



Here Goes the Neighbourhood

Deconstructing Migration Discourse in Russia

Masterarbeit

Schriftliche Arbeit zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades „Master of Arts“
an der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät
der Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen

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_____24. Februar 2012_____

Ort, Datum

Unterschrift

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1. Introduction

A typical European horror-scenario would include hordes of uneducated primitive newcomers who came to feast on the Western welfare system, causing a wave of crime and replacing crosses with crescents on their way¹. With the expulsion of the Roma by the French government (The Economist 2010a) and the closing of borders for North African refugees (Reuters 2011), parties with a nationalistic agenda winning seats in Finnish, Dutch, Danish and Italian parliaments (Von Ertel, et al. 2011) Russia stands out with its violent outbursts of xenophobia (BBC 2010, Elder 2010) that is not only directed at international migrants, but also at the Russian citizens who come from other Russian regions and don't conform with a stereotypical ethnic Russian appearance. Several authors (Delanty, Millward 2007, 141) argue that Europe in general is experiencing a new form of racism that was dubbed 'cultural' or 'symbolic' racism which is directed at immigrants and refugees and plays on 'common-sense' cross-group differences (van Dijk 1985).

Even though the Soviet regime glorified 'internationalism' and suppressed manifestations of nationalism 'its nationality policy pervasively institutionalized... territorial *nationhood* and ethnic *nationality* as fundamental social categories. In so doing it inadvertently created a political field supremely conducive to nationalism' (Brubaker 1996, 17, original emphasis), as each ethnic group was related to a particular territorial entity and was only recognized as such in relation to a subject of the federation (Martin 1998). The notion of nationality, which is bound in Western Europe to the concept of citizenship, derives in Russia from a Soviet atavism that included 'Natsionalnost' (ethnicity) in the vital passport data – the so-called 'fifth box' (Simonsen 1999) that indicated the 'natsionalnost' of each citizen and allowed to represent each ethnicity in the governmental institutions in a proportionate way (Simonsen 1999, 1072). The imprecise use of the term *national'nost'* in Soviet and post-Soviet terminology is symptomatic of the

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ambiguous policy and language concerning nationality/ethnicity in the USSR (Hutchings 2011) and is one of the reasons for xenophobic sentiments in Russia as after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been suffering from a quasi identity vacuum that has been often filled with jingoism and nationalism (Brubaker 1996; Kozhevnikova 2009; Laruelle 2009; Snetkov, et al. 2011; Umland 2008).

Anti-migration sentiments are a part of a wider problem of nationalism in Russia that has been raised by numerous organizations, including the Moscow-based 'Sova-Center' on the monitoring of xenophobia, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. The xenophobic outbursts that take place in Russia are not only directed at international migrants, but also at the Russian citizens who come from the North Caucasus or, plainly, do not look 'Slavic enough' (Sevortian 2009, 19). Soviet-era vernacular referred to these kind of clashes as 'inter-ethnic strife' ('mezhnatsionalnaia rozn') (Hutchings 2011, 7), but it reflects a general tendency that the understanding of what constitutes a 'Russian' is often reduced to a phenotype.

Recent opinion polls and sociological research show that people who state their ethnicity as 'Russian' not only regard ethnicity as a vital marker, but also consider violence as a possible tool to combat 'injustice towards their own folk' (Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences 2011, 211). Moreover, the percentage of people who think that Russia is a home for many ethnicities has shrunk since 1995 by 20% according to the sociological report 'Twenty Years of Reform' by the Russian Academy of Sciences, while the number of people who consider that Russia should be a country of ethnic Russians or that ethnic Russians should have preferential treatment vis-à-vis other ethnicities amounts to 45 % in 2011 comparing to 24 % in 1995 (Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences 2011, 207).

Derogatory terms like 'kavkazcy' (Caucasians), 'chyornye' (blacks) have become ubiquitous in everyday speech (Kozhevnikova 2007) while mass media (Lenta.ru 2010) employ euphemisms like 'litsa neslavyanskoy vneshnoti' (non-Slavic looking people) when it comes to the identification of crime suspects. On a more sinister side, the killing of a football club 'Spartak' fan Sviridov led to violent riots in the centre of Moscow with

the crowd chanting 'Russia for Russians' and other racist slogans (The Economist 2010b), while ethnic clashes in Sagra in July 2011 were portrayed as a 'War in Sagra' by the local news agency with a definitive us-versus-them juxtaposition of 'Russians' who had to 'resort to weapons' to protect the village from the invading 'blacks' (Vyugin 2011). Such a terminology already identifies migrants with criminal intentions, which 'Russians' should be protected from.

Another issue that contributes to framing migration discourse in security terms is the problem of terrorism. Major terror attacks in Russia were carried out by terrorists from the North Caucasus - explosions in the Moscow underground in March 2010 (BBC 2010a), the school hostage-crisis in Beslan in September 2004 (Milashina 2007), or the Nord-Ost hostage-crisis in October 2002 (CNN 2002). As in Europe after 9/11 (Allen 2002), terrorist attacks spurred a wave of xenophobia in Russia (Verkhovsky 2009), especially towards so-called 'Kavkazcy' – a pejorative generalization of Russian citizens from the North Caucasus. Thus, migrants are viewed essentially as a threat to 'Russians' that requires extraordinary measures to deal with – a perfect fit for a securitization framework.

The Copenhagen School that developed the concept of securitization moved beyond the traditional understanding of security in terms of military capabilities and expanded this notion to sectors, usually not taken into consideration in security studies, such as environment, society or economics. Securitization means that a particular phenomenon is represented through a discursive process as bearing an existential threat to a referent object, i. e. "as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure" (Buzan et al. 1998, 23-24). The existential nature of the threat legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures to deal with it (Buzan, Waever 2003, 491).

According to securitization theory, security pertains not only to the survival of a state, but also to the survival of societal i. e. group identities. Thus, 'the main threats to security come from competing identities and migration' (Buzan 1993, 43). When it comes to the societal sector, some authors even described securitization as a new form of

racism (Ibrahim 2003) or as an extreme form of ‘othering’ (Diez 2004). This resonates well with the topic of migration, as the representation of migrants is often portrayed with an emphasis on their threatening difference to the host society. In the Russian case the problem of ‘othering’ is particularly acute as the migrants are technically part of the existing group identity – they are Russian citizens or eligible thereof.

Crucial components in the securitization framework are the securitizing actor(s), the referent object, the constructed threat and audience that accept the threat as such. However, several scholars identified the lack of study of the audience in the securitization process (Ruzicka 2009, Balzacq and Leonard 2009, Salter 2008; Balzacq 2011, 8), which is attributed to the different securitization frames which were studied at the expense of proving if the actual securitization took place (Bourbeau 2011). The ‘voice’ of the audience in the securitization process has been largely neglected and the acceptance of the securitizing move has so far been presumed based on the authority of the security speaker.

The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, I will emphasize the role of the audience in the analysis of the securitization framework and show that it is not only important to prove that an issue is securitized within the audience, it is also important to identify who is the audience and who is the securitizing actor in the securitization process, as they both play an important role in identity construction. Secondly, contrary to usual theorizing of migration as an external threat (Huysmans 2006, Guild 2009) I will argue that the construction of the migrant threat can be internal, because the process of securitization in this case is an extreme form of ‘othering’ that occurs on a popular level as well through the mass media where the demand for extraordinary measures to deal with the (constructed) threat can also be voiced.

It is crucial, thus, to analyse, whether an audience accepts a phenomenon as a security threat. One of the ways to operationalize the role of the audience is to use commentaries in the blogosphere, because it provides an interactive environment and represents a way to observe reactions of people in their ‘habitat’ without the pressure of lab experiments or questionnaires (Harrison, List, Towe 2004; Levitt, List 2009). The effect of the mass

media in general has already been theorized and is known as the CNN effect (Gilboa 2005; Livingston 2000; Neuman 1996, Hansen 2011). The effect of social networks and new media has not yet been theorized in political science, although Hansen (2011) argued that it is necessary to include the study of new technological means of conveying information, because it contributes greatly to the constitution of the audience. There is virtually no research on securitization and the Internet, even though during the Arab Spring the Internet and social networks played a prominent role in resource mobilization and framing (Parvaz 2011). Nonetheless, some scholars did attempt to analyse the effect of blogging in Russia (Dyakova 2004, Zassoursky 2009, Schmidt, Teubener 2006) and identity construction (Lemish, Elias 2009; Rydin 2008; Georgiou 2006).

Migration has been widely analysed not only as an important factor in world politics (Betts 2009; Loescher and Monahan 1989; Castles and Davidson 2000; Guirardon 2000; Joppke 2005), but also from a security perspective. The advocates of the security approach to migration argue that migration is associated with anarchy (Kaplan 2004), a threat to national identity (Huntington 2004; Miller 1998) or can be a source of conflict (Weiner 1993). The landmark book 'Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe' (Waever et al 1993) proclaimed the new 'suspects' for the Western security and spurred a string of academic thought that concentrated on the research of the security/migration nexus (Huysmans 2000; Huysmans 2006; Albert et al 2001; Ibrahim 2005; Stivachtis 2008). This paper also follows the argument that a migration 'threat' is a socially constructed phenomenon and attempts to deconstruct the migration discourse in Russia and demonstrate a constituent relationship between the formulation of identity and the articulation of security concerns.

In Russian studies there is quite a large body of literature on nationalism and xenophobia, but so far linking security and migration in the Russian context was only carried out to study Chinese migration to the Far East (Alexeev 2006, 2011). The securitization of the migration paradigm has also been applied in Russian studies to analyse the same problem (Wishnik 2008, Timchenkova 2010). Chinese migration is an obvious example for the securitization framework: it conforms to the European take on

external threat that emanates from people physically and culturally different. However, in my research I will argue that a prominent securitization discourse is carried out in regard to internal migration as well, which may seem unusual to scholars like Huysmans (2006), Guild (2009) or Bourbeau (2011, 4) who associate the term ‘migrant’ with an alien, not a citizen.

The paper will concentrate on unpacking the dynamics of the securitization of migration in Russia, paying particular attention to identities’ construction during the major event that is linked to the securitization of internal migration - Manezhnaia riots in December 2010. My essay will proceed in the following way. Firstly, I will present the securitization concept with its adjustments by Hansen (2006), Stritzel (2007), Vuori (2008) and Balzacq (2005, 2011) and highlight the role of identity and ‘othering’ in this process (Diez 2004). I will identify different phases of securitization, showing how different actors can constitute audiences and securitizing actors. Then I will move over to methodology exploring the discourse analysis as a method to identify binary opposing discourses in relation to the threat and referent object. Thirdly, in order to track the success of the securitization process, I will analyse the comments to blog entries that were related to Manezhnaia riots and the reaction of the government in the aftermath of the riots. Finally, I will conclude with the analysis of the finding and outlook for the future research on the topic.

2. Theoretical Framework

Securitization as a concept

The theoretical framework of this essay lies within the larger debate about the concept of international security (Buzan, Hansen 2009) that has been both ‘widened’ to include a broader range of security sectors and new threats, and ‘deepened’, acknowledging other than the state possible referent objects such as societal groups and human beings. ‘Widening’ security studies draws on the assumption that focusing on the state as a referent object omits a whole set of threats that are not associated with the military and a range of referent objects that can be endangered by new threats (Booth 1991, 2007).

An important role in widening and deepening the security studies was played by the scholars of the Copenhagen School. The Securitization theory developed by B. Buzan, O. Wæver et al. widened the notion of security including not only military, but also economic, societal, political and environmental sectors (Buzan, Wæver et al 1998, 4-7), rendering the concept of ‘security’ subjective and discursively construed (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998, 29-30). However, the Copenhagen School warns against the unlimited inclusion of policy fields in the securitization framework, at the risk of diluting the specificity of ‘security’ until it becomes indistinguishable from politics (Buzan et al. 1998, 4). In turn, this could lead to the legitimization of emergency measures that would be unthinkable in a non-securitized situation (Cf. Wæver 1995, Buzan et al. 1998, 24).

Another way of conceptualising securitization was proposed by D. Bigo and the so-called Paris School that focuses predominantly on technical and administrative processes that lead to securitization instead of political discourse. According to the Paris School, securitization is largely a technocratic process and is a consequence of technological developments and bureaucratic procedures (Bigo 2000, 2002): routine practices such as passport controls contribute to the everyday process of securitization (Bigo 2006, Huysmans 2000). Thus, technology is both an enabling force as well as a source of legitimacy for the securitisation process.

A given issue may be successfully presented as a security problem (Bourbeau 2011, 39) and is drawn into a realist definition of a mode of dealing, which is marked by exceptionality (Stritzel 2007: 366). Or, as Hansen puts it, ‘when something – or somebody - is constructed as a threat to ‘national security’... it takes on an objective character and a particular rhetorical and political urgency’ (Hansen 2006, 34). However, according to the traditional Copenhagen School an issue is only successfully securitized when the audience accepts it as a security problem (Buzan et al. 1998, 25).

Even though most scholars concentrate on the identification of a particular phenomenon as a threat, Guzzini notes that

[...] The theory [of securitization] relies on a quite huge repository of common meanings and self–other understandings within which we can understand why certain political processes may lead to securitization or desecuritization... It is not a generic friend–foe distinction but embedded self–other understandings that predispose political discourses, public opinion and hence also the receptivity of the wider public to certain political moves (Guzzini 2011, 335).

Self-other understandings are particularly important for the societal sector of security, as threats in this case are posed by aliens who exhibit their own culture, compete for jobs and are a source of criminality (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998). Guzzini’s remark on self-other understandings is a central concept for this essay, as securitization is often construed as an extreme ‘othering’ process (Diez 2004, Ibrahim 2005). Essentially, the threat posed by migrants consists in their ‘otherness’. The logic here is that traditions built in a particular society represent means to secure its stability, whereas migrants, by bringing something new, ‘threaten the existing way of life. It is thus seen as rational to preserve one’s culture through the exclusion of other cultural groups’ (Ibrahim 2005, 166). Or as Huysmans puts it, linking migrants with insecurity ‘sustains a radical political strategy aimed at excluding particular categories of people by reifying them as danger’ (Huysmans 2000, 771)

Internal migration, which is portrayed as a threat in Russia (Hutchings 2011, Sevortian 2009), is a case in point, because the threat is not external; it is rather a part of the 'self'. This is why a poststructuralist view of the problem is necessary as it focuses on a discursive construction of reality and the construction of the meaning manifests itself through binary differences: self/other, inside/outside, order/anarchy, while these binaries are often value-laden (Hansen 2006) and invoke threats.

As noted in the introduction, the securitization process possesses the following key features: (1) the securitizing actor who constructs a particular (2) phenomenon as a (3) threat to a (4) referent object, while the (5) audience accepts the discursive representation of the phenomenon as a threat and demands for (6) extraordinary measures. Moreover, as the notion of security has been expanded, referent objects other than the state became part of the analysis. Thus, in the case of the societal sector it is the group identity that is at stake (Buzan, Waever et al. 1998, 123-124). Migration represents a savoury phenomenon to securitization theory because it can influence a number of security sectors: be it traditional military fears of territorial integrity, economic competition or diluted identity (Cf. Buzan, Waever et al. 1998, 121).

Securitization: speech act versus discourse

One of the main discussions that revolve around securitization is related to the understanding of security as a speech act versus security as a discourse. Wæver's original concept of securitization emphasized the role of speech act (Wæver 2005), where security attains its meaning in particular contexts that are defined by key characteristics and the securitization process accrues through securitizing moves, in particular speech acts that describe a particular issue as a threat to a community (Buzan et al. 1998, 26). Some authors (Vuori 2008; Stritzel 2007; Balzacq 2011) also tend to distinguish between security illocution (i.e. an act *in* saying something) and security perlocution (i.e. an act *by* saying something). Wæver (2005) tended to conflate the illocutionary, and perlocutionary aspects of speech acts in his theory of securitization (Vuori 2008, 73-74), but it is because of the concentration on the illocutionary aspect of speech act, that the role of the audience was neglected (Balzacq 2005, 176-7) and that the theory of securitization was concentrated on the securitizing actor, while the audience is no less

important for the securitization process. Other scholars (Williams 2003, Hansen 2011) emphasized that securitization can manifest itself through non-speech securitizing moves, such as visuals or even silences (Hansen 2000) - an extension only applicable to understanding of security as discourse, not as a speech act. In general, by identifying securitization as manifested through a speech act one gets caught up in the agent/structure problem, as the securitizing move is dependant on the factors that are external to it, or, as Vultee puts it, 'how can the act of speaking security be performative, if it relies on the consent of the audience?' (Vultee 2011, 77).

However, Balzacq (2005, 172) argues that the assumption that by mere utterance security reduces the whole process to a conventional procedure, whereas a better understanding of speech act lies in the contextuality and configuration of circumstances (Balzacq 2005: 172) or embeddedness (Stritzel 2007, 259). Moreover, as Stritzel notes 'the basic idea of security as a speech act itself is too limited to allow a scholar to study 'real-world' securitizations. In reality, the speech act itself, i. e. literally a *single* security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it' (Stritzel 2007, 377). Thus, it would make more sense to study security as a discourse (Hansen 2011), rather than a separate utterance and examine the context in which the security utterance takes place, in order to then relate it to a particular event. As Guzzini notes, 'Conceiving of security as performative meant for me that it is simply part of an ongoing social construction of (social) reality. Only in its most legal sense can security be empirically conceived as a 'speech act' in terms of a single event'. (Guzzini 2011, 335). Therefore, in this paper I will concentrate on securitization as a discourse.

Felicity conditions

There is a broad discussion regarding securitization success (Wæver, 2000; Vuori 2008; Stritzel 2007, 2011; Balzacq 2005, 2011; Leonard and Kaunert 2011) that includes 'felicity conditions' (facilitating conditions) for the process:

'facilitating conditions' for the success of (de)securitization include (1) the way certain arguments are 'empowered' through the mobilization of a bias within

existing foreign policy discourses and identities (dispositional) and (2) the validity that accrues to an argument by 'force' of the reputation and positional power of the agent (relational). But, in a second aspect, contingent factors can play a role, since both such discourses and such positions are also endogenous to the process (i.e. they can be affected by the process and are not necessarily constant throughout). (Guzzini 2011, 335)

Guzzini's dispositional condition can be compared with Stritzel's (2007) 'embeddedness', and they both refer to the fact that the securitizing move is supposed to resonate with existing discourses and practices, i. e. the discursive construction of reality, while 'positional power of the agent' is consistent with Wæver's (2000) concept and reflects the hierarchal 'grammar' of the securitization argument that contradicts Guzzini's original poststructuralist thesis. Wæver argues that successful securitization processes have three felicity conditions: (1) the grammar or plot of security, (2) the social capital (authority) of the enunciator, and (3) conditions related to the threat (cf. Wæver, 2000, 252–253), but Balzacq adds a fourth felicity condition: (4) conditions related to the audience of securitization (cf. Balzacq, 2005). However, this discussion did not lead to the development of indicators that can actually prove that a particular phenomenon is perceived as securitized by the audience and there is a limited number of studies (Bourbeau 2011) that analyze the way security practices can prove the existing process of securitization, i. e. according to the Paris School concept, and still concentrated on the securitizing actor side. Most importantly, securitization scholars concur that securitization is only successful when it resonates with existing identity constructions.

Audience problem

One of the main problems of securitization consists in the question 'who can speak security to whom' - the above mentioned 'social capital' or 'positional power' of the security speaker - and there is a certain hierarchal division between the securitizing agent who is in a superior position to securitize a phenomenon and an audience that is supposed to accept the discursive representation of a phenomenon as a threat (Wæver 2000). Leonard and Kaunert (2011, 58) argue that the Copenhagen School's position on audience is contradictory, because on the one hand the audience is assigned an

important role on the grounds of securitization being an intersubjective process, while on the other hand Buzan and Wæver posit that it is the securitizing actor that decides whether an issue should be handled as an existential threat. Thus, Copenhagen School leans more towards self-referentiality than to intersubjectivity (Balzacq 2005, Stritzel 2007, Leonard, Kaunert 2011), which can explain the underdeveloped theorization of the audience concept. Moreover, there are no concrete illustrations of possible audiences, just a vague reference that the ‘audience is those who have to be convinced in order for the securitizing move to be successful’ (Wæver 2003, 11-12) and an indication of audience’s variance. Also, the Copenhagen School becomes tautological when it concerns the explanatory power of securitization: we know about the acceptance by the audience once the policy can be pursued, thus there is no direct scrutiny of the audience. However, it is unclear who needs to accept the securitizing moves and to what degree. For example, is the audience limited to decision-making audiences such as parliaments or cabinets?

In most studies on securitization in general and securitization of migration in particular, securitizing actors are high-ranking politicians (Huysmans 2006, Bourbeau 2011) because they are deemed to be authoritative enough for the audience to accept the securitizing move, i. e. articulation of a certain phenomenon as a threat. Recent scholarship proposes to re-evaluate the role of the audience in the securitization process (Ruzicka 2009, Balzacq and Leonard 2009, Salter 2008, Leonard and Kaunert 2011, Balzacq 2011, 8) and postulates the centrality of the audience in the securitization process, but still gives the audience a passive subordinate role. Vuori (2008, 72) goes as far as noting that it is impossible to define who constitutes the audience in securitization theory and Doty maintains that securitization ‘is a widely dispersed and at times amorphous phenomenon not controlled or even initiated by the elites’ (Doty 2007, 116).

Following Salter (2011, 118) who argues that ‘process of securitization must be taken as dispersed, iterative and interactive’, I will show in this paper that the *audience’s acceptance of a securitization move can be shown as a re-articulation of certain discursive constructions in relation to migration*. Hence, the audience participates in the securitizing process as securitizing actors as well, because their articulating ‘back’ contributes to the overall construction of

a discourse and ultimately can lead to their potential partaking in the legitimization of certain policies. While demonstrating on Manezhnaia, for instance, the mob was chanting 'Russia for Russians' and one of the main responses to the riots was tightening migration legislation. In this configuration it was the mob that was the securitizing actor possessing the positional power, rather than the government officials who, concerned with the nationalistic outburst, accepted the audience's threat articulation and took the measures to curb it. Thus, the securitization theory in such a configuration will conform more to the original postulates of discourse fluidity and constant articulation (Milliken 1999) and in my paper I will try to bring out the key terms voiced by the audiences that can attest to a particular narrative.

Democratic versus authoritarian contexts

The Copenhagen School was criticized for its Western bias (Vuori 2008, Hansen 2011) because it operates with simplified notions of 'speaker' and 'audience' in a democratic state model, neglecting authoritarian contexts (Vuori 2008) and their need to legitimate certain actions as well. As Vuori puts it,

'The need for the refinement of the concept of securitization arises from a certain preference for, or even bias towards, democratic decision-making, which can be detected in the paradigmatic understanding of the theory of securitization. Perhaps it is due to this bias that it is sometimes suggested that the theory of securitization is only applicable to democratic political systems' (Vuori 2008, 68).

In authoritarian countries, or in countries with restricted democratic participation and freedom of speech it is presumed that political systems are in no need of political legitimacy (Holm 2004). Due to the absence of the realm of 'regular politics' there is no need to move security issues away from the democratic process into 'special politics', as there are no democratic processes to begin with (Vuori 2008, 68-69). Yet authoritarian regimes have to legitimize their use of extraordinary measures as well (Holm 2004, 219), and security is a strong legitimator even in non- democratic political systems (Vuori 2008, 68). Legitimacy is a crucial element in the survival of any social institution and all governments must exercise a minimum of both persuasion and coercion in order to

survive (Wiberg 1988, 120). Even tyrants need people to do their bidding, a certain amount of ‘electorate’ and loyal actors and subjects are important in totalitarian systems (Elo 2005, 128–31).

Wæver has argued that securitization raises issues within the arena of ‘special politics’, and even though this notion remained vague it is generally understood that special politics refers to the realm of non-democratic decision-making due to necessities of survival (cf. Buzan et al., 1998, 29). ‘Due to the Euro-emphasis of empirical securitization studies conducted so far, this understanding easily premises democracy as the norm of politics; securitization is often seen as a means of moving issues beyond the democratic process of government. But also states that have no democracy have security issues’ (Vuori 2008, 69). Thus, the distinction between ‘special politics’ and ‘normal politics’ might not be valid for non-democratic contexts, but the realm of security still provides a useful tool for policy legitimation.

European scholars can trace if the audience accepts the threat construction through democratic institutions, by analysing the transformation of official discourse or responses of official discourses to criticisms stemming from the opposition (Hansen 2006, 60-64), a method lost in Russia because the official discourse is restricted to the ruling party (Gill 2006; von Eggert 2011). Moreover, most of the mass media are under government control – the Kremlin has around 60% of newspapers under control, not to mention stakes in all national television stations (The Economist 2011). Therefore, the only open forum for discussion is the Internet that has become a major platform for opposition. Parliamentary debates cannot really be considered as such, because the overwhelming majority of the seats belong to ‘United Russia’ (‘Edinaya Rossiya’). A free discussion is carried out only on the Internet, where popular blogs became platforms for actual political discussions (Popov 2008, 28, Bidder 2010, Zassoursky 2009). Therefore, the intertextual research model for migration discourse should be centred on cultural representations – Hansen’s 3A model of analysing film, computer games, fiction and media because these subjects of analysis can provide evidence for the sedimentation or reproduction of identities (Hansen 2006, 64).

Migrant threat, externality of the threat

Certain migrant communities are traditionally regarded as posing a military/political threat to a country. In the Russian case it is the Chinese migrants who are seen as the forefront of Chinese attempts to overtake Siberia and the Far East (Wishnik 2008) but this understanding of migration is a derivative of a realist perception of security where international migrants pose a geopolitical threat (Guzzini 1998, 231). In major works on the securitization of migration (Bourbeau 2011; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998; Guild 2009; Huysmans 1993; Huysmans 2006; Ibrahim 2005; Wishnik 2008, Bigo 2000, Bigo 2001) the general understanding of a migrant is in first place a person without the citizenship of the receiving country that makes him/her external to the host society, even though this externality is 'imagined' (Anderson 1991). Or as Nakache (2008, 36) puts it 'contemporary debates surrounding South-North migration in Western receiving societies reveal the ambivalence that pervades the national identity and law. Law is an essential agent in the nation's relationship to the other', thus citizenship is a necessary tool to identify the 'other'.

Also, in the above mentioned essays migration has always been accounted as a part of the societal security agenda (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 120-122) where the threat of migration consists in 'X people are being overrun or diluted by influxes of Y people; the X community will not be what it used to be, because others will make up the population; X identity is being changed by a shift in the composition of the population' (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 121). Horizontal and vertical competition threats are likely to emanate from Russia itself vis-à-vis former Soviet Republics, as it was and is still trying to establish itself as a leading agent for integration among CIS-countries (Gvosdev 2004, Tsygankov 2006). Thus, according to Buzan and Wæver (1998) the influx of migrants implies that the incoming group is alien to the receiving community – i. e. external. It is important to highlight that it is the territorial space that shapes the migration debate as territory is often considered as a formative part of the national identity discussion. 'In relation to migration, this means that the apparent internal unity and the relativization of differences between individuals and social groups within the territory are made possible by subordinating these differences to the overarching

distinction between “ourselves as citizens” and “themselves as foreigners”. As such, the external frontier – real or imagined – serves as a “projection and protection of an internal collective personality” (Nakache 2008, 52-53).

The externality of the threat is largely presumed, therefore the limitation that migration securitizers like Guild, Huysmans and others make is not necessarily justified especially given that ‘othering’ process can take place on different levels (Campbell 1998, Diez 2004) and citizenship is largely a formality. Eventually, if there are no ‘commonsense differences’ between the groups, the othering process can boil down to the Liliputian quarrel over breaking up eggs from *Gulliver’s Travels*, as a group always needs to identify itself against another one (Coser 1956; Huddy 2004). Therefore, it is vital to take into consideration the othering construction that is carried out in regard to *internal* others, as securitization can move towards a construction of the ‘other’ regardless of citizenship and in Russia it is exactly internal migrants who are generally considered as ‘the other’.

3. Methodology


Configuration of securitization process

According to Bourbeau (2011) ‘the focus has been on proposing explanations as to why migration is securitized almost at the expense of answering the question of how we have established that migration is in fact securitized’ (Bourbeau 2011, 7). That is why it is necessary to deconstruct migration discourse in Russia and prove that it is in fact securitized. There is no common ground as to what practices actually contribute to securitization apart from speech acts. Bigo (2002, 64) for example connected securitization of migration to routine bureaucratic practices of security professionals and several studies in Russia (Sevortian 2009, Open Society Justice Initiative 2006) prove that daily police activities contribute to a securitized understanding of migration. Moreover, the fact the Federal Migration Service is a part of Ministry for Internal Affairs already gives it a securitized ‘touch’.


In order to track the success of the securitization process I will concentrate on the representation of migration in the Russian media and the audience’s acceptance of the securitized representation of migration. ‘Audience’ and ‘securitizing actor(s)’ in this case will be not permanent designations. As Hutchings (2011) notes, the Manezhnaia riots represent a milestone in Russia’s interethnic relations, a turning point that exposed the state’s deficient policies. It was also a junction that turned the governmental officials into the audience instead of securitizing actor. The reason I argue that during Manezhnaia riots it was the mob that constituted the securitizing actor is because the government had not resorted to an overtly nationalistic agenda before, with V. Putin and D. Medvedev never referring to the tensions resulting from internal migration (Laruelle 2009, 212). After the riots, however, V. Putin suddenly lashed out at ‘new-comers who don’t respect the host traditions’ (Putin, 2012) and ‘people cannot go out of their houses during holidays because of the problems with migrants’ (RBK 2012) etc. re-articulating a milder version of what was uttered on Manezhnaia. I identified three phases of securitization that surrounded the riots and that reflected the changes in the

configuration of securitizing actor and audience actors (see below). (1) The first phase included the government through state-owned media promulgating a discourse that was potentially harmful for Russian inter-ethnic relations, using vernacular that was already designating migrants, including internal migrants, as an ‘out-group’. (2) The second phase coincided with the riots and in this case the securitizing actor was the mob in Manezhnaia Square that articulated the ‘Caucasian threat’ and the government officials constituted the audience and responded to the mob’s articulation by aggravating the anti-migration discourse and proposing extraordinary measures. (3) The third phase reflected the acceptance of the governmental audience of the threat articulation and the assuming of the original roles of securitizing actors and audience: the government intensified ‘anti-migration’ discourse and additional measures were employed to respond to ‘migratory threat’ with the government becoming the securitizing actor in migration discourse.


Graph 1. Phase 1 Securitization Process before Manezhnaia



Graph 2. Phase 2 Securitization Process during the riots



Graph 3. Phase 3 Securitization Process after Manezhnaia



It is also important to note that the audience in Phases 1 and 3 has changed as well. When in Phase 1, the securitization was aimed at Russian citizens in general, while in Phase 3, the measures and public discourse were aimed at appeasing football fans and ethnic Russian citizens, reflecting a shift in the targeted public and thus creating schisms in Russian society.

Discourse Analysis

In order to investigate the securitization process, I will employ the method of discourse analysis to carefully investigate empirical constructions of identity and formulations of policy in regard to the migration debate (Hansen 2006, 30), because ‘underpinning the concept of ‘national security’ is a particular form of identity construction...’ (Hansen 2006, 34). Several scholars emphasized the importance of analysing mass media’s role in the securitization process (Vultee 2011, Hansen 2011) and as Vultee notes ‘securitization works as ... an effect *in* media... or an effect *of* media. These effects are created in a multisided, often recursive interaction among political actors, the media, and the public’ (Vultee 2011, 78, original emphasis). Hansen (2011) also stressed the necessity to analyse new media in the analysis of securitization because new technologies facilitate proliferation of information and expand the audience.

Discourse analysis strives to highlight ‘the processes by which the social world is constructed and consolidated. Discourse analysis focuses attention on the role that language, texts, conversations, the media and even academic research have in the process of creating institutions [i. e. established social order] and shaping behaviour’ (Burnham, et al. 2008, 249-250).

As Doty (Doty 1996, 6) notes, discourses are open, unstable and always in the process of being articulated, thus it is vital to analyse the environment where the articulations are most frequent – mass media, because ‘it is one of the functions of discourse analysis to reveal the bases of these common assumptions [of how to respond to particular events or crises] and to show how they are related to different interests in society’ (Burnham, et al. 2008, 250). The most common way to investigate society’s responses are public opinion polls, but according to recent behaviourist studies (Harrison, List, Towe 2004; Levitt,

List 2009), most people are unlikely to behave or to answer the questions true to them, due to the inadvertent psychological pressure of the investigator. However, when it comes to the Internet, the anonymity (Nie and Erbring 2000) enhances the likelihood of participation in the debate and discussions themselves tend to be more frank (Albrecht 2006, 27; Putnam 2000, 172-173; Gauntlett and Horsley 2004). Thus, the Internet provides a useful platform to observe human behaviour in its natural 'habitat'.

There is an already established discourse that is applied to migrants and is usually promulgated by the Russian TV channels and as TV channels are largely under governmental control, this discourse can be considered as the official stance of the government as well. The current research on the identity construction in the Russian TV by Hutchings (Hutchings, Tolz 2011) identified several patterns that are common to all major TV channels and they conform to the binary process of 'othering' that has been identified by most discourse scholars (Milliken 1999; Hansen 2006; Burnham, et al. 2008). One of the most common ways of referring to migrants is 'litsa neslavyanskoy vneshnosti' (non-Slavic looking persons) which already presents the migrants as an out-group, by defining the in-group as 'Slavic' and adding a negation 'ne' and draws a line between in-group and out-group based on appearance. This reference, however, is usually thought of as a politically correct way of identification (Hutchings, Tolz 2011). Another way of reference to migrants is to refer to their origins, even if they are from Russia their territorial link is kept: 'lica kavkazskoy nacionalnosti' (persons of Caucasian ethnicity) – a nonsensical term, that transforms the territorial reference into a non-existent ethnicity. It is worth mentioning that the word 'Caucasian' in Russian (kavkazskiy) has only one meaning, i. e. a person from the Caucasus and does not possess a corresponding meaning in the English language.

A xenophobic discursive representation of migrants applies to non-Slavic looking individuals irrespective of their citizenship, even though former USSR citizens can seek Russian nationality according to the Federal Law on Citizenship (Federal law No. 62 'On Citizenship of Russian Federation', 2002). There are several competing discourses that were identified by Hutchings and Tolz (2011) and they refer to different ways of representing (internal) migrants in the Russian society: (1) Friendship of the peoples; (2)

ethnic criminality (3) culture conflict/inter-ethnic strife (4) conspiracy of power. I will add another discourse – terrorism - that is usually applied to internal migrants but has been somewhat overshadowed by the recent strained ethnic relations and is partly responsible for representation of the internal migrants as bearing a threat (see table 1).

Table 1 Competing Discourses

Discourse	Referent Object	Threat	Key Terms	(Potential) measures
(Terrorism)	(All citizens)	(Terrorist attacks)	(‘litsa neslavianskoi vneshnosti’ (non-Slavic looking people))	(Tightening security controls, tightening migration regulation)
Ethnic criminality	Ethnic Russians	Criminality that emanates from particular ethnic groups that engage in criminal activity	‘litsa neslavianskoi vneshnosti’, ‘kavkazcy’ (Caucasians),	Fight against corruption, tightening migration regulation
Culture conflict	Ethnic Russians	Alien traditions that destroy the Russian cultural identity, including language, religion	Host traditions, priezzhiye (newcomers), gosti (guests), ‘litsa neslavianskoi vneshnosti’, ‘korennoe naselenie’ (indigenous people)	Secession of alien territories, tightening migration regulation
Friendship of the peoples	Russia as a whole	Radicals, opposition striving to break harmonious multi-ethnic Russia apart	Radicals, left-radical youth, ‘litsa neslavianskoi vneshnosti’	Tightening migration regulation
Conspiracy of Power	All citizens	Somebody is organizing nationalist groups to take control of Russia	‘vlasti’ (authorities)	Fight against corruption, tightening security

These five discourses almost all have in common the fact that they all play on the same palette of terms, which refer to internal migrants and almost all of them see as a potential answer the tightening of migration regulation in Russia. Hutchings and Tolz (2011) note that the most widespread discourses that are propagated in the Russian mass media are *ethnic criminality*, *culture conflict* and *friendship of the peoples*. All of these discourses, however, have the same points of references: even the supposedly politically correct *friendship of the peoples* discourse includes distinctions between groups grounded in their appearance, emphasizing the otherness principally in racist terms that can have long-lasting consequences. Moreover, even in attempting to conform to *friendship of the peoples* discourse, the Russian mass media often devolves into *ethnic criminality* and *culture conflict*

discourses by representing ‘Caucasians’ as an organized group involved in criminal activity or accentuating religious/cultural differences.

The fact that ethnic criminality and culture conflict discourses are so well sedimented in the Russian society can be also attributed to the two Chechen wars and terrorist attacks carried out in Russia since 1990s (Verkhovsky 2009, 96). As noted in the introduction, major terror attacks in Russia were carried out by terrorists from the North Caucasus - explosions in the underground in March 2010 (BBC 2010a), the school hostage-crisis in Beslan in September 2004 (Milashina 2007), or the Nord-Ost hostage-crisis in October 2002 (CNN 2002). On top of that, most terrorists declared themselves to be Muslim, which inexorably sparked a wave of Islamophobia reminiscent of that in Europe after 9/11 (Allen 2002, Verkhovsky 2009). This already makes people from the North Caucasus associated with danger, so the followed discourses fell to a fruitful ground as in all them it was the origins of the people that mattered. In this case the pre-existing terrorism discourse acted as a felicity condition for the infiltration of the ethnic criminality and culture conflict discourses.

The indicated discourses of *terrorism*, *ethnic criminality*, *culture conflict*, and to a large extent *friendship of the peoples* are very suitable for the othering process: they all locate an out-group at the audience’s disposal and present categories along the lines of which the othering process should proceed. The fact that the out-group represents a threat to the in-group – through physical danger (terrorism), through criminal activities (ethnic criminality) or through alien cultural influence (culture conflict) – is the logical consequence of the securitization process that is understood here as extreme othering.

Culture conflict discourse is particularly fitting for a securitization framework, as numerous proponents of this viewpoint would like to see the secession of North Caucasian republics from Russia that will in a way complete the threat construction and finally make the internal migrants external to Russian borders. When the threat emanates from ‘self’ a logical continuation would be to separate the threat from ‘self’, that is why this representation has the potential of parts of Russia to break away. This discourse is particularly disturbing for Russia, as in the wake of the Soviet Union breakup, there

were also calls to stop ‘feeding’ other Soviet Republics (Solzhenitsyn 1990). That kind of discourse is highly reminiscent of today’s sentiments. One of the popular slogans, that was even mentioned by Medvedev and Putin, is ‘Hvatit Kormit’ Kavkaz’ (Stop feeding Caucasus) and it refers to relatively significant budgetary injections into the budgets of North Caucasian republics in comparison to their Central Russian counterparts (Balatskii 2010; BBC 2011).

It is also noteworthy that the discourses have different referent objects: with terrorism and ethnic criminality it is an (ethnic Russian) individual. In case of culture conflict and conspiracy of power the referent object is the community of (ethnic) Russians, i. e. group identity (classic securitization understanding of a societal threat), while in the case of friendship of the peoples it is the state that is the referent object, or, to be precise, indivisible Russia in its present borders. Thus, when these different discourses are employed its speakers have different referent object in mind: for instance, an ardent proponent of ‘Stop feeding Caucasus’ slogan is very likely to disregard Russia’s territorial integrity for the sake of building a culturally homogenous society.

In order to trace the discourse related to migration, I will identify patterns of references to migration and then explore whether similar patterns emerge in blogs and the commentaries thereof. In the discourse analysis of the blogs I will ‘pay careful analytical attention to how signs are linked and juxtaposed, how they construct Selves and Others’ (Hansen 2006, 45):

‘...meaning and identity are constructed through a series of signs that are linked to each other to constitute relations of sameness as well as through a differentiation to another series of juxtaposed signs. For example, to construct ‘the Balkans’ as different from ‘Europe’ does not create much meaning unless this construction is situated within a discourse that links and differentiates these signs’ (Hansen 2006:42)

As noted in the introduction, the understanding of ‘Russian’ is often reduced to a phenotype, but there are other points of reference that are employed by mass media.

After Kurban-Bairam, Turkish name for Eid-al-Adha - a Muslim holiday of sacrifice, there are numerous reports of Muscovites' outrage about 'Muslims slaughtering sheep on the streets of Moscow' (Mayantseva 2010). A typical headline in a Russian newspaper about a street fight would involve 'Caucasians brutally beating up' somebody 'without any reason' (Akhtyrko 2011; Mironov and Pcholkina 2010). A popular TV show 'Nasha Rasha' (Our Russia) makes fun of labour migrants who speak Russian poorly and are poorly educated. Moreover, after the riots on Manezhnaia, a number of blog commentators complained that the mob 'did not beat up the right guys, they did not speak with an accent and two of them looked definitely Russian' - a clear sign of sedimentation of these perceptions. Thus, in the case of Russia, an example of competing juxtaposed identities would look the following way:

Table 2 Juxtaposed identities of ethnic Russians vis-à-vis migrants

(Ethnic) Russian	Migrants
Civilized	Barbarian
Controlled	Violent
Developed	Underdeveloped
Christian	Muslim
Literate	Illiterate

Cf. Hansen 2006, 42

The above-mentioned types of descriptions have an undertone of comparison between ethnic Russians and migrants. Most often emphasized is the fact that migrants speak with an accent (illiterate, underdeveloped), are engaged in criminal activities or incite violence for no reason (violent) or celebrate their 'alien' holidays on the streets by cutting animals (Muslim, barbarian). These binary oppositions resonate with the competing discourses mentioned above, especially in ethnic criminality discourse that draws directly from the usual designation of 'Caucasians' as an organized group of criminal offenders and clash of cultures discourse that draws on the foreign to ethnic Russian traditions, while both of them are thought of as representing a threat to ethnic Russians, be it a physical or societal.

Sources for discourse analysis

As I am investigating the securitization process of internal migration through the Manezhnaia riots case study, the empirical part will consist of the following segments:

- (1) Events leading to the riots
- (2) Analysis of the riots in order to examine the demands that have been put forward by the Manezhnaia mob and how they fit in with existing discourses on migration.
- (3) Reaction in blogs will serve as an indicator of the success of securitization the reaction in blogs will show to what degree the securitizing discourse resonated and, finally,
- (4) I will analyse the reaction of the authorities to monitor how the Manezhnaia's securitization move worked among the political elite.

These four segments include different sources for discourse analysis. In the first segment I will present an impartial timeline of events leading to the riots. In the second segment I will draw on the existing research by Hutchings and Tolz (2011) and assign the slogans that sounded on Manezhnaia to a particular discourse. In the third segment discourse analysis will be applied in the monitoring of Russian blogs on livejournal.com, a platform that is considered particularly influential in the Russian media landscape and inter alia in political debates (Dyakova 2004; Pasti 2010, Litovskaia, Shaburova 2010, Beumers et al 2009, Zassoursky 2009).

LiveJournal is a blog platform registered in the US that allows its users to have their own online-diary (blog), to comment on other people's blogs, add other users as 'friends' and follow their posts. The Russian-speaking segment has increasingly been gaining popularity ever since the platform's creation and counts now 2,481,904 users (LiveJournal Statistics 2011) and works as a social network, especially given that it is interconnected with facebook, twitter, vkontakte (Russian clone of facebook) and Google+.

LiveJournal.com has been identified as the most politicized segment of Russian blogging community with prominent media personalities that have been acknowledged as

opinion leaders in Russia. High-profile newspapers, such as the Wall-Street Journal, Der Spiegel, Newsweek and other prominent global media have interviewed Russian bloggers such as Alexey Navalny (aka Navalny), Rustem Adagamov (aka Drugoi), or Artemiy Lebedev (aka Tema) and acknowledge their influence on a particular audience (von Eggert 2011). Some of the oppositional blogs were even under cyber attack (DDoS-attack) in the spring 2011 (Blagoveschensky 2011), which was allegedly initiated by the Kremlin youth movement (Karimova 2012). Moreover, the recent disclosure of governmental youth agency activities through a hacking scandal with email accounts belonging to the heads of governmental youth agency exposed, shows that a significant portion of governmental financing was spent on creating fake accounts supporting the government and organization of online provocations against oppositional bloggers (Karimova 2012, Nikolsky, Dorokhov and Boletskaya 2012). ‘Kremlingate’ shows that even the government acknowledges LiveJournal’s influence.

The Russian search engine yandex identifies the most popular blogs in Russia by subscriptions - i.e. how many LJ users see the posts daily in their friend-feed; but most posts are accessible to non-LJ users as well, which can amount to more than 9 million unique visitors per month, i. e. non-subscribed, non-LJ users with a unique IP-address (von Eggert 2011). Hence, though, the number of subscription to the most popular blogs can be relatively few (30 to 60 thousand) in comparison to the size of the Russian population (142 million), the messages posted by bloggers can reach a significant audience when including the opportunities afforded by the proliferation of social networks. This enables posts to be recommended, reposted and experienced by so-called second hand viewing – when individuals receive the information from relatives, friends or acquaintances who have read the posts. Consequently, emerges a ‘facebook-effect’ through recommendations and ‘liking’, which increases the potential audience. Thus, it is hard to estimate the exact size of the platform audience, but most experts (von Eggert 2011; Beumers et. al. 2009; Dyakova 2004) agree that it is a significant fraction of the population.

The blogs with most subscriptions can, in this case, be just as influential as newspapers with the highest circulation, i. e. represent a mass medium with an option of

commentary where one can analyse commentaries to entries related to migration and trace acceptance (or not) of a particular discourse by the audience. Major migration-related events are largely discussed in blogs and often get the print media's attention through popular blogs. In this framework media work as a tool of securitizing actors: 'to move an audience's attention toward an event or a development construed as dangerous, the words of the securitizing actor need to resonate with the context within which his/her actions are allocated' (Balzacq 2005, 182).

As noted in the theory chapter, the success of the securitization process can be determined by the audience's acceptance of it. Thus, in order to prove the fact that the securitization took place it is necessary to track, by the audience's reaction, if the securitization discourse was re-articulated. In my essay there are essentially two audiences, whose responses should be monitored: the general public that is represented here by the commentators in LiveJournal.com and the authorities, represented by governmental officials, President D. Medvedev and prime-minister V. Putin. Even though I identified three phases of securitization process, I will analyse the success of only the first two phases, as the third one is still in progress.

The first phase will consist in analysing the existing anti-migratory discourses and their sedimentation in audience. The audience's reaction will be operationalized in the following way: a quantitative analysis of the audience's reaction will be performed and then based on the key terms that are derived from the findings, a more precise discourse analysis will be performed. To that end, I will create word clouds (www.wordle.net) out of posts by the bloggers and commentaries to them. Wordle.net processes the plain text of the webpages and uses the number of times a word appears in a text to determine its relative size, omitting so-called "stop words" (a frequently-used, but unimportant word, such as "the", "and", or "but" and their analogues in Russian). Word clouds will highlight what words are used most frequently by the commentators and shed light as to what competing discourse the audience re-articulated and what kind of message it sends as a potential securitizing actor. By analysing the contexts within which the key words were used in word clouds, I will be able to assign to the commentaries a particular competing discourse or a conflation of discourses: (1) Friendship of the peoples; (2)

ethnic criminality (3) culture conflict/inter-ethnic strife (4) conspiracy of power and (5) terrorism.

I will analyse the entries that have a direct connection to the Manezhnaia riots with the most subscription. The most popular bloggers that responded to Manezhnaia were *drugoi*, *navalny*, *tema* and *zyalt*, with the latter being an eyewitness to the riots. Each of the bloggers' entries related to Manezhnaia will be analysed in the empirical part to determine the key words and contexts in which they were used.

The second type of audience consists of governmental officials and their response. Being less numerous, they present a lesser challenge to analyse. In this case I will conduct discourse analysis of the statements made by President D. Medvedev, prime-minister V. Putin, Vice-prime Minister D. Rogozin, Minister of Interior R. Nurgaliev and the Head of Migration Service K. Romodanovsky. To offer a more comprehensive analysis of this audience's response I will also analyse the proposed measures and actions undertaken by the above-mentioned officials.

Non-speech securitization

As noted previously, discourse is not limited to linguistic articulation; it can also be manifested through visuals with spectators projecting a 'voice' to the image (Mitchell 2005, 140; Hansen 2011, 54; Campbell 2004, 62). Thus, visuals are read within a historical, political and social context that can 'utter security' (Hansen 2011), using the same binary opposition only in depiction of Selves and Others, with Other being (1) barbaric, evil or (2) insignificant and weak (Hansen 2011, 59). In this case security presents a modality and is not necessary to be uttered. Thus, the visual should be able to resonate with a particular context that invokes security.

Hansen argues that the image can be studied as image itself, its immediate intertext, the wider policy discourse, and the texts ascribing meaning to the image (Hansen 2011, 53). As pieces of news are usually accompanied by a visual, be it a photograph or a caricature, it makes sense to include an analysis of visuals in the discourse analysis to

make the study of the discourse more comprehensive. Moreover, there are several recent phenomena observed on the blogosphere that are important for the non-speech securitization analysis: one of them is akin to the American ‘demotivator’ images – a black background with a photograph in it and a phrase that summarizes the ‘punchline’ of the visual; the other one is the so-called ‘photozhaba’ (‘phototoad’, but is derived from the word ‘photoshop’), a photoshopped photograph or an image. One of Russia’s top-bloggers *tema* arranged a weekly contest of photoshopped caricatures on a particular topic and instead of comments people often post the Russian demotivator pictures as well. With a demotivator it is easier to analyse the non-speech instances as it has a ‘voice’, i. e. immediate intertext, and even though it is tied to the context, the inferences can be more or less common.

However, even the existing coverage can prove to be securitizing already. For instance, the coverage of celebration of Muslim holidays in Russia usually includes pictures of slaughtered animals or Muslims praying on the streets (Mayantseva 2010). These visuals already present an implied threat of otherness in comparison to predominantly Russian Orthodox community that does not involve the same rites. Even though the text is powerful enough, the image reinforces the message. As noted previously, these images are very likely to resonate within Russian society as there are already existing anti-Muslim sentiments (Verkhovsky 2009) and the fact that people from the North Caucasus are predominantly Muslim brings them to the same discursive field.

4. Empirical Part

Events leading to riots

On 6 December 2010 a group of Muscovites, including two fans of 'Spartak', one of Russia's famous football clubs, got in a row with another group of people, later identified as 'Caucasians'. The circumstances of the events are still unclear, but the verbal exchange of invectives led to a physical confrontation that left Yegor Sviridov, a prominent member of the fan community of 'Spartak', shot dead and four of his friends wounded. The police shortly thereafter arrested a group of six young people, including Aslan Cherkesov, who were identified by five witnesses as participants of the fight, with Cherkesov carrying the gun Sviridov was shot with. Shortly after, the police, allegedly under influence of 'Caucasian diaspora' released five of Cherkesov's co-accused (Nizamov 2010). These actions immediately created an outcry among Spartak's fan community. 'Fratrria', Spartak's fan community, published an online statement saying that their 'brother' was killed by 'eight Caucasian bandits' (Petrov 2010).

On 7 December 2010 a group of Spartak fans protested in front of the police station that set free Cherkesov's companions. According to the footage of the march, the crowd was chanting 'Russkie vpered!' (Russians, forward!), 'Za eto ubiistvo otvetyat vashi deti' (your children will answer for that murder), 'Rossiya dlya russkih, Moskva dlya Moskvichei' (Russia for Russians, Moscow for Muscovites) (Shmaraeva 2010). The mainstream media did not at first react to this event, as Sviridov's murder was but one out of on average 19 thousand murders annually in Russia (Sherbakova 2011), but as the perpetrators were let go and the fan community was quick to organize, the demonstration forced the TV channels to respond to the situation. For instance, the coverage by 'Vesti', a state-owned channel, did not mention the racist slogans of the crowd used on 7 December 2010 and provided footage showing the crowd chanting 'Russians, forward!', a usual football match chant. In general, the racist undertones were censored, but it was after this demonstration that the police forces issued notices for Cherkesov's acquaintances that also participated in the fight but was let go earlier on.

Several commemorations followed, including the one organized by the Spartak football club on the morning of 11 December 2010 on the street where Sviridov was killed, which proceeded peacefully (Egorov 2010). However, on the same day, violence erupted in the centre of Moscow, near the Kremlin, on Manezhnaia Square, leaving 29 wounded, most of them members of the police forces who tried to counteract the riots. Several victims of racially motivated violence refused to be taped by the state TV and remained anonymous. The police arrested 65 offenders, but most of them were let go and none of the actual lynchings was judged (Sokovnin 2011).

Manezhnaia riots analysis

The first coverage of Manezhnaia riots was delivered by an independent photojournalist Ilya Varlamov, who posted live photographs of the events on Manezhnaia that were subsequently re-posted by more popular bloggers. Varlamov's photographs (Varlamov 2010) showed a significant crowd, later estimated at 10,000 people, many with Spartak's scarfs and covered faces, lighting smoke pellets, raising hands in Nazi greeting, clashing with the police forces (See Annex 1). According to Varlamov's account (Varlamov 2010) and the report by Ekho Moskvyy (Romenskiy 2010), an oppositional radio station, the police seemed helpless and after announcing that the demonstration was illegal, the protesters attacked the policemen, who fled the square.

Violence erupted after several 'non-Slavic looking' adolescents appeared at the Square and the mob started to lynch them, while the police tried in vain to protect them. After the policemen refused to hand over the young people to the crowd, the mob clashed with the remaining policemen. Later, the head of the Moscow police force, V. Kolokoltsev came to Manezhnaia to ask the mob to leave, during which time one of the protesters asked him to 'solve the Caucasian question'. After a while, the mob dispersed, went into an underground station where members beat up presumably non-ethnically Russian people.

Apart from the violence on and around Manezhnaia square directed at 'non-Slavic looking' (among those who got lynched by the mob turned out to be Slavic-looking boys who tried to protect their not so lucky friends) and clashes with the police forces, the

mob repeated a range of chants. In the table below I will analyse the most prominent slogans according to videos and testimonies of witnesses (See Table 2).

Table 3 Slogans used by the mob on Manezhnaia Square

Slogan	Translation	Explanation
1. Rossiya dlya russkikh	Russia for Russians	Russia should be a country for ethnic Russians – a common slogan for most nationalistic organizations in Russia. ‘Russians’ here is bereft of any civic meaning
2. Yeb...t Kavkaz Yeb...t	F...k the Caucasus	The Russian verb bears a more offensive overtone than its English equivalent, and is tantamount to a denigrating aspersion, which feminizes the recipient.
3. Smert chernozhopym	Kill the Wogs (literally: death to black asses)	‘Black’ in Russian vernacular is not a reference to the black race, but a reference to people with darker skin and hair, i. e. phenotypically a ‘black person’ in Russia would be considered a South European or an Arab.
4. Slava Rusi, Kavkaz sosi!’	Glory to Russia, suck it, Caucasus	A rhymed version of slogan no. 2 with an explicit homophobic subtext
5. Rossiya dlya russkih, Moskva dlya Moskvichei	Russia for Russians, Moscow for Muscovites	A variation on slogan no. 1 with the reference to the large influx of migrants to Moscow, which ought to be averted, and the implicit statement that migrants should obey ethnic Russians.
6. V Moskve hozyain Russkiy	In Moscow the Russian is master	An almost direct reference to ‘clash of cultures’ discourse with an indication that ‘Caucasians’ don’t respect their hosts in Moscow, i. e. ethnic Russians

7. Vpered Rossiya, my s toboi	Forward, Russia, we are with you	A variation of football slogans, common to football games between the Russian national team against other countries.
8. Otsosi u vseï rossii	Suck it from all Russia	An obscene scurrility, establishing Russia as master and the recipient (here unnamed) as slave with a gender overtone, feminizing the recipient.
9. Bei zhidov	Kill the Jews	A reduced version of the slogan known from the Jewish pogroms of XIX- beginning XX centuries, with the full version being 'Kill the Jews, save Russia'

These slogans, offensive, base and racist as they were, also carry messages that were later adopted by the government in a milder form. Slogans no. 1, 5, 6 establish the circle of in-group, with it being ethnic Russians and Muscovites. They also have the subtext of difference between the indigenous people ('korennoe naselenie') and migrants, often described as guests (Hutchings, Tolz 2011). In these slogans the othering process is evident: it is based on territoriality as it was grounded by the Soviet system of bond between the territory and ethnicity.

The same message albeit in a much more crude form is present in the other slogans as well. For instance, slogans 2, 4, 8 have an extremely offensive sexual connotation, but they bear a meaning that goes beyond the usual insult by using taboo vernacular (Kon, 2011). According to numerous studies (Dreizin, Priestly 1982; Zhel'vis 1997; Gachev 1994, Kon 2011), Russian taboo vernacular has a very potent gender aspect that refers to master/slave relations. Thus, by putting the recipient in the 'female' position the agent legitimizes a higher hierarchal position than the recipient (Kon 2011, 30) and signifies the implied loss of virility of the receiver performed by the agent of the action (Mikhailin 2000). Given that 'Caucasians' are mostly represented as all-male groups the insult is deemed even more portentous. Even though slogan no. 6 does not have a sexual subtext, the message conveyed by all four of them is the same: establishing the higher position of ethnic Russians over 'Caucasians' and echoing the *culture conflict* discourse,

whereby the hierarchal position of master versus slave is reproduced in a combination master versus guest (Cf. Hutchings, Tolz 2011). Moreover, by trying to sexually abuse the opponent in the slogans the enunciators usually feel threatened by the targeted group that needs to be turned submissive through the proclaimed sexual action (Kon 2011, Zhel'vis 1997).

Another disturbing message was carried by slogan no. 3. Apart from the pronounced call for violence, the recipient is distinguished as an out-group phenotypically, i. e. as being black as opposed to 'white Russians'. This slogan in particular echoes with the conventional pseudo-politically correct form used in the Russian mass media – 'non-Slavic looking people' (Hutchings, Tolz 2011). Thus, by identifying the out-group as not being fair-haired and blue eyed, Russian official discourse legitimized a basis for a more derogatory othering process by using the same category - physical appearance.

Slogan no. 9 involved, sadly enough, a typical securitization example: identification of Jews as an existential threat for Russia and a call for extraordinary measures to deal with it. Why this slogan appeared during the riots seems at first unclear, as they had an ostensibly anti-Caucasian orientation, but, unfortunately it is perfectly in line with the dynamics of the othering process (Diez 2004, Owen 1997, Campbell 1998) whereby all potential out-groups are singled out as different and ultimately as posing a threat. The fact that among the slogans surfaced an anti-Semitic one only proves that the riots had a racist agenda altogether and in the end targeted all types of out-groups in Russia not only based on their ethnic belonging.

The mob did not have many posters; most of them were related to football club insignia, Nazi symbolic or flags of ultra-nationalist organizations. Unrelated posters included a black poster with targets on it with photographs of Volkov and Sviridov, the two killed Spartak fans and the question: 'Are you next?' This poster is slightly different from the overall *culture conflict* mood of the riots as it is related to *ethnic criminality* but it goes in line with the overall securitized mood of the riots, only emphasizing the individual as a referent object for the 'Caucasian threat'.

troubles concealing the murders of Russians committed by those black asses'; 'they rob our boys, rape our girls' also indicate the absence of a rule of law and commentators' confidence in the complicity of authorities in the crimes – a conflation with *conspiracy of power* discourse. A very common reference to 'Caucasians' as guests - a stereotypic depiction of 'migrants as 'uprooted' people who have become morally corrupt because they have lost their link to their native soil' (Hutchings and Tolz 2011, 6) – is frequently echoed in comments like 'Caucasians forgot that they were guests and now they denigrate us'.

Another important thread of discussion was related to the Chechen Republic and the fact that Russians were 'squeezed out of Chechnya', 'forced to leave their homes' and now the ones who made the ethnic Russians leave 'invade' Moscow and 'install their ways' – a definitive reference to *culture conflict* discourse. This topic quickly spread from denouncing the population of the North Caucasian republics to dwelling on the hardships endured by ethnic Russians in Central Asian countries, so the xenophobic backlash against migrants (both internal and external) is seen by these commentators as justified for the offenses committed in their home republics.


Due to the sheer volume of the commentaries (more than 2,500 Word pages) some of the discussion threads were not statistically significant. However, a notable characteristic of the discussion was the fact that commentators who were trying to criticize the actions of the mob on Maneznhaia or to argue that racist remarks were unacceptable were being lambasted and accused of being 'Caucasian whores' (female commentators) or of being homosexually involved with 'Caucasians' (male commentators), otherwise those commentators were asked about their ethnicity. It was also common to start with the comment with 'I am myself an ethnic Russian...'. Thus, unless one stated to be an ethnic Russian, the opinion did not count and non-racist remarks usually provoked suspicion.

The terrorist discourse that was mentioned among the competing discourses previously in Chapter 3 did emerge as a justification for the violence against 'Caucasians'. The most typical comment of that sort was 'you wait until Caucasians start blowing up the

underground again’, but this discourse was statistically overshadowed by other competing discourses related to *ethnic criminality* and *culture conflict*.

Entries in other blogs received less attention, but still collected a fair amount of response as they also contained photographs of the riots:

Word Cloud 2 Statistical analysis of comments posted to the entry by Drugoi
<http://drugoi.livejournal.com/3438260.html>



The words most frequently used are ‘fanaty’ (fans), ‘sebya’ (self)², russkikh, russkie (Russians), kavkazcev, kavkazcy (Caucasians), naroda (people), vlasti, vlast (authorities), bydlo (a derogatory analogue of hoi polloi).

If one looks at the context of those words the following picture emerges. ‘Fans’ was most commonly used to denote the only organized group that was able to protest against the injustice perpetrated by the police (who let ‘Caucasians’ go) and by the ‘Caucasians’ themselves. One of the most poignant commentaries said that ‘...it is only the fans who


² ‘Self’ was used in different contexts, most often in discussions about the behaviour of the fans and the ‘Caucasians’ so it cannot be attributed to either ‘camp’ of racist or liberals.

are able to stand against the police’. Also, fans were described as the most nationalistic segment of the population.

The words ‘Russian’ (Russians) and ‘Caucasians’ were used in a much more charged context and often were employed in the same commentaries. Usually ‘Russian boys’ were juxtaposed in the same sentence with ‘chernomazyе ubiicy’ (black murderers), ‘Caucasian bandits’ and references to other ethnicities. Moreover, the commentators who referred to ethnicities were more likely to be more racist in their commentaries, confirming the study of Meeus (Meeus et al 2010) that the self-identification on the basis of ethnicity correlates with the increased likelihood of discrimination of the out-group. Moreover, this kind of usage resonates with the discourse of *ethnic criminality* identified by Hutchings (Hutchings 2011) and *culture conflict* with references to ‘Caucasians’ dancing lezghinka, a traditional Caucasian dance, at the Red Square.

The word ‘people’ was either employed in the context of a juxtaposition with ‘authorities’, alluding to a possible *conspiracy of the power*: ‘Vova [i. e. Putin] just wants to come back as a pacifier of the nationalists like he did with Chechnya in 1999...’ Another context identified people as ‘wakening nation’ that protested against the injustice or people as ‘hoi-polloi’ depending on the attitude of the commentator with the former approving the riots and latter disapproving thereof. However, already later the same day the key words represented a different picture to the same photo report.

Word cloud 3 Statistical analysis of comments posted to the entry by Drugoi
<http://drugoi.livejournal.com/3438476.html>



Most popular terms included here 'churki' (a derogatory term for people with darker skin and hair, wogs), 'protiv' (against), 'Rossii' (Russia), 'russkie' or 'russkih' (Russians), 'sebya' (self), 'ubiicy' (murderers), 'svoikh' (ours), 'mentov' (policemen); terms like 'kavkazcy' (Caucasians), 'bydlo' (a derogatory analogue of hoi polloi), 'fanaty' (fans) shifted to the background, but still remained statistically significant.

Here the public opinion already shifted to more derogatory terms: 'wogs' is never used by mass media, while 'Caucasians' are often employed on the official level and in the print media. Expectedly, the discussion did not revolve around the topic of football fans anymore, but concentrated on the problem of 'nationalism' and 'fascism' (also frequently used terms). A typical commentary where the term 'wogs' was used was 'after the riots those wogs will calm down for a couple of days, but then they will start dancing lezhinka on the streets again' – a typical example of the *culture conflict* discourse.


Fascism was also used mostly by the commentators who were appalled that a country that defeated fascism³ had a demonstration, where people used its paraphernalia, but there were also a limited number of commentators who 'did not see anything wrong with fascism' if it could protect Russia from 'uncontrolled Caucasian crime'.

The word 'against' was used in rather similar contexts: the commentators were against the policemen ('menty') who are not doing their duty; against the authorities who endorse Caucasians; against 'Caucasians' who behave like they are at home and violating the law. Thus, the conflation of the *culture conflict* and *ethnic criminality* discourses is clearly visible. 'Hoi-polloi' was used primarily by commentators who condemned the riots, referring to the mob in such a way and the fact that this word is so statistically significant gives an understanding of how many people were actually disapproving of the riots.

³ The word 'fascism' in Russia is used in reference to German National Socialism due to the fact that during the Soviet times, and especially during the war, the state propaganda was weary to use the word 'socialism' in relation to Hitler's regime to avoid confusion. Hence, the term 'fascism' is not used in Russian language to describe Mussolini's dictatorship

The opinion changed once more in the same blog to the entry that contained the collection of photo reports from Manezhnaia:

Word cloud 4 Statistical analysis of comments posted to the entry by Drugoi
<http://drugoi.livejournal.com/3438712.html>



This time the centrepiece was occupied by ‘Russkih’, ‘russkie’, ‘russki’ (Russians), России (Russia), 'kavkazcy' (Caucasians), ‘natsionalism’ (nationalism), ‘strane’ (country), ‘omon’ (abbreviation for a ‘special mobile police squad’), ‘vlast’ (power, authorities)

The most frequently used terms were often used in the same contexts and sentences. For instance, a lot of comments alluded to the discrimination of Russians vis-à-vis ‘Caucasians’ who are ‘allowed to carry weapons’ and ‘get enrolled at universities at the expense of Russians’, while Russians ‘don’t have any rights in the Caucasus’ and ‘had been driven away’. Another recurrent pairing was with ‘Caucasians’/Russians and authorities: ‘Russians should be able to have a normal life in the Caucasus’, but the ‘authorities justify all violence directed against Russians’; ‘authorities are to blame...we and Caucasians are just cannon meat for the authorities’. Thus, the streak of *conspiracy of power* is combined here with *ethnic criminality* discourse that in other parts degenerated in outright racism, like plain bigoted remarks ‘Caucasians are Muslim – that means it is aggression squared’; ‘Caucasians know how to behave here... they just challenge us because they want to behave like at home’.

Apart from racist and negative comments there were also opinions like ‘it is insane to think that Caucasians kill Russians and only Russians... it is like accusing red-heads of all crimes’; or sarcastic comments like ‘of course the ‘Caucasians’ are guilty that there is no rule of the law’ – that also shows that reference to the established vernacular and differentiation can be negative. As for the official *friendship of the peoples* discourse it only came out in a limited number of remarks, where ‘Caucasians’ ended up being the scapegoats anyway: ‘It was the Caucasians who provoked the violence, they were just wearing masks’.

The same theme that the authorities were on ‘Caucasian’ side was also visible in the contexts related to police: ‘[we] were trying to send the wogs back to their villages but the police interfered’ ‘I have never seen police members beaten up! respect!’; ‘too bad the police did not let (us) hunt’; ‘if police is against the Russian guys, they are for Caucasian criminal and murderers’; ‘the police should better fight the ethnic criminality than be at war with citizens’. Even though there was a range of laudatory comments for police members who tried to protect the boys from being lynched by the crowd, the majority of the commentators accused the police of being on the same side with ‘Caucasians’ and endorsing the ethnic criminality. Thus, when it came to the police forces they were almost unanimously identified as one of the ‘protectors’ of ethnic criminality. Consequently, this *ethnic criminality* discourse seems to be very closely linked to the discussion of the rule of law in Russia: according to most commentators, the police do not fulfil its primary responsibility, catering instead to the criminal interests. This attitude is often justified, as in the case of Sviridov’s murder the police let go of possible accomplices of Cherkesov ‘after diaspora’s pressure’. Moreover, in the earlier case of Spartak fan murder, Volkov’s killer was let go until Spartak community expressed its indignation (Kommersant 2011). Actions like this and many other examples of corruption in police forces (Mendelson and Gerber 2008) certainly fall in a pattern of behaviour and justify the lack of trust most Russian citizens have in the police.

Another key word – nationalism – was surprisingly employed not in relation to the protesters on Manezhnaia, but to ‘Caucasians’: ‘ethnic Russians don’t have nationalism, it is Caucasians who are ready to kill you if you are from a different village’; ‘it was an

anti-Nazi demonstration against Caucasian fascists'; 'people went out to protest against Caucasian nationalism and fascism'. Moreover, the riots were described as 'healthy nationalism' and 'people who call those on Manezhnaia nationalists or fascists are hypocrites'. Moreover, the violence on Manezhnaia was described as 'an act of patriotism' (!) – a conflation of terms that will be also visible in D. Rogozin's vernacular (see part *Reaction of authorities*).

It is necessary to make a side note on the general context surrounding the word 'fascism' in Russia. Apart from the fringe nationalist commentators who consider themselves racially pure, the discourse related to the Great Patriotic War - Russian designation of World War II – has several particularities. Firstly, the memory of the War is still very much present in modern Russia through a range of monuments in practically every city with the motto 'Nikto ne zabyt, nichto ne zabyto' (Nobody is forgotten, nothing is forgotten) (Bellamy 2008, 15; Forest and Johnson 2002) and especially the revival of military parades for commemoration of the victory contributes continuous association of the Great Patriotic War as a part of the national identity (Pääbo 2011). Secondly, World War II narratives in Russia have always had a particular sense of urgency linked to the threat of physical annihilation by the Nazi troops that has been averted by the heroism of the people (Fedorov 2007; Putin 2006) Thus, the usage of this context is in most cases related to existential threat to all inhabitants of Russia (Soviet Union). However, when the word 'fascism' is used in the context with 'Caucasian', it has a slightly different reference that was also noticeable in other blogs. In this way people from North Caucasus are portrayed as being on a quest similar to Hitler's, i. e. presenting a danger of physical annihilation for *ethnic* Russians.

Obviously, there were also negative remarks on nationalism. Comments like 'Russian ethno-nationalism has become very popular' or 'your nationalism stinks' were also present; some also acknowledged that 'problem is in corruption and not in ethnicity'. Surprisingly, both racist and unprejudiced commentators seemed to share the distrust in authorities and especially in the police forces. No matter if the police were taking the 'Caucasian' side or not, the police was generally viewed as vile and corrupt and the fact

that some of the policemen protected the boys from lynching was rather met with surprise than anything else.

Russia's moderate nationalist Alexey Navalny, aka navalny, also posted photographs relating to the riots in two separate entries on 11 and 12 December. His journal was also under a cyber attack that resulted in several hundreds of identical comments insulting the owner of the blog.

Word Cloud 5 Statistical analysis of comments posted to the entry by Navalny
<http://navalny.livejournal.com/535267.html>



The most frequent terms count 'strashno' (frightening), 'fanaty' (fans) russkih, (Russians), 'problemny' (problems), 'lyudi', 'lyudei' (people).


The word 'frightening' was used in opposite contexts: seemingly liberal commentators emphasized that the situation with the violent xenophobia was scary, whereas racist commentators insisted that it was scary to walk around Moscow and 'be shot by some Caucasians', but the people who were critical of racism were immediately called 'tolerasty' (a derogatory conflation of 'pederast' and 'tolerant'). Moreover, those people who tried to disapprove of the Manezhnaia actions were immediately asked what was their ethnicity and were insulted.

Nonsensical terms like ‘Caucasian ethno-fascism’ or ‘Caucasian nationalism’ were also quite common and represent variations on *cultures conflict* discourse: they refer to discriminatory attitudes of ‘Caucasians’ towards ethnic Russians. However, this discourse bears a more urgent overtone than regular criminal references as in these cases the supposed aim of ‘Caucasians’ is either physical extermination or severe discrimination of ethnic Russians. There were a range of comments that did not employ this terminology but had the same message like ‘wait until you have a mullah calling for prayers from St. Basil’s Cathedral’ – a threat of cultural extermination is implicit.

‘People’ was used mostly in a neutral form to describe the protesters on Manezhnaia (they are regular people who are tired of abuse of power’) or that ‘all Russians are people’ without ethnic divisions – thus, it was an indication of *friendship of the peoples* discourse.

The second entry featured a video of Russia’s Interior Minister making a statement about Manezhnaia riots, that is why the key terms were slightly different from the ones used in drugoi’s and zyalt’s blogs.

Word Cloud 6 Statistical analysis of comments posted to the entry by Navalny
<http://navalny.livejournal.com/535320.html>



The key terms in this word clouds are ‘MVD’ (Abbreviation of Russian Internal Ministry), ‘Nurgaliev’, ‘Nurgaliva’ (the surname of Russia’s Interior Minister), ‘Rossii’ (Russia), ‘vlast’, ‘vlasti’ (authorities), ‘russkix’ (Russians), ‘strane’ (country), ‘chelovek’ (person), ‘lyudei’ (people).

The discussion around this entry was slightly different from the previous entries in other blogs and concentrated on criticisms of the Ministry of Interior (MVD) and his head (R. Nurgaliev). However, most commentators were very pessimistic talking about ‘authorities’ bringing ‘Russia’ to the end of it. Moreover, the commentators were less likely to discuss the ‘Caucasian’ problem (the word remained much less statistically significant in comparison to previous entries), but were more concerned with the ordinary ‘people’ subjected to violence and disregard of the law by the police forces – a theme recurrent in visual representations of the riots (see *Non-speech securitization* part). In general, the comments to this entry were a sliver of light among the others as the proportion of racially biased commentators was either much lower or the outrage committed by the police forces had overshadowed the ever-present ‘Caucasian threat’.

It is logical that the commentators in all blogs did not accept the official version, because they have access to other than state-owned sources of information. It is also possible that other segments of Russian population accepted the official version that blamed left-radical youth for the riots. However, those who have access to the Internet represent a significant fraction of the population (Zassoursky 2009) and, most importantly, the economically active population that would be the backbone of the electorate in a democratic regime (von Eggert 2011).

All in all, the reaction in blogs demonstrates that at least a fraction of the population, already imbued with anti-migratory discourses established in the mainstream mass media, re-articulates it in a manner stripped of all societal niceties. Derogatory terms based on existing pseudo politically correct mass media terms are abound, all possible prejudices about Muslims, people with darker skin or with origins from the North Caucasus are exploited to their core. Moreover, the commentators did not ‘buy’ the

official ‘friendship of the peoples’ interpretation of the events on Manezhnaia that included the ‘harmonious multi-ethnic society’ disrupted by a marginal nationalist grouping, indicating a growing distrust of government, with a fraction of the population going as far as accusing the government of arranging the disturbances (*conspiracy of power* discourse) and a significant part of the population actually supporting the actions of the mob. Not surprisingly, the racist commentators were taking the otherness of people from the North Caucasus to the extreme, not only invoking cultural difference, but actually, picturing ‘Caucasians’ as nationalists and fascists implying in such a way the context of existential threat posed to the Soviet Union by the Nazi troops. These commentators represent the evolution of securitization process in its complete form: if less racist commentators complained about alien traditions and criminality, the former ones invoked existential threat.

Non-speech securitization in the blogs

Even though the discussion of the riots was mostly carried out in a verbal way, there were several significant visual representation of the riots which could be observed in the second most popular blog by a Russian designer Artemy Lebedev (aka tema). He proposed his readers to create caricatures based on Manezhnaia events, playing with football insignia, police attributes and nationalistic paraphernalia. The resulting ‘photozhaby’ (caricatures) reflected the wide mistrust and derogatory attitudes to the police forces and the general perception that the riots were racially motivated.

Especially popular caricatures included the chief police officer of Moscow wearing the same mask as the rioters and saying that ‘Moscow is a Russian city’ (see Annex II); combination of Brullov’s painting ‘The last day of Pompeii’ and rioters lighting the fires; Spartak’s club colours red and white combined with a swastika; a caricature where Manezhnaia square was replaced by a football field; a combination of the Kurban-Bairam celebration in Moscow and a photograph of trampled young people with a title ‘looks similar’, illustrating Hansen’s posit that the binary opposition is represented in a humiliated way, but also with an undertone of ‘foreignness’ of people who were lynched on Manezhnaia.

There were dozens of other caricatures, but it seemed that the commentators mostly enjoyed making fun of police forces and football teams; the latter can be explained with an unremitting feud between the fans of different football clubs. As the Sviridov was a member of Spartak fan community, rival fan communities went out of their way to make fun of Spartak insignia, red and white colours, puns on Spartak's nickname 'myaso' (meat) and other symbols. But apart from the understandable football scorn, the general trend reflected Russians' distrust and derogatory attitudes towards the police forces. The mocking over the police forces also shows that they as well were cast as Other during the course of the events.

Even though the commentators were given a 'task' to create caricatures related to football, nationalism and police forces, the caricatures showed the palette of attitudes towards migrants. Apart from the condemnation by several commentators, there was a range of humiliating and racist pictures that not only played on 'common-sense differences', but also reflected the general racist attitudes of the police (see Annex II) and football fans. An important theme also concerned the danger of racism, illustrated by the 'Last Day of Pompeii' as the last day of Moscow or the fact that the active demonstrators are very unlikely to take up the jobs carried out by the migrants – such as construction. These two visuals actually presented a different type of securitization. The first one articulated the threat of the end of Russian statehood through racism, while the second one acted more as a de-securitization instance, presenting migrants as essential for Moscow workforce that will hardly be replaced by the masked racists from Manezhnaia square.

Reaction of authorities

Russian authorities initially refrained from any public comment concerning the riots, apart from a confused statement by the Minister of Interior who promised to punish those who break the law. Predictably, major TV channels did not offer substantial coverage of the riots. However, due to the sheer number of rioters involved, as well as the coverage delivered by the oppositional press and blogging community, the TV channels and then the authorities were forced to react to the events. As Hutchings and Tolz note (2011) the riots were initially hushed up and presented as a minor outbreak of

violence provoked by a radical minority and the official line, preserved initially in mass media, was aimed at downplaying the magnitude of Manezhnaia riots.

President D. Medvedev addressed governmental officials publicly about the events on Manezhnaia on 13 December 2010, calling to qualify the ‘events, pogroms, and attacks on people’ as crimes and people involved in these disturbances to be punished:

[...] Especially harmful are actions aimed at inciting hatred and feud on the grounds of race, nationality [i. e. ethnicity] and religion. These actions endanger the stability of the state. During the counteraction to these actions, the police can and should apply all possibilities and means provided by the law. I emphasize: all lawful, necessary and adequate means. Mess on the streets and in public places should not take place. Take care of that. Unlike the situation that we had in our country 10-15 years ago, we managed to make life normal, but it is not a reason to relax. Firstly, because there will be always people who don’t like this kind of life, who try to achieve their political or just puny and lucrative goals, by shaking the societal stability. It is necessary to fight them and fight them severely. [...] It is extremely important, even in a situation when a country does not have evident threats as it was sometime ago, but you know all our problems. They are extremism, terrorism in the Caucasus, corruption, activities of criminal organizations of different creeds. All of these areas of work should be addressed. (Medvedev, 2010, author’s translation)

As is visible from the text of the speech, there was only one reference to the fact that the riots included an ‘inter-ethnic strife’ component that was provoked by ‘people who don’t like our kind of life’ – one of the first indications to the *friendship of the peoples* discourse that blamed provocateurs in the violence. This is virtually the only public statement made by Medvedev regarding the Manezhnaia riots and he only mentioned the Caucasus in relation to terrorism - a use of well-established collocation that only upholds the stereotypical association of Caucasus with danger.

At the session of the State's Council on measures to enhance 'mezhnatsionalnoe soglasie' (interethnic agreement) on 11 February 2011, Medvedev warned of 'dramatizing the problems with inter-ethnic relations' (Stenogram of State's Council Session 2011). One of the problems he highlighted was that Russian culture is 'unknown inside Russia', and illustrated this comment by pointing out that the Bolshoi Theatre never visits the Caucasian republics. This reference to Caucasian republics and culture in particular indicate that the President actually employs the *culture conflict* discourse and indicates the inhabitants of North Caucasus as bearers of different culture, even though on the first sight the speech is seasoned in *friendship of the peoples* discourse.

The riots on Manezhnaia were mentioned by other participants at the session who were afraid of Manezhnaia scenarios in their regions and classified the riots as 'involuntary outburst of *ethno*-national conflicts and socio-cultural deformation that had been accumulated over the past two decades' (Stenogram of State's Council Session 2011, my emphasis). Even though this phrase seems harmless it alludes to both *ethnic criminality* and *culture conflict* discourses. The only participants of the session that referred to actual problems were two representatives of North Caucasian republics M. Magomedov and A. Kanokov, who rightly pointed out that North Caucasus was treated by the mass media as a foreign enclave and that people from the Caucasus are often represented as criminals. These two justified remarks remained unnoticed, even though it was President Medvedev who was supposed to bring these problems up.

Minister of Interior R. Nurgaliev issued a statement about Sviridov's murder and Manezhnaia riots on the same day, saying that Sviridov was killed 'as a result of hooliganism', while his killer and 'members of his gang' were arrested. Nurgaliev condemned an 'unsanctioned gathering' that was 'joined by radical youth', who 'provoked and incited to mass disturbances' that led to wounded among the policemen. A week later the 'inciters' of the violence in Manezhnaia were arrested – among them 14 and 15-year-old boys (Sokovnin 2011) who were accused of racially motivated murder committed the next day. In general, Nurgaliev remained set in his opinion that the riots were provoked by 'left radicals' thus supporting the original *friendship of the peoples* discourse.

If President Medvedev tried to be more or less neutral in the Manezhnaia antagonism, Prime-Minister Putin adopted a considerably more biased approach. One of his first actions was to meet with the heads of the football fan communities on 21st December 2010, where he emphasized the ‘lack of diaspora’s oversight’ and the possible ‘tightening of migration regulation’, because of the ‘weakened immunity against xenophobia’. In an attempt to explain the violence on Manezhnaia, Putin compared the ‘punishment for disrespect’ in Central Russia and in the Caucasus and that he ‘would not give even ten kopeks for the health of a person’ who would go to the Caucasus and start disrespecting the Koran. For the disturbances he also blamed ‘destructive elements’ who were acting in ‘lucrative, political interests’, in order ‘to shake the country’ – almost the exact same phrasing as President Medvedev used in his speech. After the meeting Putin went to the cemetery to place flowers on Sviridov’s grave.

While analysing Vesti’s report about the meeting it becomes clear that despite the politically correct shots of heads of fan organizations from all over Russia and overall message that Sviridov’s murder was a tragedy for all fan communities, including the ones from the North Caucasus, the meeting conveyed not only *friendship of the peoples* messages. For example, what does a diaspora oversight have to do with law enforcement agencies letting a previously convicted man carry a weapon? However, by mere mentioning the word ‘diaspora’ Putin already used the *ethnic criminality* subtext. If the reason for the meeting was the murder of a young man, why was not a similar meeting convened several months before when another young Spartak fan was killed and his offenders were let go (Egorov 2011)? Clearly, it was the riots that spurred Putin’s appreciation of a person’s life and by shifting the blame for Sviridov’s death on diasporas he was also absolving the corrupt policemen who let those initially arrested go free. Later, other participants of the fight that led to Sviridov’s death were arrested and found guilty as Cherkesov’s accomplices, while Cherkesov was sentenced to an almost maximum jail time disregarding his claims that he was acting in self-defence (Kommersant 2011).

Moreover, by evoking the parallels of Russians behaving badly in the Caucasus and getting punished for this, Putin practically justified the riots at Manezhnaia: according to his logic by misbehaving the ‘Caucasians’ brought the violence on themselves; and by talking about respecting the host traditions he borrowed from the *culture conflict* discourse vernacular. In addition, the repeated promises of tightening migration regulation speak for themselves: not letting migrants from other regions to Central Russia and especially Moscow, seemed the measure the Manezhnaia mob implied. Hutchings (2011) also notes that one of the most important reactions of the authorities was V. Putin’s commemoration of Yegor Sviridov’s grave and his meeting with the fan communities so even though both Putin and Medvedev were talking about the friendship of the peoples Putin clearly sent a message that his allegiance lay with the protesters from Manezhnaia and not the victims of the mob violence who were never even mentioned. This is a very important signal sent from the authorities indicating that the mob’s actions were taken seriously.

Throughout the year 2011 Putin took steps to secure his base within the nationalistic milieu. In his annual live TV conversation with Russians ‘Conversation with Putin. Continuation’ on 15 December 2011 he also answered some of the questions relating to migration. In one of the answers he maintains that there is no such nationality as ‘Caucasian’ but in the next answer he uses this designation. In a direct answer to a question about ‘playing the nationalistic card with the football fans’ Putin said the following:

[...] As for everything connected with it [Russian nationalism and Manezhnaia riots], you will see that that the kind of chauvinism or Russian nationalism is out of question. Among those who called for the killings, there are no Russian names, and those who committed murder or have been involved in the murder too, there is not a single Russian name. What does the great-power chauvinism have to do with it? Look at the names of convicts. Not a single Russian name is there. So let us not provoke a Russian man, because if you do provoke him, he won’t calm down again (Putin 2011, author’s translation)

Thus, according to Putin, it was not ethnic Russians who were at fault during the disturbances, Putin practically blamed other ethnicities in inciting pogroms on Manezhnaia, emphasizing twice that there were no Russian names among the convicts. Consequently, he shifted the responsibility for the disturbances on some unnamed not ethnically Russian people, resonating with Manezhnaia mob's articulations, who were blaming people from the North Caucasus for criminality. Moreover, the fact that Putin differentiated between ethnic Russians and the rest of the population shows that he does not conform with the *friendship of the peoples* discourse that was employed initially and has used the *ethnic criminality* narrative.

Even though in the immediate aftermath of the riots the government tried to stay in line with the *friendship of the peoples* discourse, later events showed that Mr. Putin who is seeking to be re-elected as Russia's President has acknowledged the potential of the nationalist segments of the population and their capacities to stage 'offline protests' and tried to integrate the demands of the nationalist electorate into his campaign (Gaufman 2012; Matthews and Nemtsova 2011). It is especially noticeable in comparison to the demands to re-count the votes in parliamentary elections by liberal opposition that was accused of working for the Department of State (BBC Russian Service 2011).

Moreover, later activity initiated by the government goes in line with the protesters' slogans. With Putin identifying the 'national question' (in this case ethnicity) as one of his main presidential campaign focal point and proposing tightening migration regulation and increased punishment for its violation indicates that the threat comes from the migrants and not from the mob chanting 'Russia for Russians'. Vladimir Putin's article on nationalism in Russia (Putin 2012) seems to capture these attitudes by proposing to tighten migration regulation by banning illegal migrants from entering Russia for 10 years. More disturbingly, he speaks about criminal punishment for the violation of domicile registration in the paragraph discussing internal migration. Russian Penal Code does provide for criminal punishment for illegal migration and organization thereof, but it only refers to international migrants (Gaufman 2012) and at the time of article publishing it was unthinkable that violation of registration can be cast as criminal offences for Russian citizens as well.

However, shortly afterwards the head of the Federal Migration Service K. Romodanovsky also proposed to issue wanted notices for Russian citizens who are absent from their registered domicile for more than three months and strip them of their registration (RIA-Novosti 2012) – a flagrant anti-constitutional initiative that was proposed after a meeting with V. Putin (Smolyakova 2012). This measure, if introduced, will effectively keep most Russian citizens locked up in the regions they were born, not letting ‘Caucasians’ settle in Central Russia – exactly what the mob on Manezhnaia demanded. Even though Romodanovsky did not refer to specific Russian regions and spent most of his speech discussing punishments for international offenders of migration law, the proposed measure speaks for itself.

One of Putin’s steps was to recall Dmitry Rogozin, a former head of the party ‘Motherland’ that was suspended from the 2005 Moscow city elections for instigating ‘inter-ethnic strife’ (Rossiyskaia Gazeta 2005). M. Rogozin had been Russia’s representative to NATO, and was recalled to Russia and appointed vice prime-minister. The Congress of Russian Communities, the organization that Mr. Rogozin heads and that was denied registration up until 2011, joined the All-Russia People’s Front, Putin’s new United Russia ersatz. D. Rogozin also came up with an article condemning the neglect for ethnic Russians and replacing the word ‘nationalistic’ with ‘patriotic’:

[...] Putin brought the Russian question [i. e. the question of ethnic Russians lacking rights in Russia] to the fore. From now on, to talk about Russian rights and the problems will not be considered as something seditious and inappropriate. Even the mere appearance of Putin's article is a confirmation of fledging government cooperation with a number of patriotic organizations, primarily the "Rodina [Motherland] - the Congress of Russian Communities." Now, Putin can count on the fact that his actions on the national [in this case ethnicity] question, he has broad political and organizational support of a reputable and the oldest organization in today's Russia national-patriotic movement. And his article is the proof of our argument that the Russian patriotic movements should boldly integrate power and learn how to manage

such a complex organism as the Russian state [...]. (Rogozin 2012, author's translation)

Rogozin largely reformulated Putin's article on national question in Russia for it to sound more appealing to nationalistic circles. Apart from the paragraph on criminal punishment for violating the registration, Putin's article had more or less *friendship of the peoples* with overtones of *culture conflict*. Rogozin, on the other hand made it sound as a manifest for the resurgence of ethnic Russians and their position in the state. Reminding of his party that was notorious for racist representation of people from the North Caucasus in election videos, he deliberately called to mind the 'enemy' ethnic Russians have to deal with. Moreover, Rogozin's calls to give ethnic Russians a privileged position echoes Manezhnaia demands directly – the obscene hierarchy established by the mob in their offensive slogans. Moreover, the conflation of the terms 'nationalistic' and 'patriotic' already implies a binary opposition: the ones who do not support ethnic Russians are not patriots of the country.

If at first sight it seemed that Russian authorities tried to propagate the friendship of the peoples discourse, a closer look at the statements and TV programs shows that in personal statements by V. Putin the *friendship of the peoples* discourse lost its importance. On the contrary, his public statements and actions echoed *ethnic criminality* and *culture conflict* discourses, blaming not ethnically Russian citizens for riots and promising outrageous measures to deal with migrants. Even President Medvedev who has always represented a more moderate line in governmental politics came up with statements that definitively had elements of *culture conflict* discourse and singling out North Caucasus as the problematic region. Needless to say that none of the government officials visited the victims of Manezhnaia violence in the hospital; it looked particularly grotesque next to meretricious meetings with football club fan communities, supposedly the real victims in the events. Demonstrative reconciliation with Rogozin was also a sign for a more nationalistic stance of the government and the fact that Federal Migration Service proposed measure fitting for the new course is a definitive indication that the securitization process was successful and complete: the government accepted Manezhnaia mob's articulation of 'Caucasian threat' and proposed extraordinary

measures to deal with it. Even more disturbing is the fact that the government, assuming its role as a securitizing actor again has started a new phase in securitization process that is very dangerous to any referent objects mentioned: individuals, regardless of their looks, societies and Russia as a state.

5. Conclusion

Migration has been cast as one of the major contemporary challenges to security (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998) and spurred the creation of whole systems of border protection and supervision (Neal 2009). While in Western Europe the defensive attitude is not commonly justified on the basis of race, the underlying concerns for migratory influxes are inadvertently related to migrants' differences from the host society, which pose a threat (Ibrahim 2005; Bourbeau 2011). In Russia, these concerns have been voiced more vocally and contain more explicit racist overtones, even in regard to its own citizens. The title of my thesis – here goes the neighbourhood – has a Russian verbose counterpart ('Ponaekhali tut') that means 'too many people have come here' – an accurate reflection of popular sentiments regarding migration. It sends a message that the people who have come are different, that their presence is undesired and that they might be a threat.

'Different' is an instinct for danger that had been developed over millennia of human history in order to distinguish between 'us' and 'them' (Ibrahim 2005). When Hansen (2011) and Guzzini (2011) talk about the binary understanding of self-other, they draw on the same supposition that is a central concept for this essay: securitization is often construed as an extreme 'othering' process (Diez 2004, Ibrahim 2005). The fact that migrants are linked to insecurity, according to Huysmans (2000), is just a strategy aimed at discriminating particular categories of people. Essentially, the threat posed by migrants consists in their 'otherness'.

What most migration scholars fail to note is the fact that discriminatory attitudes towards migrants are not restricted to people without the citizenship of the receiving country, the process of othering can take place on many other levels. In my thesis I showed that when it comes to representing a phenomenon as a threat it is often about making the threat an 'other' and while many migration scholars try to draw a line between a citizen and a migrant, the Russian case proves that having a citizenship is not

a bulwark against ostracism. Internal migrants have been cast as so dangerous that Russian authorities even plan to restrict the free movement of citizens inside the country, a measure reminiscent of a segregating regime.

I employed the securitization framework to illustrate the processes at work in Russian society. Contrary to the original understanding of securitization as a speech act I showed how securitization functions as a discourse in a continuous manner. Moreover, I expanded the study of the role of the audience in the securitization framework and explored the audience's acceptance of securitization moves, shifting the spotlight to the long-neglected empirical proof of securitization success that can be shown through the audience's acceptance. During my research I developed an indicator for securitization success that consisted in re-articulation of securitization discourse uttered by the securitizing actor.

In order to apply the securitization framework I used the example of racist riots on Manezhnaia Square in December 2010 and its repercussions. Not only did they represent a milestone in Russia's ethnic relations, they also proved that unrest and violence next to the Kremlin could force the government to act differently. I identified three phases of securitization that showed that designations like 'securitizing actor' and 'audience' are not permanent. If before the riots a more conventional securitizing phase took place and consisted in governmental officials employing the securitizing discourse towards migrants; Manezhnaia riots showed, however, that the audience accepted the securitizing move all too well and became the securitizing actor itself: a milder and less obscene version of the slogans used by the mob on December 11th 2010 were swiftly picked up by the political establishment and integrated into Putin's presidential campaign. The analysis of the riots and its aftermath proved that securitization is a double-edged sword that can work both ways: yesterday's audience quickly became the securitizing actor and vice-versa. Even though mainstream scholars do not accept the shifting of the audience's and securitization actor's roles (Hansen 2011, Balzacq 2011), I argued that the rigidity in understanding the grammar plot of security disregards the whole post-structuralist essence of securitization.

Equating the Russian population with Internet users and even more narrowly LiveJournal readers may appear as a conceptual stretch, but most experts concur that the audience of LiveJournal posts is much larger than the number of subscriptions and includes both second-hand viewing and interconnection with other major social networks (von Eggert 2011). Moreover, due to the anonymity of most of the commentators, it allows for a more honest exhibition of attitudes to the problem (Putnam 2000). Even though the comments can become really ugly and racist, the results of their analysis will correspond more to the actual sentiments of the people stripped of social convention and the pressure of the investigator's presence.

In order to analyse the comments I based my findings on on-going research by Hutchings and Tolz (2011) on identity construction in the Russian mass media. They identified four dominant discourses – ethnic criminality, culture conflict, friendship of peoples and conspiracy of power – that I complemented with an earlier but nonetheless significant terrorism discourse. Even though at first sight, it would seem that state-owned media would strive to promulgate friendship of peoples discourse, presenting Russia as a harmonious multi-ethnic society, the Manezhnaia riots challenge this stereotype. Moreover, even if the government, media and Manezhnaia mob have found their unanimous threat, the referent object of this threat is different and ranges from an ethnic Russian individual to Russia as a state. This fundamental difference in understanding what or who should be protected is crucial in recognizing the reason for competition between discourses.

The riots demonstrated that the offensive slogans that were employed by the rioters in December are merely more offensive versions of already existing semi-official narratives, borrowing from culture conflict and ethnic criminality discourses. Most slogans were related to culture conflict with the mob trying in degrading manner, to establish a hierarchy between ethnic Russians and 'Caucasians' by feminizing the opponent. The enunciators were hurling abusive slogans in order for the targeted group to be turned submissive through the proclaimed sexual action (Kon 2011, Zhel'vis 1997). The fact that an overwhelming number of people employed Nazi insignia showed that the participants of the riots consider ethnic Russians a superior race vis-à-vis people from

the North Caucasus and that the latter are supposed to be exterminated. This insinuation was confirmed in several slogans that used death threats.

The Manezhnaia riots also provided a litmus test to check how ingrained the official discourses have become with the population. With leading bloggers drawing attention to the event, it was possible to monitor the initial reaction of the people that was based on their previous exposure to the above-mentioned discourses. I conducted a quantitative analysis of the comments in order to identify the key, most frequently used, words and then analysed the context they were used in. The results of the analysis are quite unsettling. Even though the reification of internal migrants from the North Caucasus as dangerous stems in part from the fact that most terrorist attacks were carried out by the natives of this region (Verkhovsky 2009), the current discourses at work like ethnic criminality and culture conflict are purely racist and are often encouraged by the mass media and by the corruption of Russian police forces.

According to my findings, a significant fraction of the commentators employed derogatory terms to describe people from the North Caucasus. They mostly used the same category of difference as the Russian mass media – phenotype. However, when mass media at least try to use pseudo politically correct terms like ‘non-Slavic looking people’, the commentators went on to use offensive terms that also played on differences in appearance. Even though each blog has different crowds of subscribers, it is obvious that the key words and even contexts were astonishingly alike: words like ‘Caucasians’ with negative connotations surfaced in every analysis. As a counterpart to ‘Caucasians’ the word ‘Russians’ in an ethnic sense was used and in most comments the two ‘ethnicities’ were juxtaposed. This usage indicates that the memory of the ‘fifth box’ is still very vivid in the minds of Russians and, more importantly, ethnicity remains associated with a specific territory, resulting in disparaging attitudes towards people that are ‘not from here’.

Internal migrants were largely identified with the criminality and alien traditions that not only conforms to Hansen’s binary opposition thesis of security but also shows that the best way to ‘other’ someone is to represent them as bearing a threat by means of

physical and cultural dangers. If one considers the othering process as embryonic securitization, a significant fraction of the commentators actually employed discourses that were matured securitization: the fact that some of the commentators even used terms such as ‘Caucasian fascism’ shows how deeply embedded the association is with security, drawing from cultural differences a threat of physical annihilation.

Less information was available on non-speech securitization, as rioters themselves resorted mostly to slogans and violence. One particular image prominently displayed a target board featuring ‘Are you next?’ that was in line with ethnic criminality discourse. As for the reaction in blogs, most commentators chose a verbalized opinion on the riots and if not for the caricature competition organized by Artemy Lebedev, there would not have been much visual material to analyse. Most caricatures reflected a disrespectful/mocking attitude towards the police forces and deprecating views of people from the North Caucasus or adhering to Islam, which is in line with Hansen’s (2011) suggestion that the securitizing image will depict the Other in such a manner. Interestingly enough, the police was also cast as an Other in the discussion around the riots reflecting the general mistrust of law-enforcement agencies. The analysis of visuals represents a promising avenue for research, as it is one of the few ways to publicly express displeasure with the authorities. They represent that added benefit of speedy dissemination throughout social networks.

The Manezhnaia riots exposed a range of problems in Russian politics: not only has the mass media under the government’s control propagated a discourse harmful to Russia’s multi-ethnic society, the authorities try to inveigle the nationalistic crowd by proposing to restrict migration even more. The examination of statements made by high-ranking Russian politicians shows that the only part of friendship of the peoples discourse left is the referent object – Russia as a whole, while the threat to it is represented by those ‘who behave like they are at home’ – a typical culture conflict avowal.

Moreover, in the quest to secure his presidency in 2012 V. Putin resorted to overtly nationalistic rhetoric, bringing closer politicians affiliated with nationalistic organizations that made the culture conflict discourse even more pronounced.

By accepting the rioters' Caucasian threat, the government is re-articulating slogans that sounded at Manezhnaia Square. Most disturbingly, during the presidential campaign V. Putin was condemning one of the opposition leaders 'who is, by the way, an ethnic Georgian' (BBC Russian Service 2012). Those kinds of statements create lesions in society that cannot be easily healed. By cajoling the nationalists Putin's government increases the likelihood of inter-ethnic conflicts and ultimately, Russia's demise as a multi-ethnic state.

Annex I

Photographs from Manezhnaia Square 11.12.2010



Annex II

Caricatures on Manezhnaia riots

Caricature 1 'Moscow is a Russian city'



Caricature 2 'The last day of Pompeii'



Caricature 3 'Moscow for Muscovites? No problem!'



Caricature 4 'something similar'



Что-то общее...

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