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**State Properties and Foreign Policy
Industrialized Countries and the
UNESCO Crisis**

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
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1. Introduction

In the UNESCO crisis, which spanned a ten-year period from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, the industrialized countries were confronted with the Third World's claim for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). To this challenge they reacted in many ways ranging from full or partial support of Third World demands to withdrawal from UNESCO. How can this variety of state behaviour be explained? In order to answer this question we employ and test competing approaches of foreign policy analysis which attempt to attribute foreign policy behaviour to state properties. After a brief account of the UNESCO crisis (section 2) and of three basic approaches to the explanation of foreign policy by state properties (section 3) this paper outlines our research design and presents an analytical model of the foreign policy process (section 4). Section 5 contains the conceptualization of the dependent variable and a description of the policies of four major industrialized countries at the height of the UNESCO crisis (1983/84): the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The results of this description indicate that the approach of "interest-oriented behaviour" can be applied in order to account for the differences in UNESCO policies. In section 6 we test subsystemic and positional hypotheses based on this approach which provide a first tenable but not sufficient account of foreign policy behaviours. In a second explanatory cut we therefore include variables presumed to influence foreign policy styles in order to arrive at a more refined and complete explanation (section 7).¹

2. The UNESCO Crisis

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation was established in 1945 as a specialized agency of the United Nations. The purpose of UNESCO, as stated in article 1 of its constitution, is "to contribute to peace and security by promoting collabora-

1 This paper originates from a research project on the "Policies of Industrialized Countries towards UNESCO 1978-1986" currently conducted at the Center for International Relations/Peace and Conflict Research, University of Tübingen and funded by the German Research Association (DFG). We would like to thank Hans Peter Schmitz and Marion Urban for their valuable assistance in providing some of the data for this study as well as Michael Zürn for his comments on an earlier version of this paper.

tion among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law, and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations". This task became controversial in the mid-1970s and evolved in what is usually called the "UNESCO crisis".

The issues which were discussed during the UNESCO crisis can be summarized in three major categories: New World Information and Communication Order, organizational efficacy and efficiency, and politicization.²

(1) The program of a *New World Information and Communication Order* (NWICO) which stands in close relation to the New International Economic Order has brought UNESCO criticism stemming mostly from the Western states.³ UNESCO's constitution requires in article 1 "to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image", thereby reflecting the Western view that governments ought not to interfere with or control communication across borders. In the course of growing Third World self-confidence and self-assertion in international organizations, this hitherto predominant Western view was attacked: Third World countries were displeased with the quality and quantity of news coverage of their territories by the predominantly Western controlled global media. Western media were accused of monopolizing world news coverage, creating a one-way flow of information from North to South. As to the content of information, they were criticized for a negative bias in their information about Third World events, e.g. the emphasis on such phenomena as corruption and coups d'etat. Thus, Third World governments demanded a new order aimed at obtaining fair shares of communications facilities and of information flows for developing countries which lacked the necessary infrastructure. Already in the 1972 Declaration on Satellite Broadcasting,⁴ the principle of "free flow" was challenged by the new slogan of "balanced flow of information". The 1978 UNESCO Declaration on the Media⁵ contained a com-

2 Cf., e.g., Dicke (1988: 80ff).

3 Cf. Beigbeder (1987: 29ff); Imber (1989: 96ff).

4 UNESCO, Gen. Conf. 17th. session, res. 4.111.

5 UNESCO, Gen. Conf. 20th. session, res. 4/9.3/2.

promise formula by demanding a "free flow and wider and better balanced dissemination of information".

(2) Conflict in the field of *organizational efficacy and efficiency* focused on Western complaints about excessive budget growth and inadequate financial control.⁶ It was further criticized that UNESCO was an overcentralized organization in which power was concentrated in the hands of the Director-General. Delays in making routine decisions, inflexibility, inadequate means of co-ordinating activities to avoid duplication, and the ineffective implementation of programs were seen to be the consequence of this centralization. As to personnel management, the concentration of staff at headquarters in Paris was considered inappropriate. Charges of mismanagement focused on the Director-General, Amadou Mahtar M'Bow.

(3) The Western complaint about excessive *politicization* was based on the Functionalist argument⁷ that the tasks of specialized agencies were only technical, economic, and social in nature. Therefore, general foreign policy differences between states should not become the focus of debate within UNESCO. The charge that UNESCO was politicized⁸ referred predominantly to discrimination against Israel. At the 1974 General Conference of UNESCO a majority of states refused to admit Israel to the regional sub-group "Europe" because of its alleged misbehaviour in the occupied territories. In addition, UNESCO's 1974 General Conference criticized Israeli archaeological excavations in the Old City of Jerusalem, i.e. occupied territory. Moreover, UNESCO has been reproached for its peace and disarmament activities (mainly initiated by the Soviet Union) and for its support of national liberation movements.

6 Cf. for the following, e.g., Beigbeder (1987: 32).

7 The term "Functionalism" here refers to an approach to the study of international organizations and integration introduced by Mitrany (1966; first published in 1943). In this view, international organizations serve to manage the increasing interdependence between states and will be most successful if they deal with problems of so called "low politics". For a Functionalist analysis of UNESCO cf. Sewell (1975).

8 Cf. Beigbeder (1987: 30); Imber (1989: 103ff).

Already in the early seventies some of these conflicts caused changes in the foreign policy behaviour of several states towards UNESCO, e.g. the withholding of funding for UNESCO by the U.S. Congress in 1976 and the Israeli cessation of participation in UNESCO from 1974 to 1978. However, in the period from 1978 to 1986, UNESCO was going through a severe general crisis which threatened the existence of the organization. During that period the industrialized countries acted in very different ways. Whereas the United States and Great Britain eventually left UNESCO, the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries strongly supported Third World demands. Between these poles, the Nordic states and France sought to partly accommodate the demands of the developing states. Other Western countries like the Federal Republic of Germany strongly opposed any efforts to restrict the "free flow of information" but chose not to leave the organization.

3. State Properties and the Explanation of Foreign Policy

In order to explain the variation in state behaviour during the UNESCO crisis, our study focusses on the properties of the state actors involved. This focus is justified because in UNESCO - in contrast to the ILO, for example - only governments are represented and able to act directly. However, our understanding of "state properties" is broad enough to include the position of a state in the international system as well as the type of relationship it maintains with domestic societal groups. This allows us to analyze foreign policy in UNESCO from a single perspective, that of the state, while neither neglecting international opportunities and constraints nor societal demands (or supports) influencing state behaviour.

How do state properties determine foreign policy? Explanations of foreign policy behaviour by state properties can be subdivided into three main approaches or ways of causation:

(1) *Foreign policy as interest-oriented behaviour* is understood as the pursuit of state or "national" interests. According to this approach, behaviour can be conceptualized as goal-oriented action and states as rational or intentional actors.⁹ Therefore, it is sufficient to account for the interests of a state in order to explain its concomitant external behaviour.

9 Cf. Allison (1971: ch. 1).

However, whereas the classical rational actor-model is either not concerned with the nature of the goals pursued (e.g. in game theory) or posits an invariable "national interest" like the "eternal quest" for power and independence (realism), we assume that foreign policy interests have to be empirically determined with reference to specific demands and values in each case.

(2) *Foreign policy as behavioural style* means a national tendency to prefer certain foreign policy instruments and strategies and discard others. A style is seen as at least partially independent of the issues at stake and state interests: In contrast to the assumption of interest-oriented behaviour, states may well have identical interests and yet pursue them by very different means. In agreement with this approach it is possible to describe a state's foreign policy as (comparatively) "aggressive", "cautious" or "low profile" in general. The well-known hypothesis about "peace through democracy" belongs to this kind of explanation.

(3) In case of *foreign policy as emergent behaviour*, the external behaviour of states is attributed neither to defined interests nor to preferred styles but to the outcome of an interplay between societal and governmental actors or between various governmental actors depending on the situation. The "decision-making approach" (Snyder/Bruck/Sapin 1962) and the "bureaucratic politics paradigm" (Allison 1971, Halperin 1974) are examples of models that explain foreign policy behaviour on the basis of this approach.

For each of these three causal paths we can further distinguish "second image"- and "third image"-reasoning following an early categorization by Kenneth Waltz (1965). "*Second image*"-approaches focus on the *internal* properties of states or their societies in order to explain foreign policy behaviour, i.e. on foreign policy interests caused by domestic demands and values, on domestically shaped foreign policy styles, and on the interplay of domestic groups and organizations. Among these internal properties we furthermore distinguish between *institutional factors* that refer to the durable properties of a state, *situational factors* that are at work only in a specific conflict situation, and *dispositional factors* which contain the cognitive and subjective dimensions of foreign policy making. These categories correspond to the structural, the situational, and the cognitive modes of foreign policy explanation¹⁰. "*Third image*"-approaches assume foreign policy behaviour to be mainly determined

10 Cf. Carlsnaes' similar model of foreign policy explanation (1986: 114f., slightly modified and dynamized in 1992).

by *positional* properties of the states which describe their positions in relation to each other and in the international system. However, our study is mainly intended to assess the influence of domestic, subsystemic factors on foreign policy. Positional variables are, therefore, represented in smaller numbers and rather regarded as control variables.

Which state properties determine foreign policy? Hypotheses which try to explain external state behaviour by state properties can be drawn from several strands of research on international relations (IR):

(1) The investigation of peaceful conflict management through international institutions lies at the intersection of peace and conflict research and research on international governance, i.e. international organizations and regimes. In peace and conflict research the explanation of peaceful behaviour by referring to actor properties has a long tradition. In recent years it has focused on the relationship between democracy and peace and established as one of the few laws we find in IR that democracies do not go to war with each other¹¹. However, the inquiry into which specific features of democracies are responsible for their peaceful relations (and for their sometimes not so peaceful relations with non-democracies) has not yet gone very far. Although we are not dealing with a peace or war situation here, we take up some of the more prominent *state properties held responsible for the peaceful interactions of democracies* in order to test their explanatory power in accounting for cooperative or non-cooperative foreign policies.

(2) In research on international organizations and regimes, the lack of subsystemic approaches to the explanation of international institutions has now and then been lamented, but rarely been tackled in a systematic fashion¹². Our study, therefore, is intended to test some promising subsystemic *hypotheses about state behaviour conducive (or opposed) to building and strengthening international institutions* such as UNESCO.

(3) Since the mid-1970s, a rich body of *literature on the security and foreign economic policies of Western industrialized countries* has emerged. Studies such as those on the "strength of the state", the "trading state" and "neocorporatism" relate societal, govern-

11 Cf. e.g. Doyle (1983), Rittberger (1987), and Russett (1990).

12 See Zürn (1993) as an attempt to fill this gap.

mental and international variables in an innovative way¹³. However, *foreign cultural policy* has been widely neglected as a distinct object of research. Therefore, it would be interesting to see if the approaches and hypotheses developed for the analysis of security and economic issues also hold up in this more ideologically charged field.

4. Research Design and Analytical Model

Several demands on our research design and analytical model ensue from this overview:

- (1) Our study - as research on foreign policy ought to be in general - has to be designed in a way that allows for the testing of substantive hypotheses as well as of formal approaches. The analytical model and the hypotheses therefore have to distinguish not only state properties assumed to influence foreign policy but also the ways of causation or process patterns by which this influence is supposed to be exerted.
- (2) In order to fit into the broad stream of both conflict research and research on international governance, from which we draw our hypotheses for the most part, in the context of this study the general dependent variable "foreign policy" will have to be conceptualized in the terminology of conflict theory.
- (3) This dependent variable has to be split into two dimensions, one substantive or interest dimension, the other behavioural. This is necessary in order to evaluate the "interest-oriented" vs. the "foreign policy style" approach but also follows from an analytical distinction fundamental to conflict theory.¹⁴ We therefore name the interest dimension of foreign policy "conflict position" and the behavioural dimension "conflict behaviour".

13 For an overview see Müller/Risse-Kappen (1990).

14 Cf. Mitchell (1981), Kriesberg (1982), and Efinger/Rittberger/Zürn (1988) who distinguish between "conflict" as a situation of goal incompatibility and "conflict management" as the interactive behaviour dealing with this situation. Although the separation of substantive and behavioural dimensions of foreign policy is widespread, "conflict" has usually been conceptualized on one dimension only in comparative foreign policy analysis, with "conflict" and "cooperation" as a dichotomy or as the extremes of a continuum. It has usually not been considered whether a conflict understood as goal incompatibility exists or not. Cf. e.g. the WEIS data base, its recategorization in Salmore/Munton (1974: 340-41), and Hermann (1978: 41).

ANALYTICAL MODEL

Starting point: reaction to the international challenge by Third World claims for a NWICO




Figure 1

Our analytical model (Fig. 1) tries to meet these requirements and is defined as openly as possible in order not to exclude or predetermine any correlations or ways of causation from the start. The variables listed in the model have been assigned to ways of causation according to hypotheses in the literature and considerations of plausibility. They refer to the hypotheses which will be put to a test in sections 6 and 7.¹⁵ We can now "locate" the approaches to foreign policy analysis and corresponding state properties in the model.

(1) State properties assumed to cause *interest-oriented behaviour* can be found in the upper part of the model. Hypotheses based on this approach start from the assumption that foreign policy is subsystemically determined by basic societal values and goals, rational cost/benefit assessments as well as causal beliefs of the state actors, and externally influenced by the state's position in the international power structure. These factors explain the foreign policy interests of a state which are expressed in its conflict position (arrows A). It is further assumed that "conflict position" is the real dependent variable of which the conflict behaviour is a direct and undistorted consequence (arrow B). Thus, the implicit correlation between conflict position and conflict behaviour is: The greater the conflict intensity (i.e. the distance of one actor's position from that of another), the more uncooperative the behaviour toward this other actor.

(2) Hypotheses about *foreign policy styles* are derived from the assumption that foreign policy behaviour is mainly influenced by established internal policy styles and the normative and cognitive setting in which foreign policy decisions are made. As a possible external cause of foreign policy styles we also consider the degree of the states' enmeshment in international institutions. These variables are listed in the lower left and right parts of the model. It is assumed that these factors work in part independently of the goals at stake in a concrete conflict situation, and that they intervene in the relationship between conflict position and conflict behaviour (arrow C) systematically distorting the result which would have been expected according to the idea of interest-oriented behaviour. In our comparative design, hypotheses about foreign policy styles can only be tested if the conflict position is controlled for, i.e. held constant: The possible existence of different foreign policy styles is then indicated by identical or similar conflict positions but divergent behaviours of two or more states.

15 Other potential explanatory factors have been omitted because of obvious irrelevance or marginal theoretical importance.

(3) The perspective of *emergent behaviour* is treated here as residual. Only if the foreign policy behaviour can neither be attributed to one of the aforementioned ways of causation nor to a combination of them, will we consider the interplay of societal and governmental actors as a possible explanation. Although it should be possible to formulate generalized statements about the effect of the decision-making process on foreign policy, the "decision-making approach" and the "bureaucratic politics paradigm" only offer a checklist of relevant factors but no testable hypotheses.¹⁶ Furthermore, it is mainly according to this model that we expect foreign policy to be the result of idiosyncratic factors working more or less at random, of properties specific to one country, one situation or one leader. If that is the case, there cannot be any hypotheses which explain cooperative or uncooperative behaviour across countries.

In contrast to the quantitative, data-based analysis predominant in the American "Comparative Foreign Policy" movement of the 1970s,¹⁷ we follow the more recent scholarly work on the foreign economic policy of industrialized states in using a qualitative case study design. Our research is oriented towards the method of structured, focused comparison with a few selected cases (George 1979). The UNESCO policies of the United States, France, West Germany and the (former) Soviet Union were intentionally selected based on prior knowledge that these cases extend over the whole spectrum of values of the dependent variable "conflict behaviour". At the same time, these cases have a number of basic properties in common: All four countries are industrialized countries with a developed communications infrastructure, and they are not "small states".¹⁸ The selection also unites three major liberal-democratic countries which, however, differ significantly with respect to their internal organization. As for the Soviet Union, it will be interesting to see if the reform of the Soviet system in the second half of the 1980s produced the expected changes in behaviour. Although our number of explanatory variables is too high, the number of cases too small, and their selection too biased to "yield strong causal inferences",¹⁹ we expect to narrow down

16 Cf. Haftendorn (1990: 410f).

17 Cf. as representative compilations Rosenau (1974) and East/Salmore/Hermann (1978).

18 Small states are often attributed a status of their own in foreign policy theory-building. Cf. Katzenstein (1985) and Papadakis/Starr (1987).

19 Cf. King/Verba/Keohane (1991: 142).

the number of plausible hypotheses and generate new ones that can be put to a more rigidly designed test with a greater number of cases.

5. Foreign Policy in the UNESCO Crisis: The Dependent Variable

In this section, the dependent variable "foreign policy" will be conceptualized and classified separately for the interest and the behaviour dimensions. In the interest dimension, the requirement is to measure conflict intensity in terms of the size of difference between Third World and industrialized countries' positions and to rank-order typologically the positions on the international information and communication order. In the behaviour dimension, the aim is to classify the behaviour of states in terms of three aspects: whether their behaviour can be classified as cooperative or uncooperative in general, whether their behaviour contributes to international institution-building, and which behaviour they chose when dissatisfied with an organization's performance.

5.1. Conflict Positions

Since Western criticism of UNESCO covered several issue-areas and every country accentuated its criticism differently, it is necessary to differentiate the various issue-areas in a systematic way. Table 1, therefore, lists the major issues of the UNESCO crisis in the three areas of the international information and communication order, organizational efficacy and efficiency, and politicization as briefly discussed in chapter 1, indicates the mainstream Third World positions and orders actor positions²⁰ on the issues according to three degrees of conflict intensity. This disaggregated approach to the UNESCO crisis is necessary because we cannot assume that each industrialized country deviates equally from the Third World position on all issues and because we do not want to make any rash judgments on the relative importance of these issues for the crisis.²¹

20 Actor positions have to be measured independently from, and prior to, the concomitant behaviour in order to avoid giving mere rationalizations the status of motivating interests. We determine actor positions on the basis of official policy statements and interviews with decision-makers.

21 For a similar procedure see Hart (1981) on the NIEO.

Table 1: Issues and Conflict Positions in the UNESCO Crisis

Issue	Third World Position (0)	Difference of Positions/Degrees of Conflict Intensity		
		weak (1)	medium (2)	strong (3)
1. international information and communication order				
1.1. quantitative news flow	elimination of market mechanisms	limited protectionist measures	free flow plus supporting measures	absolute free flow
1.2. Third World access to communication technology	free of cost	development aid, reduced cost	market conditions plus financial and technical support	pure market conditions
1.3. influx of foreign information	national control, prior consent	national control and prior consent under certain conditions	no national control or prior consent, but appreciation of the problem, recommendations	absolute free flow
1.4. control of communication contents	ban on racist and militarist contents	limited, partial ban	no restriction, but appreciation of the problem, recommendations	absolute freedom
2. organizational efficacy and efficiency				
2.1. budget	constant rise	reduced growth	freeze	reduction or bilateralization
2.2. management and programme	centralisation, no criticism of management and programme	minor changes in the management and programme of M'Bow and the secretariat	some reform measures in the direction of decentralization and debureaucratization	thorough restructuring of management and programme
2.3. staff policy	staff recruitment strictly according to membership	staff policy favouring a more balanced regional representation	staff policy slightly favouring major contributors	staff recruitment strictly according to contributions
2.4. support for director-general	support for M'Bow	support for another Third World radical	support for Third World moderate	resignation of M'Bow, replacement by a Western DG
3. politicization				
3.1. Palestinian question	condemnation of Israel, expulsion (from certain programs)	general discussion, condemnation of Israel, but no sanctions	only UNESCO issue-specific discussion, but no condemnation	no discussion
3.2. fight against colonialism, racism, Apartheid	main orientation in UNESCO policy and programming	one issue among others in UNESCO policy and programming	discussion, but no UNESCO programs	no discussion

Table 2 adds a qualitative recategorization of the conflict positions for the conflict about the NWICO (part 1 of Table 1): a six-field typology of possible policies towards the international information and communication order based on the preferred principles of control. This typology is necessary in order to test some of the hypotheses in section 6. Furthermore, this recategorization attempts to develop more concrete and aggregated foreign policy types which facilitate the comparison of foreign policies across issue-areas.²²

Table 2: Foreign Policy Types Concerning the International Information and Communication Order

control of international information and communication order	economic	ideological
liberal	informational free trade (1.1.: 2,3; 1.2.: 2,3)	freedom of communication (1.3.: 2,3; 1.4.: 2,3)
nationalistic	protectionism, subsidies (1.1.: 0,1; 1.2.: 0,1)	national control or censorship, prior consent (1.3.: 0,1; 1.4.: 0,1)
internationalistic	international media corporations (e.g. anti-trust commission, international news agency)	international media council or board of censors

We now turn to a *general description of the conflict positions* taken by the Soviet Union, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States followed by a more formalized assignment of values of conflict intensity according to Table 1. However, we only cover the positions at the height of the crisis, i.e. approximately 1983/84, and neglect changes over time which actually occurred in most countries with respect to some of the issues.

The *Soviet* position toward the international information and communication order can be clearly characterized as *nationalistic*: The international information flow was not to be regulated by the market forces of supply and demand but by national control of the amount and of the content of foreign information allowed to cross state borders. The Soviet Union constantly emphasized the principles of national sovereignty and national responsibility in the field of communication. The USSR was especially concerned with the content of informa-

²² Cf. Zürn (1987: 42f). The fields contain examples of the control types. The numbers in brackets refer to the fields in Table 1, e.g. the field "liberal/economic" represents positions taken on issue 1.1. with a medium (2) and strong (3) conflict intensity.

tion: All states should be obliged to ensure that only information which strengthens peace and mutual understanding be disseminated from their territories.²³ On *organizational issues*, the Soviet Union regularly expressed its discontent with Soviet (and East European) under-representation in the UNESCO administration and programs, the institution of permanent contracts and the oversized and expensive UNESCO bureaucracy.²⁴ The general interest in this area was to prevent the UNESCO administration from becoming independent of the member states, on the one hand, and to increase the number of (party controlled) Soviet officials in the UNESCO bureaucracy. The *politicization* of UNESCO was undoubtedly the most important general orientation of Soviet UNESCO policy. Although the Soviet Union in the early 1980s was mainly interested in turning UNESCO into an instrument of its "peace propaganda", Third World emphasis on "anticolonialism" was welcomed as far as it was clearly directed against Western influence in the South.

As far as the *French* position toward the international information and communication order is concerned, we have to distinguish two perspectives. From the *ideological* perspective the French position can be characterized as liberal insofar as French political actors demanded that UNESCO must adhere to its constitutional values. Any Soviet-inspired attempts to slip in a legitimization of censorship or other controversial issues into UNESCO documents provoked fierce French opposition. At the same time, however, there was a strong under-current in French policy opposing an alleged American cultural hegemony. The dominance of "Coca-Cola", jeans and the English language was perceived as a potential danger leading to a certain uniformization of cultures. France, therefore, played a leading role in the attempt to limit the Anglo-Saxon cultural influence by imposing quotas on the number of American films shown in France and other European countries.²⁵ There was an even stronger *nationalistic, protectionist* orientation in French policy where the *economic* side of the NWICO is concerned. Stressing cultural identity became a kind of synonym for the protection of markets for the French-based communication industry. Especially in its former

23 Cf. e.g. Kašlev (1981) and Kolosov/Cepov (1983).

24 Cf. e.g. the detailed Soviet position paper "Pozicija SSSR po nekotorym principal'no važnym voprosam dejatel'nosti JUNESKO na sovremennom ètape (The position of the USSR on some fundamentally important questions of UNESCO activity at the current stage)", September 17, 1984, in: SSSR-JUNESKO 1989, I, 312 ff.

25 Hadesbeck (1991: 161).

African colonies France tried to defend and safeguard its economic and political interests.²⁶ More than most Western states France - at least verbally - stressed the need to help the developing countries create their own communication infrastructure. In the issue-area *organizational efficacy and efficiency* the initial French position is characterized by only weak differences of position. Officially in line with the western zero growth-approach France wished to demonstrate its support for the organization by accepting moderate growth rates of the budget.²⁷ Concerning management problems the French position was also characterized by only slight criticism because the centralized management techniques in UNESCO - at least partly - follow French traditions and were elaborated by M'Bows predecessor René Maheu, a Frenchman. As far as the question of staff policy is concerned, France kept a low profile. There are hardly any official statements on the issue. We can nevertheless assume a weak positional difference favouring a slightly better representation of developing countries in the Secretariat because of France's general Third World orientation. We can not assume, however, that France advocated a recruitment strictly according to membership criteria because of its own overrepresentation in the Paris-based organization.²⁸ Almost unconditional support for the Senegalese Director-General M'Bow, a product of the French educational system, is a striking feature of French policy towards UNESCO at that time. Not until the French government realized that M'Bow's tenure could eventually lead to a break-up of UNESCO did it dissociate itself from the Senegalese. If we take a look at the French position towards *politicization* we can conclude that the French Government generally opposed attempts to politicize UNESCO. Discussion of anti-Jewish or of disarmament draft resolutions was seen as fruitless and dysfunctional because it threatened to paralyze the organization and endanger its universality. Moreover, the French were eager not to spoil things either with their Arab friends or with Israel and the West by being forced to take a vote on controversial resolutions.

The positions of the *Federal Republic of Germany* in the various issue-areas can be described as follows: German politicians readily acknowledged the asymmetry of the news flow and

26 Hadesbeck (1991: 158).

27 Cf. Records of the General Conference. Twenty-Second Session. Proceedings. Vol. 3, Paris 1983. Paris, p. 1212.

28 According to *Le Monde* (Oct. 16, 1979) 1038 of UNESCO's 3249 employees were French nationals.

the necessity to assist developing countries in establishing their own media structures. They accepted a formula of a new world *information and communication* order being described as an evolutionary process which is largely dependent on the elimination of internal and external obstacles to the free flow of information. A substantial number of communication projects in Third World countries were funded by the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation. Germany's stance in respect to communication contents can be characterized as rigidly liberal. Germany was not prepared to accept any restriction of the freedom of the press, an aspect of the media issue which was most important for Germany. Less importance but still high priority was assigned to the *management* and *budgetary* problems of UNESCO. As a major financial contributor Germany demanded a zero-growth budget. Only after hard bargaining was it prepared to accept a budget providing for (reduced) growth rates as a gesture of support for the organization. As the crisis escalated with the British announcement to withdraw, the budgetary stance of the Federal Republic became more uncompromising. Furthermore, the government demanded thorough organizational reforms. M'Bow's staff policy, i.e. his increasing nepotism and favoritism towards personnel of African origin did not seem to pose a real substantial problem for Germany although criticism that those persons (allegedly) lacked the qualification and skill necessary for top Secretariat posts was widespread, masking perhaps the desire for a staff policy favouring major contributors. The question of M'Bow's succession was not openly discussed until 1986. *Politicization* did not play an exceedingly important role for the German Government. In contrast to Anglo-Saxon, especially American positions, Germany never denied UNESCO the right to discuss political topics - provided, however, they fell within the scope of the organization's mandate.

The *American* position toward the *international information and communication order* can be characterized as strictly liberal. While the United States acknowledged some concerns of the Third World toward a certain imbalance of the news flow - IPDC²⁹ is an American invention -, it opposed any attempts to restrict free trade or impose state control on the media. As far as *organizational efficacy and efficiency* is concerned, the USA adopted an uncompromising zero-growth position in the budget-issue combined with the demand for a thorough reform of the management. Confronted with the Third World claims for a better

29 "International Programme for the Development of Communication", founded in 1980 in order to financially and technically assist the poorer countries in developing their communications infrastructure.

representation of their nationals in the Secretariat, the Americans reacted by criticizing that many staff members from the Third World had been employed by M'Bow for purely political reasons. This can be interpreted as a position slightly favouring the major contributors because their reservoir of skilled personnel is larger. Although the U.S. Administration did not directly demand the resignation of M'Bow, it is clear that they would have preferred another Director-General. *Politicization* was a major issue for the USA. It refused discussion of topics like Palestine, Apartheid or disarmament. Even a discussion of issue-specific topics such as the educational situation in the occupied territories was rejected as serving the propagandistic aims of the Soviet block and its radical Third World allies.

Table 3 presents an attempt to numerically summarize the degree of conflict intensity for each issue between the selected industrial countries and the Third World at the height of the UNESCO crisis.

Table 3: Degrees of Conflict Intensity at the Height of the UNESCO Crisis³⁰

issue	Soviet Union	France	West Germany	United States
1.1.	0	1	2	3
1.2.	1	1	2	2
1.3.	0	2	3	3
1.4.	0	2	3	3
type	nationalistic	economy: nationalistic; ideology: liberal	liberal	liberal
2.1.	1	1	2	2
2.2.	0	1	3	3
2.3.	1	1	2	2
2.4.	0	0	2	2
3.1.	0	3	2	3
3.2.	1	3	2	3
median	0	1	2	3

30 Ordinal scale values according to Table 1.

These findings allow the following conclusions:

- (1) The conflict intensity for the individual countries is certainly not identical across issue areas and issues. Nevertheless, distinct general tendencies can be identified for all four countries. Although one should be cautious using descriptive statistics here - differences of positions are not standardized - they convey a fairly clear picture and rank order of the overall intensity of conflict with regard to Third World claims: Medians or central values of conflict intensity are 0 for the Soviet Union, 1 for France, 2 for West Germany and 3 for the United States.
- (2) The countries' positions also cover a wide range of possible control mechanisms for the international information and communication order. Whereas the Soviet Union preferred a nationalistic control for both the ideological and economic dimensions of information, France took a protectionist stand with regard to the economic dimension only. The West German as well as the U.S. position can be characterized as liberal, although the United States tended more towards liberal orthodoxy.

5.2. Conflict Behaviour

In the behaviour dimension of the dependent variable, it is necessary to classify policies according to their conduciveness to cooperation and international institution-building. Among the various classifications proposed in the literature, three suit our purposes best:

- (1) The first is a standard classification based on the *dichotomy of cooperative and uncooperative behaviour* which can be operationalized as follows:

Cooperative behaviour: The actor is ready to negotiate, to compromise and to make prior concessions unconditionally and independently of the other party's behaviour.

Conditional behaviour: The actor makes his readiness to negotiate or to make concessions dependent on the behaviour of the other party (e.g. linkages, reciprocity, tit for tat).

Uncooperative behaviour: The actor is not ready to negotiate or to make concessions and ignores or refuses the other party's offers.

- (2) The second is based on a typology originally used by Albert *Hirschman* (1974) to classify different reactions to dissatisfaction with the performance of an enterprise or an organization:

Exit: The actor withdraws from the organization or at least from certain parts of it.

Voice: The actor expresses his dissatisfaction or manages the conflict within the organization.

Adaptation (loyalty): The actor adapts to the majority position. The conflict disappears.

(3) The third typology is based on several classifications of state's *policies towards and within international organizations*.³¹

Integrative behaviour: The actor strengthens international institutions and, in particular, the autonomy of international organizations.

Instrumental behaviour: The actor neither strengthens nor weakens international institutions but tends to make a selective use of the given competence and resources of international organizations for particularistic purposes.

Disintegrative behaviour: The actor weakens international institutions and, in particular, the autonomy of international organizations.

With regard to these categories, we can now give a broad outline of the conflict behaviour of the Soviet Union, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States at the height of the UNESCO crisis (1983/84).

Soviet behaviour during the UNESCO crisis was generally in support of Third World positions. The Soviet delegation regularly voted in agreement with the overwhelming majority of Third World countries and defended Third World claims and UNESCO policy against Western criticism. This is not surprising since Third World and Soviet interests matched on almost all issues. Although Soviet commentators invariably declared the NWICO to be a demand of the "liberated countries" and not of the "developed socialist countries", it was said to merit Soviet support insofar and as long as its main thrust was "antiimperialist".³² For the same reason, the Soviet Union was willing to play down the modest conflict it had with the Third World on some organizational issues and on whether the issues of "peace/disarmament" or "anticolonialism" were the most important ones for UNESCO programming. In sum, Soviet behaviour can be characterized as "adaptation" according to Hirschman, "cooperative" towards the Third World and "instrumental" towards UNESCO: AI-

31 Archer (1992: 135ff) distinguishes three images of international organizations: instrument, arena, and actor. Karns/Mingst (1987: 469) mention two basic behaviours, viz., to "resist collaboration and ... minimize ... intrusions" and to "follow adaptive strategies ... maximizing the influences and even intrusions of IGOs".

32 Cf. e.g. Kansev (1984: 170f).

though the general line of UNESCO policy was welcomed and the organisation was used as a forum to disseminate Soviet views, the Soviet Union strongly refused to take any steps towards a more autonomous role for UNESCO.

French behaviour in UNESCO can be characterized by the attempt to prevent conflicting interests from clashing and to bridge the gap between Third World and Western countries. Playing a mediator's role, France hoped to be able to avoid the risk of alienating friends by taking sides. Wherever possible, France sought to initiate compromise solutions either by trying to establish a study group or by searching for a compromise formula in the Drafting and Negotiating Group where it usually played an eminent role. But there was always a limit beyond which France did not yield. While it ostentatively supported UNESCO and its Senegalese Director-General by regularly voting in favour of the draft budget and by defending M'Bow against attacks, France never succumbed to a condemnation of Israel or to an abandoning of basic Western values in texts on communication issues. When the USA announced their withdrawal, French reactions were mixed. The British withdrawal, however, and the prospect of other major contributors turning their backs on UNESCO led to a hardening of the French behaviour towards M'Bow and his management style. Together with Britain, France initiated a 12-member Temporary Committee in the Executive Board which produced more than 100 reform proposals. In sum, French behaviour consisted of some "adaptation" but mainly "voice" according to Hirschman and can be classified as "cooperative"/"integrative" because of its readiness to find negotiated solutions and its efforts to prevent the organization from breaking-up.

The *Federal Republic of Germany's* behaviour during the UNESCO crisis is characterized by the attempt to find a solution for UNESCO's problems without yielding to the pressure to withdraw which was exerted by the right-wing faction of the governing coalition and by the U.S. government. In close cooperation with France, the Federal Republic was searching for acceptable compromise formulas in the media debate. Like other Western countries West Germany voiced its reservations concerning the Third World demands and only reluctantly accepted the consensus. At the same time the Federal Republic was comparatively generous in its support for the IPDC hoping thus to deradicalize Third World demands. Unlike France with its close relations to former colonies and its special status as host country, Germany always sought to act in a framework of strong European concertation. Several times - 1980

and 1983 - it abstained in the vote on the budget. Financial contributions were temporarily withheld in 1984 to step up reform pressure. Like in other countries, mismanagement was heavily criticized but not until M'Bow publicly declared that he did not want a third mandate did Germany actively seek an alternative candidate. Germany has always voted against resolutions on politicized issues like Palestine or disarmament. In summary, one can classify the German behaviour as "voice" in Hirschman-terms. It was "cooperative" in some issue-areas but was preponderantly "conditional". Since Germany plays an active part in the reform movement aimed at improving UNESCO's functioning, we can call its behaviour towards international organizations "integrative".

The behaviour of the *United States* was generally hostile towards Third World positions. Although the USA accepted the consensus found in the NWICO debate, US-authorities remained suspicious and strongly committed to an essentially non-protectionist approach. The United States usually voted against the budget. They were the only country to refuse the compromise found when the Nordic states proposed a budget ceiling of 374 million US-\$ for the biennium 1983/84. Obviously, neither the consensus in the media debate, nor the reduced budget ceiling and the promise of reforms were enough to prevent the U.S. from threatening to withhold its financial contributions for some time and then announcing their decision to withdraw. The U.S. General Accounting Office, which was granted access to UNESCO in 1984 after heavy political pressure from the U.S. Congress, produced a report which served as a factual basis of U.S. demands for a thorough restructuring of the management. When UNESCO reacted with detailed reform plans they were refuted by the State Department as half-hearted and not far-reaching enough. While it became more and more clear that the U.S. Government wanted M'Bow to resign, demanding it openly was scrupulously avoided. Confronted with draft resolutions condemning Israel or demanding disarmament, the USA harshly denounced them as anti-Western propaganda and voted against them. In sum, the behaviour of the United States in the years 1983/84 was oriented towards "exit". Even before it actually announced to leave UNESCO, the U.S. administration behaved "uncooperatively" by constantly refusing to negotiate and to compromise. By the same token, American behaviour was disintegrative: In the view of the United States' eminent position as a major contributor (25% of the budget) it was bound to severely weaken UNESCO.

From this account of the four countries's behaviour at the height of the UNESCO crisis we draw the following conclusions:

(1) The Hirschman and the two other conflict behaviour typologies apparently capture the same dimension of foreign policy behaviour and thus should be integrated into one typology. On the one hand, Hirschman's "voice" category proved to be too broad because it contains French, West German, and U.S. behaviour before its withdrawal; it should be split up into the three categories of cooperative, conditional and uncooperative conflict behaviour. On the other hand, Hirschman's "adaptation" and "exit" categories are not covered by other typologies and therefore should be added to it as the two extremes at which conflict disappears (Table 4). The integrative-disintegrative continuum seems to describe a dimension of foreign policy not consistent with the two other classifications: Neither did Soviet cooperation with the Third World coincide with an integrative policy nor did France and even Germany abstain from efforts at stabilizing UNESCO despite their more uncooperative behaviour towards the Third World and Socialist majority in the organization. Since all the hypotheses tested later on require that we measure behaviour according to a cooperative-uncooperative scale so that we have to put aside the dimension of integration at this point.

Table 4: Classification of Conflict Behaviour at the Height of the UNESCO Crisis

adaptation	voice			exit
	cooperative	conditional	uncooperative	
Soviet Union	France	West Germany		United States

(2) We found that Soviet, French, West German and U.S. conflict positions and conflict behaviour co-vary systematically, i.e. the conduciveness of state behaviour to international cooperation decreases with the intensity of conflict as measured by the difference in conflict positions vis-à-vis the Third World. This finding generally confirms the implicit correlation between conflict positions and conflict behaviour inherent to the causal path of "interest-oriented behaviour" and thus can serve as a starting point for the evaluation of the competing approaches to foreign policy explanation. However, the comparison between the United States and West Germany reveals that whereas the conflict positions of both countries were quite similar, their respective behaviour at the height of the UNESCO crisis was far more disparate than the approach of "interest-oriented behaviour" would lead us to expect. Thus, a more detailed look at the policy styles of these two countries will be necessary and will be

undertaken in chapter 7. Nevertheless, the values for both dimensions of the dependent variable seem to warrant us, in a first and basic explanatory cut, to concentrate on domestic and international factors presumed to influence foreign policy interests in the area of international communications policy.

6. Interest-Oriented Behaviour: the Basic Explanation

6.1. Subsystemic Hypotheses

The hypotheses about domestic interest-oriented behaviour refer to the variables listed on the upper left hand side of our analytical model (Figure 1). Each hypothesis explains the conflict position and the concomitant conflict behaviour. We begin with institutional factors, go on to dispositional and conclude with situational factors.

Rosecrance (1986) distinguishes between *trading states* and *military-political states* with respect to their foreign policy orientation. However, since we intend to use this approach as an independent variable, we direct our attention exclusively to the internal differences of both types of states. According to Rosecrance, all military-political states seek to be self-sufficient in order to achieve full independence. Therefore, we can assume that a military-political state strives for control over news flows and prefers a nationalistic international order. In contrast, the trading world is composed of functionally differentiated nations. Each may seek to improve its position but, because the states depend upon each other, we can assume that they are interested in a liberal international order which is the most compatible with functional differentiation. Therefore, we can formulate the following hypotheses:

H1): Trading states adopt a liberal position and act uncooperatively towards non-liberal positions concerning the international information and communication order; military-political states adopt a nationalistic position and act uncooperatively towards non-nationalistic positions concerning the international information and communication order.

A second important institutional approach we want to refer to deals with the *ideological determination of foreign policy*. It is based on the idea of a "*domestic analogy*", i.e. the assumption that states want their international environment to be ordered by the same values and principles as their domestic system. In the area of information and communication,

societal values and principles are reflected in the media system, so that we can hypothesize as follows:

H2: The more liberal the media system of a state is, the more liberal is its position in the conflict about the international information and communication order and the more uncooperatively it behaves towards non-liberal positions.

This last institutional hypothesis has a dispositional parallel. However, now it is not the ideological foundation of the social system but the *ideological orientation of the government of the day* that is held to account for a state's foreign policy. It has been hypothesized in research on domestic policy that "parties matter" particularly in issue areas of high ideological import.³³ According to this view, bourgeois parties are status-quo oriented and emphasize private initiative. In contrast, social-democratic/left-wing parties frequently criticize the existing North-South relationship and emphasize international solidarity. Because of that, one may suppose that left of centre governments are more open to the claims of developing states for a new information order. This leads us to the following hypotheses:

H3: The more a government is on the right of the ideological spectrum, the more liberal its position will be and the more uncooperatively it behaves towards non-liberal positions concerning the international information and communication order.

A dispositional approach which is closely linked to the rationalist mode of foreign policy explanation is "*cognitive mapping*" (Axelrod 1976). Instead of focussing on normative beliefs it takes causal beliefs as its point of departure: Actors establish causal connections between concepts and act according to the so defined situation. However, it is difficult to derive general statements from this approach so that our hypotheses only reflect a simplified application of "cognitive mapping".

H4: The more negative a state evaluates the situation of UNESCO in the crisis period, the more its position differs from the position of the Third World and the more uncooperatively it acts during the UNESCO crisis.

33 Cf. Schmidt (1982); Castles (1982).

Hypotheses about situational factors in the utilitarian mode of foreign policy explanation center on the concept of *costs and benefits*.³⁴ In this vein we can hypothesize:

H5: The higher the expected costs of an uncooperative foreign cultural policy behaviour are, the less a state's position will differ from the position of the Third World concerning the international information and communication order and the more cooperatively a state acts in its foreign cultural policy.

Problem pressure is a related situational factor stemming from the context of foreign environmental policy (Schwarzer 1990). The presumed relevance of this variable is based on the fact that transboundary communication is continually increasing. This creates an especially high problem pressure for states which are forced to maintain an information monopoly because of their system of rule. Societies attaching high importance to the preservation of their cultural identity can also be expected to react adversely to a liberal international information and communication order. This leads us to the following hypotheses:

H6: The higher the media political problem pressure within the liberal international information and communication order is for a state, the more illiberal its conflict position and the more cooperative its behaviour towards non-liberal positions will be.

Taking a look at the values for the six independent variables as displayed in Table 5, we discover a good fit of almost all hypotheses. Only Rosecrance's typology of trading and military-political states does not seem to be helpful in explaining interests and behaviours in the field of international communication. As to the other variables, we assume that they are not independent of each other and can be put in causal order. Since the media system is the most basic and durable state property among these factors, it is plausible to place this institutional factor at the beginning of the path of causation. Consequently, the cost/benefit assessment, problem pressure and causal beliefs, which in the rationalist mode of explanation are assumed to determine foreign policy, can themselves be attributed to the institutionalized values of a state. Whether "parties matter" cannot be ascertained here, since their ideological orientation varies in parallel with the media systems in our selection of cases at the height of the UNESCO crisis. However, they may have had a reinforcing effect on the policy choice. Thus, we basically arrive at an *ideological explanation* of foreign policy

34 Müller/Risse-Kappen (1990); in the context of foreign environmental policy cf. Prittwitz (1984); Sprinz/Vaahtoranta (1991).

because the different media systems represent fundamental assumptions about the good order of the state and the society.

Table 5: Values for Subsystemic Variables Influencing Interest-Oriented Behaviour

H	Variable	U.S.	West Germany	France	Soviet Union
1	state type ³⁵	military-political state	trading state	mixed	military-political state
2	media system (audiovisual media)	commercial	public	high state influence	state control
3	parties in government	conservative	conservative-liberal	social-democratic	communist
4	definition of the situation	very negative	negative	mixed	very positive
5	expected costs (of change in international order)	high	medium	medium	low
6	problem pressure	no	low	medium	high
	CONFLICT INTENSITY	3	2	1	0
	CONFLICT BEHAVIOUR	exit	mainly conditional	mainly cooperative	adaptation

If one accepts this way of causation, the explanation of the four selected countries' foreign policies during the UNESCO crisis might proceed as follows:

The *United States* had an almost entirely commercial audiovisual media system and thus the most liberal media order among the selected countries. Problem pressure was virtually non-existent since this media system was perfectly compatible with the present liberal international information and communication order and there was no danger of foreign media dominating the American market. On the other hand, a successful change in the international information and communication order would have caused extremely high costs for the United States. High expected costs, negligible problem pressure, and the conservative beliefs of the governing elite led the U.S. Administration to define the situation in UNESCO very negative-

35 Indicators used to determine state types were export and import quotas 1980, war involvement since 1945 and military expenses 1980.

ly. That the United States' position was the most market-oriented and its behaviour the most uncooperative is exactly what our hypotheses would predict under these circumstances.

On the other side of the spectrum, the media system of the *Soviet Union* was completely controlled by the state and the party and, thus, the most authoritarian one among the selected countries. This national media order was in conflict with the uncontrolled flow of information typical for the international information and communication order resulting in high problem pressure for a system of rule based on the monopoly of information. Therefore, the benefits of a change in the international order would have clearly outweighed any possible costs. All these factors led to a very positive definition of a situation in which the Western dominated international order was challenged. So the Soviet support for Third World demands for a nationalistic international information and communication order is highly understandable.

At the height of the UNESCO crisis, the media system of *France* was still characterized by a monopoly of state-owned audiovisual media and by a relatively high degree of governmental interference with television (although reforms were underway). The dominance of American TV and movie productions was widely regarded as a threat to national culture and therefore created a marked problem pressure and a call for protectionism within the French polity. Therefore, France might have partially benefitted from a more nationalistic international order. This led France to a mixed definition of the situation which is reflected in its partially liberal and partially nationalistic position on the international information and communication order and its mainly cooperative conflict behaviour.

The media system of *West Germany* with public ("öffentlich-rechtlich") TV and radio was less government-influenced than the French and less commercialized than the U.S. media system. Germany also took a more liberal stand than France because the German weakness in the international media market was no issue of public concern and therefore created no problem pressure in favour of a nationalistic policy. At the same time, because of this weakness a change in the international information and communication order would have caused less costs to West Germany than to the U.S.. Moreover, the German government defined the situation in UNESCO less dramatically than the American administration. In particular, it did not share the negative American view of the United Nations system in

general. These two factors might also help to explain why German behaviour in UNESCO was so much more cooperative than U.S. behaviour although both supported the liberal international information and communication order.

Let us now look if we can find a similarly convincing explanation by utilizing international factors.

6.2. Positional Hypotheses

According to our analytical model, we can confine our search of positional state properties that explain conflict positions to the international power structure. The Realist school offers two hypotheses about the relationship between power position and foreign policy interests, one concerning the overall, the other the issue area power structure.

The hypothesis about the overall power structure is based on a kind of "common sensical realism" rather than being deduced from any formulated theory. It starts from the assumption that the power competition between great powers and the type of relationship between them and the lesser powers account for different foreign policy interests and behaviours.

H7: In a bipolar international system both great powers support competing principles of the world information and communication order and react differently to challenges to this order. The more a state is dependent upon or allied to one of them, the more it supports the position of its leading power and the more it follows its behaviour.

The hypothesis based on the issue area power structure was developed in the context of neo-Realist international political economy. According to the theory of hegemonic stability, a hegemonic power is both interested in a liberal world order and powerful enough to guarantee international compliance with liberal rules. When its relative power declines, its policy becomes more self-centered: the "benevolent hegemon" turns into a "predatory hegemon".³⁶ However, states, like the majority of Third World states, which are economically

36 Cf. Gilpin (1987: 72, 88ff).

so weak that they cannot withstand global market pressures, favour nationalistic control.³⁷

Thus, we hypothesize:

H8: The more powerful a state is in international communication, the more liberal is its position on the international information and communication order and the more uncooperatively it behaves toward illiberal positions.

Table 6: Values for Positional Variables Influencing Interest-Oriented Behaviour

H	Variables	U.S.	West Germany	France	Soviet Union
7	power status	great power	closely allied	loosely allied	great power
8	issue area power (news agencies ³⁸ , flow of TV programs ³⁹)	502.000	56.800	345.000	296.000
		2% import 64.3% export	20% import Western European export 14.9% (F > West Germany)	17% import	8% import 1.1% export
	CONFLICT INTENSITY	3	2	1	0
	CONFLICT BEHAVIOUR	exit	mainly conditional	mainly cooperative	adaptation

Table 6 compares the power values to conflict positions and conflict behaviour. The evidence for hypothesis 8 is mixed. Certainly, the American position in the world media market can be called hegemonic: The United States does not only control the world market of programs for the most important mass media, but U.S. news agencies also maintain a leading although certainly not dominant role in the Third World. Thus, the expected "hegemonic liberalism" has been confirmed. However, this hypothesis cannot conclusively account for the interests of the other countries investigated. It most strikingly fails to explain why West Germany, with its relatively small national news agency and small share of exports, takes such a liberal stand on communication issues.

37 Cf. Krasner (1985: 5, 11).

38 Amount of words sold by national news agencies (U.S.: AP, UPI; West Germany: dpa; France: AFP; Soviet Union: TASS) to Third World regions in 1984. Cf. Höhne (1984).

39 Import of TV programs in percent of total broadcasting time; export of TV programs in percent of world market (except for Asia) in February 1983. Data based on: International Flow of Television Programmes (UNESCO Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, No. 100). Paris: UNESCO 1985.

However, the evidence obviously supports hypothesis 7: Third World claims for a NWICO and a more politicized role of UNESCO were widely perceived by both superpowers to reduce Western, i.e. above all American, global influence in the case of their success and to open the door for increased Soviet influence in the Third World. This easily explains the Soviet Union's sustained support as well as the United States' fierce resistance to these claims. West Germany was closer allied to and more dependent on the United States for security reasons than France which was not part of NATO's military integration and disposed of its own *force de frappe*. Therefore, France - in the Gaullist tradition - was free to pursue a more mediating policy and to seek a more independent role with regard to the Third World than West Germany. However, German behaviour deviated strongly from the American which according to H7 could not be expected in view of the close relationship between the two countries. Once again, it seems worthwhile to look into the policy styles of these two countries for an explanation of this discrepancy.

Our discussion of hypotheses based on the approach of "interest-oriented behaviour" has produced two explanations - one subsystemic or "second image", the other quasi-systemic or "third image" - which account to a large extent for the overall variance in the foreign policies of our four selected countries. Although it is not possible to clearly determine which explanation is superior in the context of this limited study, it should be considered an achievement to have narrowed down the number of plausible approaches and hypotheses. Moreover, it is not necessary at this point to make a decision.

(1) Both the domestic ideological and the international power political causes are compatible to a large degree. Given the issues at stake, it is highly plausible that both motivations come into play: In the context of East-West relations questions of ideology have always been closely linked to those of power. And any given international information and communication order is of high importance both to the domestic media system and to the distribution of cultural power on the international level. Finally, both explanations are complementary: The competing universalistic ideologies on which the media systems are based are able to explain the world political rivalry of the Soviet Union and the United States, whereas the power political hypothesis also covers the issue of politicization which is left unexplained if one only looks at domestic factors.

(2) Both causes were present in the motivations and intentions of the actors. For the Soviet Union it was at least as important to assure a general "antiimperialist" thrust of UNESCO

as to promote an international information order that would allow to better protect its own territory from Western media and to strengthen its position in the "propaganda war". The United States was as much concerned about the freedom of the press as about Third World radicalism and Soviet influence in the developing countries. French policy reveals a preoccupation with the Americanization of French culture and the decline of the *francophonie* side by side with the effort to preserve its close relationship with Third World countries. For Germany, the accomplishment of measurable reforms of UNESCO attained top priority in order to defend and justify its general cooperative policy line towards international organizations against domestic and international pressure.

However, whereas this explanation is able to account for the conflict positions and conflict behaviours of the four countries in relation to each other, it has two flaws. First, it does not sufficiently explain "absolute" behaviour: Neither does it seem to be inevitable that the United States withdrew from UNESCO nor that West Germany acted mainly conditionally instead of uncooperatively. The other flaw has already been mentioned: The explanation based on "interest-oriented behaviour" does not sufficiently explain variations in the distances between the conflict positions on the one hand and the conflict behaviours on the other for a given pair of countries. This is particularly unsatisfactory in the case of the United States and West Germany in which conflict positions are much closer than conflict behaviours. Hopefully, this flaw can be remedied by taking into account hypotheses assumed to explain differing foreign policy styles.

7. Policy Styles: Accounting for the Difference in U.S. and West German Behaviours

The hypotheses about policy styles refer to the variables listed in the lower part of our analytical model (Figure 1). We begin with institutional factors, then go on to dispositional factors and conclude with a positional hypothesis about policy styles.

The central institutional subsystemic hypothesis has been proposed by Czempiel (1981). He sees a relationship between the states' modes of domestic value allocation and their foreign policy behaviour. On this basis, we can assume an analogy between the modes of domestic conflict management and a state's foreign policy conflict behaviour:

H9: The more cooperative a state's domestic policy style is, the more cooperative its foreign policy style will be.

For investigating this hypothesis we refer to several concepts dealing with a state's domestic policy style. The first of these approaches emphasizes the *strength of a state*.⁴⁰ Strong states are able to push their interests through in domestic affairs even if they encounter opposition by social groups. Therefore, they do not have to develop cooperative strategies. However, weak states are forced to cooperate with societal interest groups in order to achieve their goals. Thus, one can assume that weak states (provided that they are capable of acting at all) are so accustomed to a cooperative policy style in managing conflicts that they will lean towards cooperation in foreign policy as well. The second analytical context we refer to is *corporatism*.⁴¹ Corporatism as a domestic policy style is characterized by the voluntary cooperation of antagonistic social groups, such as trade unions and employers' associations, and the state. If a state's domestic policy patterns are marked by corporatist arrangements, it is to be expected that it will seek cooperative conflict management in international affairs, too. The third and last analytical approach relevant to domestic policy styles concerns the *type of democracy*.⁴² Democracies differ from each other in their ways of regulating social conflicts (Lijphart 1984). Consensus democracies are characterized by proportional representation and decision-making aimed at general approval, whereas Westminster democracies are strictly majoritarian. This distinction leads us to presume that Consensus democracies will orientate their foreign policy style toward cooperation as well.

One more institutional factor deserves closer consideration: the degree of popular participation within a state. The relevant analytical context for this factor is the discussion about the relationship between the type of rule and a state's foreign policy behaviour (Müller/Risse-Kappen 1990), especially between democracy and peace. Ever since Kant it has been a prominent argument in liberal theory that a state's foreign policy will be less violent and more cooperative if it has to have the consent of its citizens. Therefore, one can assume that a state with a participatory foreign policy decision-making process shows a cooperative foreign policy style.

40 Cf. Ikenberry/Lake/Mastanduno (1988), Katzenstein (1976), Krasner (1978).

41 Cf. Schmidt (1982); Reutter (1991).

42 Cf. Lehbruch (1967, 1969); Lijphart (1984, 1991).

H10: The more participatory a state's foreign policy decision-making process is, the more cooperative its foreign policy style will be.

Hypotheses about dispositional factors influencing policy style can, first of all, be found in the literature on belief systems.⁴³ According to this approach, the foreign policy decision-making elite is led by their normative beliefs and by the image that they have of international reality.⁴⁴ Because of that, it can be assumed that these beliefs will tell a lot about the expected behaviour of the state in an international conflict. Following the research done in the United States during the last decade, we can distinguish two general beliefs of the foreign policy elite: 'accommodationism' and 'hardline'.⁴⁵ 'Accommodationist' means that the individuals strongly support cooperation with other states and with international organizations. Conversely, the preparedness to follow unilateral strategies including the use of military to achieve global U.S. interests can be described as 'hardline'. Therefore, we can assume that a state whose foreign policy elite has a belief system characterized by 'accommodationism' tends to adopt a cooperative foreign policy style. Thus, we can formulate the following hypothesis:

H11: The stronger the fundamental beliefs of the foreign policy elite are oriented toward 'accommodationism', the more cooperative the state's foreign policy style will be.

The second dispositional factor worth considering, the problem-structural approach, has been developed in conflict theory, and it has proven its explanatory power in research on international regimes.⁴⁶ The problem-structural approach argues that the properties of issues or conflicts predetermine the way they are dealt with. However, one has to take into consideration that these properties are not typical of the issues as such but generally ascribed to them by the actors. Therefore, problem structure can be regarded as a dispositional factor. Once the actors have assessed the issue, it can be concluded that they will select one mode of conflict management rather than another. Four kinds of conflict need to be distinguished.⁴⁷

43 For an overview see Smith (1988).

44 Cf. among others George (1980).

45 Based on Wittkopf (1987, 1990).

46 Cf. for example Rittberger (1990).

47 Cf. Aubert (1963); Kriesberg (1982); Efinger/Rittberger/Zürn (1988); Rittberger (1990).

Conflicts about values are extremely difficult to regulate, whereas conflicts about means are believed to be more easily dealt with in a cooperative way. In addition, we distinguish between conflicts of interest about relatively assessed goods and conflicts of interest about absolutely assessed goods. Here, the hypothesis suggests that conflicts of interest about absolutely assessed goods are most conducive to regulated conflict management, whereas conflicts of interest about relatively assessed goods are much more difficult to manage in a cooperative way. On the basis of this analytical reasoning we can formulate the following hypothesis:

H12: The higher a state assesses a conflict on the scale (1) conflict about an absolutely assessed good, (2) conflict about means, (3) conflict about a relatively assessed good; (4) conflict about values, the more uncooperative the state's foreign policy style will be.

Our *positional* hypothesis about policy styles deals with the institutional enmeshment of a state in international organizations. It is based on the assumption that a state which is strongly integrated in international organizations is used to a mode of cooperation with other states.⁴⁸ Therefore, we can formulate the following hypothesis:

H13: The more a state is institutionally enmeshed in international organizations, the more cooperative the state's foreign policy style will be.

Taking a look at the values for the subsystemic policy style variables as displayed in Table 7, we can see that not all of our hypotheses seem to be helpful in explaining the behavioural difference between the United States and West Germany despite their similar conflict positions. As far as the explanatory power of the domestic policy-style hypothesis is concerned, it is difficult to find a clear-cut answer. West Germany is neither a weak nor a strong state but is usually characterized as stronger than the U.S.. Therefore, according to our assumption, a *less* cooperative behaviour of Germany could be expected. However, since we can identify stronger corporatistic traditions in West Germany than in the USA, this evidence would suggest just the opposite, i.e. a *more* cooperative behaviour of Germany. Taking a look at the type-of-democracy concept, the evidence is again inconclusive: According to our operational criteria, both countries range between the Consensus and the Westminster model with only a slightly stronger tendency of Germany towards the Consen-

48 Cf. among others Zürn (1993).

sus-type. Thus, the domestic policy style hypothesis as a whole does not seem to possess sufficient explanatory power. The same is true for the hypothesis about the degree of participation since it was low in both states. The belief systems, on the other hand, and the conflict assessment of the foreign policy elite in West Germany and the United States differed very strongly from each other and may have led the two states to the foreign policy behaviour which we would expect with regard to the hypotheses.

Table 7: Values for Variables Influencing Policy Styles (West Germany, U.S.)

H	Variable	West Germany	United States
9	domestic policy style	in between	in between
	strength of the state	medium	weak
	corporatism	medium	weak
	type of democracy ⁴⁹	in between	in between
10	participation	low	low
11	belief system	accommodationist	hardline
12	conflict assessment	conflict about values and conflict of interest about a relatively assessed good	conflict about values
13	institutional enmeshment ⁵⁰	49 memberships in international organizations	47 memberships in international organizations
	CONFLICT BEHAVIOUR	mainly conditional	exit

As it seems, our explanation will have to rest on these two concepts because our positional hypothesis cannot claim any explanatory power either. Although Germany's membership in international organizations is slightly higher than the United States', the difference is not big enough to suggest any meaningful conclusion.

49 The United States' and Germany's type of democracy was determined according to the values for the following factors: concentration of the executive power; legislative-executive relationship; bicameralism; federalism; minority rights.

50 The institutional enmeshment for West Germany and the United States was determined according to our own calculations based on the Yearbook of International Organizations 1986/87. For reasons of comparability, the figures for regional organizations are not included.

Thus, the behavioural difference between West Germany and the United States may be explained as follows: In *West Germany* the belief system of the foreign policy elite was basically oriented towards international cooperation. There was a common conviction among the principal actors that Germany should behave as a responsible, tolerant and useful member of the international community, a lesson learned from the experience of the Second World War. Because of the conviction that in an interdependent world one cannot completely disregard one's neighbours' aspirations without damage to one's own long-term interests and because of their accentuation of concertation and dialogue, the Germans' belief system favoured 'accommodationism'. In Germany, like in most other Western States, too, the UNESCO crisis was perceived as a conflict about values, about irreconcilable ideological cleavages between East and West. At the same time, however, Germany attached comparatively more importance to the justified claims of the Third World for a better balanced dissemination of information, i.e. a conflict of interest about relatively assessed goods.

The belief system of the foreign policy elite in the *United States* must be described as 'hardline'. When the Reagan administration came to power the right-wing members of the Republican Party became very influential in the foreign policy decision-making process. The belief system of these foreign policy actors was characterized by a more bilateral than multilateral attitude. In accordance with their belief system it was not important to support international organizations like the United Nations. There was a strong conviction among the foreign policy elite that the influence of the Soviet Union had to be reduced and the spread of communism contained. The U.S. Administration perceived the UNESCO crisis as an ideological conflict between Western values and Eastern values. The demands of the Third World countries for a New World Information and Communication Order were almost exclusively regarded as an attack against Western values, not as an attempt at just distribution.

To conclude, although the institutional and international hypotheses about the impact of policy styles on foreign policy behaviour could not be confirmed by the empirical evidence, there is sufficient reason to believe that the behavioural differences of the United States and West Germany can be attributed to two dispositional factors. First, the belief system of the United States' foreign policy elite was strongly oriented towards an uncooperative foreign policy behaviour, whereas their West German counterparts believed in the adequacy of a

more cooperative foreign policy behaviour. Second, the conflict assessment in the United States further encouraged a more uncooperative foreign policy behaviour.

8. Conclusion

In this paper, we have tried to account for the divergent behaviour of four industrialized countries, the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and West Germany, at the height of the UNESCO crisis by testing competing approaches to the explanation of foreign policy and different hypotheses fitting these approaches. Since we found the conflict behaviours during the UNESCO crisis to be systematically related to the different interests of the four countries, we proceeded on the basis of the causal path of "interest-oriented behaviour". In a first explanatory cut we were thus able to explain the variety of UNESCO policies by the different media systems, and the societal values they represent, and by different positions in the overall international power structure. Although the approach of "interest-oriented behaviour" proved successful, it was not completely satisfactory because U.S. and West German behaviours differed to a much greater extent than their interests. In a second cut we therefore tried to refine our basic explanation by looking at factors which might account for differences in U.S. and West German foreign policy styles. Now, hypotheses based on dispositional factors showed the greatest explanatory power: The differences in U.S. and West German behaviours seemed above all to reflect differences in the belief systems of the respective foreign policy elites. In sum, it has proven worthwhile to begin the analysis on the basis of an open analytical model which not only included different causal paths but also a great variety of potential independent variables: The explanation has benefitted from the combination of two ways of causation as well as of domestic and international, institutional and dispositional factors.

However, there are a number of reasons for caution. Firstly, this explanation does not yet take into account policy changes over time. The result is a static picture that might not be adequate for the whole length of the UNESCO crisis. Secondly, factors other than those included in our model probably had an influence. One of them could be the special characteristics of UNESCO as an international organization: Disintegrative behaviour may well have been encouraged by the absence of a veto for major contributors in UNESCO. Fur-

thermore, UNESCO, in contrast to the ITU, did not possess any regulatory power in international communications. Therefore, it was possible for the United States to choose the exit option without substantial costs. The special status of France as host country of an organization with a Director-General from Senegal, a former French colony, virtually excluded certain behavioural options as much as the special situation of Germany as a divided country. Thirdly and lastly, our results might be due to our limited selection of cases. More countries may have to be analyzed in order to put the approaches and hypotheses to a more severe test and to substantiate or modify this account.

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