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## **Research Report**

# **Migration, Democracy and Security (midas)**

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Report on the ESRC-funded research project  
The Socio-Political Effects of Securitising Free Movement:  
the Case of 9/11

[RES-223-25-0055]

Birmingham: University of Birmingham  
Milton Keynes: Open University  
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## 1. Background

The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, and those that followed in London, Madrid and elsewhere, have had global policy ramifications. In their wake, security studies have focused more explicitly than in the past on the question of terrorism. The majority of analyses try to understand the nature of the terrorist threat, and ask how we can effectively reduce chances of a similar attack occurring in the future. Political and bureaucratic responses to 9/11 have often mirrored this approach to security questions. Yet these responses have also triggered concerns about the extent to which they give in to the logic of terrorism and undermine liberties in Western European society. On both sides of the argument, this is sometimes framed as “balancing” liberty and security. We disagree with this framing, as it relies on an opposition of the two concepts on one spectrum (Neal and Huysmans, 2006). Instead, we are interested in the ways in which security is brought into the debate about liberties, and how the latter is therefore “securitised”.

In particular, it seems that the freedom of movement, and especially migration, is increasingly considered a potential threat and that the concepts of migration, terrorism and security have been linked in the political debate. This project set out to investigate this link. Our starting point has been that there are other policy options that do not single out the migrant. On this basis, we asked how significant the securitisation of migration was in structuring counter-terrorism debates. How have these policies been legitimised? Who have been the driving political forces behind them? How has the democratic debate been shaped by particular representations of migrants in their relation to terrorism?

The concept of securitisation is at the core of our research. In the original formulation by Wæver (1995) and the so-called “Copenhagen School” of security studies (e.g. Buzan et al. 1998), securitisation is the successful discursive construction of an issue as an existential threat to a particular group, which justifies extraordinary measures taken by that group against the threat. In another variant, the so-called “Paris School” (Wæver; 2004, c.a.s.e. collective, 2006), the focus is less on the discursive construction as a set of speech acts (“securitising moves”) but as a set of largely bureaucratic and technocratic practices (e.g. Bigo, 2002). As we will argue below, however, the different ways of securitising are not only evident in different kinds of practices, but also in different kinds of rhetoric.

We are not the first ones to study the securitisation of migration. Indeed, this is one of the first and best-researched fields in which the concept has been applied (Wæver et al, 1993; Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 1997; Huysmans, 2000 and 2006a; Bigo, 2002; Bigo and Guild, 2005; Buonfino, 2004; Pilkington, 1998), and the two different forms of securitisation have both been demonstrated in relation to migration. Parallel to our project, two successive international research projects funded through the European Union’s Fifth and Sixth Framework Programme, have also done work in this area, largely related to concrete policies on the EU level: European Liberty and Security (ELISE) and its successor, Challenge ([www.libertysecurity.org](http://www.libertysecurity.org)). Our contribution to this debate comes largely from having worked between these two schools and from having studied two empirical cases, Germany and the UK, in a comparative fashion, which allowed us to clarify the differences and relationships between the different forms of securitisation (Diez and Huysmans, 2007).

## 2. Objectives

The project had the following aims and objectives:

(1) *To develop an analytical framework on the basis of a critical engagement with the concept of securitisation that will help to systematically integrate the paradoxical relationship of security and democratic liberties into security studies.*

We have done this by re-phrasing the relationship between security and liberty [see 4.4; Neal and Huysmans 2006, Huysmans 2007] and by drawing out the different ways in which securitisation occurs in the political debate [4.1; 4.3; 4.4; Diez and Huysmans 2007].

(2) *To analyse empirically how this paradox has played out in the area of free movement of people (with an emphasis on migration and asylum) in the wake of 9/11, and to what extent the practice of securitisation has (a) foreclosed alternative policy options and (b) privileged policies that have limited or enabled the exercise of civil liberties and democratic political rights.*

We have done this through a detailed analysis of parliamentary debates in Germany and the UK [4.3; Diez 2006; Huysmans and Buonfino 2006] and an analysis of the role of NGOs in the UK in particular [4.4; Noxolo 2006].

(3) *To systematically integrate the role of bureaucracies in the study of security and of securitisation processes in particular, with specific reference to the field of migration.*

We have done this in relation to the EU and the development of the European Border Agency, Frontex [4.3; Neal 2007]. We have also done some initial interviews with airport security officials. However, we encountered several difficulties that had the effect of downplaying this objective in our work. Firstly, we had difficulties to get access to bureaucrats, who would often view our project as “political” and refer us to the politicians. Secondly, the unexpected differences between the German and the British parliamentary debates [see 4.3], which we analysed first, meant that we had to spend far more time on analyzing these differences than initially expected. Thirdly, artificially cutting off the research of the political field just before the London bombings in July 2005 (the original timeframe was 2001-4) would have undermined much of the credibility of the research findings. Fourthly, this aspect of the work was to be done largely by the research fellow. However, because of the frequent changes in this position, there was not the necessary continuity to do a proper and systematic analysis of the field with a focus on bureaucratic actors, especially not given the other difficulties.

(4) *To further develop the concept of securitisation as an analytical tool and theoretical construct in particular with regards to (a) a specification of who is able to successfully securitise under which circumstances; (b) a clarification of the relationship between politicisation and securitisation; (c) a firmer sociological grounding.*

We have analysed the role of different actors in securitisation; and have clarified further the relationship between politicisation, securitisation and desecuritisation [4.1; 4.2; Diez and Huysmans 2007]. Given the unexpected finding of the difference between the British and German debates, we have not pursued our original objective of a firmer

sociological grounding (see comments on objective [3]), and instead focused on the teasing out of the relationship between the two securitisations [4.1; 4.2; 4.3; Diez and Huysmans 2007; Huysmans and Buonfino 2006]. The latter was important for two reasons. First, we argue that the two approaches to securitisation can come together at the level of the relationship between their respective logics of insecurities, despite serious theoretical differences in their conceptualisation of the drivers of securitisation. Secondly, developing the difference and relation between the two securitisations throws a controversial light on the importance of the debate on balancing security and liberty and the existential justification of exceptional politics. Especially in relation to free movement, the governance of unease is in some cases clearly the dominant process of securitisation, implying that the public focus on reconciling liberty and security is misplaced in these instances.

(5) *To develop a European perspective on the relationship between democracy and security responses after 9/11, with a specific focus on the securitisation of migration and asylum in Germany and the UK.*

We have spent considerable time in analyzing the securitisation of migration and asylum in Germany and the UK, with a focus on parliamentary debates [4.3; Huysmans and Buonfino 2006; Diez 2006] and the role of NGOs [4.4; Noxolo 2006]. To further our understanding of how the two securitisations play out at the level of the EU, we have added an EU dimension in the analysis of the development of the European border agency, Frontex [4.3; Neal 2007].

### 3. Methods

The main parliamentary discussions we analysed were selected in the following way: we analysed all relevant parliamentary debates that took place between 11 September 2001 and early June 2004. The dates were chosen so that they would give us a better understanding of the post-9/11 and the post Madrid bombings debates. In the first instance, the debates were searched through *Hansard* and the *Stenographische Berichte des Deutschen Bundestags* as well as the *Bundesrat* protocols via the *Dokumentations- und Informationssystem für Parlamentarische Vorgänge* (Documentation and Information System for Parliamentary Proceedings, dip.bundestag.de) and the body of data included every debate containing the word 'terrorism'. We also included some of the key debates in 2005 to check if there were any important changes, especially after the London bombings in July. The second stage of selection involved reading the debates and looking for references to the terms *immigration, migration, migrant, asylum-seeker, refugee, bogus* and *foreigner* in the UK case, and *\*migr\**, *Ausländer\** and *\*wander\** in the German case. The debates containing those references were then read for meaning, structure and connection with other themes. The purpose was to understand whether and how the debates constructed the link between counter terrorism and immigration and/or asylum and what they told us about the way politicians framed (in)security in the societal area. In addition, we conducted a limited number of interviews. In Germany, the immigration bill was debated in the conciliation committee between Bundestag and Bundesrat, which meets behind closed doors, for large parts of our period of analysis. The interviews helped us to better understand the political process leading under these circumstances.

NGOs were researched first by means of a broad sweep of the field, which was then narrowed down to a few key NGOs. First their public statements were analyzed similarly to the parliamentary debates. Several interviews were conducted to fill in gaps. Both

analyses looked at how political parties and NGOs positioned themselves in their respective fields of interaction. Of importance was also how NGOs are dependent on developments in the political field.

A limited case study on Frontex was conducted to develop an insight on how the two securitisations played out at the level of the EU, which is an important political arena for German and British policies on free movement. A body of key documents and debates leading to the establishment of the agency was analysed similarly to the parliamentary debates and discourses of NGOs. A few interviews were then conducted to gain some additional insights and double check initial findings.

## 4. Results

The research has produced the following results in relation to four areas of research:

### 4.1 Security studies: concepts of security

Our first contribution is the clarification of two logics of securitisation, associated with the “politics of exception” and the “politics of unease”, and related to the so-called “Copenhagen School” and “Paris School” of Security Studies respectively.

In the Copenhagen School, securitisation is a speech act. Security is a contested concept the meaning of which cannot be fixed in the abstract. Instead, borrowing from Austin, Wæver argued that issues are being turned into a security threat through speech acts. The interest of the analyst is in the discursive production of security. Securitisation here invokes “existential threats”, such as immigration, to a “referent object”, such as the state or nation, in order to legitimise specific policy measures, such as enforced “repatriation”, mostly as a matter of urgency. Securitisation in this sense has a constraining effect on the political debate in that it becomes difficult to make serious proposals of policies that do not exclude or are directed against the Other that constitutes the threat. Normatively preferable therefore is desecuritisation, opening up the political debate, and moving an issue away from the politics of the exception and back into the realm of “normal” political rules.

In the Paris School, insecurities are constructed by policing agencies seeking to manage a wide range of societal issues, including migration, asylum, hooliganism, external borders of the EU, urban violence, and terrorism. In contrast to the Copenhagen School, the securitising effects of security technology (such as visas, CCTV and databases), professional security knowledge and relations between security professionals take precedence over discourse and the performative effects of language (Bigo, 1996, 2000 and 2006; Bigo and Guild, 2005, Huysmans, 2002, 2004 and 2006a; Bonditti, 2004). Securitisation is the formation of patchworks or continua between different policy issues that facilitate the transfer of security knowledge, skills and technology between them and that allow the political exchange of fears and unease. The key element in this process is not the constitution of crisis situations and the introduction of emergency measures but rather the institutional and discursive intertwining of different policy areas by means of applying routines, institutionalised knowledge, and technologies to the regulation of these areas. De-securitisation is not a key concept within the Paris School. The conceptualisation of securitisation in the Paris School suggests, however, that a de-securitising move must be one of shifting the professional fields and knowledge that

structure and institute questions of migration, urban violence, terrorism, border controls, etc. away from networks of security professionals and security technologies. Ideally this move needs to be combined with a political empowering of the disempowered so that they can enter the political and professional fields.

To the extent that these different forms of securitisation have been debated so far, they have been treated as related to two different empirical realms (political debate/bureaucracy). Our analysis has shown, however, that the different logics of securitisation are also applied within the political debate itself, so that migration is securitised differently by different speakers and in different political contexts.

#### 4.2 Security studies: sociology of security

For reasons explained above, we have not been able to take the sociological objective of the research as far as we initially aimed to, especially not in terms of the bureaucratic and professional institutionalisation of securitising processes. But the study has nevertheless produced important sociological insights for security studies. First, securitisation as a strategy of legitimisation is never a simple process of moving from politicisation to securitisation. Security measures remain heavily contested within the political field that continues in a democratic format. Both in the UK and Germany the parliamentary processes continued contesting and amending security measures, the judiciary continued to play an important role in both legitimizing and resisting some of the measures, civil society actors continued to challenge government policies, etc. These findings are not necessarily surprising but have an important implication for the study of securitisation. The political construction of security problems does not take normal politics out of the political process. The analyst therefore needs to take seriously the distinction between securitising moves and securitisation. The former as such are not yet politically effective. Rather than labeling it a “speech act”, security is therefore better conceptualised as a discourse, and securitising moves as the individual speech acts within this discourse. The emphasis then is on the broader societal field of securitising statements that prescribe what counts as “common sense” and “legitimate”, and what as “unreasonable”/“irresponsible” and “illegitimate”.

Secondly, focusing on the political field, which is defined by the relation between competing participants, also brings out that the key question for securitisation is not so much whether or not ‘the audience’ accepts the securitising moves but rather what are the relative power positions of those defending securitising moves within the field. The research question shifts from speaker-audience to dominant-versus-subordinate positions in the political field.

Thirdly, our analysis of the UK parliamentary debates in particular showed that the specific rendition of insecurities within the politics of unease also emerged in the political field. This is one of the main reasons why we conceptualised the difference between securitisation and politics of unease at the level of the *logic* of security (the technique of governing and framing insecurities) rather than at the level of differences in agencies and institutional locations. For the sociological study of securitisation this implies that one can recast the difference between the Copenhagen School’s and Paris School’s understanding of securitisation as the politics of exception and the politics of unease. Rather than emphasizing the different social theories and ontologies that underlie the two approaches, one can focus on the different framings of the meaning of insecurity –

exceptionalism versus unease. Both framings play an important role in the contemporary politics of insecurity. Hence the double question, which became central to our project, of how they relate and which one is dominant when in the securitisation of migration.

#### 4.3 The securitisation of migration in the UK and Germany

The Comparative analysis of the processes of legitimisation brought out important differences in the public framing of migration in relation to security and terrorism. The main focus on a policy level (the “emergency measure”) in Germany was on the partial retreat from a new immigration law that would have significantly facilitated immigration. While the first Bundestag debate on 12 September 2001 is still characterised by shock and compassion, the debates from 19 September 2001 onwards, to the extent that they link migration and terrorism, do so by representing migrants as a potential threat to political security that demands greater infringements on their rights and in particular privacy than would have been legitimate before 9/11. Interestingly, there is also a noticeable shift in the argument from a securitisation in terms of identity, social and economic concerns (societal and economic securitisation) to the increasing stress on national security in more traditional terms.

This mode of securitising surfaced in particular again after the Madrid bombings, when the revised immigration bill was debated in the conciliation committee between Bundestag and Bundesrat. As a result, the final version of the law contained much stricter conditions for the granting of a residence permit and the facilitation of expulsion than the initial draft. Residency or naturalisation is only to be granted after a check with the *Bundesverfassungsschutz* (Office for the Protection of the Constitution), a procedure previously only followed by the generally more restrictive, CDU/CSU-governed Bayern and Baden-Württemberg. Foreigners can be expelled if they are seen as supporting terrorism or inciting hatred, and are expelled as a matter of course if there is evidence to suggest that they constitute a threat to society (*tatsachengestützte Gefahrenprognose*). In addition, the Anti-Terrorism laws passed after 9/11 included provisions specifically aimed at foreigners, such as in Art. 9, which amended the Societies (*Vereins*) Law, allowing the closure of clubs ‘whose members are all or predominantly foreigners’ if they are seen to threaten domestic peace or incite hatred. Art. 11 made it possible to include biometrical data in residence permits for foreigners at a time at which this was not the case for German citizens.

In the UK the parliamentary debates related counter-terrorism very explicitly to asylum and immigration only in autumn 2001. The link then largely disappeared from the parliamentary radar in 2002-2003. The Newton report (December 2003), which heavily criticised Part 4 of the ATCS Act 2001, did not revive immigration and asylum, as a matter of controlling cross-border movement of people, as an important issue in the debates on counter-terrorism. It moved the focus from cross-border movement to the legitimacy and effective use of nationality, i.e. a distinction between foreigners and British citizens, in counter-terrorist measures. The reaction to the London bombings in July 2005 produced a confused picture. In the weeks after the bombings major attempts were made in the public domain to externalise the threat by focusing on foreign influence, especially the influence of radical imams of foreign origin and specialist terrorists coming into the country to help the local bombers. However, in the parliamentary interventions references to foreigners and the externalisation of the danger only played a marginal role. The central issues of debate on the terrorism bill in the Commons in autumn 2005 were

the consequences for free speech and the extension of the period during which suspects can be held without charge. Migration and asylum related issues, in so far as they concerned (the control of) cross-border movement of people, were not as upfront as in 2001.

The findings also indicate that a nexus between migration, community relations, and terrorism within debates on social cohesion and multiculturalism, among others, risks linking the security issue of extremism to a much wider construction of a Muslim collectivity that is partly made responsible for producing extremists. Before July 2005, references to the Muslim community in the political field were primarily about protecting them from becoming a target of violent public reaction, whereas after, the Muslim community was explicitly rendered as an instrument for policing radicalisation within. This suggests that a process of securitisation is taking place in which existential threats of extremism become linked to an identification of a wider community as a problematic collectivity. These processes are reminiscent of what securitisation approaches have identified as societal enemy construction, but it also emphasises the need to unpack the often complex relation between politics of exception and unease in the political field.

The case study on Frontex, the EU external border agency, similarly confirmed the complexity of securitising processes. The official aim of developing common EU policies on asylum, immigration and strengthening coordination at the external border goes back to the “Tampere scoreboard” established in 1999. The responses to 9/11 from the key EU institutions refocused this aim, making clear links between terrorism, security, migration and borders. For example, these responses explicitly called for “common services to control external borders” to be created. Despite the apparent post-9/11 securitisation of migration in the EU, the documents, political processes and rationales relating to the construction and remit of Frontex do not use overt securitising language and do not follow the classic logic of securitisation. Rather, the predominant conceptual language in the rationale and documentation of Frontex is that of risk. It is only after the establishment of Frontex that securitising moves in the Copenhagen sense are performed again by the agency actors themselves.

The difference between the different securitisations of migration can partly be explained by coincidental factors, in particular the coincidence of the new immigration bill debate and 9/11 in Germany, and the fact that some of the 9/11 attackers had resided in Hamburg for a considerable period in the preceding years. Yet we have also advanced a more structural explanation, which includes different citizenship regimes tied into different discourses on the nation that make it easier in the German case to distinguish between “self” and “foreign” (Diez and Squire 2007). This in turn is part of broader state/governance structures. Clearly, these explanations need further research.

#### 4.4 Democratic negotiation of security and liberty

Much of the discussion of insecurity in the wake of 9/11 focuses on the question of whether current security policies are undermining foundational principles of liberal democracy. Yet - however important the relationship between security and liberty is for democratic politics, focusing exclusively on the legitimacy and democratic compatibility of exceptional security measures overlooks a crucial dimension of the contemporary politics of insecurity that is played out in the area of immigration and asylum: governance of and through unease. The inclusion of the latter is more generally important for



understanding: A) how the linkage between immigration and asylum with counter-terrorism feeds into and is embedded in a more long-term and continuous process of rendering immigration and asylum into a question of insecurity and B) how this bears upon organizing society and politics around principles and policies of fear and unease.

By framing the debates on counter-terrorism in terms of the politics of exception, one tends to ignore the fundamental questions that the governmentality of unease raises: how to organise democratic politics within technocratic arenas? Do the key democratic institutions of rule of law and parliamentary accountability have a significant input in these arenas? What are the consequences of structuring policies around exchanges of fear and unease for democratic politics?

NGOs play a crucial role in democratic politics, especially when it comes to migration issues. A range of strategies are available to NGOs at a time when security is a widespread concern. Though there are NGOs who choose to 'ride' the wave of security concern by heightening unease around migration, others 'ride' the wave by networking with other NGOs in order to maintain a high profile for critical responses to immigration controls. Other NGOs are able to re-focus security concerns through the lens of immigration concerns, and yet others are able to challenge the linkage between anti-terrorism measures and immigration controls most effectively through networking (Noxolo 2006). It can be difficult for NGOs to maintain an effective critical voice whilst balancing traditional territorially-bounded discourses of self-legitimation and moral authority against the demands of a globalising world in which NGOs' operational roles are moving towards an implication in the more governmental positions of monitoring and regulation of populations. Our interviews with Refugee Council representatives in Germany and the UK show that they do not see this only see as a constraint (accepting securitisation in their work) but also as a chance (counter-securitising "in the name of" migrants). EU funding can play a supportive role for NGOs, such that the availability of funding leads to the employment of Refugee Councils by national government agencies that would otherwise not provide funding to the Councils (Interview Weinzierl).

Ultimately, most NGOs are clear that the connection between migration and security is not an inevitable one, and wielding it can be fraught with difficulties. For most NGOs, addressing this linkage is therefore still relatively marginal in their work, as they attempt to address wider immigration issues around, for example, destitution and forced returns, or wider civil liberties issues around identity cards for example. However, the increasing importance to NGOs of networking as a way of pooling resources and increasing impact can mean that, as with the security professionals described by Bigo (2002), immigration and security can become a 'lingua franca', thus reinforcing a contingent connection that must be handled with care.

## 5. Activities

### Organisation of conferences and panels:

Annual Conference of the *British International Studies Association*  
University of St Andrews  
21-23 December 2005  
Panel on 'Securitizing Migration after 9/11'

One-day workshop on *Sicherheit und Migration*  
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik & MIDAS  
Berlin, 9 March 2006

***Annual Conference of the International Studies Association***

22-25 March 2006, San Diego  
Organised panel: 'The political (re)construction of the security-migration nexus after 9/11 – comparative perspectives'. Thomas Diez and Jef Huysmans presented papers; other papers covered Spain, the US, and Canada.

*Freedom, Fear, Security: re-visiting insecurity after 9/11 and 7/7*  
Two-day conference organised by MIDAS and CCIG (Centre for Citizenship, Identities and Governance)  
The Open University, Milton Keynes  
29-30 June, 2006

Link to other NSC projects:

Besides using the seminars organised to stimulate cross-project links in NSC programme, we established explicit links with *Shifting Securities*:

- Presentation of paper at one of their symposiums
- Presentation of a paper by Marie Gillespie from *Shifting Securities* at the MIDAS workshop in the OU
- Currently working on a joint paper on the politics of fear, using findings from MIDAS and the database of *Shifting Securities*.

Link to *Challenge* (Sixth Framework Integrated Project The Challenge of Liberty and Security in Europe)

We sent some of our findings to their web site and included links to *Challenge* in our web site. A MIDAS representative was present at the *Challenge* annual conference in Paris, June 2006. Representatives of *Challenge* did papers in the MIDAS workshop organised in June 2006. Didier Bigo, one of the *Challenge* coordinators, visited POLSIS for a departmental seminar.

Other presentations of project findings:

Workshop 'The Refugee in Trans/National Politics and Society: Representation, Contestation and Control'  
University of Oxford, 17-18 May 2007  
Paper: 'Domestication dangers. Societal insecurity, community relations, and migration.'  
(Huysmans)

Workshop Migration and Refugee Protection Research Group  
Birmingham, 2 May 2007  
Paper 'Securitisations and Desecuritisations' (Diez)

Workshop 'Citizenship, Identity and Migration in Europe'

University of Surrey, 17 March 2007  
Paper 'Discourses of Citizenship and the Securitisation of Migration in Britain and Germany' (Diez)

Workshop 'The passenger as a risk: monitoring movement and privatizing threat'  
Radboud University Nijmegen, 15-16 March 2007  
Keynote: Society at risk. Or, what is wrong with liberty-security debates? (Huysmans)

Cross-departmental seminar series  
'Taking exception to the exception; or, what is written out of the security-liberty debates?' (Huysmans)  
Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, 28 February 2007

London in a Time of Terror: the Politics of Response.  
Birkbeck College, University of London, December 2006  
Paper: Politics of exception & unease (Huysmans)

Joint Seminar of COST ACTION A24: The evolving social construction of threats  
The Open University, London, 23– 24 November 2006  
Paper: Securitisation and risk at the EU border (Neal)

Departmental seminar Lancaster University  
November 2006  
Paper: 'Who feels it knows it: NGOs 'at the sharp end' of the securitisation of migration and asylum post 9/11?' (Noxolo)

The Society for Caribbean Studies Annual Conference  
July 2006  
Paper: 'Don't I know you? Anthony Walker, Abdullah Shaheed Jamal, and the relationships between African-Caribbean and British identities' (Noxolo)

Symposium 'Terrorism, Media and War: From New York to London, From Iraq to Iran'  
Organised by project 'Shifting Securities: News Cultures before and beyond the Iraq 2003 War' of ESRC New Security Challenges Programme  
King's College London, 15-16 June 2006  
Paper: 'The politics of exception and unease' (Huysmans)

Symposium 'Crime, Migration and Ethnicity'  
International Association for the History of Crime and Criminal Justice & Groupe Européen de Recherche sur la Normativité  
Maison des sciences de l'homme, Paris  
8-10 June 2006  
Paper: Counter-terrorism, immigration and asylum in the UK since September 2001 (Huysmans)

Workshop: 'Civil Society and Conflict Prevention: Patterns and Limitations'  
Lancaster University, May 2006  
Paper: 'Riding, Re-focusing, Challenging: NGOs and the politics of security around immigration and asylum post 9/11' (Noxolo)

The European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions of Workshops

Nicosia, Cyprus, April 2006

Paper: 'Freedom, fear and representation: narrative in British NGO discourse as a function of postcolonial governmentality' (Noxolo)

Workshop: 'UK Asylum Policy and Counter-Terrorism'  
Chatham House/Information Centre for Asylum and Refugees  
Noxolo acted as discussant

Departmental seminar, London School of Economics  
January 2006

Paper: 'Governing and the non-governmental: NGOs and the securitisation of migration in the UK since 9/11' (Noxolo)

British Council Prague conference on citizenship  
29 November 2005  
Lecture: 'European citizenship' (Diez)

#### News media:

Jef Huysmans was interviewed by Paul Lashmar, providing background information for an article in *The Independent on Sunday*. A summary of an interview with Thomas Diez on migrants from CEECs was published in *The Birmingham Post*. We have sent a short commentary— by Andrew Neal and Jef Huysmans – of the limits of framing current security debates in terms of balancing liberty and security to *The Guardian*. Another commentary – also by Neal and Huysmans – following the Queen's Speech in Parliament in November 2006 was circulated to some journalists and relevant NGOs.

## **6. Outputs**

The project ran a website, [www.midas.bham.ac.uk](http://www.midas.bham.ac.uk), which included the main project papers, weblinks, a timeline of events and other relevant information.

#### *Main papers as referenced above:*

Diez, T. (2006) 'Opening, Closing: Securitisation, the War on Terror and the Debate about Migration in Germany', draft paper available on project website

Diez, T. and Huysmans, J. (2007) 'Securitizations and Desecritizations: The Politics of Exception and the Politics of Unease', paper under review

Diez, T. and Squire, V. (2007) 'Discourses of Citizenship and the Securitisation of Migration in Britain and Germany', unpublished draft paper.

Huysmans, J. (2007) 'Taking exception to the exception. Schmitt, Agamben and Liberty-Security Debates', unpublished draft paper

Huysmans, J. and Buonfino, A. (2006) 'Politics of Exception & Unease: Immigration, asylum and insecurity in parliamentary debates on terrorism in the UK', paper under review.

Huysmans, J. and Neal, A. (2006) 'Comment: Taking Exception to Security', commentary on project website.

Huysmans, J. (2005) 'Nexus terrorism-immigration/asylum/refuge in parliamentary debates in the UK: Commons Debates since 11 September 2001', report on project website.

Neal, A. (2007) 'Securitization and Risk at the EU Border', paper under review.

Noxolo, P. (2006) Security, networking, circulation: NGO networking as a mechanism of security in a governmentalising world, paper under review.

## **7. Impacts**

Since our outputs have not yet been published, we are not aware of any project-specific impact on policy or other research as yet.

## **8. Future Research Priorities**

1. Researching in greater detail the degree to which the differences between Germany and the UK can be explained by differences in the tradition of citizenship, long-standing differences in the governance of free movement and migration, and coincidental differences such as which legislation is going to the parliament at the moment events like those of 11 September 2001 take place.
2. Research in more detail the relative importance of the two securitisations within the field of professionals of security in the UK and Germany. Does this mirror our findings in the political field or does the professional field strongly enact one of the logics of securitisation?
3. In the UK, much of the securitisation of migration develops in relation to asylum and illegal immigration. Politically labour migration was kept largely out of this process. An interesting question to be pursued is how unions and employers have been affected by the securitisation of free movement post 9/11.

## Appendix 1: Non-project references

- Bigo, Didier (1996) *Polices en réseaux. L'expérience européenne*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
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