

Determination of Throughput Guarantees for Processor-based SmartNICs

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https://comsys.rwth-aachen.de/

 Δ packet drops and congestion testing with traffic traces gives no guarantee

Match-Action-based Programmable Switches

- + If a program compiles, it runs at ~1 pkt/cycle
- Difficult to program (subset of P4, no loops, few sequential operations)



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Processor-based SmartNICs

- + Are easier and more freely programmable (C, BPF/XDP)
- Performance varies and is not obvious [our Netsoft2019 paper]



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Processor-based SmartNICs


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Our Contribution: A tool to calculate the throughput of a programwhile developing a program.as part of regression tests.



Netronome Agilio CX 2x40 GbE


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




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
• Challenges

► The throughput depends on the executed instructions

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
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


• Challenges

- The throughput depends on the executed instructions
- DRAM access can be a bottleneck

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• Challenges

- The throughput depends on the executed instructions
- DRAM access can be a bottleneck
- Packet sizes influence throughput



if (pkt.size < 100)

Different paths cause different throughput

 \Rightarrow The slowest path establishes a lower bound

```
if (pkt.size < 100)
    return DROP;
if (pkt[ethtype] == IPV4)
    ip4_counter++;
if (pkt[ethtype] == IPV6)
    for (...) ...;
return PASS;</pre>
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 - Perhaps a tighter lower bound is possible
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
How do individual instructions influence the throughput?



Instruction Costs

Processing Cost

• Linear scaling over 50 cores




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 - Branches take 2-3 cycles when taken
 - Deterministic DRAM access times when not overloaded



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DRAM Cost

- Too many memory instructions overload the DRAM
- DRAM throughput varies up to ×4
 ⇒ Lower bound


Atomic Inc:
$$\geq$$
 248M ops/s $cost = \frac{50}{rate}$ Read32: \geq 197M ops/s



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A program path is either processing or DRAM bottlenecked

- Per instruction cost tuple: (processing cost; DRAM cost)
- Per path bottleneck: maximum over processing & DRAM cost



- Can not enumerate all paths: Incremental longest path algorithm [Kundu, 1994]
- Check paths for contradictions: Use SMT solver (similar to symbolic execution)



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


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


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


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


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
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
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


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




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Determines packet-rate guarantees



- Bit-Rate throughput influenced by
 - The time it takes to process a packet
 - ► The size of the packet

Programs which process fixed sized headers

- Processing mostly independent from packet size
 - \rightarrow Packet-rate guarantees

Programs which loop over multiple headers and payload

- Processing depends on packet sizes
 - \rightarrow Bit-rate guarantees

Example Program

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if (pkt.size < 100)
    return DROP;
if (...) ...;
if (...) ...;
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Example Program	pkt.size: 60-99	pkt.size \geq 100
if (pkt.size < 100)		
return DROP;		
if ();		
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if ();		if ();
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


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


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
Enumerate paths ordered by bit-rate































- Analyzed 9 real XDP/BPF programs on a desktop PC (Core i7, 16 GiB)
 - ▶ Up to 102 s analysis time (except maliciously crafted example)
 - SMT checking improved throughput guarantees by up to 44%

Is fast enough to be part of the regular development cycle



- Measured throughput of 21k paths through all analyzed programs
 - Minimally sized example packets produced by the SMT solver



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Minimally sized example packets produced by the SMT solver

Program	Slowest Path
switch.p4 (parser)	\checkmark
Cloudflare DoS	\checkmark
QUIC LB (IPv4)	\checkmark
QUIC LB (IPv6)	\checkmark
RTP a→µ-law	\checkmark
RTP a→µ-law (opt)	\checkmark
DNS Cache	7 th
Count-Min (5)	\checkmark
Count-Min (20)	\checkmark



• Measured throughput of 21k paths through all analyzed programs

Minimally sized example packets produced by the SMT solver

Program	Slowest Path	Estimated	Measured	Accuracy	_ not a lower bound
switch.p4 (parser)	\checkmark	24.7G Bit/s	25.8G Bit/s	+4.1%	
Cloudflare DoS	\checkmark	35.2G Bit/s	34.7G Bit/s	-1.0%	\leftarrow
QUIC LB (IPv4)	\checkmark	22.8G Bit/s	23.5G Bit/s	+2.9%	
QUIC LB (IPv6)	\checkmark	27.6G Bit/s	28.5G Bit/s	+2.9%	
RTP a→µ-law	\checkmark	2.97G Bit/s	2.97G Bit/s	\checkmark	worst underestimation
RTP a→µ-law (opt)	\checkmark	4.70G Bit/s	4.70G Bit/s	\checkmark	
DNS Cache	7 th	9.0G Bit/s	10.4G Bit/s	+13.1%	\checkmark
Count-Min (5)	\checkmark	21.6G Bit/s	22.2G Bit/s	+2.4%	
Count-Min (20)	\checkmark	6.0G Bit/s	6.0G Bit/s	\checkmark	



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Count-Min (5)	\checkmark	21.6G Bit/s	22.2G Bit/s	+2.4%	
Count-Min (20)	\checkmark	6.0G Bit/s	6.0G Bit/s	\checkmark	

Accurate throughtput guarantees

Conclusion

Throughput Guarantees for Processor-based SmartNICs

- Which packet-rate or bit-rate is achievable by a given program?
- Similar determinism as match-action pipelines and FPGAs
- Our approach is fast
 - ▶ Because, we combine incremental ordered enumeration with SMT checks
- Our approach is accurate
 - Because, we model the SmartNIC performance characteristics

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Full Implementation & All Measurement Data



https://github.com/johannes-krude/nfp-pred-artifacts

