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Land and Democracy:
Land Expropriations, Protests, and Votes in Taiwan Democracy
Transiting Process

Wei-Che Fu

PhD Candidate, National Tsing Hua University

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European Research Center on Contemporary Taiwan

Eberhard Karls University, Tuebingen
Wilhelmstr. 133
72074 Tuebingen

Ph.: +49 7071 29 72717
e-mail: ercct@uni-tuebingen.de

Land and Democracy:
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Wei-Che Fu[2]

【abstract】

How could we understand democratic development in Taiwan after its democratization? Different from the literatures recently focusing on the exterior factors such as China factors explanation, this study provided perspective from interior governance crisis on land expropriation issues happened after 2010. The study used longitudinal statistical analysis from 1995 to 2015, and found that before 2010, the year "Dapu Eviction(大埔強拆)" happened, local governments get votes by land developments; After the year, with the increasing number of anti-land grabbing protest, relation between land development and votes turned opposite. The much area of land development had been implemented, the less local governments, implementing land expropriation, got votes. With the gathering of anti-land grabbing movements during 2010 to 2016, it became more consolidated for land owners' property right under the two key institutional changed on 2012 and 2015. However, though a new institution was just formed under the pressure of civil society and new ruling party in 2016, a much more conflicts because of the structural resources inequality between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors and geographical north and south of Taiwan were just on the begin.

Keywords: land justice, land expropriation, democracy, civil society

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[2] 傅偉哲；National Tsing Hua University(Taiwan) PhD. Candidate. Contact: fuweiche@gapp.nthu.edu.tw

1. Introduction

Different from the perspective of geopolitical influences on Taiwan, the study examined the domestic governing crisis － spicifically on land expropriation and governance after democratization in 1990s － and its consequences for democracy of Taiwan. In 2010, the farmer eviction conflict(called Dapu incident "大埔事件") invoked several civil protests against local and central governments. Under the persistent social movements after the year, Kuomintang (KMT), the ruling party at the time, was dramatically defeated by Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the opposition party, in the ally with citizen coalition in 2014 nine-in-one local election (from municipality, county to town levels). Except from focusing on cross-strait relations during 2010 to 2014, the study provided social conflicts explanation which was caused by land expropriation and found that the anti-land grabbing protests obviously affected the political support for local governments, launched expropriation, after 2010; in other words, land expropriation resulted in both political supports and social unrests, but the latter one also undermine the former one.

The study used longitudinal official and private datasets from 1995 to 2015, and examined the relation between land expropriation and vote share of two major parties (KMT and DPP) during local elections in Taiwan. The study, therefore, pointed out the causes and effects of local political elites, implemented land expropriation, and the relation between land developments (from use of farm lands to urban constructions) and democratic development (institution of private property protection). In 2016, the new government － DPP － enforced a more consolidated institution in order to protect farm land usage － "The Spatial Planning Act（國土計畫法）"－, yet resulted in a more controversial development issue which implied unequal sectors (between agrarian and non-agrarian sectors) and regional development(between north and south part of Taiwan) in Taiwan. With the disputes remained unsolved, the issue of land governance had getting more prominent for democratic governance, and the issue of spatial governance, such as "factories on farmland（農地上的工廠）" was just on the beginning of discussion in public policies of Taiwan.

2. Land Expropriations in Taiwan: past and now

The history of Taiwan after world war II has been known for its "Land Reform(土地改革)" and successful industrialization policies(Amsden 1985, Chu 2015a, 2015b). The Land Reform policy－the first mass land expropriation launched by the governments after post-

WWII (Hsu 2016)－has changed the structural relation of landlords and peasants, formed since Japanese colonization era, and strengthened KMT's ruling regime (Chen 2011)）－ whether it had positive effects on the following industrialization policy (Chu 2015b, Huang 2002).

Literatures were more concerned on real estate speculations in urban regions(Chen 1995；Liu and Hsiao 1999, for instance) instead of land expropriation after 1990s, during the democratization of Taiwan; they began to focus on land expropriation disputes (Tsai 2010,2011, Hsu and Liao 2011) until 2010, the year farmers eviction happened in Miaoli (called "Dapu incident(大埔事件)"). Although they had pointed out land expropriation institutional problem: "Land Expropriation Act（土地徵收條例）", emphasizing incomplete property protection of land (Chung and Hsu 2011) and the problem of unbalanced sectors developments (agriculture and industry) which was the result of industrialization since 1960s (Tsai 2011), the consequences of farm land expropriation to democratic development remained unsolved.

The classic historical-comparative study, Barrington Moore's (1996) *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* which compared the development of civil society, contentious politics, and elite conflicts, implied the class conflicts for political regime development in land dispossession issues (specifically on the actors of political elites, landowners and farmers). For a country, after authoritarian transition（O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986）, whether a democratic institution result in more dramatically land expropriation implemented? If the answer is yes, then what are the reasons for a democratic country to launch land expropriation? And what are the consequences of land expropriation for the stakeholders(landowners and farmers, for instance) and democracy development?

With longitudinal official datasets, this study examined two major party's vote share in county-level election (including mayor and regional legislature) since 1995 to 2015, the amount of land expropriation, and the number of anti-land expropriation protests through quantitative analysis. The study, thus, point out that the causes of land expropriation for local politics was political alliance by different classics and that the consequences of land expropriations was a more consolidated property right protection institution especially on land property after democratization. The political logic of land developments－which we called political survival－explained not only the difficulty of new farm land protection policy implemented by DPP government after 2016, but political conflicts based on agriculture／non-agriculture and north／south part of Taiwan's unbalanced resources distribution in 2018's local election.

3. Method and Data

This research used official and China Credit Information Service(中華徵信所) Top 5000 corporations' datasets since 1995, and tested the hypothesizes through statistic Fixed-effect regression model. **Graph1**. showed the total number of land expropriation area since 1996, and the number of anti-land expropriation protests after 2006(the Dataset still on constructing). It showed the correlative trends between land expropriation area and number of anti-land expropriation protests. **Graph1.** showed that the more land expropriation implemented by governments, the more anti-land expropriations protests in one to two years. **Graph2.** showed the relation of two major parties vote share in local elections and land expropriation (in statistic "LOWESS" line), and total declination of land expropriations and overturn of two major parties vote share in local election since 2012. The graphs implied that the increasing protests because of land expropriation could lead to the overturn of two major parties vote share in local elections, and that the competitiveness of two parties could decrease the amount of land expropriation area. **Graph3.1 to 3.3** showed the descriptive relation between land expropriation and vote share of two major parties in local elections (county mayor and legislator) in each counties since 1992 to 2015, and the potential land development strategies and political effects in different counties. With these datasets, we compared votes of two parties with land expropriation and protests through panel data (from 1995 to 2015) and fixed-effect regression model; the regression result showed the strategy of land expropriation launched by local political elites, and consequences for democracy development in Taiwan.

Graph-1. Land Expropriation area and number of anti-land expropriations protests 1992-2015

Graph-2. Land Expropriation area and two major parties vote share of local elections in LOWESS line,1992－2015.

Graph3-1. The relation between land expropriation area and vote share of two major parties in Taipei, Kaosiung City, before year 2010.

Graph3-2. The relation between land expropriation area and vote share of two major parties in New Taipei, Taipei, Taichung, Tainan and Kaosiung City, after year 2010.

Graph3-3. The relation between land expropriation area and vote share of two major parties in counties, since 1992-2015.

3.1 Hypothesis

According to literature (Chu 1989) which focused on the relation of local factions("地方派系") and land developments (especially on urban land speculations), land development was an instrument for central political elites to incorporate local factions, and therefore local political elites made money through land developments, which were under the promise of central government. On the other side, literatures studying on "class politics" (Lin and Hu 2011, Hu, Lin and Huang 2009, for instances) pointed out the social bases of two major parties after 1990s, and that upper-classes (including capital and middle classes) were more likely to support KMT, and labor and agrarian classes were more likely to support DPP after 2000. From these literatures, we could have following hypothesizes:

Hypothesis I : Land Developments and Votes
(H1-1)
Local political elites from KMT would be more likely to launch land developments (including land expropriations). They get more votes by land developments in housing, commercial, and financial activities.

(H1-2)
Local political elites from DPP would be more likely to launch land developments for industrial activities. They get more votes in industrial activities area, and are more vulnerable in the agrarian reform policy (Lin 2018).

Hypothesis 2: Land Developments and anti-land grabbing protests

(H2-1)
When the farmers and landowners' lands were expropriated by governments, they are more likely to protest in the changing political opportunity structure after 1990s. The stronger the degree of anti-land expropriation protests, the less the votes, local political elites, who launched land expropriation, get.

(H2-2)
Under political party competitiveness and contentious politics, the institution of landowners and farmers' property right protection would be more consolidated.

3.2 Data and variables

Local political elites distributed resources through county level governments, so we used official datasets at county level as main analysis unit. There are land expropriations area, including general（"一般徵收"）, zone（"區段徵收"）, and land consolidation（"市地重劃"）－three types, and building occupation permit（"建築物使用執照"）area, including house（"住宅"）, commerce（"商業"）, industry（"工業"）, and office（"辦公室"）－four types areas. The number of land expropriation and building occupation permit area indicated degree of land development and types implemented by local governments. We used land expropriation area, named **_Land_**, and house, commerce, industry, and office four types construction area, named **_House, Com, Indus, and Office_** as dependent variables in hypothesis **H1-1** and **H1-2**. According to hypothesis I: different local political elites' parties have different land development strategies, so we used **_local-KMT_** and **_local-DPP_**, representing incumbent local party, as independent variables in **H1-1** and **H1-2**. By these hypothesizes, we examined the relation of land expropriation and local political elites and the strategies of land development (see Data Sources and Variable Descriptions in **Table 1.**).

Table 1. Data Sources and Variables Descriptions

VARIABLES	DESCRIPTIONS	RESOURCES
DPP	Vote share of Democratic Progressive Party(DPP) in county and legislator elections in county level, since 1995 – 2015.	Central Election Commission database (Taiwan)
KMT	Vote share of Kuomintang (KMT) in county and legislator elections in county level, since 1995 – 2015.	Central Election Commission database (Taiwan)
LAND	The logarithm of land expropriation area, including general expropriation, zone expropriation, and urban land readjustment in county level, since 1995 – 2015.	Minister of Interior, Statistical database(Taiwan)
HOUSE	The logarithm of house building occupation permit area in county level, since 1995 – 2015.	Minister of Interior, Statistical database(Taiwan)
COM	The logarithm of commerce building occupation permit area in county level, since 1995 – 2015.	Minister of Interior, Statistical database(Taiwan)
INDUS	The logarithm of industry building occupation permit area in county level, since 1995 – 2015.	Minister of Interior, Statistical database(Taiwan)

OFFICE	The logarithm of office building occupation permit area in county level, since 1995 – 2015.	Minister of Interior, Statistical database(Taiwan)
LOCAL-KMT	KMT =2 represents ruling party in local governments, and DPP=1 represents ruling party in local governments, Non-party=0 represents ruling party in local governments.	Central Election Commission database
LOCAL-DPP	DPP =2 represents ruling party in local governments, and KMT=1 represents party in local governments, Non-party=0 represents ruling party in local governments.	Central Election Commission database
PROTEST	The number of anti-land enclosure protests happened in county level, since 1995-2015.	United Daily News Group database
AFTER 2010 (YEAR)	The year is after 2010 = 1 ; before = 0, represents the year after Dapu event happened.	

LOCAL GOVERNANCE FACTORS

CORPS	The logarithm of construction and real estate income in county level, since 1995 – 2015.	China Credit Information Service
TAX	The logarithm of land tax revenue in local governments, including land tax,housing tax, increment tax on land value, and land value tax in county level, since 1995 – 2015.	Minister of Finance, Statistical database(Taiwan)
ECO	The logarithm of economic expenditure in county level governments, including economic development, economic reconstruction, other economic expenditure, since 1995 – 2015.	Statistical Annual Report in Local Governments, Urban and Regional Statistics(Taiwan)

MACROECONOMIC FACTORS

GDP	The logarithm of GDP per capita (NTD), since 1995 – 2015.	National Statistics database(Taiwan)
UNEMPLOYMENT	Unemployment rate, since 1995 – 2015.	National Statistics database(Taiwan)
DEPEND CHINA	Taiwan's Trade dependency on China, since 1995 – 2015.	Customs Administration Ministry of Finance database(Taiwan)

| CENTRAL | KMT=1 as ruling party in central government, DPP=2 as ruling party in central government. | Central Election Commission database |

After democratization of Taiwan in 1990s, political elites got ruling power by votes. We used both legislators and local mayors' election party vote share since 1995, named **KMT** and **DPP**, as dependent variables, and total area of land expropriation, **sum-Land** and construction types, **sum-House, sum-Com, sum-Indus,** and **sum-Office,** during the term of incumbent as independent variables in hypothesis **H1-1** and **H1-2** to examine relation between land developments and votes.

In order to examine whether anti-land expropriation protests decrease land expropriation implementations, we used the number of anti-land expropriation protest, named **Protest**, events reported in United Daily News Group dataset（"聯合知識庫"）since 1995 as dependent variable**,** and land expropriations, the year after 2010, named **After 2010**(the year after Dapu events happened) as independent variables in hypothesis 2, **H2-1** to test the hypothesizes.

Hypothesis 1 and 2 were all controlled by local governance factors, including income of construction and real estate, local governments' tax revenue, and economic expenditures, and macroeconomic factors, including land price, GDP, unemployment rate, Taiwan's trade dependency on China and ruling parties in central government. According to datasets accessibility and the form of panel data analysis, the datasets above were all from 1995 to 2015. (Hypothesis equations see **Table 2.**)

Table2. Equations of hypothesizes

H1-1,2	**Land** *(it)* = Corps *(it)* + *Lag.*Tax *(it)* + **Local-KMT** *(it)* + Central-DPP *(it)* + Before 2010 *(it)* + *Lag.*Eco *(it)* + LandPrice *(it)* + GDPPC*(t)*+ Unemployment *(t)*+ DepChina*(t)* + Up *(it)*+ *Lag.*House *(it)*+ *Lag.*Com *(it)*+ *Lag.*Office *(it)*+ *Lag.*Indus *(it)*
H1-1,2	**Cons** *(it)* = *Lag.*Corps *(it)* + *Lag.* Land *(it)* + *Lag.* Tax *(it)* + **Local-KMT** *(it)* + Central-DPP *(it)* + *Lag.*Eco *(it)* + LandPrice *(it)* + GDPPC*(t)* + Unemployment *(t)*+ DepChina *(t)*+ Up *(it)*
H1-1,2	**Indus** *(it)* = *Lag.*Corps *(it)* + *Lag.* Land *(it)* + *Lag.* Tax *(it)* + **Local-DPP** *(it)* + Central-DPP *(it)* + *Lag.*Eco *(it)* + LandPrice *(it)* + GDPPC*(t)* + Unemployment *(t)*+ DepChina *(t)*+ Up *(it)*
H1-1,2	**House** *(it)* = *Lag.*Corps *(it)* + *Lag.* Land *(it)* + *Lag.* Tax *(it)* + **Local-KMT** *(it)* + Central-DPP *(it)* + *Lag.*Eco *(it)* + LandPrice *(it)* + GDPPC*(t)* + Unemployment *(t)*+ DepChina *(t)*+ Up *(it)*
H1-1,2	**Com** *(it)* = *Lag.*Corps *(it)* + *Lag.* Land *(it)* + *Lag.* Tax *(it)* + **Local-KMT** *(it)* + Central-DPP *(it)* + *Lag.*Eco *(it)* + LandPrice *(it)* + GDPPC*(t)* + Unemployment *(t)*+ DepChina*(t)* + Up *(it)*

H1-1,2	**Office** *(it)*= *Lag.*Corps *(it)* + *Lag.* Land *(it)* + *Lag.* Tax *(it)* + **Local-KMT *(it)*** + Central-DPP *(it)* + *Lag.*Eco *(it)* + LandPrice *(it)* + GDPPC*(t)* + Unemployment *(t)*+ DepChina *(t)*+ Up *(it)*
H1-1	**KMT** *(it)*= Corps *(it)* + *sum*Land *(it)* + ***sum*House *(it)*** + Eco *(it)* + Tax *(it)* + GDPPC*(t)* + Unemployment*(t)* + DepChina*(t)* + Local-KMT *(it)* + Central-DPP *(it)* + LandPrice *(it)* + Up *(it)* + VoteRate*(it)*+ Type-II*(t)* + Type-III *(t)*
H1-1	**KMT** *(it)*= Corps *(it)* + *sum*Land *(it)* + ***sum*Com *(it)*** + Eco *(it)* + Tax *(it)* + GDPPC*(t)* + Unemployment*(t)* + DepChina*(t)* + Local-KMT *(it)* + Central-DPP *(it)* + LandPrice *(it)* + Up *(it)* + VoteRate*(it)*+ Type-II*(t)* + Type-III *(t)*
H1-1	**KMT** *(it)*= Corps *(it)* + *sum*Land *(it)* + ***sum*Office *(it)*** + Eco *(it)* + Tax *(it)* + GDPPC*(t)* + Unemployment*(t)* + DepChina*(t)* + Local-KMT *(it)* + Central-DPP *(it)* + LandPrice *(it)* + Up *(it)* + VoteRate*(it)*+ Type-II*(t)* + Type-III *(t)*
H1-1	**KMT** *(it)*= Corps *(it)* + *sum*Land *(it)* + ***sum*Indus *(it)*** + Eco *(it)* + Tax *(it)* + GDPPC*(t)* + Unemployment*(t)* + DepChina*(t)* + Local-KMT *(it)* + Central-DPP *(it)* + LandPrice *(it)* + Up *(it)* + VoteRate*(it)*+ Type-II*(t)* + Type-III *(t)*
H1-2	**DPP** *(it)*= Corps *(it)* + *sum*Land *(it)* + ***sum*House *(it)*** + Eco *(it)* + Tax *(it)* + GDPPC*(t)* + Unemployment*(t)* + DepChina*(t)* + Local-KMT *(it)* + Central-DPP *(it)* + LandPrice *(it)* + Up *(it)* + VoteRate*(it)*+ Type-II*(t)* + Type-III *(t)*
H1-2	**DPP** *(it)*= Corps *(it)* + *sum*Land *(it)* + ***sum*Com *(it)*** + Eco *(it)* + Tax *(it)* + GDPPC*(t)* + Unemployment*(t)* + DepChina*(t)* + Local-KMT *(it)* + Central-DPP *(it)* + LandPrice *(it)* + Up *(it)* + VoteRate*(it)*+ Type-II*(t)* + Type-III *(t)*
H1-2	**DPP** *(it)*= Corps *(it)* + *sum*Land *(it)* + ***sum*Office *(it)*** + Eco *(it)* + Tax *(it)* + GDPPC*(t)* + Unemployment*(t)* + DepChina*(t)* + Local-KMT *(it)* + Central-DPP *(it)* + LandPrice *(it)* + Up *(it)* + VoteRate*(it)*+ Type-II*(t)* + Type-III *(t)*
H1-2	**DPP** *(it)*= Corps *(it)* + *sum*Land *(it)* + ***sum*Indus *(it)*** + Eco *(it)* + Tax *(it)* + GDPPC*(t)* + Unemployment*(t)* + DepChina*(t)* + Local-KMT *(it)* + Central-DPP *(it)* + LandPrice *(it)* + Up *(it)* + VoteRate*(it)*+ Type-II*(t)* + Type-III *(t)*
H2-1	**Protest** *(it)* = Corps *(it)* + *Lag.*Tax *(it)* + Local-KMT *(it)* + Central-DPP *(it)* + ***Lag.*Land *(it)*** + *Lag.*Eco *(it)* + LandPrice *(it)* + GDPPC *(t)*+ Unemployment*(t)* + DepChina *(t)*+ Up *(it)*+ *Lag.*House *(it)*+ *Lag.*Com *(it)*+ *Lag.*Office *(it)*+ *Lag.*Indus *(it)*
H2-1	**Land** *(it)* = Corps *(it)* + *Lag.*Tax *(it)* + Local-KMT *(it)* + Central-DPP *(it)* + **After 2010 *(it)*** + *Lag.*Eco *(it)* + LandPrice *(it)* + GDPPC *(t)*+ Unemployment*(t)* + DepChina *(t)*+ Up *(it)*+ *Lag.*House *(it)*+ *Lag.*Com *(it)*+ *Lag.*Office *(it)*+ *Lag.*Indus *(it)*

Notice: *i*, county; *t*, year

4. Empirical analysis and explain institutional changed

Land developments and Votes

According to regression model analysis result, we found that local governments belonging to KMT party have significant positive relation with land expropriation area (Model 1); the relation meant that KMT local governments indeed more likely launching land developments than its counterpart (**H-1-1**). From the result of Model 8 – 11, we also found the significant positive relation between land developments on housing, commercial, and financial type usage and KMT's vote share in local elections; the relation meant the more land development on housing, commercial, and financial usage, the more votes KMT party got in local elections.

In regression Model 4, we found DPP local governments have significant positive relation with industrial land developments (comparing with Model 3, 5, 6 and 7 showing KMT local governments have significant positive relation with total construction area and construction area in housing, commerce, and office usage), and regression Model 16 showed the more industrial land developments had been implemented, the more votes DPP got in local elections(with significant correlation). The fixed-effect regression model analysis verified hypothesis H1-1 and H1-2, and showed the different land development strategies and social bases between KMT and DPP parties.

Hypothesis H1-1 to H1-2 showed the different land developments strategies implemented by local political elites, but the strategies evoked several disputes. As anti-land expropriation protests increased dramatically since 2010(see Graph1.), we examined the trend of land developments and the relation between land developments and votes of two major parties. We found total number of land development decreased dramatically in 2010(see Model 2), moreover, and number of land development have significant negative relation with vote share of KMT in local elections (see Model 12). The relation between land developments and votes of KMT had turned. Land developments could have no longer increased the votes, and become a negative factor for vote share of local parties which launched land expropriation because of increasing number of protests.

From the point of contentious politics, the increasing number of anti-land expropriation protests could be detrimental reason to explain both the decline of land expropriation area(Graph2) and local election result in 2014 in Taiwan. Anti-land expropriation protests were evoked greatly in 2010, epically after "Dapu Event("大埔事

件")", and the study verified that the persistent protests indeed influenced local election results.

Tabel3.1 Model 1-2

	LAND (MODEL 1)	LAND (MODEL 2)
LOCAL-KMT	0.376*	1.015
	(0.171)	(0.582)
CENTRAL	0.041	-0.364
	(0.166)	(0.185)
BEFORE-2010	0.337*	
	(0.165)	
AFTER 2010		-0.911**
(YEAR)		（-0.299）
CONTROL VARIABLE		
LAG-CORPS	0.012	0.012
	(0.011)	(0.011)
LAG-TAX	0.397	0.670*
	(0.338)	(0.331)
LAG- ECO	0.125*	0.146**
	(0.056)	(0.056)
LAND PRICE	0.075	0.120
	(0.068)	(0.071)
GDP	-4.162***	-3.379**
	(1.058)	(1.101)
UNEMPLOYMENT	-0.067	-0.057
	(0.114)	(0.106)
DEPEND CHINA	0.001	-0.004
	(0.019)	(0.019)
UP GRADE	0.836**	0.920**
	(0.312)	(0.313)
LAG-HOUSE	-0.188	-0.225
	(0.137)	(0.137)
LAG-COM	-0.032	-0.045

	(0.040)	(0.040)
LAG-*OFFICE*	0.175*	0.147
	(0.080)	(0.079)
LAG-*INDUS*	-0.018	-0.016
	(0.060)	(0.059)
CONS	46.850***	31.226*
	(12.611)	(13.613)
N	447	447

NOTE："*"P<.05, "**"P< .01, "***"P< .001

Tabel3.2 Model 3-7

	CONS (Model3)	INDUS (Model 4)	HOUSE (Model 5)	COM (Model 6)	OFFICE (Model 7)
LOCAL-KMT	0.105**		0.283***	0.082	0.121
	(0.040)		(0.057)	(0.227)	(0.106)
LOCAL-DPP		0.987*			
		(0.475)			
CENTRAL	-0.046	0.115	-0.003	-0.809***	-0.004
	(0.038)	(0.131)	(0.054)	(0.216)	(0.101)
CONTRO VARIABLE					
LAG-CORPS	0.005	-0.002	0.013***	0.022	0.013
	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.007)
LAG-LAND	0.019	-0.026	-0.013	-0.031	0.054
	(0.012)	(0.041)	(0.017)	(0.068)	(0.032)
LAG-TAX	0.366***	0.718**	0.340**	-0.088	0.334
	(0.077)	(0.267)	(0.110)	(0.441)	(0.206)
LAG-ECO	-0.005	0.080	-0.029	-0.032	0.034
	(0.013)	(0.045)	(0.018)	(0.074)	(0.034)
LAND PRICE	0.061***	0.071	0.041	0.109	-0.014
	(0.016)	(0.056)	(0.023)	(0.092)	(0.043)
GDP	-0.731**	-0.527	-1.654***	-1.006	-1.033
	(0.249)	(0.865)	(0.355)	(1.426)	(0.668)
UNEMPOLYMENT	-0.172***	-0.234**	-0.271***	-0.374**	-0.106
	(0.023)	(0.079)	(0.033)	(0.131)	(0.061)
DEPEND CHINA	0.005	0.013	0.050***	-0.084***	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.025)	(0.012)
UP GRADE	0.147*	0.266	0.193	0.698	0.332
	(0.074)	(0.257)	(0.105)	(0.423)	(0.198)
CONS_	15.416***	-0.535	27.489***	29.311	15.840*
	(2.923)	(10.167)	(4.165)	(16.732)	(7.835)
N	447	447	447	447	447

Note：" *"p<.05, "**"p< .01, "***"p< .001

Table 3.3 Model 8-12

	KMT（Model8）	KMT（Model9）	KMT（Model10）	KMT（Model11)	KMT（Model12)
SUM-LAND	0.040***	0.039***	0.037***	0.038***	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)
CORPS	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
SUM-CONS					0.034
					(0.019)
SUM-HOUSE	0.034*				
	(0.014)				
SUM-COM		0.026***			
		(0.008)			
SUM-OFFICE			0.027*		
			(0.011)		
SUM-INDUS				0.011	
				(0.009)	
					-0.028**
*AFTER2010*LAND*					(0.010)
ECO	-0.010	-0.010	-0.012	-0.012	-0.013
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
TAX	0.096*	0.097*	0.101*	0.087*	0.097*
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.044)
GDP	-1.054***	-0.997***	-1.006***	-1.017***	0.049
	(0.163)	(0.159)	(0.162)	(0.164)	(0.187)
UNEMPLOYMENT	-0.009	-0.011	-0.011	-0.010	-0.042*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.020)
DEPEND CHINA	0.028***	0.028***	0.027***	0.027***	0.010*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
LOCAL-KMT	0.053**	0.055**	0.053**	0.056**	0.055**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
CENTRAL	0.053*	0.026	0.050*	0.049*	0.007
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.038)

UP GRADE	-0.097*	-0.089*	-0.090*	-0.081*	-0.073
	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.042)
VOTE RATE	0.004*	0.002	0.003*	0.003*	0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
VOTE TYPE-I	0.425*	0.265**	0.260	0.073	0.502
	(0.202)	(0.098)	(0.139)	(0.110)	(0.273)
VOTE TYPE-II	0.109**	0.109**	0.093*	0.105**	0.068
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)
CONS_	11.167***	10.666***	10.660***	11.326***	-2.909
	(1.861)	(1.838)	(1.876)	(1.887)	(2.424)
N	211	211	211	211	211

Note："*"p<.05, "**"p< .01, "***"p< .001

Table 3.4 Model 13-17

	DPP （Model13）	DPP （Model14）	DPP （Model15）	DPP （Model16）	DPP （Model17）
SUM-LAND	-0.020**	-0.021**	-0.022**	-0.019**	0.012
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)
CORPS	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
SUM-CONS					0.013
					(0.019)
SUM-HOUSE	0.020				
	(0.015)				
SUM-COM		0.009			
		(0.008)			
SUM-OFFICE			0.008		
			(0.012)		
SUM-INDUS				0.026**	
				(0.009)	
					-0.002
AFTER2010*LAND					(0.010)
ECO	-0.004	-0.004	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
TAX	-0.067	-0.068	-0.067	-0.080	-0.070
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.044)
GDP	0.119	0.152	0.149	0.112	-0.497**
	(0.173)	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.169)	(0.185)
UNEMPLOYMENT	0.013	0.012	0.012	0.013	0.038
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.020)
DEPEND CHINA	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.011**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
LOCAL-KMT	-0.064**	-0.063**	-0.063**	-0.060**	-0.061**
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
CENTRAL	-0.058*	-0.070**	-0.062*	-0.052*	-0.050
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.038)
UP GRADE	0.016	0.023	0.023	0.019	0.003

	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.041)
VOTE RATE	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	0.000	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
VOTE TYPE-I	0.272	0.096	0.081	0.304**	0.165
	(0.213)	(0.106)	(0.148)	(0.113)	(0.271)
VOTE TYPE-II	0.073	0.073	0.068	0.065	0.076
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)
*CONS_*	0.170	-0.002	0.018	0.506	8.349***
	(1.968)	(1.978)	(1.990)	(1.935)	(2.402)
N	211	211	211	211	211

Note："*"p<.05, "**"p< .01, "***"p< .001

Anti-land grabbing movement and institution amendment

In 2015, the "Spatial Planning Act（國土計畫法）" had been passed in Legislative Yuan in Taiwan, just before the 2016 presidential and legislative election. Before new spatial regulative institution was formed, "Land expropriation Act （土地徵收條例）",which were amended under the pressure of civil societies, was seriously criticized by land owners and farmers. The original price of governments' expropriation, which was evaluated by the governments－called "Current Land Value(公告土地現值)", was replaced by "Market Price(市場價格)" in the new "Land Expropriation Act" in 2012. The institutional changed during 2012 to 2016 showed not only new regulation for governments to control land developments initiated by local governments randomly, but also a more consolidated property right protection mechanism in Taiwan. The consequences of land development were not only evoked anti-land grabbing movement, but the changed of land governing institutions, which were more consolidative to land owners' property right.

5. Conclusion and implications

The land dispossession events, after 1990s democratization, were not the only problem of land governance institution in Taiwan; structural problem resulted from both uneven development of agricultural and industrial sectors and north／south part of Taiwan was the detrimental reason for spatial usage's conflicts. Although that the "Spatial Planning Act（國土計畫法）" had been passed through Legislative Yuan in Taiwan on December 2015, and that, for NGOs, it was a significant victory for environment conservation and

agrarian reform movements specifically on farm land use since 1990s (Zhan 2015), the new act was another controversial beginning between economic promoters and environmental conservation supporters (Huang 2019)－because the law had a more comprehensive protection on farmer land-owners' land right than ever.

The project demonstrated the mechanism of how local political elites got votes by land developments, and what the consequence of land expropriations was; the cause and effects of land expropriation in Taiwan implied classes conflicts which was based on the uneven development of sectors, and democratic consolidation, after the "Spatial Planning Act" acted, among this process. The governments in Taiwan, which experienced rapid economic development, based on comparatively cheap labor force from rural areas／agricultural sectors－so called "Economic Miracle (Gold 1986)"－since 1960s, had not reviewed its agricultural policy systematically until 2002, the year Taiwan became a member of World Trade Organization. From the prospective of economic development distribution justice, it was not just a right of private property protection for farmers evicted because of land expropriation, happened in and after 2010, but class conflicts from different economic development sectors; the land issue will continue to be a critical composition of social conflicts in Taiwan, probably in different forms.

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