarian institutionalism), and role players (normativistic institutionalism). Muller (1993) tests five approaches to the problem of regime effectiveness four of which are taken into consideration here, too. Both his "complex institutional theory" and his "pure institutionalism" can be subsumed under "normativistic institutionalism".

6 Relatively early formulations of this theory can be found, for instance, in Kindleberger (1976) as well as Krasner (1976). The term "hegemonic stability theory" was coined by Keohane (1989, ch. 3, reprint).

7 This is a hypothetical scenario, of course, because the Soviet republics have never had the possibility to refuse compliance with international regimes.
itself among the successor states or an external state achieves overwhelming influence in the area and thus guarantees hegemonic stability anew.

The corresponding general assumption is:
*Power distribution is the most important factor in the explanation of regime robustness. The higher the concentration of power, the higher regime robustness.*

(2) One of the basic assumptions of *Neorealism* is that states are most concerned about maintaining and enhancing their autonomy and about preventing relative gains of their competitors. This behavior is caused by the anarchic and undifferentiated structure of the international system:

"A state worries about a division of possible gains that may favor others more than itself. That is the first way in which the structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states. A state also worries lest it becomes dependent on others through cooperative endeavors and exchanges of goods and services. That is the second way ..." (Waltz 1979: 106).

As stressed by Grieco, cooperation will often fail even when states expect absolute gains and are confident that their partners will not cheat:

"A state will decline to join, will leave, or will sharply limit its commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that gaps in otherwise mutually positive gains favor partners" (Grieco 1990: 10, 42).8

In our context, Neorealist theory would probably develop the following argument: International arms control regimes between East and West were possible and stable because both sides perceived their results as supporting military parity. Arms reduction obligations were seen as balanced and not threatening the independence of either side. When the Soviet Union collapsed, this bilateral balance collapsed, too. The successor states, above all immediate rivals like Russia and Ukraine or Armenia and Azerbaijan, are now occupied above all with the power struggle among each other. They avoid new restrictions to their newly gained independence and try to prevent each other from gaining more than what they perceive as their fair share of the Soviet inheritance. Regimes will only survive if they do not contradict efforts to "enhance prospects for survival and independence" (Waltz 1979: 107) and if they provide for a balanced distribution of gains.

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8 However, as Snidal (1991: 703) rightly emphasizes, not every bargaining about the terms of cooperation, about the "distribution of joint gains" indicates a relative gains orientation.
In general terms:

Relative gains concerns and the quest for autonomy are the most important factors in the explanation of regime robustness. The more balanced or equitable the perceived distribution of gains, and the less limiting the effects of cooperation on independence, the higher regime robustness.

(3) In his book "After Hegemony" Keohane objects to the theory of hegemonic stability. Whereas he admits that hegemony might play an important role in the formation of international regimes, he goes on to argue:

"Cooperation does not necessarily require the existence of a hegemonic leader after international regimes have been established. Post-hegemonic cooperation is also possible" (Keohane 1984: 32).

Keohane bases his argument on the economic theory of institutions in order to explain the durability of international regimes (cf. Keohane 1984: 100 ff.): First, regimes reduce transaction costs. The negotiation of arms control treaties requires high efforts before agreement is reached: sounding out intentions, fixing procedures, arriving at a common understanding of the subject matter. Delegations need to get to know and to trust each other. And after concluding a treaty, each party has to check the compliance of the others. Once regimes exist, they help to reduce these costs: They set common principles and understandings, further informal contacts and establish procedures which facilitate future negotiations and verification of compliance. Second, regimes reduce information deficits and imbalances which would otherwise prevent the participants in a transaction from reaping maximal benefit from it. Regime rules and procedures help to collect, exchange and equally distribute the necessary information, e.g. on the equipment and location of armed forces in all participating countries. And third, networks of regimes make linkages possible. International actors usually interact in more than one issue-area of international relations. Those who violate the norms and rules of one regime therefore risk to damage their reputation and incur high costs in other areas where they would benefit from norm-guided cooperation.

From this Institutionalist viewpoint one would expect that compliance with the regimes concluded by the Soviet Union (or their adaptation to the new context) is in the self-interest of the successor states because it reduces mistrust between them and uncertainty about their future relations. In particular, international security regimes could prevent a new, "intra-Soviet" arms race. However, this strand of Institutionalist thinking which can be called utilitarian Institutionalism does not view compliance as unconditionally guaranteed:
"Institutions should persist as long as, but only so long as, their members have incentives to maintain them" (Keohane 1988: 387, my italics).

For utilitarian Institutionalists these incentives are neither the power of a hegemon nor balanced gains or enhanced autonomy but joint absolute gains from institutionalized cooperation. Utilitarian Institutionalism thus tries to refute both Realist hypotheses. Only when the number of states is very small does relative gains seeking have a high impact (Snidal 1991).

However, in general one would hypothesize:

**Individual costs and benefits are the most important factor in the explanation of regime robustness. The higher the perceived net gains, the higher regime robustness.**

(4) Individual cost-benefit analyses lose their importance in normativistic Institutionalism. According to normativism, the behavior of states is not explained by actor interests but by the normative context in which they act. In the case to be analyzed here, proponents of this approach would probably put forward the following three arguments in favor of regime stability: First, like young members of a society new states are socialized to the normative context surrounding them. In order to become accepted and respected they comply, by and large, with the prevailing rules independently of cost-benefit considerations (Young 1986: 120). Second, new states will have especially high difficulties to orientate themselves in the complex environment of international relations. Therefore, they will adhere to existing normative institutions because they give guidance and reduce uncertainty. And third, in a period of crisis endangered issue-area specific regimes are backed by higher order networks of norms and institutions like the general rules of international law.

Accordingly, the last general assumption presented here is:

**The authority and utility of norms per se is the most important factor in the explanation of regime robustness. The more developed and stable the normative environment, the higher regime robustness.**

The explication of the competing approaches should have made clear that it is not sufficient to look at the outcome of international interactions in terms of regime compliance. Simple correlation analysis will not do because none of the approaches would flatly deny the possibility of regime survival in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse although the hypothesized probability increases from positions (1) through

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9 This is actually a core argument of the conservative theory of institutions.

10 This is what Müller (1993) refers to as "complex institutional theory".
(4). The explanatory power of the approaches can only be evaluated by also looking at two other facts: the political process that led to a given degree of regime robustness, and the motivation of the actors in this process to the extent that it can be inferred from their statements and actions. The evidence would corroborate

(a) hegemonic stability theory if the process was characterized by hegemonic imposition and if the successor states were motivated by hegemonic pressure and possibly hegemonic side payments;

(b) Neorealism if the process was characterized by conflict about relative gains and if the successor states were motivated by the desire to enhance their status, to maximize their autonomy, or even to "win";

(c) utilitarian Institutionalism if the process was characterized by cooperative bargaining and if the successor states were motivated by absolute cost/benefit assessments, information needs, and the desire for long-term partnership;

(d) normativistic Institutionalism if the process was one of socialization and if the successor states were motivated by the desire for recognition and orientation.

Finally, it should be mentioned that this study constitutes a rather hard test for Institutionalism because security issues are traditionally regarded as the home ground of Realism and because the collapse of a major state is a shock that can be counted among the highest conceivable strains on international institutions.

4. Arms Control and Reduction Regimes after the Dissolution of the Soviet Union

An analysis of regime robustness presupposes four elements in chronological order: the existence of an international regime at $t_1$, the occurrence of a shock at $t_2$, the participating states' reaction to the shock at $t_3$, and the resulting state of the regime at $t_4$ (see Figure 1).

In order to test the robustness of international arms control and reduction regimes after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, cases have to be selected according to the following criteria:

(a) regimes which the Soviet Union had joined before its dissolution. This means at least the signing of the treaty or the agreement containing the regime rules, not necessarily its ratification.

(b) regimes of which the Soviet Union was an indispensable participant, i.e. the goals of the regime could not be attained without the USSR. Only in this case does the dissolution of a state constitute a major shock to the regime.
regimes for which there was no evidence of systematic rule violations by the Soviet Union. Otherwise regime compliance after the shock would not be a valid indicator of regime robustness.

Figure 1: Model for the Analysis of Regime Robustness

These criteria are fulfilled by the four international arms control and reduction regimes which will be investigated in this study: the nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the strategic arms reduction regime negotiated during the bilateral U.S.-Soviet START talks, the European conventional arms reduction regime established through NATO-WTO negotiations within the CSCE framework, and the European operational arms control regime based on the CSCE confidence-building measures.

This selection is not the result of a well thought-out comparative research design: Apart from the requirements listed above cases were chosen because they equally represent nuclear and conventional issues, because they can be considered the most important arms control and arms reduction regimes for the Eurasian region, and because findings from an analysis of four cases can be stated with more confidence than those based on just one. No doubt, these cases are highly comparable: They concern by and large the same actors, the same international context, and the same time period; they differ mainly with regard to the kind of regulated military equipment or activity. However, one cannot expect a full and final study of regime robustness here: If at all, the implementation of regime rules has only just begun for the Soviet successor states in most of the investigated cases. The focus will therefore be on the processes of accession of the former Soviet republics to the international regimes.\footnote{Especially with regard to nuclear arms control developments in the former Soviet republics are too uncertain and too much in a state of flux to allow strong conclusions. This study covers events until the beginning of June 1993.} Each short case study will cover the items "main regime components", 

\[ \text{SHOCK} \]

\[ \text{regime I} \]
- components
- compliance

\[ \text{reaction of participants} \]
- process
- motivation

\[ \text{regime II} \]
- constancy
- compliance

\[ t_1 \]
\[ t_2 \]
\[ t_3 \]
\[ t_4 \]
"challenges to the regime by the dissolution of the Soviet Union", "regime constancy", "regime compliance", "political processes", and "actor motivations".\textsuperscript{12}

4.1. The Non-Proliferation Regime

The non-proliferation regime was initiated by the United States and the Soviet Union and was founded in 1968 by the Non-Proliferation Treaty.\textsuperscript{13} It is based on the common conviction of the regime participants that the proliferation of nuclear weapons (technology) stimulates the arms race and increases the danger of war. The norms of the regime commit nuclear weapon states (NWS) not to assist non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) in the acquisition or production of nuclear weapons and commits NNWS to abstain from any efforts of this kind. In order to attain this goal all participants guarantee the physical protection of nuclear materials on their territory, agree to tolerate international inspections and declare to export nuclear materials for peaceful use only to countries which allow international inspections.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union produced a twofold challenge to the non-proliferation regime:

(1) internal proliferation: Nuclear weapons as well as nuclear power stations and nuclear research institutes were scattered all over the USSR but were centrally administered by Moscow. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union this central control threatened to crumble and it was possible that new nuclear weapon states emerged on its territory. Indeed, if one trusts the official assertions, at the time of the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union and shortly thereafter, tactical nuclear weapons were completely removed to Russia from all republics but those where also strategic nuclear forces were located: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

(2) external proliferation: The dissolution of the Soviet Union was accompanied by a general decay of public authority and economic capacity. This also affected state financing and control of nuclear technology thereby increasing the danger of forbidden exports of nuclear technology and a brain drain of Soviet nuclear experts.

The constancy of the non-proliferation regime was not questioned as a consequence of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, none of its general provisions was modified.

\textsuperscript{12} The analysis is based on newspaper reports, academic journals, and documentations, above all The Arms Control Reporter (ACR). Moreover, Schlichting/Wallner (1992) have given a valuable overview.

\textsuperscript{13} Cf. the description of the regime by Müller (1989: 282ff.). I will confine myself to those regime components which are relevant for the context of this investigation, i.e. the possession and transfer of nuclear weapons (technology).
Current reform plans have rather been triggered by the danger of proliferation in the Third World and in particular by the Iraq case. However, an ad hoc measure was added which was tailor-made for the three de facto NWS: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. On 23 May 1992, together with the United States and Russia, they signed a START Protocol in Lisbon which linked the non-proliferation issue to the START process (cf. ch. 4.2.). In the Lisbon Protocol, the three de facto NWS were accepted as parties to the START treaty. In return, they committed themselves to sign the NPT as NNWS "in the shortest possible time" and to remove all nuclear weapons from their territory within the seven-year START arms reduction period - and not necessarily until the end of 1994 as they had promised before. Thereby a recognized intermediate status was created especially for Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. It did not change any of the regime rules but introduced a measure of flexibility which was expected to further regime compliance.

Regime compliance in the case of internal non-proliferation would mean that only one of the former Soviet republics inherits the Soviet Union's NWS status in order not to increase the global number of NWS. All others would have to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as NNWS and give up control over the nuclear weapons stationed on their territory. Meanwhile, Russia has assumed the USSR's position at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the only recognized NWS among the new states on former Soviet territory. Azerbaijan, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Uzbekistan have become parties to the NPT. All remaining successor states have so far repeatedly restated their general intent to join the NPT as NNWS but, as yet, have not acted on their intent. The crucial cases for the evaluation of regime compliance are the three de facto NWS which would really have to give up something in order to comply with the non-proliferation regime and which are potentially in a position to violate the principle of non-proliferation by expanding the number of NWS. Focus will therefore be on the policies of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

The compliance problems do not concern the tactical nuclear weapons which were stationed on their territory: They were shipped off to Russia for destruction well before the negotiated deadline of 1 July 1992. Yet in the case of strategic weapons even the temporary loosening of the non-proliferation principle by the Lisbon Protocol has not led to a final settlement. Almost one year after Lisbon only Belarus has joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (and made an agreement with Russia to transfer nuclear weapons until the end of 1994). Kazakhstan and Ukraine are prepared to become

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14 I call them "de facto NWS" because they are not officially recognized as NWS under the non-proliferation regime.
members of the IAEA and to accept its system of safeguards but have not yet acceded to the NPT.\textsuperscript{15}

Whereas Kazakhstan has cast no serious doubt on its intention to eventually follow Belarus in joining the NPT, irritating signals have been sent by the Ukrainian political leadership:

(1) Ukraine has repeatedly made giving up nuclear weapons subject to two conditions: First, it has demanded international security guarantees which should obviously go beyond a mere reaffirmation of the declaration made 1968 in connection with the NPT. It contains the assurance that nuclear aggression or nuclear threats against any NNWS would immediately be countered by action of the UN Security Council. Besides negative and positive guarantees by the Western NWS Ukraine demands Russian guarantees to assist in case of attack, to renounce economic pressure on Ukraine, and to respect Ukrainian territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders.\textsuperscript{16}

(2) Second, Ukraine has demanded financial compensation for the value of the nuclear weapons and materials as well as for the costs of arms transfers and destruction. Ukrainian demands amount to 1.5-2 billion US-Dollars, and it has time and again threatened to sell nuclear materials to the highest bidder otherwise.\textsuperscript{17} However, the sums which Western states as well as Russia have offered Ukraine fall far short of this demand.

(3) Since the Lisbon agreement a conflict about the control of the strategic forces located in Ukraine has gone on unresolved between Russia and the Joint Armed Forces High Command of the Community of Independent States (CIS) on the one side and Ukraine on the other. Whereas Russia and Šapošnikov, head of the CIS command, insist on exclusive CIS ownership of and control over weapons and troops (as conceded by Belarus and Kazakhstan), Ukraine demands national ownership and "administrative" control.\textsuperscript{18}


\textsuperscript{17} Cf. ACR 1992: 611.B.748 and 761; SZ, 7, 29 January, and 8 February 1993.

\textsuperscript{18} Cf. ACR 1992: 611.B.740ff. and 1993: 611.B.785ff. Since the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command is dominated by Russians, CIS and Russian control tend to be de facto synonymous. Nevertheless, the Russian government has demanded exclusive Russian control over the strategic forces on the eve of the 8th CIS summit in January 1993 (SZ, 22 January 1993) and at many other occasions since then.
(4) Ukraine's commitment to nuclear disarmament has come under growing domestic opposition. Whereas President Kravčuk has not officially altered his position, head of government Kučma is reported to have judged Ukrainian nuclear weapons as a restraining factor in East European international politics and to have pleaded for a temporary NWS status (ACR 1993: 611.B.779; SZ, 5/6 June 1993). Resistance to NNWS status is on the rise in the Ukrainian parliament which is currently debating the NPT in connection with the START-1 treaty. Influential legislators apparently favor to disregard the Lisbon Protocol and to delink the ratification of START and NPT again.19

As far as external proliferation is concerned, no systematic or dangerous violation of NPT prohibitions seems to have occurred. Although the Soviet export control system collapsed and has not been replaced by effective controls outside of Russia (Zagorski 1992: 32ff.), and although reports of uranium theft and smuggle abound in the newspapers, there is

"no solid evidence of the illicit exports of any nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon components, or militarily significant quantities of weapon-grade material from Russia or the other Soviet successor states".20

Moreover, minor violations of trade prohibitions seem to be the consequence of weakened state controls rather than intended and systematic violations by the governments themselves. However, it seems that the danger of a brain drain of Soviet nuclear scientists and technicians has not been banned but is increasing in spite of the International Science and Technology Centers to be established with Western funding (cf. SZ, 12/13 December 1992; Müller/Schaper 1993: 3f.).

To sum up regime compliance: Although all successor states have vowed to sign the NPT almost as soon as they became independent the actual process of accession has so far been slow and hesitant. This in itself is hardly an indication of strong regime compliance. Moreover, Ukraine even appears to move away from the non-proliferation regime. Although Ukraine currently ranks third among the world's NWS, its disinclination to ratify the NPT would not necessarily break up the regime which has long existed without Chinese and French participation. But it would considerably weaken this institution at a time when China and France have finally decided to join

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19 This is the opinion of the president of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Verhovna Rada, Dmytro Pavlyčko (SZ, 26 March 1993; IHT, 1 April 1993).

the NPT. This is all the more serious as it would be the first time that a state in clear possession of nuclear weapons withdraws from the regime and thus reduces its area of application. In the East European region, such a Ukrainian behavior would deal a mortal blow to the institution of non-proliferation. However, as of now it remains unclear whether Ukraine is aiming at procrastination or at outright non-compliance. It is highly doubtful whether Ukraine possesses the capability to operate nuclear missiles let alone to maintain nuclear forces in the long run (ACR 1993: 611.E.-2.46ff.).

The international political processes concerning the non-proliferation issue show considerable vacillations in the behavior of the de facto NWS. This is not only true for Ukraine (cf. ACR 1992 and 1993: 602.B, 611.B). Already in 1991, the Supreme Soviets of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan decided that their countries should become NNWS. The Minsk (8 December 1991) and Alma Ata agreements (21 December 1991) - by which the CIS was founded - reaffirmed central control over nuclear weapons, i.e. by the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command, and once again committed Belarus and Ukraine to joining the NPT. However, as soon as the three republics became independent states, they began to deviate from their unconditional non-nuclear position. Time and again, President Nazarbaev has demanded that Kazakhstan be recognized as an (at least temporary) NWS. He made nuclear disarmament dependent on equivalent steps by Russia and pointed to the fact that his country was surrounded by NWS or states aspiring to be nuclear. Like Ukraine, Kazakhstan has raised doubts about the peaceful intentions of Russia in the face of potential border and ethnic conflicts, demanded joint control and a veto power over the use of the former Soviet strategic forces, and asked for extensive international security guarantees and economic assistance as a precondition for becoming a NNWS. Ukraine even temporarily halted the handing over of tactical nuclear weapons in March 1992 and demanded international control over the destruction of these forces in Russia.21

These attempts to redefine the terms of non-proliferation have constantly been balanced by Russian and Western efforts to keep the successor states in line. No opportunity, be it a bilateral meeting or a multilateral conference, was missed to remind the de facto NWS of their commitment to a nuclear-free status, to express concern about any relaxation of this commitment, and to press for quick and unconditional adherence to the non-proliferation regime as NNWS. Western states and in particular the United States have furthermore explicitly linked a cooperative

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21 In contrast to Kazakhstan and Ukraine, Belarus has generally kept a very low profile in these processes.
relationship with the successor states and economic assistance to non-proliferation (cf. 
SZ, 27/28 March 1993; IHT, 1 April 1993). The U.S. has insisted on giving security 
guarantees to Ukraine only after its accession to the NPT and has threatened to with-
hold financial and economic assistance in the case of non-compliance. On the other 
hand, it promised to assist in the destruction of weapons, to sponsor an International 
Science and Technology Center, and to buy nuclear material from the CIS (cf. Bardehle 1993: 142ff.). Recently, President Clinton even refused to meet the Ukrai-
nian Premier Kučma before the Ukrainian accession to the NPT (FR, 10 April 1993). 
In their interactions with Western states, e.g. at the various meetings of the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the three de facto NWS have repeatedly 
renewed their declarations of intent to become NNWS.

What do these processes and related statements by the representatives of the de facto 
NWS tell us about their motivations? Quite obviously, the de facto NWS have been 
subject to various influences. At the beginning, nuclear weapons were seen as wea-
pons of the disliked Union and linked to the sad experiences Kazakhs, Ukrainians, 
and Belarussians had made with nuclear energy: at the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site 
and the Černobyl nuclear power station. Hence the early and unconditional decisions 
to become NNWS. When the countries became independent, additional factors came 
into play:22

(1) The de facto NWS quickly found out that the possession of nuclear weapons 
attached an importance and drew an attention to their countries which they otherwise 
would not have received and which could fade away once they became NNWS: 
Nazarbaev advisors and Belarus' minister of defense Kozlovskij quite openly avowed 
this positive side-effect of nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip in foreign rela-
tions.23

(2) More importantly, however, the de facto NWS found themselves in an uncertain 
international context and were faced with a powerful neighbor toward whom mistrust 
was widespread: the Russian Federation. Ukraine and Kazakhstan have large Russian 
minorities and are to a considerable extent dependent on the Russian economy. 
Influential nationalist and communist forces in Russia do not accept the independence 
and the territorial integrity of the two largest neighbor republics. Uncertainty has 
recently been fueled by the constitutional crisis in Russia and the neighbor's uncertain 
future foreign policy orientation. Moreover, the leaders of Kazakhstan and Ukraine 
were aware that the non-proliferation regime (and the Western policy in its support)

22 Cf. Heinemann-Grüder/Petersen (1992: 17f.); Schröder/Schneider (1992: 20; 41); Um-
bach (1992: 32f.).

had a strong bias in favor of Russia: Whereas Russia would inherit the position and the power of the Soviet Union, they would have to renounce nuclear status and become "second-rate" countries. This situation created a strong tendency to retain nuclear forces as a last resort, to postpone accession to the non-proliferation regime until Russian intentions became clearer, or to demand security guarantees in exchange for giving up nuclear weapons.

(3) These two factors which work to some extent in favor of non-compliance were balanced by Western pressure in favor of compliance. The United States has firmly refused to accord any kind of NWS status under the NPT to Belarus, Kazakhstan, or Ukraine and has defended the Russian claim to exclusive inheritance of the Soviet nuclear arsenals. Since the successor states of the Soviet Union are looking mainly to the West, and above all to the United States, for recognition and assistance, this authority gave the U.S. administration considerable leverage in the promotion of the non-proliferation regime and was translated into a mix of negative and positive incentives.

4.2. The Strategic Arms Reduction Regime

The strategic arms reduction regime came into being by the START negotiations and the START treaty signed on 31 July 1991 by the United States and the Soviet Union. It is based on three principles: prevention of nuclear war, risk reduction, and strategic parity. The central norms of the regime contain not only the limitation but also (and this is a novel element) a marked reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles as well as unprecedented verification measures. At the end of a period of seven years after its entry into force, the parties will be allowed no more than 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 6,000 nuclear warheads. Further specific rules apply to the distribution of warheads to different kinds of vehicles, the counting procedures, to a ban on certain kinds of strategic weapons as well as on possible ways to circumvent treaty provisions. The most important procedures concern verification, data exchange, and a Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Again, the collapse of the Soviet Union created a double challenge to the regime: (1) ratification and implementation: When the Soviet Union ceased to exist START had neither been ratified in the United States nor in the Soviet Union. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the weapons in question were not only located in Russia but also in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

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(2) adaptation: START was the last treaty reflecting the era of bipolar superpower confrontation in its origins and its principles and it soon was "widely recognized that the level of forces allowed under START no longer correspond[ed] to new political realities" (Daalder 1992: 57; cf. Cowen Karp 1992: 30).

Because of these challenges, rigid regime constancy would not have been an indication of optimum robustness in terms of goal attainment. Indeed, the strategic arms reduction regime has proven flexible both with regard to the post-Soviet and the new international security environment. New rules and procedures were added. In order to promote ratification and implementation of START not only Russia but all four successor states with strategic nuclear forces succeeded the Soviet Union as parties to the treaty. This was recorded in the already mentioned Lisbon Protocol of 23 May 1992 which otherwise did not modify any of the START provisions. Five months later regulations were added which provided for the participation of the three new parties in the START Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. In order to coordinate arms reduction within the CIS, it was agreed at the Bishkek meeting of October 1992 that the Joint Armed Forces High Command would monitor the destruction of nuclear weapons and the observance of START (ACR 1992: 611.B.751).

In order to adapt the regime to the new international situation Russian-American strategic arms reduction talks were reopened in January 1992. Only one year later, on 3 January 1993, they resulted in the signing of the START-2 treaty. START-2 introduces new weapons limits to the strategic arms reduction regime: Russia and the United States committed themselves to reducing their intercontinental ballistic missiles to 3,000-3,500 until 2003. This means a 50% cut compared with the START-1 limits. In particular, land-based missiles with multiple warheads which are considered to be the most destabilizing elements of the nuclear arsenal will have to be eliminated completely. However, START-2 can only enter into force after ratification of START-1 by all five parties.

Since START-1 was linked to the NPT via the Lisbon Accord regime compliance has been undermined by the same procrastinating Ukrainian policy which also threatens the non-proliferation regime. To be sure, Kazakhstan, Russia, and the United States ratified START-1 in 1992. Belarus followed at the beginning of February 1993. Only Ukraine has signed the treaty but not ratified it yet, thus preventing it from entering into force. Although the Ukrainian president Kravčuk and his government have always officially endorsed START-1, they and speakers of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet have made ratification subject to the same security and financial conditions as the accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Furthermore, Ukraine recently demanded the verified destruction not only of the launchers and missiles but also of the
nuclear warheads (SZ, 13 April 1993). Finally, it was reported that the majority in the Verkhovna Rada tends to cast a vote on START-1 only after ratification of START-2 by the Russian parliament (SZ, 3 March 1993). In view of Russia's constitutional crisis and the fierce resistance to START-2 announced by nationalist and communist forces in the Supreme Soviet this could take a long time.

Originally, the three de facto NWS were admitted as parties to START-1 in order to ensure and facilitate their transition to non-nuclear status. Meanwhile, it seems that the linkage between strategic arms reduction and non-proliferation constitutes an impediment to ratification of START-1 in Ukraine: On the one hand, those leading legislators who hesitate to give up nuclear weapons because of mistrust toward Russia would not oppose START-1 as such if it was not linked to the NPT via the Lisbon Protocol. On the other hand, the Russian Supreme Soviet ratified START-1 subject to the condition that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine join the NPT as NNWS and delayed the exchange of documents until then. The United States also considers the Lisbon Protocol to be legally binding (cf. ACR 1992: 611.B.738 and 755; IHT, 1 April 1993). A separate ratification of START-1 in Ukraine could therefore call into question the whole regime.

Thus, the Ukrainian policy of delaying ratification of START-1 and of making it subject to several conditions has certainly weakened the strategic arms reduction regime. However, one has to keep in mind that Ukrainian procrastination is not directed against strategic arms reduction but against denuclearization and the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia. The weakness of the strategic arms reduction regime therefore stems mainly from its linkage to the non-proliferation regime. Apart from this fundamental problem and some American complaints about the "counting" of strategic forces and the lack of trained personnel in the former Soviet Union there is no evidence of violated regime rules or procedures (cf. ACR 1992: 611.E-3.40; ACR 1993: 611.B.771).

The political process which led to the modified START procedures closely parallel those of the proliferation issue to which it was eventually linked. At the beginning, the United States and Russia were in agreement that Russia should be the sole successor of the Soviet Union as party to the START treaty. During his January 1992 trip to the former Soviet Union it still appeared to Undersecretary of State Barthomolew that the de facto NWS shared this view. However, in February the Ukrainian President Kravčuk took the lead in denying Russia the right to speak on strategic dis-

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25 It is therefore sufficient to discuss it until the signing of the Lisbon Protocol. Cf. ACR 1992, section 611.B.
armament in the name of all post-Soviet NWS. Negotiations about a quadripartite agreement on the implementation of START were inconclusive because Ukraine insisted on collective or individual participation of all post-Soviet NWS in the START process as equal parties to the treaty. Finally, the United States and Russia gave up their resistance in return for the commitment of the three de facto NWS to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as NNWS. However, the U.S. has always opposed any renegotiations of the material provisions contained in START-1.

This process reveals the same basic motivations which have characterized the proliferation policy of the post-Soviet states. At the beginning, the START provisions were unconditionally accepted. Then, a mixture of jealousy and mistrust toward Russia led the de facto NWS to demand equal participation. The Lisbon Protocol not only enhanced their status but also gave them access to direct information about, and a modicum of control over, the disarmament process.

4.3. The Conventional Arms Reduction Regime

The conventional arms reduction regime is based on the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) signed at the Paris CSCE summit by the members of NATO and WTO on 19 November 1990. In its preamble, the following principles are listed: non-aggression, prevention of military conflicts in Europe, "a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels than heretofore", elimination of disparities and of capabilities for launching surprise attacks and for initiating large-scale offensive action. The treaty subdivides the area of application (Atlantic to the Urals) into four subzones, defines alliance and individual ceilings for several types of conventional weapons in each subzone, and demands that any "treaty limited equipment" in excess of these ceilings be deactivated in a verifiable manner. Specific rules contained in the numerous protocols to the treaty pertain to the counting of equipment, the reduction process, information exchange, and inspection. Procedures cover not only a joint consultative group and review conferences but also follow-on negotiations on military personnel (CFE 1A).

The challenges to regime robustness posed by the collapse of the Soviet Union concerned

(1) ratification and implementation of the CFE treaty: The CFE treaty had been signed but not yet ratified by the Soviet Union. Now eleven successor states are

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26 Treaty provisions are summarized in Sharp (1991: 407ff.).
situated within the area of application: the three Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.

(2) adaptation: The CFE treaty, although it was negotiated within the CSCE, was de facto an agreement between NATO and WTO and reflected the bloc confrontation, e.g. in its definition of zones and ceilings. Concerning the former Soviet Union it is particularly outdated because it was orientated toward the borders of Soviet military districts which did not correspond to the new national borders and because the collective CIS conventional forces were replaced by national armies under national command.

(3) continuation of the follow-on negotiations: Whereas the CFE treaty had already been signed by the Soviet Union, the follow-on negotiations on military personnel were still in process when the Soviet Union was dissolved. It was by no means a matter of course that the new states in the area of application would participate in the negotiations.

As far as regime constancy is concerned, it had been the policy of the other parties to the treaty from the beginning to achieve the highest possible ratification rate among the successor states of the Soviet Union by making the least possible changes in the treaty. A renegotiation was categorically excluded. However, it was not possible to find a common adjustment for all post-Soviet states. The Baltic states dissociated themselves from the regime in October 1991: Whereas Soviet equipment located in the former Baltic Military District would still be subject to treaty limits, any national forces would be as exempt from international regulation as those of the neutral and non-aligned countries (Sharp 1992: 465ff.). However, the other eight states agreed to allocate the former Soviet weapons and limits among themselves at their 15 May 1992 meeting in Tashkent and thus paved the way for the "Final Document" signed at the "Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty" during the NACC meeting of 5 June 1992 in Oslo and containing the minimal changes in rules and procedures necessary for the treaty to enter into force under the new European conditions.

Neither have the ongoing negotiations on military personnel been greatly hampered by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The politically, not legally, binding CFE 1A agreement was signed in Helsinki on 10 July 1992 by the heads of all states which are party to the CFE treaty. It sets a ceiling on the military personnel of conventional forces in the zone from the Atlantic to the Urals. Each state decides and declares its limits autonomously and may not exceed it after 40 months from entry into force. These ceilings are accompanied by "stabilizing measures" (advance notification obligations in case of an increase in personnel strength) destined to impede upward changes of the declared limits. All in all, the conventional arms reduction process has
shown considerable steadfastness with regard to the tremendous changes in Eastern Europe. It has responded to the end of the Soviet Union with the indispensable quantum of flexibility. However, the regime has not been flexible enough to overcome its outdated limitation to the former bloc members and the obsolete zonal subdivision of the continent.

In order to evaluate regime compliance we will have to concentrate on the successor states' readiness to participate in the CFE process, to sign, ratify, and implement the CFE documents:

(1) At first glance, the Baltic states' rapid dissociation from CFE looks like a clear case of non-compliance. However, it neither reflects a general refusal of international security regimes (see their early accession to the non-proliferation regime) nor is it incompatible with the original military bloc orientation of CFE. It should rather be interpreted as an expression of neutralism by three small and "harmless" states following the example of their Swedish and Finnish neighbors none of whom takes part in the CFE process. Nevertheless, the withdrawal of the Baltic states was no sign of regime robustness either. Although the other parties to the treaty consented to it, it was certainly not welcome by the Non-Soviet former Warsaw Treaty members, above all Poland (Sharp 1992: 466).

(2) All other successor states of the Soviet Union concerned have from the beginning declared their readiness to ratify and implement the CFE treaty without a substantive revision. They have negotiated the necessary adjustments, signed the Oslo Final Document, and deposited their instruments of ratification until 30 October 1992, Belarus and Kazakhstan being the last states to do so. As 17 July 1992 remained the official date of the treaty's entry into force, the baseline inspection phase could be almost entirely completed until 14 November 1992 and was followed by the destruction inspection phase.

(3) Some problems have occurred during the initial implementation of the CFE treaty. Since September 1992, a U.S.-Russian dispute over the access of U.S. inspection teams to certain Russian military sites has gone unresolved because both sides interpret the treaty differently (ACR 1992: 407.B.477, 480). Yet this dispute has not questioned the success of the baseline inspections. Furthermore, the total number of reduction liabilities announced by the successor states was much below the former Soviet requirement. Gaps appeared especially with regard to hundreds of tanks in the Caucasian region which were either declared to have "disappeared" or contested between Russia and Georgia. Some equipment obviously ended up in the hands of nongovernmental groups, other weapons were probably destroyed in the Azeri-Armenian war or simply did not work so that no one wanted to be responsible for
them. Whether these problems represent systematic violations of the regime rules is often hard to tell from the outside. Probably many of them are due to the civil wars raging in this area and to a general lack of central governmental control. A further problem which is bound to arise during the CFE implementation is the high cost of destruction. Less costly procedures are currently under discussion.

(4) Participation in the CFE follow-on process has been low: Only Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine actively negotiated CFE IA on military personnel. Nevertheless, it was signed in Helsinki by all new states in the CFE area of application. However, the southern successor states have been reluctant to declare their limits of military personnel strength. Kazakhstan could announce a zero limit because only a small and scarcely populated part of its territory belongs to the area of application. Georgia declared 40,000 troops several months after the signing of CFE IA. As to Moldova and Armenia, only unofficial announcements have come in. Azerbaijan has not declared any ceiling whatsoever. Finally, one should not forget that personnel limits could be declared unilaterally. Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine announced limits which are higher than those contained in national troop reduction plans so that regime compliance should pose no major problem to these states. However, this practice devalues CFE IA to a certain extent (ACR 1993: 407.E-1.113ff.).

(5) On balance, the conventional arms reduction regime has proved strong with regard to the core states of the CIS, Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. It has failed to integrate the Baltic states. And it looks quite frayed at the south eastern rim of its area of application. One more aspect of regime compliance merits to be mentioned: The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan for Nagorny Karabach might not violate CFE rules and procedures at this early stage of the implementation process. However, it certainly is against the principle of non-aggression on which the whole regime is based. And it is questionable whether it is pure coincidence that the states which have been reluctant to declare personnel limits are the same which are engaged in civil and interstate warfare.

The political process leading to the entry into force of CFE bears some resemblance with the processes we have seen so far (cf. ACR 1992: 407.B). Already on 20 December 1991 a High Level Working Group (HLWG) was formed by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in order to organize and guarantee the transition from Soviet to the successor states' participation in the CFE process. NACC and its HLWG were especially useful because they brought together the representatives of

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states which did not actively participate in the CSCE negotiations (Dunay 1993: 10). On 10 January 1992, this HLWG reached a general agreement with the eight remaining successor states within the CFE area of application that CFE would not be renegotiated. Soviet treaty obligations would be apportioned among these states by way of collective decision and ratified by each of them before the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting in March. The majority of the new states joined the CSCE on 30 January 1992. In their accession letters, they promised again to ratify and comply with the CFE treaty. On the one hand, the following months were characterized by unsuccessful attempts of the CIS states to reach an accord on the allocation of Soviet forces and limits. Progress was impeded by the usual rivalry between Russia demanding the overwhelming majority of ground weapons and Ukraine attempting to get as close as possible to parity with the Russian Federation. Armenia and Azerbaijan sought a far greater share than the other CIS states would concede. The uncertain future force structure in the CIS, i.e. the relation between joint and national forces, further complicated the situation. The early informal proposals

"clearly demonstrated that each successor state was eager to maximize its own military power and significantly restrain that of its potential competitors" (Dunay 1993: 13).

On the other hand, the West increased its pressure for a quick agreement without directly intervening in the CIS deliberations on quota and without taking sides. In February, the HLWG decided on a "road map for bringing the CFE treaty into force". In March, the NACC communique committed the former Soviet republics to an entry into force of the treaty by the time of the Helsinki summit in July. The NACC also set the date for an Extraordinary Conference during its June meeting at which the CIS agreement would be incorporated into the CFE treaty. No opportunity was missed to insist on this deadline and on the participation of all eight states.

The motivating forces which have led to the current state of the conventional arms reduction regime were as complex and contradictory as the political process. Organizations and fora formed on Western initiative like the NACC, its HLWG and the Extraordinary Conference were probably as instrumental as constant Western insistence on quick agreement in bringing about the desired result which saved the conventional arms reduction regime in less than half a year. To be sure, the validity of CFE norms and rules had not been openly questioned by any of the new states. However, the necessary distribution of forces and force limits among them invited conflict motivated by relative-gains considerations between neighboring states which might have continued much longer without Western organizational assistance and unrelenting pressure. Only in the European South of the former Soviet Union is the regime under
continuing pressure of civil wars and dwindling government control which appear to provide stronger motivating forces to the disadvantage of the CFE process than those which the West is able to muster in support of the regime.

4.4. The Operational Arms Control Regime

In contrast to conventional arms reduction, operational arms control is not concerned with the structure, quality, and quantity of the armed forces but with their peacetime operations such as force activations, manoeuvres and other kinds of troop movements. Confidence and security-building measures (CSBM) have been part of the CSCE process from the Helsinki Final Document onwards and have been updated and extended 1986 in Stockholm and 1990 in Vienna. Another round of CSBM negotiations had begun right after the signing of the 1990 Vienna document and was scheduled to be concluded before the 1992 Helsinki Follow-up meeting. The operational arms control regime is based on the principles of war prevention by reducing the risk of surprise attack, non-aggression, peaceful conflict settlement, and individual and collective self-defense. Its basic norms comprise the notification of military activities, numerical constraints on exercises, exchange of militarily relevant data, observation and inspection by other states as well as an increase in general military contacts. Regime rules put these norms into concrete terms, e.g. they contain numerical notification and observation thresholds as well as inspection procedures. The main procedural features of the operational arms control regime are the uninterrupted negotiation process on new CSBMs and, since 1990, a Conflict Prevention Center.

The challenges to the operational arms control regime produced by the dissolution of the Soviet Union are the same as with other regimes:

(1) participation and adherence: It had to be guaranteed that the successor states of the Soviet Union accepted the CSBMs already in force, took part in the CSBM negotiation process and subscribed to new CSBMs.

(2) adaptation: Existing CSBMs were still preponderantly orientated toward the Europe of the two military blocs: Quantitative rules were adapted to large-scale alliance maneuvers and would have had to be lowered significantly in order to do justice to the new realities of small-scale military operations and limited regional conflicts. The area of application excluded the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union (cf. Lachowksi 1992: 482ff.).

For a regime analysis of CSBMs see Efinger/Ritberger 1991.
The operational arms control regime has shown flexibility with regard to both aspects of the new situation. Already at the end of January 1992 when the bulk of successor states joined the CSCE, not only the European but also the Central Asian states agreed to apply the provisions of the Vienna Document 1990 on CSBMs. This extension of the area of application was confirmed at the beginning of March when the new Vienna Document was signed by all 48 CSCE members. For every regime norm the Vienna Document 1992 expands and strengthens regulation: For the first time, it committed the signatories to exchange information on the upgrading of low-strength and temporarily activated units. Notification and observation levels dropped to 9,000/13,000 troops or 250/300 tanks respectively. Constraints on exercises became tighter, too.\(^\text{29}\) In contrast to the other regimes discussed here, the operational arms control regime did not demand the distribution of Soviet weapons, quotas, or limits. This considerably facilitated adaptation.

It also facilitated regime compliance as far as accession to the regime is concerned, because the recognition of the regime norms and rules could be declared unilaterally, without prior negotiations among the successor states. Furthermore, because of its political, not legal nature, the operational arms control regime did not require potentially lengthy ratification. Therefore approval of the CSBMs has been immediate (together with the accession to the CSCE) and universal with the exception of the CSCE latecomer Georgia: All other successor states committed themselves to the Vienna Document 1990 and later signed the Vienna Document 1992 although most of them had not participated in the Vienna CSBM deliberations. So far there have not been any reports on regime violations. The fact that Russia and other CIS members did not provide information on their planned military activities as of 30 January 1992 should be attributed to the turbulences and uncertainties in this early period of post-Soviet consolidation, not to an intention of concealing military plans (cf. Lachowski 1992: 488). However, Armenian and Azeri military activities have long passed the stage of peacetime exercises. They exceed the new Vienna notification and observation levels and will probably increase further.\(^\text{30}\) Even if both states had notified the CSCE about their attacks (which would have been a ridiculous kind of regime compliance, indeed), the war as such would still have violated the CSBM principles and thus undermined the operational arms control regime. On the whole, however, the regime has proven strong except for ethno-nationalistic war.


\(^\text{30}\) Cf., e.g., NZZ 8 July 1992 which reported 10,000 troops and 100 tanks to take part in an Azeri attack on Nagornyj Karabach.
The political process which led to the general recognition of the CSBM regime among the successor states of the Soviet Union was unspectacular in comparison with the ones described so far: The agreement to follow the rules of the regime was an integral and unquestioned part of almost all of the new states' accession to the CSCE, and the signing of the Vienna Document 1992 apparently was an equally "natural" action since most of the CIS states did not even participate in the deliberations. Therefore, the motivation behind this behavior seems to be neither hegemonic pressure nor realization of gains but respect for the rules of a normative community which all successor states desired to be part of.

5. Findings

In this final section I will try to draw generalized conclusions from the analysis of the four cases with regard to regime constancy and compliance as well as to process and motivations. This will allow to determine the relative explanatory power of the Realist and Institutionalist approaches to the analysis of regime robustness. As a lead-in, the results of Chapter 4 are summarized in Table 1.

5.1. Regime Robustness

In the time period covered by this analysis, the main issue of regime robustness at stake was the new states' accession to existing arms control and reduction regimes and the negotiation and entry into force of rules that had still been in the process of negotiation when the Soviet Union was dissolved. Due to mainly Ukrainian resistance and procrastination this accession period has not ended yet as far as nuclear arms control and reduction measures are concerned. However, the accession to regimes dealing with conventional forces was completed when the CFE treaty entered into force in October 1992.

None of the regimes under investigation proved unstable in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In all cases, changes in the regime components come under the category of "flexibility". The highest priority was given to the ratification and implementation of existing treaties and the successful completion of ongoing negotiation processes. For that purpose, changes within the regime have in general been kept to the unavoidable minimum of rule and procedure modifications necessitated by the dissolution of the Soviet Union (extended START participation, Oslo CFE document). Renegotiation has been excluded from the start for fear of opening a Pandora's box even if the new international situation would have lent itself to a more
extensive change. Follow-on negotiations have proceeded without delay and ended with success: The material standards contained in the regime rules have not only survived intact - in all cases except non-proliferation they have even been raised (START-2, CFE 1A, Vienna Document 1992). In other words, "flexibility" was not synonymous with "deregulation" but led to "more order" and "stricter rules" in international security relations.

Table 1: Regime Robustness - Overview of Results (May 1993)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>challenges mastered</th>
<th>non-proliferation</th>
<th>strategic arms reduction</th>
<th>conventional arms reduction</th>
<th>operational arms control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>constancy</td>
<td>flexible: linkage to START</td>
<td>flexible: linkage to NPT, extended participation, START-2</td>
<td>flexible: distribution of Soviet forces, CFE 1A</td>
<td>flexible: extension of area, Vienna Document 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>weak: slow accession</td>
<td>weak: linkage to non-proliferation delays ratification</td>
<td>strong (except in war-zones)</td>
<td>strong (except in war-zones)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>processes and motivations</td>
<td>various</td>
<td>various</td>
<td>various</td>
<td>socialization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, a number of ad hoc rules and procedures have been established in order to preserve regime coherence and promote regime compliance. Probably the most striking example of an ad hoc measure was the linkage between non-proliferation and strategic arms reduction. Ad hoc procedures have proved useful in almost all cases. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council, although no institutional part of any of the regimes investigated, turned out to be the major forum for the promotion of the existing arms control regimes.\(^{31}\) It gave organizational assistance, e.g. through the

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31 This is actually exactly what the former German foreign minister Genscher conceived of as the main purpose of the NACC after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Cf. ACR 1992:
High Level Working Group on CFE which has probably been of greater importance than the regime’s Joint Consultative Group, by setting up schedules for negotiations within the CIS, and by providing a greater forum which could help (or press for flexibility) when CIS negotiations got bogged down. At each meeting the NACC has sworn the new states to joining the NPT, to ratifying the START and CFE treaties, and to keeping to the agreed schedules. One has to keep in mind, of course, that ad hoc rules and procedures which to some extent circumvent the original regime provisions are no sign of regime robustness in terms of constancy, even if they should contribute to regime compliance as they undoubtedly have in the investigated cases.

In the compliance dimension of regime robustness, the results vary more strongly. However, in no case has there been an outright rejection of regime principles and norms. Even the Baltic states’ withdrawal from conventional arms reduction was consistent with the limited area of application of the CFE treaty and did not result in a "dead" regime. Otherwise, there is no clear picture concerning either the nuclear or the conventional weapons regimes. The reason why the former are classified as weak and the latter as strong is based on the severity of non-compliance. The weakness of the linked non-proliferation and strategic arms reduction regimes consists in the fact that - almost one and a half years after the collapse of the Soviet Union - the majority of post-Soviet states have not yet signed the NPT and that Ukraine, the most important of the de facto nuclear weapon states and an indispensable regime participant, has not ratified either the NPT or the START treaty. What is more, Ukraine consciously postpones regime accession and casts serious doubts on its eventual readiness to become a non-nuclear weapon state.

In contrast, the transition from Soviet participation to the participation of the former Soviet republics has been on the whole successfully mastered in the sphere of conventional arms control and reduction. Existing regimes have been accepted by all successor states concerned although some of the deadlines for reaching agreement or ratification were missed. CSBMs and conventional arms reduction regulations are now being implemented. The violations of regime rules which have been reported are neither systematic nor relevant enough to call into question the regimes as such. Therefore, the conventional arms reduction regime and the operational arms control regime have proved to be rather strong.

However, there seems to be one test which even the conventional arms control regimes are not able to pass: ethno-nationalistic conflict. All of the investigated regimes have been initiated by two mainly defensive military blocs or their leaders in

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402.B.300.2. On the usefulness of the NACC see also Dawydow/Trenin 1992: 363.
order to reduce the mutual threat perception and to prevent instability which might escalate into a war that neither of the opponents wanted. As the wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan - and, by the way, in former Yugoslavia - reveal, these peacetime institutions turn hollow or dead as soon as one or both sides in a conflict consciously decide in favor of violent action. Ethno-nationalistic conflict and the combination of civil and interstate violence it usually engenders on the territory of the former Soviet Union hampers regime robustness in yet another way: The example of conventional arms reduction in the Caucasian region shows that weakened state controls make effective treaty implementation difficult.

In sum, the record of regime robustness is non-uniform. On the one hand, the shock waves radiated by the collapse of the Soviet Union have not destroyed the international institutions created during the détente periods of the East-West conflict. International arms control and reduction regimes have not only remained highly constant. They have also proved flexible enough to assure their applicability in the changing international environment and to incorporate some rules and procedures which are more adequate under the new circumstances. International regimes concerning conventional forces have furthermore been able, by and large, to ensure strong compliance. On the other hand, the dissolution of central Soviet rule has exposed the regimes to considerable stress: Ethno-nationalistic conflicts and weakened state controls have undermined the effectiveness of conventional arms control; uncertainty and mistrust have delayed the accession of the successor states to international regimes regulating the proliferation and reduction of nuclear weapons.

These findings should by no means be regarded as final. They will most probably change as the new international subsystem on the territory of the former Soviet Union evolves. We simply do not know whether the highest shock waves have already passed or are yet to come. Neither do these results in themselves offer clear evidence in support of or against any of the Realist or Institutionalist hypotheses stated at the beginning of this study. Therefore, we will now have to take into account the political processes and actor motivations which influenced regime robustness.

5.2. Processes and Motivations

One look at Table 1 suffices to reveal that the political processes dealing with the international arms control and reduction regimes have been subject to various motivations. No single motivation - and that also means: no single theoretical approach - can explain the outcomes of the regimes’ evolution after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Hegemonic stability was certainly not provided by Russia. The Russian Federation emerged as by far the (militarily) most powerful former Soviet republic. Since it was also recognized as the legal successor to the Soviet Union, the existing security regimes, in particular those concerning nuclear weapons, also worked to Russian advantage. Yet in spite of its clear military superiority and interest in regime robustness, the Russian Federation could not establish itself as a new regional hegemon capable of ensuring regime compliance of the other successor states. On the contrary, Russian strength aroused suspicion among its neighbors and complicated the process of accession to the arms control regimes. This corresponds to Kindleberger’s emphasis on the perceived legitimacy of leadership (1976: 38).

The theory of hegemonic stability can also shed some light on one of the common process characteristics of the cases investigated here: Western insistence on quick and unconditional accession to, and compliance with, the existing international regimes as well as repeated declarations of the successor states that they would join and adhere to the relevant agreements and treaties. The Western countries, and in particular the United States possessed the means to exert the necessary influence on the new states which Russia did not dispose of: economic power and attractiveness, authority as models of development and leaders of the European international community, and organizational power. Even if one hesitates to apply such an ambiguous and poorly defined term: This highly asymmetrical relationship can be called an economic, political, and - not to forget - cultural hegemony of the West and its common institutions with regard to at least the core states of the former Soviet Union. Although the Western states did not directly interfere with negotiations among the CIS states there can be no doubt that they greatly contributed to regime robustness by extra-institutional means: by linking economic assistance and admittance to international organizations to regime compliance, by setting the schedules and guidelines of regime adaptation, and by providing an additional organizational framework (NACC plus bilateral consultations) to press for and facilitate agreement. Or, to express it in the form of counterfactual questions, would the accession of the new states to the international security regimes have progressed that far if the West had not advocated the regimes so strongly? And would the result have been the same had not the West but a less influential group of states taken the role of regime advocates?

The negative answer to these questions suggests that Western influence has to be regarded as a necessary factor in any explanation of regime robustness. However, it cannot explain

(a) why "nuclear regimes" proved to be weaker than "conventional regimes". The overall power of the West is the same in both instances, and there is no evidence that issue-area power was of importance in the process (or considerably
lower concerning nuclear weapons than in the field of conventional armaments).

(b) why the West as the "winner of the Cold War" did not invoke the "rebus sic stantibus" clause in order to terminate existing treaties and to create new rules institutionalizing its "victory". On the contrary, the West continued to abide by the regimes negotiated with the Soviet Union in a rigid way although they reflected to a considerable extent former Soviet interests. This was not undisputed within the U.S.: There were voices in the administration calling for a renegotiation of START-1 in order to get "a better deal" or to just wait for strategic superiority "to fall in our laps" (cf. ACR 1991: 611.B.704; 706).

(2) Neorealism is able to account for a second general characteristic of the political processes around the arms control and reduction regimes: rivalry among the successor states of the Soviet Union and the desire to maximize status and autonomy vis-à-vis Russia. This kind of process inevitably set in whenever the adaptation of a regime to the post-Soviet situation involved the allocation of Soviet rights and obligations, weapons and troops, quotas and limits. As we have seen, bargaining was, on the one hand, marked by Russian attempts to take over Soviet rights and assets as undiminished as possible. On the other hand, in particular the "medium powers" among the former Soviet republics, Kazakhstan, and even more so Ukraine, jealously saw to it that the gap in status and weapons between Russia and them was as small as possible. The successor states did not just try to obtain as much as possible from the Soviet inheritance but watched that they received a "fair share" in relation to their neighbors and (potential) rivals. As assumed by Realism, this preoccupation with relative gains threatened to block agreement among the CIS states and, as a consequence, accession to the existing international regimes.

Neorealism can also offer an explanation for the difference in robustness between the nuclear and the conventional weapons regimes: Whereas the demanded reduction of conventional weapons was more or less proportional for all post-Soviet states, the nuclear non-proliferation principle would reduce Ukrainian, Kazakh and Belarussian assets to zero and bring Russia the nuclear monopoly among the successor states. Moreover, in contrast to conventional weapons, strategic nuclear forces can be regarded as the ultimate guarantors of national independence and the highest military status symbols. Because mistrust toward Russia was so dominant, Ukraine has so far renounced side-payments offered by the West in order to keep nuclear weapons.

Like Western influence and pressure the quest for relative gains and independence was an essential factor of the political processes which have evolved after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, this motivation alone cannot explain
(a) why Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan have eventually chosen different policies with regard to the nuclear question although they were in a similar structural situation. Only in Ukraine has a "Neorealist" strategy become dominant. why existing regimes remained highly constant and were generally accepted as a normative base for the following bargaining processes.

(3) Utilitarian Institutionalism can be associated with a third observable feature of the political process: cooperative bargaining for a maximum of individual benefits, certainty, and transparency. Not all negotiations about the distribution of Soviet assets show a relative-gains motivation. The use of nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip to attract Western interest and to receive financial compensation as well as economic assistance was oriented toward absolute gains and concerned more the terms than the conditions of cooperation. However, this factor was eclipsed by the "security dilemma" in the relationship between the de facto NWS and Russia. The ever rising Ukrainian demands for compensation and guarantees are better interpreted as attempts to put off denuclearization than as high bids in cooperative bargaining. The interest of the de facto NWS to participate in START can be attributed to the information function the regime procedures fulfill. START helps to assure the future NNWS that Russia will not add the weapons removed from their territory to its arsenal but will destroy them. And after having become official parties to the START treaty, they receive full information about the implementation process and Russian intentions and behavior. But then again, this information function was not sufficient to assure smooth compliance. Finally, regime linkage has taken place in the case of nuclear non-proliferation and strategic arms reduction. However, the result has rather run counter to Institutionalist assumptions: Instead of facilitating cooperation, linkage weakens both regimes.

Can utilitarian Institutionalism at least contribute to explaining the differences in robustness? On the one hand, one could apply Snidal's "small number criterion" and argue that, since the nuclear issues involved fewer parties, relative gains considerations got the upper hand. However, in both cases the de facto NWS defined their security situation in terms of their relationship to Russia. For instance, the fact that Moldova or the Caucasian states took part in the CFE process did not alter Ukrainian preferences. On the other hand, one could apply the "incentive criterion" and argue that the perceived absolute net gains were higher in the case of conventional than in the case of nuclear arms control. Certainly, CFE and CSBM limits were basically in line with national plans and therefore did not involve a comparable sacrifice for the de facto NWS. However, if we look at the Ukrainian case it is clear that calculations are not made in absolute but in relative terms. Although Ukraine was offered direct side-payments for nuclear disarmament and put under considerable Western pressure
it has leaned ever more strongly toward non-compliance because the relative balance with regard to Russia did not change. At any rate, the Neorealist explanation of differences in robustness appears to be more convincing than the Neoliberal account.

Although processes of cooperative bargaining and absolute gains orientation were certainly present in the evolution of international arms control regimes after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, they are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of regime robustness in the investigated cases. Utilitarian institutionalism cannot account for any process or outcome that could not also be explained by other hypotheses. For the sake of "parsimony", it can therefore be omitted from the explanation.

(4) Normativistic Institutionalism is backed by a fourth common pattern of the regime-related political processes: their constant orientation towards the existing international order. When the heads of state of the three "Slavonic" republics met in Minsk on 8 December 1991 and those of the 11 former Soviet republics in Alma Ata 13 days later to replace the Soviet Union by the CIS, Article 12 of their common documents contained a declaration of intent that they would fulfill all international treaty obligations of the Soviet Union. Considered by themselves, these declarations indicate the strength of normative institutions. They came too early, were too straightforward, and too generally accepted to be an expression of absolute or relative cost/benefit-analysis. At a time when the new states had hardly defined specific interests in the area of international security, it was their prime goal to become recognized members of the international community. Instead of maximizing their autonomy they accepted international norms and rules wholesale as part of their international environment and as a prerequisite to recognition. These declarations seemingly also demonstrate how specific norms and rules were backed in times of crisis by such general institutions as the Vienna Conventions on State Succession. The new states were born into a normatively highly developed international environment for which the foundations had been laid in the détente periods of the East-West conflict. In such an environment, recognition and status are based on membership in international organizations and participation in international regimes.

Normativistic Institutionalism can also explain why the Western states did not use their victory over the Soviet Union to impose new rules which would have changed the military balance in their favor. The reason is that they perceived the dissolution of the Soviet Union rather as a threat to security than as an opportunity for hegemony. The West chose to preserve the existing international order independently of other cost/benefit considerations because it was hoped to provide international stability. And the West followed the strategy of (re)integrating the new states into the normative framework of existing international regimes and organizations because this
was seen as the best way to control the uncertainties produced by the shock of the Soviet breakdown.

Thus, since it can be shown that the West - the presumed collective hegemon - acted in agreement with an international order which it had not created alone, according to its interests, or by virtue of its hegemonic power, the same policies which seemed to back "hegemonic stability" turn into evidence for normativism. Certainly, it still is beyond doubt that Western economic, political, and cultural power was indispensible to achieve a high degree of regime constancy and regime compliance. But then this is no argument against normativistic institutionalism provided the influence is used in defense of and in accordance with the legitimate order as it has been the case here: In a non-hierarchical social system like the inter-state system it is up to the state members themselves to promote and defend the international order. In contrast to domestic institutions, regimes cannot rely on the monopoly of legitimate power wielded by the state. Moreover, Western influence did not involve any threat of military force: Western interventions were confined to pressing for a quick and general accord without dictating the concrete terms of agreement. And finally, it is doubtful whether the Western states could have exerted their influence so successfully if it had not been backed by the authority of existing international regimes.

Later developments testify that the early declaratory commitments of the newly independent states to the rules of the international community were no empty words. None of the former Soviet republics has ever called into question the existing norms and rules or openly dissociated itself from them (cf. Landgren 1992: 555), with the earlier (October 1991) exception of the Baltic states and CFE. Where the accession to the existing regimes did not involve a distribution of Soviet assets, it went smoothly (and, by the way, without Western pressure). This was the case with the operational arms control regime and with CFE 1A. In all other cases there is no doubt that the adaptation involved rivalry and was complicated by relative-gains considerations and mistrust. But then this was exactly because there were no rules regulating the distribution of the Soviet inheritance which could have guided the actions of the new states. Even during these negotiations, the validity of the regimes, their principles and norms were in general not called into question. Nevertheless, normativistic Institutionalism cannot explain

(a) why the nuclear issue regimes turned out to be weaker than the conventional weapons regimes. Their binding force is certainly not lower (but rather higher if one takes into account the only politically binding nature of the CSBMs and CFE 1A).
(b) why the major post-Soviet states differ with regard to their regime compliance.
The discussion of processes and motivations has revealed that the authority of existing international institutions, Western power and pressure, and the Soviet successor states’ quest for relative gains and autonomy are necessary but not sufficient conditions of regime robustness in the investigated cases. The three factors complement one another. Normativistic Institutionalism accounts for the interests of the West which hegemonic stability theory leaves unexplained whereas hegemonic stability theory shows how the authority of norms postulated by normativistic institutionalism was translated into regime robustness. Neorealism can explain the difference in compliance between arms control regimes concerning nuclear and those regulating the number and use of conventional weapons which neither hegemonic stability theory nor normativistic Institutionalism account for. And normativistic Institutionalism can fill the explanatory gap left by Neorealism with regard to regime constancy and the normative limits to positional bargaining.

However, none of the theoretical approaches and the hypotheses derived from them can explain the difference in the behavior of the de facto NWS with regard to the NPT and START: Belarussian low-profile and compliant behavior, Kazakh initial vacillations and eventual compliance, and Ukrainian procrastination. Moreover, this multicausal explanation of regime robustness does not take into account that the motivations and processes emphasized by the competing theoretical approaches exerted their main causal influence at different points in time after the shock produced by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the last chapter, I will therefore develop a dynamic model which puts the different causes in a chronological order and completes the explanation by further necessary factors.

5.3. A Socialization Model

The causal model for regime robustness after the dissolution of the Soviet Union can be called a "socialization model" because

(a) it takes as its starting point the fact that the dissolution of the Soviet Union has "given birth" to new states,
(b) it suggests that the process which has evolved since then and the mechanisms which have produced this process are to some extent analogous to the socialization of individuals,
(c) it assumes that regime robustness is a function of this process.32

32 When using an analogy in scientific explanation we usually assume that causal mechanisms which are at work in a well understood field of knowledge can be transferred to another field in order to further our understanding there. Reasoning by analogy is always exposed to the danger of "ignoratio elenchi" (cf. Gordon 1991: 50). However, I think it is not too
The model is depicted in Figure 2. It consists of four levels and a chronological axis. The first level shows the stages of development which the international arms control and reduction regimes have passed through and the results of this study concerning the constancy dimension of regime robustness. Level II introduces issue characteristics which have an important influence on this development. The process level (III) contains relevant interactions. Level IV describes the sequence of dominant actor motivations. The interplay of factors at these different levels is assumed to produce the basic results of this study concerning the compliance dimension of regime robustness: strong conventional arms reduction and operational arms control regimes, weak nuclear proliferation and arms reduction regimes, and the erosion of regime effectiveness when ethno-nationalistic violence occurs. Along the time axis, the process can be subdivided into two phases of socialization which are usually called "primary" and "secondary socialization" in sociological analysis.

Primary socialization takes place during childhood. It is characterized by the existential dependence of the child on its parents. The child receives a social identity and is introduced to the laws and norms of its social environment. The striving of the Union republics for more autonomy and the emergence of movements for independence was a typical feature of the later Gorbachev era and eventually led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and to the independence of the former Soviet republics. This process had a double effect: It "gave birth" to new states which, although they had existed as Soviet republics before, had enjoyed little internal and no external autonomy. At the same time, it endangered those parts of the international order for which the Soviet Union was an essential participant, e.g. the international regimes investigated here. When a child is born, it is the responsibility of the community to see to it that the child finds its way around the world and that it respects the norms and rules of the community. When the Soviet republics became independent, the international community faced the same problem: to allocate the new states their place in the community of states and to make them comply with the existing international order.
Figure 2: Socialization Model

I regime evolution
- regime
- regime survival?
- high constancy, upward flexibility
- adaptation requirements
- ad hoc mechanisms

II issue characteristics
- Western interest in stability and reintegration
- dissolution of the Soviet Union
- Western strategic position in international community, Western pressure

III processes
- positional bargaining
- distributional issue?
- relative cost/gain ratio
- hollow dead regime
- weak regime
- strong regime

IV actor motivations
- quest for autonomy
- desire for recognition
- general acceptance of international institutions
- relative gains, quest for autonomy
- strategy to overcome security dilemma toward Russia

Primary socialization
Secondary socialization
Children usually obey because they are physically and socially dependent on their parents. The new states were looking for outside help. First of all, however, they wanted to be recognized as sovereign members of the international community and to receive the protection which the community rights grant to the states: inviolability of frontiers, non-intervention, formal equality etc. The role of primary socialization agents was taken on by the West. The Western states were interested in the stability of the existing international order and in preserving the international arms control regimes. They also disposed of the dominant role in international organizations like the UN and international conferences like the CSCE. This put them in the position of "gatekeepers": In exchange for international recognition they demanded compliance with the international order. The new states, for their part, declared their readiness to honor international treaties and agreements because recognition was their first and primary foreign policy goal.

The mechanism of recognition explains why, at the end of the primary socialization phase, the international arms control regimes survived intact and ongoing negotiation processes were successfully finished, thus leading to "upward flexibility" of the regime rules. The Western states fulfilled their "parental duties" by accepting the new states to the international community and by introducing them to their rights and obligations. And the post-Soviet states behaved like "good kids" trying to win their parents' favor.

**Secondary socialization** describes the transition from childhood to adulthood. The close connection between parents and child is loosened and at least partially replaced by relations to other reference persons and groups. Instead of emotional ties, the child develops interests and acts intentionally to satisfy these interests. And its dependence on the parents gradually gives way to more autonomy and equality. In the case of arms control regimes and the Soviet successor states, secondary socialization was triggered by an issue characteristic. The evolution of the operational arms control regime stopped after it had been accepted by the new states in connection with their accession to CSCE and adapted through the Vienna Document 1992 which was again signed by all new states although most of them had not even taken part in the negotiations. This was possible because operational arms control was a non-distributional issue. In contrast, all other issues investigated here necessarily demanded the distribution of Soviet assets in order to guarantee the functioning of the regimes.

This adaptation requirement put the new states into the position of negotiators where they had been dependants before. Just like a child which leaves the protected area of its home and meets other children of the same age, the new states now had to orientate themselves in their new regional environment and to define their interests in...
relation to the other former republics. In this process, they turned out to be mainly motivated by relative-gains seeking and engaged in positional bargaining. However, one should not forget that this bargaining took place in a normative setting defined by the existing international arms control regimes. Not unlike parents who closely and anxiously watch the first independent steps of their children, the Western states intervened whenever the bargaining process threatened to go beyond the permissible and pressed for quick agreement. On the other hand, they were ready to make minor concessions in order to further cooperation and regime compliance. Both behaviors led to the described ad hoc mechanisms at this point of regime development.

The degree of compliance eventually depended on two further factors. The first factor, consistent with the Neorealist approach, was the high difference in relative cost/gain ratios for the de facto NWS between the conventional and the strategic arms reduction requirements. This can explain why the conventional arms reduction and operational arms control regimes achieved higher compliance than the nuclear issue regimes but it cannot explain the different behavior of the de facto NWS with regard to non-proliferation. Therefore, a second factor is needed, which Neorealism tends to overlook: States do not inevitably maximize autonomy but can select different strategies to overcome the "security dilemma" in international relations which reach from integration to deterrence.

(1) Kazakhstan has followed a strategy of integration. President Nazarbaev had already favored Gorbachev's project of a "new Union" and is now a strong supporter of close CIS cooperation. Kazakhstan is a party to the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security which was signed a few days before the Lisbon Protocol. According to Nazarbaev, it alleviated Kazakh fears of unprotectedness and rendered possible his decision to give up nuclear weapons (ACR 1992: 611.B.735f.). At the end of February 1993, Russia and Kazakhstan even announced the creation of a common defense zone (SZ, 1 March 1993).

(2) Belarus has initially pursued a policy of low profile neutralism advocated by its head of state Šuškevič and combined with mainly adaptive steps toward Russia. Recently however, this orientation has come under pressure. Under the influence of its Communist majority the Belarusian Supreme Soviet voted in favor of joining the Tashkent Treaty (9 April 1993). To defend his neutralist course, Šuškevič is now trying to organize a referendum and to receive support from the democratic opposition (cf. Umbach 1992: 35; FAZ, 8 April 1993; SZ, 30 April 1993).

(3) In contrast, Ukraine has constantly refused any form of cooperation with Russia that could reduce its independence and opposes durable CIS integration. It rather tries
to "balance" Russian influence either by seeking Western security guarantees or through an East European alliance excluding the Russian Federation.33 To explain these different strategies would be the subject of a different study. However, it seems that subsystemic variables like the degree of nationalist mobilization or the strength of Soviet communist political forces are important factors. Opposition to international agreements has never come from the heads of states who are firmly integrated into the international network of rules and communication but has regularly emanated from domestic sources.

The socialization model shows that normativistic Institutionalism best explains the primary socialization phase of the new states which was dominated by the recognition mechanism and produced high regime robustness (of the declaratory kind). During the secondary socialization bargaining processes set in that come closest to the Neorealist view of international relations. However, in order to produce a complete explanation, other factors have to be added: issue characteristics, the continuing influence of "primary socialization", the individual choice of strategies, and last not least, the presence of ethno-nationalistic violence which tends to completely undermine regime effectiveness. Waltz is right to claim that the structure of the international system affects outcomes "through socialization of the actors and through competition among them" (1979: 74). But he overlooks that normative institutions are a part of this structure and channel these two basic processes (cf. Keohane 1989: 8f.).

33 Cf., e.g., Kravčuk's proposal in an interview with a Slovak newspaper (SZ, 6 May 1993).
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