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Counter Securitization or Slippery Slope: The Political Implications of Different Climate Security Discourses

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Abstract

Throughout the last decade climate change has increasingly been pictured as an issue of "national security" leading to conflicts over scarce resources, large scale migration, and the destabilisation of whole regions. Following the Copenhagen School, this securitization can lead to undemocratic and extraordinary emergency measures and should therefore be rejected from a normative perspective. Against such a reading, some argue that the prevailing securitization is not the only way how the issue can be securitized. Accordingly, a focus on threats to the human security of individuals or "climate risk" conceptions is supposed to avoid the dangers associated with a conflictive, national security centred securitization. The aim of this paper is to uncover the very distinct climate security discourses that are being put forward to securitize the topic and to assess their different political consequences. Drawing on Michel Foucault's governmentality approach and concentrating on the domestic debates in the US I show how climate change is securitized drawing on three different power forms that are nonetheless connected to each other. Moreover, I argue that even seemingly less confrontational climate security discourses can have negative consequences.

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"[…] climate change poses a serious threat to America's national security." (CNA Corporation 2007: 6).

"Security cannot be defined in purely military terms. Instead, governments must prepare for threats to the security of people, not just states." (Vagg 2012: 2).

"Risk-reduction and preparedness policies including adaptation and mitigation (reducing greenhouse gas emissions) will increase resiliency." (Foley and Holland 2012: 8).

With the beginning of the 21st century, climate change has increasingly been connected to security conceptions in political and academic discussions. Examples are various influential reports and articles issued by governments and their advisory bodies[1], think tanks and NGOs[2], scientists[3], and UN bodies[4] as well as high level discussions in the UN Security Council[5] (in the years 2007, 2011, and 2013). There seems to be an agreement – at least in the western centred debate – that climate change is no longer only an environmental or economic issue but has moved to the realm of security and high politics. However, a closer look at these various attempts to "securitize" the issue, reveals that they do not agree with respect to the security conceptions they employ, the threats or referent object they point to, and the solutions they advocate. As the three above cited sentences from US think tank reports on climate change show, the topic is securitized in very distinct forms, drawing on very different conceptions of security and proposing different policies and measures to counter the threat. Some argue that climate change could directly affect the national security of states, leading to violent conflict, the destabilization of whole regions and eventually to conflicts between states. Particularly in the US debate, proposed counter measures are the integration of climate threats into military planning, but also drastic top-down measures to stop dangerous emissions. Besides these argumentations focusing on national security, there are voices highlighting that climate change, although being a serious threat, would rather hit people in their daily lives instead

[1] Schwartz and Randall (2003); Solana and EU Kommission (2008); WBGU (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen) (2007); GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit Gmbh) (2008).
[2] Christian Aid (2006, 2007), CNA Corporation (2007); Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) and Center for a New American Security (CNAS) (2007); Vagg (2012); Campbell (2008).
[3] Barnett and Adger (2007); Trombetta (2008), Brauch (2008, 2009), Brzoska (2009); McDonald (2013).
[4] UNGA (United Nations General Assembly) (2008, 2009a, 2009b).
[5] UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (2007a, 2011a), Sidsnet (2013).

of states, threatening their human security. Instead of boosting military planning and short-term measures such an argumentation rather advocates for long term measures and the expansion of development aid. From a third perspective, climate change is pictured as a long-term risk, slowly undermining the well-being of people, states and the planet – with the adequate response being the development of resilient communities, the monitoring of risk-areas and groups and the lowering of the risk to a tolerable level.

Academia has already taken up these debates from different angles. There exist various works trying to assess whether climate change really is a threat to peace and security and which are the most threatened referent objects[6]. Another strand of the debate uses securitization approaches to make sense of climate change being connected to security conceptions[7]. The standard approach to study securitization has been coined by the Copenhagen School (Buzan *et al.* 1998). However, in the case of the very different securitizations of climate change, the Copenhagen School might not be the best choice. Because of its emphasis on a fixed security logic it tends to see only extreme forms of securitization leading to extraordinary measures. It thus misses different, less direct and more slowly progressing securitization processes[8] and the possibility that some of these discourses could also be considered positive from a normative perspective (Floyd 2007b). Thus, in order to catch the broad variety in securitizing climate change, the literature has so far identified various climate-securitization discourses[9]. A common aspect of these approaches is that they keep using a partly revised Copenhagen notion of securitization but extent it by conceptualizing different securitization discourses along the referent object dimension. Another line of research tries to approach the problem from a governmentality perspective (Foucault 2006a, 2006b) and conceptualizes securitization as an act of governing, as a way of rendering issues governable as security problems (Oels 2011: 18). Instead of concentrating on the referent object dimension, these

[6] Barnett and Adger (2005, 2007), Nordas and Gleditsch (2007); Gleditsch (2012); O'Loughlin *et al.* (2012).
[7] see for instance Trombetta (2008); Brzoska (2009); Brauch (2009); Corry (2012); McDonald (2013); Lucke *et al.* (2014).
[8] See also the works of the Paris School in this respect Bigo (2008); Bigo and Tsoukala (2008); Huysmans (2008).
[9] For example: Trombetta (2008); Detraz and Betsill (2009); Trombetta (2011); Corry (2012); McDonald (2013); Lucke *et al.* (2014).

approaches make a distinction between different power forms[10] that are at the core of different securitization discourses[11].

In this paper I engage in this line of research. The first aim is to show how we can improve our understanding of climate securitizations by conceptualizing them as discourses that are informed by different power forms that also have different power effects. Secondly, I show how different discourses can interact with each other and thereby even transform each other so that a normative evaluation of the consequences is only possible in a case to case and ex-post manner. In order to advance these arguments I briefly discuss the most important debates concerning the securitization of climate change and the different ways in which the literature has so far made sense of them. Thereafter I introduce my theoretical approach and then apply it to the securitization of climate change in the United States. The aim is to show how a governmentality reading can generate new insights into how securitization processes function and how we can make sense of different securitizations, the links between them, and particularly their political effects.

Discourses of Climate Change and Security

Exploring the connections between the environment and later on climate change and security has a fairly long tradition in International Relations. One strand of the debate mainly focuses on the empirical question whether and under what conditions environmental and climatic effects can lead to violent conflict. Often building on arguments of Thomas Malthus (Malthus 1970), various scholars analysed the effects of a growing human population, the degradation of the natural environment and scarce resources on the probability of violent conflict[12]. So far the results have been ambivalent and the effect at least seems to be less straightforward than originally thought and to be mediated by various societal and political variables (Burke *et al.* 2009; Buhaug 2010; Hsiang *et al.* 2013; Scheffran *et al.* 2012).

[10] Power is here defined as: „[…] a relationship between actors that produce knowledges and truths that lead to individual and social practices, that in turn tend to disseminate those truths. Knowledge transmits and disseminates the effects of power (...), while truth is a status given to certain knowledge by power. (...) Truth is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it.“ Foucault (2003)

[11] A discourse is defined as power-knowledge nexus constituting reality in a certain way, thus defining what is right or wrong and who is empowered to speak the truth. It is only through discourse that humans can access reality and thus all reality and truth is exposed to and shaped by certain power dynamics Hajer (1995: 45).

[12] Homer-Dixon (1994); Howard and Homer-Dixon (1996), Myers (1989, 1995), Barnett and Adger (2007).

A second strand approaches the topic from a securitization perspective and tries to understand how climate change has become a security issue and to what political consequences this might lead[13]. First coined by Ole Waever and Barry Buzan, the Copenhagen School departs from a traditional and essentialist conception of security and instead proposes security as something that is socially constructed. It conceptualizes securitization as a speech act, which proposes an existential and immediate threat to a valued referent object. If accepted by the relevant audience, this speech act elevates an issue above normal and democratic politics and legitimises extraordinary measures to stop the threat (Buzan *et al.* 1998: 24). Particularly when applied to the securitization of climate change, this approach has increasingly been criticized for being too static in its conception of security. The reason is that the Copenhagen School, although conceptualizing the process of securitization as socially constructed, still sticks to a partly essentialist traditional, state and military focused security logic (Stripple 2002: 109). Thus, the successful securitization always leads to extraordinary measures (or at least their legitimization) and lifts political issues above normal politics and democratic as well as legal procedures. Therefore, from a normative standpoint, the Copenhagen School sees securitization as to be avoided. However, other approaches to security and securitization have shown that this is not the only way how security can be conceptualized. Some (often associated with the Welsh or Aberystwyth School) stress that security can also be understood as focusing on humans instead of states, thus coining the idea of the emancipation of the individual from security threats (Booth 1991, 2005; Wyn Jones 2005). The concept of "human security" goes in a similar direction and has become fairly prominent in recent years among practitioners (Boutros-Ghali 1992; Werthes and Bosold 2005; Debiel and Werthes 2006). Other scholars, mostly based in France and thus often called Paris School, try to come up with a more procedural approach of securitization. They argue that instead of being initiated by public elite speech acts an issue can also be securitized over a longer period of time by everyday practices of security professionals (Bigo 2002; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008; Huysmans 2004, 2008). Finally, some scholars go back to Foucault's Governmentality approach and understand securitization as instance of governing by drawing on different power forms and thus allowing for different kinds of securitization and political effects. Considering this broad variance in security conceptions and securitizations, the question arises whether certain securitization discourses can be considered superior from a normative perspective (Floyd 2007b).

[13] see for instance Trombetta (2008); Brzoska (2009); Brauch (2009); Corry (2012); McDonald (2013).

With regards to the research on the securitization of climate change, the idea that there exist different forms of securitization has generated particular attention and various scholars came up with frameworks for distinguishing between different climate-security discourses. The roots of this research agenda can be found in the discussions about "environmental security" and the various different meanings this concept can take (Deudney 1990; Dalby 1992; Barnett 2001; Pirages 2005). One of the most prominent works by Nicole Detraz and Michele Betsill comes up with a distinction between an "environmental conflict" and an "environmental security" discourse, concluding that the normatively "good" environmental security discourse has so far prevailed (Detraz and Betsill 2009: 308, 315). Connecting to this, Maria Trombetta observes that particularly in the environmental realm security has undergone a transformation and securitization thus cannot always be considered normatively inferior to a "normal" political treatment but has already contributed to induce progressive policies in various cases (Trombetta 2008; Trombetta 2012; see also McDonald 2003). In a 2009 study, Michael Brzoska also takes up the idea of different securitizations and analyses several reports that depict climate change as security issue. He observes quite different security conceptions and accordingly also differences in the policy recommendations connected to each security concept (Brzoska 2009). Also applying the argument of different securitization discourses Matt McDonald has come up with a framework distinguishing between four discourses based on the different referent objects of security (national, human, international and ecological). He finds that on a global scale although some discourses could lead to successful climate policies the dominant framing (national and international security) so far has not facilitated effective climate governance (McDonald 2013: 49). Similarly starting with the distinction along the referent object axis but adding a second dimension that distinguishes between security and risk based securitizations others have extended the framework even further (Corry 2012; Lucke *et al.* 2014). They caution against an a priory rejection of (national security based) securitizations[14] but at the same time against a too positive judgement of human security or risk centred approaches.

As these discussions show, the literature has identified various important climate-security discourses and ways to construct them. However, this is mostly done by focusing on a distinction between different referent objects and by using a (partly revised) Copenhagen School approach.

[14] For instance, McDonald could show that even national security based securitizations can have positive consequences for environmental issues McDonald (2003).

Following Stefan Elbe, Angela Oels and others[15] I want to approach the issue from a governmentality perspective. Even though starting out from the works of the mentioned authors, my approach goes beyond their approaches in several aspects. Oels has been one of the first scholars who approached climate issues from a governmentality perspective (Oels 2005), however, although including the securitization aspect in various works (Oels 2011, 2012), her focus – and that of Methmann/Rothe as well (Methmann 2011; Methmann and Rothe 2012) – is not solely on the security aspect but rather on broader transformations of how climate change is governed within different political rationalisations or governmentalities over time. In contrast, I concentrate more on the securitization aspect and on the idea that there can be found several different securitizations at the same time that are based upon different power forms. Moreover, Oels' attention is on the global climate change debate, whereas I concentrate on the domestic level because I think it is more likely to discover concrete political effects on this level. Concerning theory, my approach is closest to the works of Elbe, yet he focuses on the securitization of HIV/aids on the global level (Elbe 2006, 2009, 2011) and to my knowledge this approach has not yet been applied to climate change.

Concerning the advantages of combining a governmental perspective with securitization, I think with its focus on the exercise of power, it can give us deeper insights into how securitizations actually function and what political effects they can have. Instead of focusing on the referent object as main distinguishing criterion between different climate-security discourses, the focus lies on three different power forms that are derived from Foucault's governmentality lectures at the College de France in the 1970s and that inform the different climate-security discourses (Foucault 2006a, 2006b). The concrete benefits of this concept are as follows*: Firstly*, because of the defining concept of the "governmentalization of security" (which will be explained in more detail in the next section) this approach entails a dynamic aspect and can account for the gradual transformation of security practices since the 1980s and the links between different securitizations. *Secondly*, because of its focus on power, the approach can give us deeper insights into how different securitizations are used to render topics governable from a certain perspective and thus having different power effects and making possible very different consequences. *Thirdly*, using this approach alerts us to the possibility that even at first glance favourable securitizations, such as human security, can wield indirect and often less noticed power effects that from a normative

[15] Oels (2005, 2013), Elbe (2009, 2006), Methmann (2011); Methmann and Rothe (2012), Rothe (2011a), Rothe (2011b).

perspective might not be desirable. In the next section I elaborate on my particular reading of the governmentality approach and how it can be applied to study contemporary securitization processes.

The Governmentalization of Security: Three Climate-Security Discourses

Before I present my operationalization of the governmentality approach for the purpose of studying the securitization of climate change, let me briefly introduce the governmentality concept and its connections to securitization in general. The starting point of the governmentality approach is a critique of the research on power and governance in mainstream political science and IR theory in the 1970s (Oels 2010a: 172). Instead of only focusing on the sovereign state and top-down governance processes using direct and often repressive "sovereign" power interventions (Foucault 1983: 84), Foucault proposes the idea of the "governmentalization of the state". This means a continuous transformation of the exercise of power in western societies from the 18th century on involving the simultaneous application of a power triangle consisting of sovereign power, disciplinary power and governmental power[16] with the last power form becoming the dominant one. In the course of this process, governmental power has continuously transformed the older power forms to serve a new objective, which is securing and increasing the welfare of the population[17] instead of the state territory, using the different characteristics of all three power forms (Foucault 2006a: 161):

> "During this era of governmentality political rule is exercised through a complex triangle of sovereignty, discipline and governmental management, which has the population as its main target and apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism." (Foucault 2007: 108–109).

Connecting to this original ideas and following Stefan Elbe (Elbe 2009), I argue that security practices have undergone a similar transformation since the 1980s i.e. we can observe a

[16] Originally this power form is called governmental management or sometimes biopower Kelly (2009: 60); Foucault (2006a: 161). However, for better comparability with the other power forms and also to avoid confusion of my distinct approach with the general governmentality approach I use the term "governmental power" in the following.

[17] What is meant by the term "population" is not only the plain number of inhabitants of a state territory. Instead the concept aims at all statistical operations that have become possible with the development of sophisticated social scientific knowledge together with the fact that state bureaucracies keep track of a sheer endless number of characteristics of the population. The art of governing now consist in the skilful manipulation of a broad range of variables at the level of the population – using the three power forms Foucault (2007: 74–75).

"governmentalization of security". This means that today security practices too increasingly aim at the welfare of populations, draw on all three power forms, are exercised not only by the state but by a broad range of actors and include all kinds of issues, including development or environmental concerns (Elbe 2009: 9, 64, 78). Just as it has been the case with the governmentalization of the state, the reasons for this transformation of security can be found in changing societal features – e.g. the discussions about new and non-traditional security threats and referent objects such as the environment or individuals – that made necessary new forms of government (Collier 2009). In this process, the main target ceases to be to secure a territory with traditional security technologies such as the police, secret service or the army. Instead a shift occurs to the fostering of the welfare of the population by using new, less direct security technologies based on a power triangle. Following this premise, in contemporary world politics, the former distinction between politics and security increasingly becomes blurred and security institutions and actors are progressively legitimized to help in fostering the welfare of the population – a development which is exemplified by the widening of security beyond military and state issues (Elbe 2009: 64). Particularly in the field of environmental and climate politics one can clearly observe a changing logic of security itself (Trombetta 2011; Corry 2012; Floyd and Matthew 2013).

Accordingly, when analyzing securitization processes it does not suffice to only look at instances of securitization along sovereign power and its direct and often negative effects – as done by the Copenhagen School – but one has to open up the analytical approach to include securitizations drawing on the other power forms as well. Securitization moves in this sense are understood as instances of governing, as processes of rendering things governable through the lens of security and the application of different forms of power. As the term "governance" already implies, from this perspective securitization processes are not a priori considered something entirely extraordinary. Rather they constitute a specific way of governing (by problematizing a topic as an existential threat or risk to a referent object) without necessarily leading to extraordinary effects – yet still it is expected that they lead to distinctive effects that without securitization would not have had been legitimate (see Trombetta 2012). Concerning securitization research and theory this brings us to the expectation of very different securitization discourses which draw on different combinations of the three power forms, with different political effects. Thus, the securitization of

climate change can be understood as contemporary example for the governmentalization of security in general[18].

Sovereign Power

The first and oldest power form, *sovereign power*, is in its effects similar to mainstream conceptions of power – e. g. what Stephen Lukes described as one-dimensional view on power (Lukes 2005) – and is based on a Machiavellian notion of power (Machiavelli 2005). Sovereign power is mostly exercised by the sovereign – often the state and its agencies such as the police or the military – in a highly visible and direct way over a certain territory, with its main target being the perpetuation of sovereignty itself (Foucault 2003: 149). It has a binary and law like character defining what is permitted or forbidden, punishing those who deviate from the law. It basically constitutes a negative form of power that takes away things, as for example taxes, labor, freedom or in extreme cases life itself (Foucault 2003: 240). The exercise of sovereign power draws the attention to hard-politics, traditional security, defense and military topics and legitimizes first of all state actors to handle problems.

Within the sovereign power discourse, climate change is securitized in a direct and highly visible way using traditional state and military focused national security conceptions and its equivalents (Elbe 2009: 86) [19]. Hence, in what can be called the *diagnostic dimension* (i.e. the definition of the referent object and threat) the focus is on security threats for states and the second-order socio-economic effects of climate change are the main problems. One of the core arguments is that climate change – in combination with population growth and degrading resources – leads to violent conflict and therefore threatens the national security of states. Large-scale migration, the spread of instability and even the growth of terrorism due to disorientating conditions and fragile as well as failed states are further dangers that are diagnosed within this discourse.

Concerning the *power effects* (i.e. the consequences that are enabled by the usage of this power form), a securitization drawing mainly on this discourse increases the attention for the issue to a

[18] See also Stefan Elbe who first made this argument in respect to HIV/aids Elbe (2006, 2009).

[19] In its general conceptualization sovereign power is broader and the focus is not exclusively on military matters. However, in a securitization context it can be understood in a more narrow fashion as primarily focusing on military, defence and traditional security matters.

considerable extent, elevating the topic into high and traditional security politics. At the same time the focus is not so much on long-term solutions for the constitutive causes of the problem, e.g. mitigation measures, but rather on short-term solutions for the symptoms, e.g. adaptation and the mitigation of the security threats. These could include military interventions in countries that are in danger of being destabilized or overwhelmed by climate change. Furthermore, a sovereign power based securitization focuses on the state and its agencies as the legitimate actors to tackle the problems, therefore one would expect that first of all solutions in the military and defense sector are being thought of and the discussions will take place in these circles.

Disciplinary Power

The second power form, *disciplinary power*, focuses on sophisticated surveillance technologies and control mechanisms aimed at the transformation of individual behavior towards a certain predefined norm – a process also called "normation" (Foucault 2006a: 90). The goal is to discipline and control individual behavior, therefore this power form is not exerted over territory buts aims at the individual body (Foucault 1975: 143). An example would be military drill schemes that intent to train individuals to comply with certain predefined behavioral procedures. Furthermore it is not a negative but productive way of exercising power that instead of taking things away tries to create and transform them according to the predefined norm. It is also a power form that is very accurate, operating at the micro-level and tries to control every part of the process, as for example the behavior of prisoners (Foucault 2006a: 74). Finally, disciplinary power broadens the spectrum of actors and it is no longer only the state that is constituted as legitimate actors but also non-state actors such as NGOs and Think Tanks.

Drawing on disciplinary power, the securitization of climate change does look fairly different compared to the sovereign discourse. Within the disciplinary discourse the focus is more on seemingly positive and "soft" human security conceptions and the like. These conceptions, look at individual bodies and try to enhance and empower disadvantaged individuals, whose human security is threatened, towards a predefined ideal norm: the well-fed, healthy, productive, democratic and wealthy citizen in advanced and highly developed western societies: „(…) the human security framework produces "'humans' requiring securing" and empowers "international institutions and actors to individuate, group and act upon Southern populations." (Duffield 2005: 2). Climate change is constituted as a problem to be tackled not only by the traditional security

actors and practices but rather by the development sector and by non-state actors. Thus, looking at the *diagnostic dimension*, the whole securitization takes place in a rather indirect and less confrontational way, instead of focusing on direct threats for the state the emphasis is on individuals and their vulnerabilities. Accordingly, the threats are not chiefly second-order socioeconomic threats but rather the direct first-order effects of climate change on the daily life of humans.

Regarding the *power effects*, the focus is more on solutions that tackle the problems of individuals which includes mitigation measures to limit global warming but also adaptation measures that could prepare individuals for climate change effects. At the same time, in the process of "normation", the surveillance and monitoring of threatened individuals is increased to constantly transform them and their circumstances towards the ideal typical norm of the healthy, affluent and climate resilient citizen. In the course of such a disciplinary securitization, all these measures are framed as positive and in the interest of the threatened people – often the poor in developing countries – and a broad variety of actors, including NGOs, is legitimized to act. Thus, the application of such disciplinary power in securitization processes does not necessarily lead to extreme and undemocratic measures by the state, but rather imposes certain identities and truth regimes onto the situation (Elbe 2009: 117). It fosters the implementation of various measures to monitor and discipline individuals that do not resemble the predefined ideal norm.

Governmental Power

The third and historically youngest power form, *governmental power*, functions in a similar way as disciplinary power. That is, it is also a productive form of power, but instead of targeting individuals it aims at the whole population – i.e. its focus is more on the macro-level – and uses the concept of "normalization" (Foucault 2006a: 98). Instead of acting on the assumption of a predefined norm, normalization tries to statistically generate a normal distribution of certain values within the population (e.g. the risk of being hit by adverse climatic effects) and then focuses at bringing statistical outliers ("risk groups", e.g. people living in high risk areas or climate hotspots) down to this average (Foucault 2006a: 97). It does so, using the most cost-efficient measures and additionally – in the spirit of "laissez-faire" or "laissez-passer – tries not to intervene too much (Foucault 2006a: 69; Elbe 2009: 132–135). Accordingly, instead of directly intervening in countries or regions at risk, the first choice would be to use less direct measures such as increasing their resiliency. A further characteristic of this power form is a focus on the governance of the

future. The goal is to prevent problems and risks from spiraling out of control, to bring them down to a tolerable level, but not to eradicate them completely (Elbe 2009: 62). Finally, as disciplinary power, it is a power form not only exercised by the state (and also not only constituting the state as sole legitimate actor) but by a great variety of different actors, thus: „The 'cold monster'[the state] breaks down into a vast range of practices and private and public institutions that enact and develop strategies of government that arrange the conduct of freedom in modern societies." (Huysmans 2008: 40).

A governmental power based securitization frames climate change as a long term risk that could gradually pertain various risk groups and areas. The topic is rendered governable as statistical problem drawing on various instruments such as risk-assessment and –management and accepting a general degree of contingency and uncertainty. Concerning the *diagnostic dimension*, the securitization is less direct, it does not point to immediate threats but rather relies on sophisticated statistical operations and models to calculate certain risk groups and areas. In contrast to disciplinary power, the main target is the overall population and statistically identified risk groups and areas and not only individuals. Drawing on the concept of "normalization", the focus is on bringing the outlier cases and their risk down to a tolerable level, so that the welfare and functioning of the overall population is not disturbed too much.

Looking at the *power effects*, a governmental securitization of climate change particularly fosters a view into the future, which is supposed to be controlled by preventive measures and by manipulating the right variables within the population. To this end the surveillance (in a cost-efficient way) especially focuses on the risk groups, which entails the danger of stigmatizing these risk groups (often poor developing countries or their inhabitants) as they become a possible danger vis-à-vis the welfare of the overall population (often highly developed industrialized states)[20]. Eventually the aim is to bring down the risk to a tolerable level that is increasing their resilience towards climate risk e.g. by propagating insurance schemes. Similar to disciplinary discourses, non-state actors play a decisive role.

[20] This dichotomy between developed and developing countries is partly due to the fact that the climate-security debate is first and foremost conducted in western industrialized countries.

The application of each of these three power forms thus encompasses very different visibilities and consequences. Consequently, by connecting this governmentality approach to the study of securitization processes it becomes possible to identify three distinct ways of securitizing an issue i.e. three ideal typical securitization discourses. Each discourse mainly draws on one of these different power forms, which in turn leads to very different problem definitions and proposed solutions and therefore different political effects of the securitization. However, one has to keep in mind that – according to the original governmentality approach – in the process of the governmentalization of security it is expected that the balance of the power triangle increasingly shifts towards governmental power, it stands so to speak at the top of the triangle (Foucault 2006a: 161; Elbe 2009: 70, 126; Dean 2010: 30). Accordingly, the older power forms, although keeping their core characteristics, are being transformed to also serve the goal to increase the welfare of the population. To this end they increasingly employ various governmental security mechanisms such as statistical analysis, risk assessments, cost-efficiency, a future orientation, a focus on processes of circulation, the inclusion of a broader range of actors and following the principle of "laissez-faire" less direct ways of intervention (Foucault 2006a: 90–97; Elbe 2009: 67–76; Dean 2010: 29). The three climate-security discourses used in this paper, can hence be seen as ideal types, to clearly distinguish between different securitizations. The gradual transformation of the older power forms towards governmental power will be considered as background premise and remains to be found in the empirical material. The following *figure 1* gives an overview of my overall approach.

Figure 1: Climate Security Discourses based on Different Power Forms



The Securitization of Climate Change in the United States

This section gives an illustrative example of how this approach can generate new insights into the securitization of climate change in a domestic context. To this end I analyse the securitization of climate change in the United States (in political debates[21]) to uncover which securitization discourses are dominant, which recommendations come with a specific securitization discourse, if there are connections between the discourses, and what political effects this kind of securitization has or could have in the future. Although there was a first phase in the US in which environmental and climate change topics were connected to security in the late 1980s and early 1990s[22], the focus of my analysis is on the second phase that mainly took place in the first decade of the 21st century with a peak in the year 2007 (Brzoska and Oels 2011; Oels 2012; McDonald 2013: 45). The reasons for concentrating on this timeframe are that it is in this second phase that the securitization process focused mainly on climate change and not on the environment in general.

One of the explanations for the beginning of this second securitization period can be found in the almost total neglect and even denial of climate matters during the Presidency of George W. Bush (Fletcher 2009: 806; Barnett 2004). Apparently having in mind the successful implementation of various environmental programs and financing schemes during the first phase of securitization (Floyd 2010: 80, 95), actors favouring a more progressive climate change commitment of the US tried again to connect climate matters to security to increase political attention (Brzoska 2012b: 172, Mildner and Richert 2010, 2010: 12) and to bridge the ideological divide between conservatives and liberals in the country at that time (Fletcher 2009: 808; Below 2007: 710). One of the most important starting points of this most recent securitization of climate change can be found in a worst-case study of Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall: "An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security" (Schwartz and Randall 2003), which they conducted for the Pentagon and that was later on leaked to the public. The focus of the study is on three climate change scenarios with different degrees of severity and their consequences for US national security. The study generated considerable interest in political as well as military

[21] The academic discussion on climate security certainly has influenced the political debate and cannot always be clearly separated from it. However, at least in the US example, it were particularly political NGOs and think tanks that had an impact on policy debates, thus I focus on these actors.

[22] This first phase can be understood in connection to a changing security environment with the end of the cold war and increasingly vibrant academic and political discussions about environmental security. It triggered various programs, institutions and funding schemes at the border of the environmental and security-defense sector Harris (2002); Floyd (2010).

circles. Moreover, the Hollywood movie "The Day After Tomorrow" partly builds on scenarios that are discussed in the study such as a discontinuation of the Gulf Stream circulation and thus interested a broader public for the possible impacts of climate change. The next important move in the US climate-security debate has been the lobbying of former Vice-President and Presidential candidate Albert "Al" Gore for a more progressive US climate policy. Particularly his movie: "An Inconvenient Truth" in which he tries to convince the audience that climate change is really happening and could have catastrophic consequences, generated worldwide attention. The impact of Al Gore's arguments was further reinforced by him receiving the Nobel Peace Prize together with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2008. In his Nobel Price acceptation speech he clearly uses a securitizing language to make his point:

> "We, the human species, are confronting a planetary emergency – a threat to the survival of our civilization that is gathering ominous and destructive potential even as we gather here. […] We must quickly mobilize our civilization with the urgency and resolve that has previously been seen only when nations mobilized for war" (Gore 2007).

The peak of the climate-security debate in the US (and also worldwide) took place in the year 2007 when several congress initiatives that linked climate change to security were initiated[23] and various important think tank and NGO reports were published. One of the most prominent and influential reports was issued by *CNAs Center for Naval Analysis (CNA)* – a think tank partly financed by the Department of Defence and employing a considerable number of former politicians and military personal – called: The National Security Implications of Climate Change. A second widely received report was published jointly by the think tanks *Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)* and *Center for a New American Security (CNAS)*, with the title: "The Age of Consequences. The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change*"*. This report as well mainly employs a national security logic. During the next years climate change was kept on the US agenda as a security issue and various further reports linked the two topics, issued for instance by the *American Security Project (ASP)*[24], the *Brookings Institution (Campbell 2008)*, the *Center for American Progress (CAP)*[25], the *Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) (Busby*

[23] For instance the "Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act" and the "Liebermann-Warner Climate Security Act" Richert (2009: 7).
[24] Vagg (2012); Foley (2012); American Security Project (ASP) (2012); Foley and Holland (2012)
[25] Werz and Manlove (2009); Werz and Conley (2012)

2007), the *Wilson Center (Dabelko 2009)*, and the *Center for Energy and Climate Solutions (C2ES (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES) 2013))*. Likewise, the election of new President Barack Obama in 2008 generated further momentum for climate legislation (Dröge 2012: 1) and introduced more climate-security rhetoric and the integration of climate change into various important planning documents[26]. Moreover, a great number of Congress initiatives[27] tried to reach an agreement on a federal climate law by playing the security card, though eventually all failed due to resistance in Senate. After these disappointments and when the international climate negotiations spectacularly failed at the summit in Copenhagen in 2009 the interest for climate matters faded again in the United States and also in the Obama administration. Today there is still no federal climate law, though various fairly progressive laws and regulations at the state level (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES) 2012).

This does not mean that the securitization of climate change in the US has been unsuccessful and has not had any political consequences. However, the consequences look different from what one would expect at first. In the following I apply my threefold matrix onto the US debate to see which discourses were dominant, whether there are links between the discourses and what political effects this distinct securitization of climate change has had so far in the country. To this end I analysed various reports that connected climate change to security and/or risk conceptions mostly stemming from the US government and its advisory bodies, think tanks and NGOs. The reports were selected on the basis of their visibility in the general climate change debate, cross-references between the reports (and parliamentary debates) as well as mentions in the secondary literature.

Sovereign Discourse

The sovereign security discourse is by far the most common one in the United States. Almost all reports, speeches and documents that draw a link between climate change and security make use of this discourse, often with reference to the threatened national security of the US. One reason could be the high standing of the military sector in US society and the long tradition of arguing with national security conceptions. Drawing on this security logic probably resonates best within

[26] Such as the Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR), the reports of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the National Security Strategy (NSS).

[27] Throughout the 2000s climate change initiatives in Congress had steadily grown with only 75 between 2001-2002 rising to 106 between 2005–2006 and the 235 in the 110th congress (2007-2008) Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES) (2008).

political and defence circles and therefore has the greatest chance of generating attention and also funding opportunities for climate matters[28]. Because one important impetus for linking the two topics was to overcome the stalemate during the Bush Jr. era in regard to climate policies, the focus on national security might also have been an attempt to convince conservative and republican circles that climate change nonetheless was an important topic (Fletcher 2009: 808). Furthermore, many reports that connect climate change and security come from think tanks that traditionally have strong ties with political as well as military circles and often employ former political and military personal.

One common characteristic of the sovereign discourse is that mostly national security conceptions are used and that the United States (or other nation states) and sometimes the military itself (CNA Corporation 2007: 37) are considered the threatened referent object – as some reports already indicate in the title[29]. Thus, the most well-known CNA report states that: "Projected climate change poses a serious threat to America`s national security" (CNA Corporation 2007: 6); and the CSIS/CNAS report also concentrates on the security of nations: "We already live in an 'age of consequences', one that will increasingly be defined by the intersection of climate change and the security of nations." (Campbell *et al.* 2007: 5).

However, it is not the direct physical effects of climate change – such as changed precipitation patters, extreme weather and resource scarcity – that are identified as main threats but rather the indirect socio-political consequences that could be triggered by such events. One important argument is that climate change could act as a threat multiplier (CNA Corporation 2007: 32) and destabilize states and eventually whole regions, thus contribute to more fragile and failed states around the world: "The challenges Africa will face as a result of climate change may be massive, and could present serious threats to even the most stable of governments." (CNA Corporation 2007: 20). This in turn is thought to increase violent conflict behaviour and provide the ground for the spread of radical ideologies and terrorism (CNA Corporation 2007: 13, 17, 20, 22, 31). One study even goes so far as to consider nuclear war as a consequence of a world that is destabilized due to

[28] See here also Floyd (2010) who already showed that a security argumentation can indeed generate extensive funding opportunities.

[29] Schwartz and Randall (2003); CNA Corporation (2007); Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) and Center for a New American Security (CNAS) (2007)

climate change: "Under the circumstances described above, it is clear that even nuclear war cannot be excluded as a political consequence of global warming." (Campbell *et al.* 2007: 78). In such an overall more instable world – that in one report is compared to the post-apocalyptic environment of the Mad Max movies (CNA Corporation 2007: 21) – the US and other nations could be forced to intervene more often (militarily and humanitarian) to keep the problems from spiralling out of control and to secure their domestic energy demand (Schwartz and Randall 2003: 14, 22). Furthermore, such an environment is thought to be characterized by a conflictive logic according to which every country must fight for its own survival: "In a world that sees 2 meter sea level rise, with continued flooding ahead, it will take extraordinary effort for the United States, or indeed any country, to look beyond its own salvation." (Campbell *et al.* 2007: 85).

An additional argument that is most common in this discourse is that developing countries – that are considered to be less stable and to lack the necessary means to adapt to climate change – are believed to be hit first and hardest by these developments. Nevertheless, through mass-migration and conflicts that spill over national borders these developments could spread to other regions and eventually even to the developed countries (CNA Corporation 2007: 32). The result would be a destabilization of the whole global security architecture: "Some migrations cross international borders. Environmental degradation can fuel migrations in less developed countries, and these migrations can lead to international political conflict" (CNA Corporation 2007: 18).

To counter these threats, in the sovereign power logic it is recommend to integrate climate change scenarios into the planning schemes of the defence and security institutions such as the Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR)[30], The National Intelligence Council reports (NIC 2013) and the National Security Strategy (NSS) (US Government 2010). Accordingly, military intervention and military led humanitarian missions are believed to become more common (Campbell *et al.* 2007: 108) and to tackle mass-migration reports suggest to strengthen border security in the US (Campbell *et al.* 2007: 59). Moreover, the military itself is advised to adapt to climatic effects, to secure its bases

[30] United States Government (2010). In 2008 the "National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)" ruled that the DoD considers the effects of climate change and incorporate it into QDR 2010 Parthermore and Rogers (2010: 5). Furthermore, the "Global Climate Change Security Oversight Act" urged the Department of Defense (DOD) to foster research into and readiness for possible military consequences of climate change C2ES (2007/2008a).

against flooding, and to improve fuel efficiency to cope with resource scarcities but also to contribute to the mitigation of GHG emissions (Foley 2012: 1, 3).

However, all these military and defence oriented measures are not believed to be sufficient (Campbell *et al.* 2007: 9) and most reports that draw on sovereign security argumentations also propose multilateral cooperation, the greening of the US economy and energy production, emission trading schemes and the developed countries helping the developing ones (Campbell *et al.* 2007: 93–108; Busby 2007: 11–21). Thus, what we can witness within the sovereign discourse is a gradual transformation of the national security logic towards less direct forms of security – as expected by the governmentalization of security. In the course, rather than extraordinary measures in the sense of the Copenhagen School or a straight militarization of climate or development measures (Wagner 2008), what happens is a "climatization" of the security and defence sector (Oels 2011: 18). This climatization works in both directions so that in its course the defence sector integrates climate change matters into its planning but at the same time also infuses climate research with security imperatives as the demand for "actionable" data on climate security threats increases (Rogers and Gulledge 2010: 41). As a consequence this contributes to the transformation of the traditional security logic and has facilitated the invention of new concepts such as "new security threats", "networked security" and "sustainable security" (Rogers and Gulledge 2010: 8, 18, 29; Werz and Conley 2012: 33–34). This has led to a gradual merging of defence, climate and development measures – a development which already took place to a certain extent in the first phase of environmental securitization in the 1990s and which is mentioned as role model for the current developments by some (CNA Corporation 2007: 46). One concrete example is the increased cooperation of USaid with the US African Command (AFRICOM) and the augmented spending of development aid through channels of the Department of Defence (DOD) (from 5.7 percent in 2002 to 21.7 percent in 2005) (CSIS (Center for Strategic & International Studies) 2008: vi). And as others already pointed out with reference of to an analysis of the NSS strategies and their mentions of climate change, the deployment of disaster response missions through the military is becoming more common and legitimate (Brzoska 2012a).

Disciplinary Discourse

The disciplinary discourse is not as widespread as the sovereign one but still almost all actors at least include this perspective into their argumentation. In this discourse the focus is less on violent

conflict and the security of states or "national security" but rather on the everyday threats for individuals and groups often subsumed under concepts such as "human security", "human vulnerability" or "food security": "Security cannot be defined in purely military terms. Instead, governments must prepare for threats to the security of people, not just states. Climate change does not respect political borders. Just because a nation has secured its territorial integrity does not mean it has ensured the security of its citizens." (Foley and Holland 2012: 2) .

So here it is mainly the direct physical effects of climate change that stand in the centre of the attention, for instance extreme weather events and disasters, droughts, food and water scarcity and the spread of infectious diseases: "These changes will negatively affect agricultural output, displace populations from coastlines, change access to water resources, and likely increase the frequency of associated disease outbreaks." (CNA Corporation and Oxfam 2011: 5). Although it is mostly people in developing countries that are believed to be in direct danger of climate change, at some instances also US citizens could be affected – for which the Hurricane Katrina often is presented as an example of what might come in the future (Busby 2007: 5): "According to a report issued by the U.S. State Department, an increase in the earth's temperature would cause sea levels to rise (threatening coastal areas where 53 percent of Americans live), increase the frequency and severity of storms, bring about the widespread destruction of ecosystems, and lead to more heat waves and droughts." (Albright *et al.* 2006: 7).

Nevertheless, the focus in the disciplinary discourse clearly is on poor people in developing countries – particularly in Africa and Asia (Busby 2007: 9; Foley and Holland 2012: 17) – that are thought to be hit first and hardest (Campbell *et al.* 2007: 7, 56, 72) and therefore are in need of help from industrialized countries. What becomes apparent here is the concept of "normation", starting from the ideal norm of a rich, healthy and well-fed citizen of an industrialized country that is able to adapt to climate change. This ideal is compared to the poor, often sick and undernourished inhabitant of an already unstable developing country whose problems now get exacerbated by climate change and who is not able to adapt properly: "Poverty and underdevelopment are key factors in South Asia's vulnerability to climate change because they reduce people's capacity to cope with large-scale disasters as well as adapt for future disruptions." (Foley and Holland 2012: 7). This deviation from the norm now has to be reduced by for example increasing development aid measures: "First, the potentially severe impacts that climate change will have on agriculture

and food security suggest that a higher priority should be assigned to protecting and rebuilding livelihoods and local food production capacity in the wake of an emergency" (CNA Corporation and Oxfam 2011: 14–15).

While being in itself a positive development, this picture nonetheless reproduces already existing identity and truth constructions of powerful industrialized versus helpless developing countries and thus reinforces prevailing dependencies of developing countries on external help: "Many of the affected areas have large, vulnerable populations requiring international assistance to cope with or escape the effects of sea level rise." (Campbell *et al.* 2007: 42). Furthermore, the call for adaptation and mitigation measures within the developing countries themselves (together with demands for democratization and economic liberalisation) are disciplinary moves that force certain patterns of behaviour onto people and states that are least responsible for climate change and its negative effects in the first place; while other actions might be more in the interest of the local people. A further result of this normation is an increased surveillance of the people and groups in those countries (by western states and organizations) and the hope to transform their behaviour and existence towards the ideal norm. Examples are the demand for "early warning systems" (Werz and Conley 2012: 18) and "monitoring activities" (CNA Corporation 2007: 23). In the end, the main danger of a securitization along disciplinary power lies in taking away agency from the threatened actors to define the situation and the means necessary to overcome the problems.

Despite these arguments, the disciplinary discourse and its focus in the security of individuals has a much more favourable image as it at first sight seems to be a less confrontational and military focused form of securitization. However, when looking at the argumentation in more detail it becomes apparent that in the US debate this disciplinary argumentation often is tied to the sovereign discourse: "A health emergency involving large numbers of casualties and deaths from disease can quickly expand into a major regional or global security. In some areas of the Middle East, tensions over water already exist. Challenge that may require military support, ranging from distribution of vaccines to full-scale stability operations" (CNA Corporation 2007: 15). In most documents the argumentation does not stop with describing problems to human security but rather the core argument keeps being a threatened US national security: "A truly sustainable approach to security, then, requires us not only to look at the traditional security threats posed by the interaction between states, but also to understand that the security of the United States is advanced by promoting the

individual well-being of people across the developing world, and by embracing collective responses to shared threats posed by climate change." (Werz and Conley 2012: 9).

Concerning the recommendations within the disciplinary discourse the focus is on development measures to help local populations to cope with the effects of climate change. Moreover, the actor spectrum here is much broader than in the sovereign discourse and it is not only state and military institutions that are empowered to act in response to the challenges but also NGOs and other non-state actors. However, with reference to the responsibility to protect, even within this seemingly less dangerous securitization there is a real possibility for military intervention with the argument that some states might not be able to protect the human security of their population or that a local human security situation could expand to a threat to regional or global security – or even travel to industrialized countries though mass-migration: "Darfur provides a case study of how existing marginal situations can be exacerbated beyond the tipping point by climate-related factors. It also shows how lack of essential resources threatens not only individuals and their communities but also the region and the international community at large." (CNA Corporation 2007: 15). Thus, although starting out from the other end of the continuum, this discourse too advances concepts such as "networked security" or "sustainable security" (Werz and Manlove 2009: 5) that facilitate a merging of climate, development and disaster response measures with military and security centred approaches (Werz and Conley 2012: 5, 31-34).

Governmental Discourse

The governmental discourse with its less direct risk conceptions that depict climate change as a long-term risk, is at first sight least common in the US debate[31]. However, although not being dominant, some of its core concepts such as the focus on statistically generated risk groups and areas and the thinking in future oriented risk and probability schemes can be found in most reports. When this discourse appears, it is most likely connected to one of the other two discourses to highlight the uncertainty of all climate predictions and the associated risk for socio-political consequences: "It seems true, if inconvenient, that X millions of acres of seashore, Y hundreds of millions of climate refugees, and Z billions of malaria mosquitoes will result if we don't act. […]. Those wide ranges, coupled with the long delay time, the intangible nature of the risks, and the

[31] One reason could be the focus on think tank reports in this paper.

complexity, make this global threat a hard sell." (Rogers and Gulledge 2010: 21). Particularly when it comes to military centred scenarios a governmental logic and risk vocabulary can be found. Thus, many reports use concepts such as "contingency planning", "risk-assessment", "scenario-planning", "precautionary principle", "black swan events[32]" and "resilience building" (Rogers and Gulledge 2010: 3, 7; Busby 2007: 14–15; Foley and Holland 2012: 6–8). The aim is to be able to cope with future climate effects and to govern these uncertain, yet dangerous future events in the present.

Furthermore, drawing on the governmental logic of "normalization" many reports identify certain risk groups (poor people, women and children) and risk areas (developing countries, already fragile or failed states, areas near the sea, arid-areas), that are particularly endangered by first and second order climatic effects in contrast to the general population. This concentration on risk groups is in line with the principle of cost-efficiency that is part of governmental power because it enables to govern economically. This can be a positive approach, as it redirects aid and attention towards those most in need but at the same time can lead to the neglect of other countries, groups and problems that cannot be linked to the risk of adverse climate change effects. Furthermore, the concentration on these high risk groups – that almost exclusively are located in developing countries – redirects the attention from mitigation measures in the industrialized countries that are responsible for climate change in the first place towards adaptation measures in developing countries. Thus, instead of tackling the root causes and mitigate GHGs, the attention shifts towards the symptoms and towards mitigating the security risks through adaptation measures.

A further characteristic of the governmental discourse is that the aim is to bring risks down to a tolerable level but not to eradicate them completely (as this is impossible, see Corry 2012). According to this logic, the goal is not to stop climate change completely by mitigating GHGs, but to keep the risk at a tolerable level by tackling some of its worst security implications. Yet, the question is tolerable for whom? From a US perspective, tolerable climate change could very well mean catastrophic consequences for small developing countries such as the drowning of whole island states or the desertification of complete regions. Moreover, as already pointed to within the concept of the disciplinary discourse, to be at risk, can quickly expand to be at odds with the welfare

[32] Events that are very unlikely to occur but could have devastating consequences.

of the overall population, so that a risk based securitization can eventually also facilitate sovereign intervention to prevent risks from becoming a danger for the general population: "(…) risk-based categories can generate further stigma for individuals who are deemed to be members of those risk groups. To be 'at risk' is effectively to be at odds with, or even a danger to, the welfare of the population (…)." (Elbe 2009: 140).

In contrast to the disciplinary discourse though, in the spirit of laissez-faire the governmental discourse seeks to interfere as little and as indirect as possible with the dynamics of the population. Hence, here the danger of direct intervention is less prevalent and the focus is more on improving the contextual vulnerability and resilience of the risk groups. However, as pointed out with regard to the question what constituted a tolerable risk, these indirect interventions might be too weak to make a big difference. Another strategy in line with this logic would be to concentrate more on avoiding to produce climate change effects in the first place by mitigating GHG emissions in the biggest polluter states, though as pointed out, this strategy is becoming less popular within the overall securitization process, which is dominated by a sovereign logic of security.

A Slippery Slope? The Power Effects and Their Normative Assessment

Looking at the overall picture, the present securitization of climate change in the US is dominated by sovereign power but also includes disciplinary and governmental elements. Despite this sovereign dominance, it has not led to any Copenhagian extraordinary measures to stop climate change. It even failed to deliver a federal climate law or to facilitate a more progressive international climate change policy of the United States. Nonetheless, it certainly had an effect in that it enabled developments that without this securitization would probably not have had occurred (Mildner and Richert 2010: 12). Thus, it rendered climate change governable in a very specific way and therefore made possible some developments (e.g. the integration of climate matters into military planning) and prevented others from being thought of as legitimate or even possible – for instance, to avoid climate change completely, is not considered a possible way of action any more, as the security effects are believed to materialize anyway.

This, however, does not mean that the normative assessment has to be completely negative. As Floyd (Floyd 2007b) already suggested, the normative evaluation of securitization processes should follow a consequentialist and ex-post logic, concentrating on each case in detail. Concerning

the US example, I start out from the twofold normative criterion that the less climate change the better (e.g. limit global warming to a maximum of 2 degrees) and the less human casualties the better. Resting on this assumption the present securitization has certainly had some positive effects. It contributed to the end of the climate stalemate in the US during the beginning of the 2000s and thus helped climate change matters to more attention in all political camps. It also led to various concrete policy initiatives that, even though in the end unsuccessful on the federal level, might have contributed to the success of some state level initiatives. This attention generating quality of security is precisely why environmental and social topics have been securitized in the past and in itself can be regarded positive (Floyd 2013: 281). Even the focus on the traditional security and defence sector could have some positive repercussions, as the military is advised to contribute to climate mitigation and energy preservation measures (Carmen *et al.* 2010: 1, 3, 8). Moreover, the disciplinary elements of the securitization focused the attention on the problems of the people first and most hit by climate change – the poor in developing countries. In this respect it undoubtedly facilitated adaptation measures, development aid programs and financing schemes helping developing countries to better cope with climate change effects. Last but not least, even though the governmental power based discourse in its ideal typical form turned out to be less used in the US example, several developments showed how the two other power forms are beginning to transform towards this less direct exercise of power. Hence, this can be regarded as an example for the gradual transformation of sovereign power and the traditional security logic as has already been put forward by Trombetta (Trombetta 2011).

On the other hand, there are also several aspects that have to be regarded problematic or at least ambivalent from a normative perspective. Hence, the newly generated attention for climate issues has, due to the focus on the sovereign discourse, not led to decisive improvements in US federal or international climate mitigation polices. Instead, the present securitization enabled a climatization of the security sector that incorporated climate matters into its planning schemes. Some reports stress this point fairly insistently and call for widespread institutional reforms that allow a better coordination between the defence and climate sector (Busby 2007: 22–25; Rogers and Gulledge 2010: 8–10). These developments could also have decisive repercussions for climate research as the security sector demands very different projections and scenarios that are more tuned to the security dimension and contain more concrete "actionable" data (Rogers and Gulledge 2010: 14, 18, 41). Furthermore, these developments, together with the also quite strong disciplinary elements

in the US discourse, also facilitated the merging of military and civilian initiatives of the US in developing countries or areas that were hit by disasters (Brzoska 2012a), thus contributing to the coining of concepts such as "networked", "sustainable security" and military-civilian co-commands (COCOMS) (Carmen *et al.* 2010: 6–7; see also Hartmann 2009, 2010; Werz and Conley 2012: 33–34). As already mentioned, what we can observe here, is the gradual transformation of the meaning of sovereign security towards the other two power forms. Direct sovereign intervention using military means is not any more considered the first choice, but is increasingly combined with less direct approaches – which does not mean that governmental or disciplinary power takes over completely, it rather is a gradual readjustment of sovereign power. This can certainly have positive effects but at the same time entails the danger of militarizing civilian interventions, disaster and development aid (Wagner 2008).

A further problematic effect of the securitization is that although most reports recommend mitigation measures, the dominant discourse refocused the attention rather on adaptation measures and on the mitigation of the security threats (and away from mitigation, which was much more prominent in the former environmental or economic framing). Thus, tackling the root causes of climate change has moved to the background to a certain extent. Likewise, the US example has shown, that the different discourses of climate security do not exist totally independent from another. As the idea of the governmentalization of security suggests, securitization process today draw on all three power forms that also transform each other. An example is the often stressed link between human and national security were an at first glance harmless humanitarian argumentation can in the end be used to make a national security argument. This could eventually legitimize military intervention in countries that are believed to get out of control due to climate change. Accordingly, even at first glance harmless or positive discourses can have unintended consequences.

Turning back to the overall normative evaluation of the securitization of climate change in the US, the equation remains only positive if one takes a short or middle term perspective – because it helped to fast start various legislative initiatives and raised attention for the problems of the people most adversely affected by climate change. Looking on the long term effects, the securitization has to be considered much more critical as it facilitated a focus on the short term and symptomatic effects of climate change thereby neglecting long term mitigation measures; and without stopping

GHGs in the first place future climate effects will most probably much more severe and more costly to cope with (Stern 2006). Moreover, the long term and more hidden effects of the disciplinary and governmental parts in this securitization, such as reproducing certain dependencies and images of developing countries and the people living there, increased surveillance and the creation of risk groups are at best ambivalent from a normative perspective and cannot be assessed completely at present.

Hence, securitizations drawing on any power form must be considered a slippery slope and each case has to be scrutinized carefully to consider its normative implications: "My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad" (Foucault 1997a: 256). Connecting to this critical attitude, the governmentality approach and the focus on the three interacting power forms can help us to uncover these dynamics and to problematize seemingly positive developments but also to see favourable effects of at first sight problematic securitizations.

Conclusion

The overall aim of this paper was to show how the governmentality approach can be combined with securitization theory in a useful manner and to demonstrate how this can generate new insights into the securitization of climate change and its political effects. To this end, a revised governmentality framework has been developed – resting on Foucault's and Elbes work – which draws on the assumption of three power forms that inform different climate-security discourses. The main advantage of this framework over the concentration on the referent object is, that due to its focus on power forms and power effects, it can generate a deeper understanding of how certain securitizations can lead to distinct political effects. To exemplify how this can work out empirically, I analyzed the climate security-debate in the United States between 2000 and 2012. As a result it was shown, that due to a predominantly sovereign power centered securitization, the debate has not primarily led to more progressive climate-mitigation policies, but rather to a focus on the symptoms and adaptation measures as well as to an integration of climate change into military and defense planning schemes. Moreover, the US example has revealed that the discourses do not exist totally independently but interact and transform each other and recode the meaning of security in the process.

There are also some things that need to be further worked out in this line of research. One point is the selection of the empirical material, which in this case was biased towards think tank reports – because it were these reports that generated most attention. These reports predominantly employed the sovereign discourse and neglected less direct securitizations such as the concentration on risk. Here, greater attention could be directed to documents of insurance industry to find more instances of governmental power and risk conceptions. Furthermore, the distinction between the three discourses is not always entirely clear when it comes to the empirical material. Yet, this is a problem that all approaches working with different securitization discourses have in common and which cannot entirely be solved on a theoretical basis but has to be acknowledged in the empirical application.

Concerning further research, it would undoubtedly be interesting to apply this approach in a comparative manner in other domestic contexts and to assess whether the dominance of other discourses in fact enables other political consequences. Moreover, a closer focus on the actors that employ these discourses and the networks between them could be a fruitful line of research. Particularly since, at least in the US, the think tanks often have close ties to political and military practitioners. Connecting to this, a more detailed analysis of parliamentary debates could generate deeper insights into how and why certain discourses were more successful and entered into political debates and policies. I hope that the approach developed in this paper can facilitate this endeavor.

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