

GAP8, 8th International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy,
Konstanz, 17-20 September 2012,

Colloquium: “Consequence and Consequences – What’s truth got
to do with it?” (18 September 2012)

Organisation: Heinrich Wansing, Manfred Kupffer

Participants: Jc Beall, Graham Priest, Peter Schroeder-Heister
Introduction by Heinrich Wansing

Full colloquium program: Congress program booklet, pp. 40-41
<http://www.gap8.de/mentis-gap8-druck-endversion.pdf>

What is the proper logic of consequence?

Peter Schroeder-Heister
Universität Tübingen
psh@uni-tuebingen.de

According to the standard view, consequence means transmission of truth: A consequence statement is valid if its conclusion is true given its premisses are true. In this sense truth is the fundamental concept on which consequence is based. From the point of view of proof-theoretic semantics I argue for reversing this order: Consequence should be taken as a ‘primordial’ hypothetical concept which does not rely on a categorical concept such as truth. The proper logic of consequence then becomes the logic of consequences, i.e., the logic of consequence statements. I will discuss the implications of this view for standard laws of consequence as well as for notions of inference and (semantic) completeness.

