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The EU, Regional Co-operation and Conflict in the Great Lakes Region

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The EU, Regional Co-operation and Conflict Transformation in Africa: A Study of the Great Lakes Region

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Great Lakes of Africa, which includes countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, is characterised by immense natural wealth and human density. For more than a decade, this sub-region has experienced a regional conflict complex¹, the so-called Great Africa War, formed by a series of interlinked civil wars driven by processes of identity politics, predation and power competition. The states that occupy this territory are diverse in terms of size, natural resources and political systems but have all experienced significant degrees of violent instability. They are also characterised by cross-border identities that have played a significant role in the regionalisation of civil wars. As a result, when analysing regionalism and regional conflict in Africa, the Great Lakes region appears a natural choice. The regional conflict and the regionalisation processes taking place, however, are highly complex and as a result pose certain challenges to the wider study in which this paper falls.

The main aim of the RegioConf project is to determine whether institutionalised regional integration, as promoted by the European Union (EU), can lead to conflict transformation. While this includes conflict management, it primarily refers to a more indirect process whereby the institutionalisation of cooperation creates new norms, provides a rule-based system of conflict management, and creates interdependence between conflicting parties, which would promote peaceful change as opposed to violent conflict resolution. The study is based on a review of secondary sources and policy documents as well as ongoing field research.


This paper will first map out the various regionalisation processes that can be identified in the region and then, through specific field work, it attempts to determine whether they

¹ See Pugh, Cooper & Goodhand 2003

have had a positive or negative effect on conflict transformation. The key processes identified and analysed are trade, the movement of people, social ties, the management or exploitation of natural resources and political conflict resolution. Some of these processes have had positive effects on the prospects for conflict transformation, while others have been negative. Then some are more ambiguous, providing potential for either peace or war. The EU acts as one of the key intervening variables in some of these regionalisation processes, sometimes with positive effects and sometimes with less clear or negative results, thereby indirectly impacting the conflict transformation process (see Figure 1).

In essence, the questions guiding this paper are: What is the state of the integration process in the region? Can regional integration, formal or informal, address the root causes of the conflict and bring about conflict transformation? Is the solution to the conflict better located at the regional level as opposed to the local or national levels? And what role does the EU play in promoting certain regional integration processes and, subsequently, conflict transformation?

Figure 1. Framework for analysis: causal paths between regionalism and conflict transformation



Our preliminary argument is that regionalism has been unable to generate meaningful conflict transformation because current policies pursuing regional integration are not compatible with the realities and challenges of the region. The basis for this argument is two fold. First, state weakness makes the EU model of regional integration or most of its sponsored initiatives difficult to implement. Secondly, most integration initiatives lack clear focus and largely target formal political and economic processes, rather than the prevailing informal structures dominating the region.

In other words, the regional integration model used (including the initiatives sponsored by the EU) have largely (and expectedly) focussed on formal regional integration, which has been difficult to implement given the lack of institutionalisation in the region. As a result, when it comes to a regional approach to conflict, this has largely entailed tackling the conflict through high-level top-down means, such as mediation talks and peacekeeping. At the same time, an informal regional 'shadow governance' continues to fuel the conflict through indirect, structural processes. There are various reasons for this observation. First, at a theoretical level, the hypothesis that regionalism would result in conflict transformation is based upon certain assumptions about the nature of the state and the nature of warfare, which are not entirely applicable to the situation in the Great Lakes. When it comes to state institutionalisation, most states in the region are notoriously weak, especially the largest of all, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Without delving into the details of the 'failed state' literature, it is important to note that many states in this region do not have the monopoly of force in their territories, unlike modern European states, nor the capacity to implement regional integration policies. Thus, bringing states together in regional organisations, while helpful, will not necessarily bring about peace while other actors act as *de facto* governments in certain areas and the state remains fragmented in its functions.

This leads to the next theoretical challenge -- the nature of war. The EU developed out of an historical context in which wars were significantly different from those experienced in central Africa currently. Twentieth-century European wars were primarily state-based and fell under the paradigm of 'total war'. Thus, regional integration in the EU form targeted the main drivers of conflict, which were the nation states. Conflict in the Great Lakes, by contrast, is different in nature. Some have tried to conceptualise it through economy-based approaches (such as the greed *versus* grievance thesis and the Political Economy approach) and identity-based approaches (highlighting the ethnic nature of the conflict) (Bal-

lentine & Sherman 2003: 20, 25; Berdal & Malone 2000: 2-5; Collier *et al.* 2003). As a result, the actors and processes that need to be targeted by regionalism are varied and overlapping, including the state, non-state armed forces, economic actors (both illicit and informal) and communal groups.

In addition, the Great Lakes region presents a conceptual and policy challenge through its contested 'region-ness'. At a policy level, the Great Lakes is in actual fact a sub-region that also forms the frontier between Central and Eastern Africa. As a result, formulating a coherent policy that targets the region is difficult since the DRC is often separated from Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi in donor policies and in established regional organisations. In addition, the DRC is a vast country, of which only the eastern part falls within the Great Lakes region. The capital sits in the West, and is largely isolated from the rest of the region and the conflict. This results in a complex situation where the regional interests of Kinshasa (pulled either to Central or Southern Africa) and those of other Great Lakes countries (who are pulled to the East) are very different.

From a 'new regionalism' perspective, one can argue that some forces pushing for regionalization have proven harmful to peace. The most glaring is that of the regional war economy, which perpetuates the conflict by creating significant spoilers. Other processes that have had a direct or indirect negative impact on the conflict include the mass movement of people and cross-border identities. Certain state characteristics also appear to be replicating themselves at a regional level, to a negative effect. For example, where authority is largely personalised in the Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC the geo-politics of the region, and subsequently the dynamics at regional organisations, are also characterised by the inter-personal dynamics between authoritarian presidents such as Paul Kagame, Yoweri Museveni and Joseph Kabila, respectively.

2. CONFLICT IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

Despite contested death tolls, the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is said to be the most deadly since World War II (IRC 2007). Its roots are multiple and complex, and originate at the local, state and regional levels. They stem from issues of identity and nation-building, underdevelopment and the so-called 'resource curse', as well as political power rivalries for control of state resources; all of which have been compounded by poor leadership and a failure of formal institutionalisation. Thus, the conflict is far more complex

than 'inter-state' rivalry (Maclean 1999: 945), while it is also more than an amalgamation of various civil wars. Rather, it can be classified as a regional conflict complex in that it is made up of various interconnected conflicts that are linked regionally through political, military, social and economic networks (Pugh *et al.* 2003). Politically, the war is driven by strategic and personal alliances between different states and between states and militia groups. Militarily, almost every civil war in the region has been started and perpetuated by rebel groups that crossed borders and received patronage from neighbouring countries. Socially, cross-border identities and the movement of refugees have sparked inter-ethnic crises as responses to events in neighbouring countries and rationalised military intervention as a move of solidarity with similar identity groups. Lastly, regional economic networks have been blamed for driving a war economy that has resulted in one of the most intractable conflicts of our day.

2.1 From genocide to an 'African World War'

The origins of war and violence in the Great Lakes can be traced back to its colonial and pre-colonial history. However, the impetus of the current conflict is seen in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The predominantly Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), led by Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame, sparked a civil war by invading from Uganda in 1990 (Prunier 1992). This culminated in the genocide against the Tutsi ethnic group, which was ended with RPF's military victory in July 1994. Two million Hutus fled to Tanzania and Zaïre, now the DRC. In the latter, the defeated old Rwandan army (FAR) and the *Interahamwe* militia, implicated in the genocide, set up bases in refugee camps and maintained their structures, threatening Rwanda's security (Dunn 2001: 53). As the Mobutu regime supported the former Rwandan regime, Kagame's RPF, now in power, started to actively encourage and support the 'Banyamulenge rebellion' in the east (a citizenship crisis that had arisen around the presence of the Banyamulenge people, who are said to originate in Rwanda), bringing in Laurent Kabila and his *Alliance des Forces Démocratique de Libération du Congo-Zaïre* (AFDL) rebel movement into the fold (Reyntjens 2005: 589). Almost immediately after Kabila's rebellion began, the new Rwandan army went into eastern Zaïre to deal with the *Interahamwe* militia (Reyntjens 2005: 589). While the war was driven by Rwanda, Uganda also had interests that pulled it into the fold, namely the *Allied Democratic Forces* (ADF), a Ugandan rebel movement based out of Zaïre. In turn, the Sudanese government supported Mobutu and the ADF, in retaliation for Kampala's support to the *Sudan People's Liberation Army* (SPLA) (Reyntjens 2005: 589).

Despite the AFDL's success in toppling Mobutu and rising to power in 1997, cross-border violence continued in the east. The alliance between Kabila and Rwanda also frayed as the new president had to distance himself from Rwanda in order to maintain legitimacy at home (Reyntjens 2005: 590). This led to a new war in 1998, with Uganda siding with Rwanda. This time, Rwanda sponsored *Le Rassemblement pour la Libération du Congo* (MLC) (AI 2001), while Kabila allied with Rwandan Hutu rebels, including ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* militias, as well as with former opposing *mai-mai* militias and the Burundian rebel group *Force Nationales de Libération* (FNL) (UNSC 2005: paras 158-69; AI 2001). Rwanda and Uganda would also turn against each other in later days in competition over the DRC's natural resources (Reyntjens 2005: 590). Although the Rwandan army would officially withdraw in 2002, it maintained a 'covert presence' in the DRC (Reyntjens 2005: 592).

Other states beyond the immediate Great Lakes region also intervened in the conflict for various reasons. Angola acted in retaliation to Mobutu's support of UNITA rebels in Angola (Dunn 2001: 53). Zimbabwe aided Kabila ostensibly to support a fellow SADC member (Katshung 2007: 118). Much of this logic, however, would give way to the logic of predation (AI 2003: 13; Ettang 2011: 184; UNSC 2002: para 65). This is why it is difficult to track the alliances between parties to the conflict since they often shift as part of a complex matrix of interests based on economic gains, security concerns, political survival, identity politics and personal relationships. The large number of rebel groups in the region are also constantly changing and forming new alliances. These groups originate locally or from neighbouring countries and their objectives range from acquiring state power, to plundering resources, to self-defence of communities in a dangerous environment (IRIN 2010) (see Table 1). However, many key rebel movements, such as the FDLR, the LRA and the ADF, have had their original political motivations complicated and, in a few cases amongst rebel leadership, supplanted by criminal or economic motivations (Hofmeier 2012: 287).

Table 1. Key rebel groups in the DRC

Group	Originating Country	Original Objectives	Status
FDLR	Rwanda	Formed by those complicit in Rwandan genocide, regrouped in the DRC to plan return to power	One of most powerful groups but severely weakened by Rwandan operations in the DRC in 2009
Mai-Mai groups	DRC	Self-defence groups, usually formed along ethnic lines	Most small but a few large groups pulled into peace negotiations
CNDP	DRC	Formed to fight the FDLR and protect the Tutsi population	Integrated into the army and formed a political party but still operational for purposes of resource extraction
FPLC	DRC	Compete with CNDP for territory	Only a few hundred fighters but active and recruiting
ADF/NALU	Uganda	Muslim militant group, goals unclear	dormant' though accused of recent attacks
LRA	Uganda	Establish theocracy in Uganda, though current objectives unclear	Forced out of Uganda and South Sudan into DRC and CAR Notorious for brutality and recruitment of child soldiers
FRPI/FPJC	DRC	Battle government forces and UN peacekeepers	Leaders on trial at ICC 'Residual' but high humanitarian toll
M23	DRC	Former CNDP rebels who mutinied because they claimed integration process into the military was too slow	Central to recent resurgence of violence by invading Goma Recently surrendered
FNL	Burundi	Hutu rebel group which fought in the Burundi civil war	Presence in Southern Kivu.

2.2 The Intractability of Regional Conflict

The dynamism characterizing the conflict needs to be addressed by regional integration if it is to find lasting peace, focusing not just on the original causes of the conflict but also on those that emerged during the war as well. In the end, institutionalised regional integration would have to decrease the costs of peace and increase the costs of war for *all* the actors in the region, both state and non-state, to promote sustainable change. This is difficult to achieve because the multitude of actors originate at the local, national, regional and global level. And many of these actors have a vested interest in keeping the eastern DRC inse-

cure. As a result, even with the formal ending of the war in 2002, the Great Lakes Region remains highly volatile.

Violence persists in the Eastern DRC, particularly in the Kivu provinces (Simons 2012: 246). In 2012, the war re-entered media headlines when M23 rebels invaded Goma (Moore 2012). And although the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo was signed in Addis Ababa in 24 February 2013 (UN News Centre 2013), the conflict continued amid accusations that Rwanda and Uganda were supplying M23 rebels (UNSC 2012), resulting in several diplomatic spats between states in the region (Interview DIRCO, 2013). Yet, there have been some significant positive developments. At the state-level, relations, while not harmonious, have become far less tense than at the height of the conflict (Hofmeier 2012: 287), largely because of the ICGLR, which is supported primarily by the EU (Interview DIRCO, 2014). As a result, there has been increased cooperation at this level to counter rebel movements (Hofmeier 2012: 287). For example, in 2011, the defence ministers of Uganda and the DRC worked together to allow Ugandan forces to pursue the LRA in DRC territory (Simons 2012: 252). This has been facilitated by regional cooperation, driven both regionally and through international support. In fact, the M23's capture of Goma in November 2012 led to strong calls by the international community, and in particular European and U.S. officials, for strengthened international efforts in the region. In addition, at an extraordinary SADC summit in Maputo on 8 February 2013, nine SADC countries pledged contributions to a 'Neutral International Force' that would be 'responsible for eliminating both local and foreign rebel groups operating in the eastern DRC' (Global Times 2013; All Africa 2013). This culminated in the proposal for the establishment of an international military force (the UN Intervention Brigade), composed of troops from regional countries, that would go into the eastern DRC with a tough peace enforcement mandate to neutralise armed militias in the region (BBC 2013b; IPI 2013: 6). This has led to the recent surrendering of the M23 rebel group (Al Jazeera 2013).

2.3 Regional implications

In understanding the origins and current state of the conflict it is necessary to question whether conventional regionalism is well-suited to address these challenges. While the regional dimensions of the conflict is normally viewed in terms of short-term cross-border issues, such as small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation and refugee flows, we

must also ask which long-term security threats would be mitigated by a more integrated region, as opposed to the current focus on state-building or fostering liberal democracy. In other words, we must analyse whether the root causes of the conflict (cross-border ethnic identities, underdevelopment, state insecurity etc.) would be eased or even resolved by greater regional integration. Since many of these causes are regional in nature, the intuitive answer would be 'yes'. Yet, as conflict is largely driven by informal regionalisation processes, it must be questioned whether the type of institutional regionalism happening in the region is likely to address the informal structures of the specific regional conflict.

In this regard, it is important to stress that there are ways in which regionalism could have either a positive or negative influence on conflict transformation. For example, regionalism could foster cooperation and dialogue, thus allowing for other means of resolving interstate rivalries. Also, in the case of identity, regionalism could foster a sense of regional 'we-ness' that would lessen volatile ethnic loyalties and distrust of 'foreigners'. However, attempting to create a regional identity when a national identity is almost non-existent may also complicate the politics of identity in the region. In terms of informal economic integration, which has a direct impact on natural resources and economic development, some of the existing informal trade networks have actually fuelled the war economy. Thus strengthening economic cooperation per se, without considering the contextual dynamics, may further exacerbate tensions. Would formalising these networks result in more secure trans-border trade that would reduce the profits of war? Could these informal networks be harnessed to increase interdependence or create some semblance of regional cohesion? In addition, the current status quo amongst states is inspired by non-interference at the formal political level, while exploiting informal networks to interfere with each other's economic and political developments. Could regionalism thus develop new progressive norms, focusing on respect for human rights, democratization and the like, that would reduce the informal meddling and promote sustainable cooperation? These are only some of the questions that will be addressed in the next sections. As to creating better state institutions or dealing with questions of power transition, in theory, regional organisations could set norms and mechanisms for their member states to follow. But this is extremely difficult when almost all member states are guided by weak institutions. The risk is that the proliferation of regional organisations may ultimately multiply these deficiencies at a regional level rather than fixing them.

3. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND REGIONALISM IN THE GREAT LAKES

In analysing the state of regionalism in the Great Lakes and its impact on conflict transformation, there are three dichotomies to keep in mind. First, there is a tension between formal institutional and informal regional processes. Second, and related, there is a discrepancy between regions defined along state borders and regions defined by economic and social networks. Thirdly, there is an uneven emphasis placed on direct regional conflict management as opposed to indirect, long-term conflict transformation, by both donors and national governments. This results in a complex matrix where formal regionalism, based on regional groupings compiled by states, primarily address the conflict through direct means such as military intervention and mediation. The structural aspects of the conflict have largely been addressed at an international (e.g. the war economy) or national (e.g. underdevelopment and ethnic tensions) levels. The indirect effects of regionalism on conflict, however, are driven by informal regionalisation processes, not constrained by state boundaries (see Table 2). This has naturally led to ambiguous effects on conflict transformation, since the informal regionalisation process has largely had a negative impact on regional conflict. Similarly, direct mediation has only occurred at a state-level and not been directed towards addressing the grievances of communities affected by informal regionalisation. For these reasons, unless regionalisation occurs at all four quadrants of the matrix, it is unlikely to have a durable impact on conflict transformation.

Table 2. Institutionalised *versus* informal regionalism


	INSTITUTIONALISED REGIONALISM (Regions defined by state boundaries)	INFORMAL REGIONALISATION (Regions defined by networks)
IMMEDIATE, DIRECT CONFLICT RESOLUTION	<u>Conflict Management</u> State-level political mediation Peacekeeping and direct intervention in the conflict	
LONG-TERM, STRUCTURAL IMPACT ON CONFLICT	<u>Management of Natural Resources</u> Water, Gas and Environment	<u>Informal Trade</u> Conflict goods Informal small-scale traders <u>Movement of People</u> Refugees, Armed groups, Migration and anti-‘foreign’ sentiment <u>Social and Cultural ties</u> Cross-border identities

Because of the state-centred nature of organised integration, the regional organisations relevant to the region seem to be dividing it rather than uniting it. This is because countries, with limited resources, are able to place their attention and loyalty in the organisation that suits them. And there are many choices available, since the Great Lakes sits on the boundary between several regions (see Figure 2). There are two regional organisations aimed exclusively at the Great Lakes countries, but neither are recognised by the AU as Regional Economic Communities (REC's), nor are they very active (Interview SFCG, 2013). First, there is the Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), which has been inactive for many years and, despite recent attempts to revive it, struggles in relevance and feasibility (Interview TradeMark, 2013). Then, there is the International Conference for the Great Lakes (ICGLR), which is a fairly new organisation but it also a forum and not meant to be an economic community. As a result, in talking about integration in the Great Lakes one has to question whether it will fall within Central or Eastern Africa. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is the struggling REC for central Africa, but excludes Rwanda and Uganda, two central players in the conflict (ISS 2007). Thus, its ability to integrate the Great Lakes region has been negligible. The East African Community (EAC) has been integrating relatively well in relation to other African regions (Hofmeier 2012: 280), but excludes the DRC and seems to be creating a boundary between the eastern DRC and the other Great Lakes countries.

The Great Lakes countries do not geographically, culturally or economically sit within Southern Africa, but the South African Development Community (SADC), by virtue of having the DRC and Tanzania as members, has been heavily involved in direct conflict management. Lastly, COMESA is an ambitious organisation that seeks to achieve a common market for Eastern and Southern Africa. While it has taken some initiatives in the Great Lakes, it is too large to focus its attention on integrating that sub-region. Thus, while overlapping membership in itself is not a problem, combined with the limited capacity of states to fully commit to one organisation, the multitude of organisations allows members to not fully commit to any and engage in 'forum-shopping' (Interview ISS, 2013a). Similarly, it can pull the focus of certain countries away from their immediate neighbour, as can be seen by Rwanda's leaving ECCAS for the EAC (ISS 2007), and the DRC's focus on SADC, despite the eastern provinces being disconnected from southern Africa. Almost all of these institutions also suffer from weak capacity due to an unwillingness by states to cede sovereignty and an over-reliance on donor funds (Interview COMESA, 2014; Cilliers 2001: 92-93;

Mumma-Martinon 2011: 46). As a result, none of these institutions could be said to have an element of supranationalism approaching that of the EU. In addition, the states and leaders in the region suffer from a lack of mutual trust, an essential criterion for a security community. The following sections will map out the various integration processes, both within these institutional frameworks and without, and analyse the role each has played on conflict transformation.

Figure 2. Overlapping membership of regional organisations



3.1 Regional conflict management and the EU

Regional organisations have played a key role in the direct regional management of the conflict in Eastern DRC. This has often taken the form of peace talks, conferences, negotiations, and, sometimes, military operations. Zimbabwe and Angola's involvement in the conflict in 1998 was portrayed as SADC sending military aid to the DRC, a fellow member (in a decision that excluded South Africa). SADC's chairperson, former South African President Nelson Mandela preferred to resolve the crisis peacefully, which brought about the July 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (Yabadi 2011: 42). Then, in 2002, SADC facilitated the Sun City Accord (Koko 2007; Yabadi 2011). Elsewhere, in January 2011, the countries of the CEPGL, after being revived by the ICGLR, agreed to intensify joint operations

against armed groups located in eastern DRC under a binding protocol on mutual regional defence and security. “This led to improved relations between Rwanda and the DRC, with the DRC inviting Rwandan troops to help track down rebels from the [FDLR]” (Mumma Martinon 2011: 42, 46).

The ICGLR is another dynamic organisation working on peace and security in the region. At its heart is the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region (PSSDGLR), which, in essence, is supposed to be “a conflict circuit breaker in the same sense that the European Economic Community (EEC) was when first developed” (Church & Jowell 2006: 19). In fact, the Nairobi Agreement signed on 9 November 2007 between the DRC and Rwanda developed from the same 2006 Nairobi conference from which the PSSDGLR emerged. As such, the ICGLR effectively provides a platform for dialogue and cooperation between conflicting parties in the region. It is arguable, for instance, that its establishment has, on the one hand, led to the re-opening of diplomatic ties between the DRC and Rwanda, while, on the other, initiated cooperative endeavours such as the joint operation *Umoja Wetu* between Rwanda and the DRC against the FDLR in February 2009 (Westerkamp *et al.* 2009: 19; Nzarama 2012: 65).

The ICGLR also played a prominent role in the Amani Process, which successfully concluded with the signature of the Goma Agreement on 23 January 2008. The agreement led to much-improved relations between the DRC and Rwanda, as evidenced by a string of key cooperative initiatives, including the *Umoja Wetu* joint operation (Smis 2011: 10-11). Incidentally, it was the ICGLR and SADC that first proposed the creation of an ‘Intervention Brigade’ such as the one established by the UN Security Council Resolution 2098 on 28 March 2013 (Boutellis 2013: 1-2). In addition, SADC and the ICGLR have recently held a joint summit to address the conflict (M&G 2013). This has raised an interesting phenomenon, which is that of *inter*-regional cooperation as opposed to *intra*-regional cooperation, which may prove more effective in this specific region (Interview ISS, 2013a).

As it would be, the latest conflict management efforts have centred on regionally mediated talks conducted in Kampala by the ICGLR between the DRC and the M23 rebel movement (Kok 2013: 177). The talks, which included Rwanda and Uganda, had progressed slowly before unravelling following renewed fighting between the Congolese army – aided by the UN Intervention Brigade – and the M23 rebels in North Kivu in October 2013 (Hall 2013: 1;

RFI 2013). This is indicative of one of the key challenges in peacebuilding and integration initiatives — the lack of trust. The latest peace talks in Kampala unraveled precisely because of deep-rooted mistrust amongst concerned parties that have actually damaged the talks' credibility; not least because of Uganda's role as mediator² (Hall & Prendergrast 2012). Correspondingly, peacebuilding organizations such as the ICGLR face leadership and agenda-setting shortcomings. As it is, the Great Lakes region comprises countries with different interests and levels of participation in the ICGLR. The obvious lack of a clear leader among the ICGLR countries makes it difficult to provide leadership and appropriate priorities (NORAD 2009: 3). In addition, while the ICGLR has succeeded in bringing former enemies under one roof, negotiations are said to be dominated by the strong personal alliance between Presidents Kagame and Museveni (Interview ISS, 2013a). As such, the Kampala talks 'have only focused on short-term security issues such as border verification and the composition of a 'neutral force' to eliminate rebel groups' (Lezhnev & Prendergrast 2012: 1). Attempts to move further and address the structural nature of the conflict during negotiations have struggled to progress (Interview DIRCO, 2013).

3.1.1 The EU's promotion of conflict management

The EU has been active in the management of conflict in the Great Lakes Region. In 1996, the first EU Special Representative (EUSR) was appointed for the Great Lakes region to 'acknowledge the regional nature of the conflict in the Great Lakes' (Lurweg & Soderbaum 2011: 5). The EU's contribution to the region ranges from funding and technical support to regional institutions, to military support (Lurweg & Soderbaum 2011). An example of the latter is the military operation led by France that was launched by the EU in June 2003 to ensure peace in the Ituri region (Council of the European Union 2003). To be sure, the European Commission has provided roughly €584 million for the DRC crisis under the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) covering the 2008 to 2013 period (European Commission 2010). This, however, is targeted primarily at the DRC state and not the region. In fact, EU policy on the conflict in Eastern DRC has often been accused of a lack of coherence and inconsistency caused, in part, by a 'gap between the EU's understanding of the conflict as regional and its actual policies that focus mainly on the DRC' (Lurweg & Soderbaum 2011: 20-21).

² Evidence has been provided by the U.N. Group of Experts, Human Rights Watch, and Western intelligence of Rwandan and Ugandan support to the M23, who are also key players in the conflict but "are not participating in the talks as acknowledged parties to the conflict" (Hall & Kumar 2013: 1, 3).

With regards to regional institutions, the EU Commission has actively advocated the revival of the CEPGL Secretariat in establishing peace and security in the region, with an initial commitment of €50 million to it (Europa World 2007), while, the former EUSR for the GLR, Aldo Ajello, was a fervent and vocal promoter for the establishment of the ICGLR. As a result, the EU, along with other donors, is also often present in ICGLR meetings (Interview DIRCO, 2013). Thus, we can see that the dominant pathway of influence that the EU uses in this case is through compulsion, by creating incentives (largely monetary ones) for state actors to be brought to the table and take part in the ICGLR. More indirectly, as some elements of the ICGLR is modelled after the ECC, there is also a degree of model-setting taking place, though it is unclear if this is a deliberate policy or a more unconscious emulation.

3.2 Formal and informal trade


A central criteria of an integrated region is intra-regional trade. In theory, states that interact regularly in multiple ways would develop a 'sense of community' (Adler & Barnett 1998: 7). Trade is one of the most important of such interactions and is believed to create interdependence, thereby increasing cooperation and decreasing war, also referred to as the commercial-liberal thesis (Owen 2012: 107). The region at hand provides an interesting test to this hypothesis. While formal intra-regional trade is very low in relation to global trade, informal trade is significantly higher. Such trade is not new and is based on long-standing economic structures and networks that pre-date the state. This, however, has not translated into sustainable peace. In fact, the economic networks that facilitate the informal and illicit trade of certain *conflict* goods is exactly what characterises this case as a regional conflict complex. This raises the question of whether the type of regionalism and type of trade, instead of regionalism in general, should be used as a criterion for transformative regional integration.

Formal trade between the Great Lakes countries is largely based on raw materials, including agricultural goods and minerals. The lack of diversification within these economies makes intra-regional trade difficult since there are few areas of complementarity (Cilliers 2001: 92-93). As a result, the DRC's imports and exports are primarily oriented towards the European Union and other global markets (see Figure 3). In 2010, the DRC's official imports from regional countries (Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda) made up less than 1% of its total imports. And the exports were even less. While the ICGLR has been discussing


trade integration through various sub-committees, such initiatives have not moved passed the planning phase, largely because of poor leadership and conflicting interests with other regional organisations (Interview DIRCO, 2013).

Figure 3. Intra-regional trade *versus* trade with the EU

Imports from the GL countries and the EU to the DRC (2010)



Exports from the DRC to GL countries and the EU (2010)



Source: World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), generated by author at <http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/>

The main trade corridors relevant to the Great Lakes is the Northern corridor (from Kigali to Mombasa) and the Dar Central corridor (from Kigali to Dar es Salaam), both of which are also connected to Bujumbura (AfDB 2012: 8). Once goods cross the border from the DRC into Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania or Uganda, they enter these corridors. These routes are also then within the East African Community. Here there have been some important

institutional steps towards regional integration. Economically, this includes a customs union, a common market, harmonization of standards for goods and a reduction of national trade barriers (EAC No date). It is interesting to note then, that as a frontier to a relatively well integrated region (East Africa), the Great Lakes region has not been able to find peace. It may even be argued that the relative ease with which conflict goods can be transported through East Africa (either through official or unofficial channels) to the coastal ports, aggravates the war economy. This poses an interesting question for future research regarding the boundaries between regional security complexes and whether disparate levels of institutionalised regional integration in such areas provide a source of instability.

In addition, while the EAC is seen as very advanced on paper, the implementation of the integration processes has not been entirely successful (Interview TradeMark, 2013). For example, there are several non-tariff barriers along these corridors that still slow the free movement of goods. From Kigali to Mombasa, one can encounter up to 47 roadblocks (AfDB 2012: 8). Other non-tariff barriers include corruption and poor infrastructure, all of which increases the cost of doing business. As a result, much of the trade in the region is informal (AfDB 2012: 9). Yet, there have been several initiatives to address this challenge, such as the recent construction of several one-stop border posts in the region (Interview TradeMark, 2013). These initiatives, however, seem to be limited to the East African Community, which excludes the eastern DRC. In fact, the growing economic community emerging in East Africa seems to be hampering integration in the Great Lakes, as Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda's attention is drawn more and more eastward.

The eastern DRC, then, functions largely on an informal economic system. Trade is often based on a barter system of minerals, game and agricultural products rather than a cash economy (Melmoth 2010: 26). It is important, though, not to confuse informality with illegality. While the informal system has allowed for a war economy to flourish, based on the trade of natural resources and arms, many small-scale traders are simply using established and socially legitimate networks for trade, which persevered as the Congolese state failed. The avoidance of official channels can be attributed to corruption, unreasonable customs fees and procedures, and harassment. This is where, once again, the legitimacy of the state is central. If regional integration was institutionalised in such a way as to formalise trade procedures without making it too expensive for small-scale traders to do business, it could possibly allow for greater regulation of the war economy. This, however,

once again requires a strong social contract between the state (as the agent of regionalism) and the people.

There has been some recognition by regional organisations of the social and economic power held by informal traders. COMESA, for example, has implemented a 'Trading for Peace' programme. By increasing contact and understanding amongst traders across borders and from different communities (who are often seen as a threat) and between traders and border officials, Trading for Peace believes that conflict between communities will decrease (Interview COMESA, 2013; DFID 2009: 6). This tackles the conflict at the local level, where animosities between communities still persist and are deepened by insecurity. So far, findings seem positive (Interview SFCG, 2013; SFCG 2012: 1-2). This is, at its core, the essence of regionalism — that increased interdependence will lead to peace — though at a smaller scale. In addition, the movement by a formal regional organisation to try and incorporate informal processes of regionalisation is essential since these informal processes are in certain ways more deeply and broadly entrenched than state-centred regionalism is. This, however, is a relatively small program if compared to the overall trends of trade integration, which focus on large-scale, formal trade.

In addition, it is important to note that trade can be a double-edged sword. Currently in the eastern DRC, the regulation of the trade in natural resources, including minerals and timber, is virtually non-existent. For example, in the Walikale territory, the difficulty of access and lack of state presence has resulted in mining zones that are not regulated by any labour law or mining legislation but by informal, verbal agreements (Melmoth 2010: 26). In South Kivu, the gold trade is one of the most notorious conflict commodities because it can be traded so easily without government control (De Koning 2010: 32). In addition, traders of minerals and other goods are often taxed, legally and illegally, by various militant parties (state and non-state) along the trade routes (Melmoth 2010: 28; Interview ISS, 2013b). Members of the M23, for example, make more money taxing trucks carrying goods than they did in the army, which is a significant challenge to their reintegration (Interview ISS, 2013b).

This forms part of what is characterised as the 'war economy', where parties to the conflict profit from the insecurity created by conflict. The discourse surrounding 'war economies' and 'shadow states' is vast and not without controversy. The particular relevance in this

case, however, is its characterisation as an informal form of regionalisation. While many of the political grievances by state and non-state actors are legitimate, they are also increasingly driven by overlapping economic interests. Rwanda and Uganda, particularly, recorded significant increases in the export of minerals at the height of the war and afterwards (Interview ISS, 2013a). In 2011, the illicit gold trade from the DRC through Uganda and Kenya and into global markets was said to be 'booming' (Simons 2012: 253-254). This caused tensions with Uganda, but an opportunity for cooperation with Kenya through a joint investigation team (Simons 2012: 253-254). This highlights the oversimplification of the idea that 'common problems require common solutions', since the same common problem allowed for cooperation amongst some states (Kenya and the DRC) but conflict between others (Uganda and the DRC) due to the nature of the existing relationship between those states. Relations between states, notwithstanding the multitude of other actors involved, is driven by complex factors which might outweigh the so-called 'common problem'. In addition, the role that regional organisations can play in curbing illicit trade, although there have been some attempts by the ICGLR, is generally believed to be minimal (Interview TradeMark, 2013), largely because they require an actor that can enforce trade regulations. Again, the lack of a functioning state makes the implementation of integration policies as they are currently envisioned difficult.

3.2.1 The EU's promotion of trade integration

Facilitating commercial integration in the region, along with Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA's), has dominated the EU's promotion of regionalism. The Balassa model is largely followed by first developing a Preferential Trade Area, followed by a Free Trade Area, then a Customs Union, a Common Market and finally economic integration (Interview TradeMark, 2013). The countries of the Great Lakes, however, are separated by the 10th EDF's Central and East Africa Regional Indicative Programmes (RIP). The RIP for Central Africa allocates the bulk of its funds for 'economic and commercial integration and EPA accompanying measures' (€97 million), with only €30 million going to management of renewable natural resources and €15 million to political integration (EU 2009: 8). €15 million is also allocated to the CEPGL (EU 2009: 8). This move, however, is seen primarily as a result of political horse-trading and not as an indication of CEPGL's regional importance (Interview TradeMark, 2013). Similarly, the Regional Indicative Program for East and Southern African and the Indian Ocean region, highlights two focal areas -- economic integration and political cooperation. The first received the bulk of the funding (85%), while the

second received 10%, and 5% was left for non-focal areas (EU 2008: viv). As one of the key drivers of the regional integration process (Interview DIRCO, 2013), the EU's promotion of trade results in a similar focus at summits, which are heavily attended and monitored by donors.

Thus, once again, the EU influences the integration process primarily through incentives and model-setting. Yet, when it comes to demand side, it is largely a process of rhetorical emulation of the EU framework, while the spirit of the EU model is not adhered to. The decisions made at the highest levels are not implemented by officials of the relevant states (Interview DIRCO, 2013), indicating a lack of buy-in on the part of local actors and a lack of understanding on the part of donors regarding the key trade issues in the region. The EU, as a formal regional organisation, tends to seek similar organisations to partner with. As a result, its resources are directed towards high-level formal trade and regional organisations, when most of the structural issues that fuel the conflict are occurring at an informal level. This makes it difficult for economic integration, as promoted by the EU, to have a meaningful impact on building peace. In addition, as seen above, the bulk of trade in the region is directed towards the EU. This indicates that the EU's trade relations with the region can counteract its policy towards promoting intra-regional trade. As a result, the impact of trade integration as promoted by the EU on conflict transformation has been minimal.

3.3 Free movement of people

Another key aspect of regional integration is the free movement of people. The Great Lakes region has experienced either *de facto* or *de jure* free movement of people throughout its history. Migration patterns have been driven by both war and the search for better pastures. At the same time, short-term mobility has been ongoing in the form of trade illustrated above. However, as a whole, the mobility of people in the region is seen as a negative, rather than positive influence on peacebuilding.

While the bulk of the literature on migration in the Great Lakes region focus almost exclusively on refugee flows and forced migration, not all migration in the region has been caused by conflict. Although, it could be argued that most migration processes are at least affected indirectly by the war. People do, however, move within the region for various reasons including education, marriage and urbanisation (Bakewell & Bonfiglio 2013: 4). How-

ever, the impact of such movement on conflict transformation remains unclear as it remains largely unstudied.

In terms of policy and immigration laws in the region, there has consistently been a gap between written law and the reality on the ground. Once again, this stems largely from the unconsolidated state and porous boundaries that dominates this region. Of course, prior to colonialism the borders between political entities were much more fluid (Kanyangoga 2010: 2). During colonialism, migration was encouraged for political and economic reasons by colonial authorities (Kraler No date: 12). Following independence, struggles in nation-building led to ethnic violence, which resulted in forced migration throughout the region. As such, the immediate causes and original roots of the conflict in the eastern DRC can be traced to certain periods of high mobility across borders. In North and South Kivu, the presence of Kinyarwanda and Banyamulenge people, who are said to have originated in Rwanda, has been a volatile political tool to garner support or placate discontented communities. This was aggravated by the wave of refugees that flooded the DRC in 1994, who transferred ethnic perceptions of the Tutsi as a threat onto the Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsi) people (who previously had not placed as much emphasis on the division between Hutu and Tutsi) (Stearns 2011 Chapter 4; Van Leeuwen 2008: 1996). It is generally accepted that addressing this, as one of the root causes of the conflict, will require a regional approach. The solutions discussed, however, are targeted primarily at the repatriation or integration of refugees, which reinforces state boundaries and hampers any concept of regional citizenship. The possibility of opening borders to the free movement of people in a more official and institutionalised way, and the likely affect on conflict transformation, has not been fully considered.

At least on paper, the countries of the Great Lakes enjoy the free movement of people, either through CEPGL or the EAC (Westerkamp, Feil & Thompson 2009: 21; Nshimbi & Fioramonti 2013: 48-49). Also, at the local level, the lack of clear demarcated boundaries results in people moving daily across country borders without being aware of it themselves (Interview DIRCO, 2013). Of course, while many people are able to cross borders relatively unhindered, the situation is rather complex. Similar to the non-tariff barriers with regards to trade, there are unofficial hindrances to formal migration in the region, including harassment and bribes at border posts and difficulty in procuring needed documentation to travel to, work and live in neighbouring countries (World Bank 2011: ii; Kanyangoga 2010:

9; 27-28). In addition, xenophobic sentiments seem to be on the rise, particularly in the economic centres such as Kenya and Tanzania (Interview SFCG, 2013; Kanyangoga 2010: 28).

This is because the mass movement of people is associated with war, either as a result of it or as an instigator of conflict. Invariably driven by internal politics, the presence of ‘foreigners’ or their role in the region, has sparked various conflicts over the years (Interview SFCG, 2013). The discourses surrounding anti-foreign sentiments is usually driven by competition for land and the question of citizenship, which provides certain economic and political benefits. This is because the movement of people is taking place in a region with states where such issues have not been consolidated, due to the ongoing statebuilding and nationbuilding process. So, there are four ways in which the movement of people have contributed to the conflict: (1) through historical migration that has resulted in the presence of communities seen as ‘foreign’; (2) through the movement of refugees that has regularly destabilised host countries; (3) through the cross-border movement and activities of rebel groups; and (4) through the building of relationships and alliances between conflict parties in different civil wars³. Theoretically, the free movement of people is meant to reduce conflict through the ‘contact’ hypothesis -- that increased contact between antagonistic groups will reduce conflict. In addition, formalising the mobility of people may reduce tensions that arise from ambiguity regarding ‘citizen’ and ‘foreign’ rights and economic access. However, thus far the context of the Great Lakes region has not been favourable for such processes to take place. In addition, the contentious nature of the issue has kept such issues low on the agenda at regional summits and meetings.

3.3.1 The EU's promotion of mobility

The EU, in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), does identify mobility and migration as one of its areas of cooperation, both within Africa and between the EU and Africa (Africa-EU Partnership 2013-2014). This partnership uses the African Union as an entry-point for its interactions with the continent. However, the African Union does not recognise any REC specifically for the Great Lakes and the EU does not indicate the free movement of people as an area of focus in its RIP for the relevant regions. Thus, while it is possible that

³ The key alliance that has formed in this way is the ongoing relationship between Presidents Kagame and Museveni, who fought together when Kagame was in exile in Uganda and was given a post in Museveni's subsequent government. This relationship has often played out negatively in negotiations with other statesmen in the region, who are often excluded by these two dominant players (Interview ISS, 2013a).

the EU has had some impact on the EAC's policies in this regard through JAES, there is no clear policy promoting the free movement of people in the the Great Lakes countries. Further research into more specific projects and programmes may prove different, however.

3.4 Social and cultural links

Closely linked with the section above, regionalism is meant to promote cross-border social and cultural links. This is a central part of a Security Community, where multiple transactions are meant to forge a regional identity, which reduces the chance of future conflict (Adler & Barnett 1998: 7, 17). This is meant to be a by-product of the free movement of goods, capital and people; an interaction which is meant to reduce the salience of ethnic identity and the need for identity-based citizenship (Mengisteab 2012: 3). However, the increased interaction between communities and nationalities that has resulted from the movement of people in the region at hand has resulted in regional cleavages rather than a regional identity. In truth, many of the conflicts in the region were instigated by a post-independence citizenship crisis that has not yet been resolved. As such, the nation-building processes in these countries are ongoing, which puts the agenda for building a regional identity on the backseat. This is reflected in the relative silence on the part of regional organisations (with the exception of the EAC) and donors (such as the EU) on this issue. Rather, the focus has remained largely on issues of political cooperation and trade. Two questions emerge from this: (1) whether forging a regional identity could manage the identity crisis in the region and (2) how such a regional identity can be cultivated, if it can.

There are significant cross-border social and cultural links in the region, some with more unifying potential than others. The multiple layers of identity reminiscent of most regions makes isolating such links difficult, especially since the Great Lakes has a history of dramatizing certain differences (national or ethnic) for violent results. Thus, ethnic differences have persisted as a divisive layer of identity that does not conform to state boundaries. The 'kin country syndrome' has allowed for states and militias to regularly interfere in each others affairs in 'solidarity' with their fellow kinsmen (Interview SFCG, 2013; Lemarchand 2009: 19). Religion, however, encompasses several ethnic groups, particularly the Catholic Church. In recognising the need for a regional approach to the conflict, the Catholic Church has conducted regional workshops on how to address the conflict (Van Leeuwen 2008: 409). However, these have had limited success as participants seemed to remain

divided on national lines and hesitant to address the *root* causes of the conflict and thus focused on shared experiences of trauma instead (Van Leeuwen 2008: 410). This only addresses the symptoms and thus hinders the potential for conflict transformation. It is also reflective of a broader regional trend of focusing on immediate issues and not the structural nature of the conflict.

At a more formal level, the EAC, once again, seems to lead in integration through cultural and social ties. With the aim of achieving a political federation, they have begun to promote an East African identity. This includes creating symbols (such as the EAC flag and anthem) and promoting student exchange programs (EAC No Date). This, however, is still in its infancy. In truth, constructing an identity from above is near impossible unless that identity resonates with the day to day life of the people it is meant to represent. Unfortunately, the negative connotations associated with migration above complicate this further as the actual impact on the lives of 'citizens' by 'foreigners' is perceived to be negative. This, however, is not a challenge unique to the region. As such, this is one area where the EU's experience may be helpful, having dealt with nationalist movements and yet managed to develop a relatively strong European identity. However, there has been little indication that this has been an area of concern for the EU or the leaders in the affected region, whose foreign relations are driven by their own identity-based relationships⁴.

3.5 Natural resource management

The management of natural resources is another field that presents opportunities for regional cooperation. Accordingly, there have been several cases in the Great Lakes Region, both at the informal and formal level where, in turn, formal cooperation can occur at the local, national or international level. For instance, local communities in Uganda and the DRC have historically had informal arrangements and close social networks linked to the shared use of Lake Albert's water resources (Westerkamp & Houdret 2010: 16). These arrangements and networks, which are based on and helped by common ethnic origins, have ultimately contributed to the establishment of informal local "early warning" system that have prevented violent escalation of conflicts in various cases in the past (Karatunga 2009; Oketch 2009; International Alert 2009: 76; Westerkamp & Houdret 2010: 16).

⁴ Presidents Kagame and Museveni, who are the dominant players in the region, are united by their forming part of a similar minority, pastoralist subculture and are thus divided from other leaders within the region. (Interview with DIRCO; Lemarchand 2001: 89)

At the formal level, examples of local cooperation include The Central Albertine Rift Transboundary Protected Area Network between the DRC, Uganda and Rwanda. The initiative, which started at the local level between the three countries' national parks, was 'formalised at the national level in 2009, with the creation of a transboundary secretariat in Kigali, Rwanda' (Westerkamp & Houdret 2010: 14). It effectively managed to bring together stakeholders from the three countries for regular meetings, even during periods of political tension and violent conflict (Houdret & Roettger 2010). To be sure, local cooperation between cross-border communities has proven to be fairly useful as a peacebuilding tool in the Great Lakes region, as evidenced by the trans-border cooperation between the Ugandan Wildlife Authority and security agents, which have reportedly assisted in the peaceful settlement of tense cross border issues in the past (Hammill & Crawford 2008; Westerkamp & Houdret 2010: 15).

At the national and international level, regional cooperation in natural resource management have included landmark initiatives such as Ruzizi II – the largest hydropower dam in the region. The project is sponsored by the CEPGL and jointly managed by Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC through a joint venture called SINELAC (Stevens, Hoebeke & Vlassenroot 2008). Other examples are SOCIGAZ, a joint venture between the DRC and Rwanda re-initiated in 2009 to jointly exploit methane gas from Lake Kivu, and the Indicative Power Master Plan, developed by the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Programme (NELSAP) for six countries including Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, and Eastern DRC. In fact, NELSAP represents one of the more dynamic formal regional cooperation programs in the region, with a host of active regional projects in natural resources management⁵. Its LEAF Project, which finances several small-scale resource management projects in the Lake Albert region, established transboundary contacts by introducing the "fisheries co-management" concept that included conflict prevention (through an informal, cross-border, early-warning system) as one of its key tenets (Westerkamp & Houdret 2010: 17).

However, while regional cooperation initiatives may play an important role in harnessing positive relations between countries, these and general peacebuilding benefits cannot be taken for granted. In fact, some of the above-mentioned regional cooperation initiatives,

⁵ It is an investment program under the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) tasked with facilitating the identification, preparation and implementation supervision of transboundary projects. It is composed of two regional sub-programs that deal with power and energy on the one hand, and water resources on the other.

such as the Indicative Power Master Plan, do not make explicit reference to whether peacebuilding was taken into account in their conceptualisation (Westerkamp & Houdret 2010: 13). Conversely, the regional undertakings highlighted above are not all successful, as illustrated by SOCIGAZ, which has yet to really materialize as an actual joint-management and common energy project, or SINELAC, where broader and deeper cooperation remains elusive and difficult (AfDB 2009: 140; Dovenspeck 2007: 105).

The reasons for such shortcomings are actually common to the GLR's regional integration trajectory. They include differences in priorities, but more importantly a lack of governance capacity and trust between member countries, which in turn lead to a lack of proper commitment to regional institutions and programs. Disagreements regarding oil exploitation between Uganda and the DRC, due to previous violent conflicts between the two in the Ituri region, demonstrates this lack of trust (Westerkamp & Houdret 2010: 22). At the same time, water cooperation projects there have in the past faced a lack of political commitment that ultimately undermines the ability to effectively make meaningful decisions on the ground, while limiting access to vital funds and administrative structures to implement integrated policies (Westerkamp, Feil & Thompson 2009; Westerkamp & Houdret 2010).

3.5.1 The EU's promotion of natural resource management

Within the framework of natural resources management, 'the EU has been an active supporter of various regional cooperation initiatives and institutions in the Great Lakes Region and has positioned itself as a key donor in this respect' (Westerkamp, Feil & Thompson 2009: 17). In particular, it has turned its attention to the development of the Great Lakes' energy sector, using the CEPGL's Great lakes Energy Agency (EGL) as an entry point (EGL 2013). In this way, the European Development Fund Financing Agreement "*Programme de relance de la CEPGL*" has promised funds for the exploration of geothermal resources in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC through a partnership between the Icelandic International Development Agency (ICEIDA) and the EU Delegation in Rwanda (EGL 2013). Otherwise, the EU has also agreed to provide the funding for the development of the Ruzizi III and IV power plants (AfDB 2009: 145).

EU countries also individually promote regional cooperation in natural resources management. USD50 million were sought from the Netherlands and Germany to complete funds needed for the NELSAP Interconnection Project (Nile Basin Initiative 2012). What's more,

the Netherlands has agreed to fund 'national and regional investments' for renewable energy (€140 million) as well as the KivuWatt project (European Commission 2012: 9).

4. CONCLUSION


Overall, when determining the impact of regional integration on conflict transformation in the Great Lakes, the results have been mixed at best. When regionalism is broken down into its various components (trade integration, conflict management, natural resource management, movement of people and social/cultural ties) and its two forms (formal and informal), it becomes clear that regionalisation processes can contradict each other. The general impact that each of these processes can have on conflict resolution, is indicated in Figure 4.

It then follows that the EU's promotion of *formal* regional integration, which has also been uneven, has not always had an impact on regionalism and conflict transformation. This is not to negate the benefits brought about by some of the EU's initiatives, particularly the peace and security initiatives that have emerged with the growth of the ICGLR. However, as mentioned, these initiatives, while an important step, do not address the structural nature of the conflict and have had limited success in furthering integration. Similarly, while the management of natural resources has promoted co-operation between conflicting parties, this has not prevented those same parties from simultaneously fighting each other elsewhere.

In order for a security community to emerge, several conditions must be met. These include trust, common values and norms, strong institutions, multiple interactions and domestic stability (Adler and Barnett 1996: 3, 5, 10, 17; Nathan 2006: 276-277). The Great Lakes region fulfils very few of these conditions. While there is significant interaction between the people within these countries, they are guided by informal rules and norms that contradict those being promoted at the inter-state level. Most of the institutions formed in the past few years have struggled to entrench new norms and values. There has been limited social learning or change in context, and the EU's influence has been limited to compulsion (which does not result in actual buy-in on the part of local actors) and some generic model-setting (where the framework of the EU has been broadly followed but not fully implemented). But above all, the lack of trust and continued domestic instability consistently challenge any strides made towards building a security community. This does not mean that trust and stability cannot be enhanced via formal top-down regionalism, but it is clear

that a more innovative model than that currently pursued will be necessary for sustainable integration and conflict transformation.

Figure 4: The EU and causal pathways between regionalism and conflict transformation



While on the surface regional organisations in the Great Lakes are inspired by the EU model, this analysis shows that this is only the case at a superficial level. The EU is the largest donor to regional organisations in the region as a whole, but its strategy does not follow the same step-by-step approach that the EU model took (Interview TradeMark, 2013). Rather, money is dispersed through a bureaucratic system that lacks an overall vision, and is more concerned with ensuring that log-frame targets are met than working towards an overall goal (Interview TradeMark, 2013). As a result, the integration process is implemented unevenly and at a pace that is not conducive to the context of the region.

Several commentators and analysts have pointed out that the European Commission's funding programmes for regional integration are not adequately harmonised (European Court of Auditors 2009: 16; Froitzheim, Söderbaum & Taylor 2011: 55, 65). No surprise then that there is an uneven focus on formal top-down economic integration and political cooperation *vis a vis* other regionalisation processes and national. Similarly, the EU has not sufficiently taken into account the absorption capability of these states and organisations (European Court of Auditors 2009: 16), and the different ways in which politics is conducted within them (Froitzheim, Söderbaum & Taylor 2011: 53). For example, currently, there are no institutional criteria that determine a country's membership of any of the regional organisations analysed in this paper, which means that already weak states must burden themselves even further to sustain equally weak regional complexes (Interview TradeMark, 2013). This shows that the link between a functioning state and a functioning regional organisation has not been considered sufficiently by the EU.

Soderbaum (2004: 420) identifies three types of regional governance in Africa -- neo-liberal regional governance, sovereignty boosting governance and regional shadow governance. It is clear from the analysis above, that the Great Lakes conflict is driven largely by regional shadow governance processes. However, attempts at peacebuilding and conflict transformation, as well as integration, have largely been following the neo-liberal regional governance model. This has resulted in superficial conflict management attempts without any significant penetration to lower levels of society. In other words, regional initiatives that target the conflict occur at a state level and at the will of national leaders. Regional integration, however, is not felt in the lower levels of society where regionalisation takes a more informal, but no less important, form. Again, this is founded on the weakness of the state. Deutsch's concept of Security Community is reliant on a functioning, stable and unitary state. In the Great Lakes, however, while regional transactions are multiple and complex, a security community has not emerged because the lack of a modern state has allowed regional processes to go unmanaged and contradict each other. In essence, for conflict transformation to occur as hypothesized, the structures that provide the basis for continued war need to be transformed. This has not taken place largely because of the gap between superficial, state-led regional conflict management and structural, multi-actor regional transformation.

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