

EBERHARD KARLS
UNIVERSITÄT
TÜBINGEN



ERCCT Online Paper Series:

The 2014 Sunflower Movement and the Cross Strait Relationship

Alex Chienwu Hsueh

Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica,

June 2015

– Young Scholars Workshop 2015 selected collections –

The CCKF-ERCCT wishes to express its gratitude to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taiwan, R.O.C.) for generously supporting the Europe-Taiwan Young Scholars Workshop.

European Research Center on Contemporary Taiwan

*Eberhard Karls University, Tuebingen
Wilhelmstr. 133
72074 Tuebingen*

*Ph.: +49 7071 29 72717
e-mail: ercct@uni-tuebingen.de*

The 2014 Sunflower Movement and the Cross-Strait Relationship¹

Alex Chienwu Hsueh 薛健吾

(Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, Taiwan)

Abstract

The 2014 Sunflower Movement which aimed at revoking the Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services (海峽兩岸服務貿易協議 or 服貿協議) proposed by President Ma and the KMT government is an influential event in Taiwan. Many think that it will have a negative impact on the future Cross-Strait relationship because it not only shows lots of people in Taiwan hold a negative attitude toward China but also reminds Taiwanese people of the potential economic threat China may exert on Taiwan. Therefore, the Cross-Strait relationship will get worse despite Taiwan's high degree of economic dependence on China. Based on the analysis of the recent social events in Taiwan during Ma's presidency, I argue that the Sunflower Movement does not mean that Taiwanese people do not want to seek more economic ties with China; instead, it means that Taiwanese people actually prefer to have a more enhanced economic cooperation with China with a caveat that this enhanced economic cooperation must be supervised based on a democratic and transparent legal procedure. As a consequence, what the impacts of the 2014 Sunflower Movement are on the future Cross-Strait relationship is that, while the movement may not make the bilateral relationship get worse, it may defer the institutionalization of bilateral economic cooperation and consolidate Taiwan's preference of maintaining the status quo. Data of the Taiwan National Security Survey (TNSS) supports all the hypotheses derived from my argument.

¹ This is still a drafted edition. Please contact the author through chsueh@sinica.edu.tw for a more complete edition if you plan to cite this work.

1. Introduction

The 2014 Sunflower Movement (太陽花學運) which took place from March 18th to April 10th is an influential event in Taiwan. It is the first large scale student movement in Taiwan since the 1990 Wild Lily Student Movement (野百合學運) and also the first time that both the Legislative Yuan and the Executive Yuan are broke in and occupied by protesters. The whole event started from March 18th 2014 on the day when the Kuomintang's (Nationalist Party, KMT) congressman Chingchung Chang (張慶忠) declared that the whole Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services (hereafter "the agreement") was reviewed and passed by the Home Affairs Committee within 30 seconds after the beginning of the committee review. To protest that such an important and influential agreement was only reviewed in such a cursory manner by the KMT, students soon broke in, with the help of the DPP congressmen, and occupied the Legislative Yuan on the same night, asking the KMT government to substantively review the whole agreement clause by clause. The movement once got out-of-control when the hawk faction of the students lost their patience and stormed into the Executive Yuan on March 23rd. In order to keep the momentum of the movement, the students appealed to the whole society to go out and demonstrate against the KMT government on March 30th. More than 400 thousands of people showed up in the March 30th anti-agreement demonstration. The whole event ended after the speaker of the Legislative Yuan, Chinpien Wang (王金平), went visit the students on April 6th and promised that he will not convene any negotiation conference between party caucuses before the draft of the Statute of Supervision on Cross-Strait Agreements (兩岸協議監督條例) is legislated. Having Wang's promise, the students finally accepted the offer and retreated from the Legislative Yuan on April 10th.²

The Sunflower Movement shows Taiwanese youth's anxiety about the future – their own as well as the society's. Although it was triggered by the ruling KMT's attempt to hastily pass the agreement with China in the Legislative Yuan, the participants' motives were not limited to Taiwan's relations with China *per se*, but also included the concern about, among other things, the deteriorating distribution of income and wealth as well as the worsening job opportunities for the young – China being seen as the cause for many of those problems.

² For a more detailed analysis about the success of the Sunflower Movement, refer to Ho 2015 and the protesters official website "Democracy at 4am" <http://4am.tw/>.

As Taiwan's most important trade partner as well as Taiwan's largest security threat, the choice between guns and butter – how to find a balance so that Taiwan can keep benefiting from its economic relationship with China and meanwhile avoid being vulnerable to China's economic and political leverage – has been the most important political cleavage in Taiwan's society,³ especially after Taiwan's democratization in the mid-1980s when the politicians have to earn their constituencies' support to win the elections.

Due to historical and political reasons, Taiwan's society has long been divided into two camps in terms of people's national identity. Generally, those who are in favor of unification or the status quo are inclined to support the KMT and/or its allies in the Pan-Blue camp, and those who prefer independence tend to back the DPP and/or other forces associated with it in the Pan-Green camp. However, when Taiwan's economy are more and more associated with China since the 1980s, in addition to the national identity issue, the issue of economic interests vs. national security is also a major concern. This political-economic two-dimensional issue space becomes an even more difficult choice for Taiwanese people in the recent years as Taiwan becomes a more opened and unequaled society in the 21st century. In this paper, I argue that the 2014 Sunflower Movement is one of the consequences of this grand social transition in Taiwan; and more than just being one of the consequences of the social transition, this movement itself has its own independent influence on the whole society in reshaping the future Cross-Strait relations as well. The goal of this research is to analyze the implications of the social transition in Taiwan and discuss how the Sunflower Movement may affect the future Cross-Strait relations. Different from the two the most popular opinions which contends that this movement is only an ephemeral phenomenon resulting from people's disappointment toward President Ma's performance and will not have a long-lasting effect on the Cross-Strait relationship, or that this movement, if has any influence in the long run, foresees a negative impact on the future Cross-Strait relations since it demonstrates Taiwanese people's reluctance of further engagement with China, I argue that the Sunflower Movement represents a more long-term trend of people's attitudes toward China and that it should not have a negative impact on future Cross-Strait economic cooperation.

Furthermore, the Sunflower Movement also represents a fact that people's attitudes toward China and toward the two big parties have changed in recent years, especially among the young generation. Traditionally, the Pan-Blue camp in Taiwan wants to enhance economic cooperation with China, and the Pan-Green camp wants

³ Magcamit and Tang 2015.

to lessen it. However, different from the standpoints of the two big parties, the young generation in Taiwan wants to enhance the economic relationship with China; but, meanwhile, they also want this enhanced cooperation to be proceeded under a more transparent and stricter “democratic supervision.” Neither of the two parties is able to satisfy these two new public demands in Taiwan’s society. This phenomenon suggests that the national identity issue, which had been the most important social cleavage in Taiwan’s elections for more than 20 years and also the main cause of people’s party identity, is gradually losing its attractiveness. This phenomenon also explains the success of Wenche Ko (柯文哲) as an independent candidate in the 2014 Taipei City Major Election. When the traditional Blue-Green or KMT-DPP politics is no longer the main reason that affects Taiwan’s China policy and the Cross-Strait relations, China have to re-gear its way to deal with the Taiwan issue as well. This is because what China will probably face in the future is not “a pro-unification KMT government” or “a pro-independence DPP government,” but a pro-democracy and pro-engagement government no matter which party controls the government. Thus, a new form of the Cross-Strait relationship is expected to appear in the near future – I expect that it will takes a long time for both sides to reach a more institutionalized economic cooperation, while the terms that Taiwan could get will become less and less advantageous as time goes by.

To process my argument, the structure of this paper is as follows. Here in the introduction I first briefly introduce the whole Sunflower Movement event as the basic background knowledge before I analyze its potential influence on the Cross-Strait relations. Then, the second part is my main argument, in which I analyze how the Sunflower Movement may change Taiwan’s China policy and so affecting the Cross-Strait relations. I refute the popular conjecture that this movement foresees a negative future Cross-Strait relation and argue that the demand of a new “democratic engagement” China policy is emerging in Taiwan’s society and as a consequence China has to re-gear its Taiwan policy as well. Several hypotheses derived from my argument will be presented in this section for empirical test. In the third section, I apply the Taiwan National Security Survey (TNSS) data⁴ to demonstrate the changes in Taiwan’s society and test my hypotheses. Lastly, in the end of the paper, I will discuss how the 2014 Sunflower movement may reshape the future Cross-Strait relations based on my findings.

⁴ Niou, Emerson M.S., Taiwan National Security Survey (Duke University).

2. Choosing between guns and butter before and after the 2014 Sunflower Movement

2.1 The trend of Taiwan's China policy and the meaning of Ma's 2012 re-election

Given the fact that China is both Taiwan's largest security threat and trade partner, Taiwan's China policy is a very controversial domestic political issue and has long been argued that it can only be understood by a two-dimensional security-economy quadrant as Figure 1 demonstrates. Generally speaking, the pure blue faction of KMT stands at the first quadrant, preferring to seek more economic cooperation with China and promote unification with China in the future; the local faction of KMT and the People First Party (PFP) stands at the middle-top of the Y-axis, preferring to maintain the political status quo while at the same time enhance the economic ties with China; the New Party, similar to the pure blue faction of KMT, also stands at the first quadrant, but prefers to politically unify and economically integrate with China as soon as possible; the DPP stands at the second quadrant, preferring to enhance Taiwan's economic ties with China while at the same time try to seek political independence; and lastly, the fundamentalism faction of DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) stand at the third quadrant, preferring to claim independence as soon as possible and largely reduce Taiwan's economic ties with China for the sake of national security. These main political forces and their standpoints in Taiwan's domestic politics are illustrated in Figure 1, and the circled region denotes the majority of the public opinion in Taiwan. The fact that the majority of people prefer maintaining the status quo with a moderate degree of economic engagement with China accounts for why Taiwan's government has generally adopted a China policy of "binding engagement and soft balancing" instead of an over-balancing policy or an under-balancing one,⁵ with minor degree of adjustments from time to time depending on whether it is the KMT or the DPP that controls the government.

[Figure 1 is about here.]

Although Taiwan's China policy has been relative stable, there are two new trends, one political and the other economic, in Taiwan's public opinion that have gradually emerged with the increase of Taiwan's economic dependence on China and

⁵ Huang and James 2014; Chen 2015.

thus largely account for Ma's winning in the 2008 and the 2012 presidential election. Figure 2 and Figure 3 demonstrate the first trend: Figure 2 shows that more and more people in Taiwan identify themselves as Taiwanese rather than as Chinese or both (refer to Figure 2), and Figure 3 shows that more and more people in Taiwan prefer to maintain the status quo, whether indefinitely or deciding at later date (refer to Figure 3). The second trend is shown by Ma's overwhelming winning in the 2008 presidential election: he obtained 58.45% (7.66 million votes) of all the votes and the DPP candidate Changting Hsieh (謝長廷) got only 41.55% (5.44 million votes). The major debate between the two candidates in the 2008 presidential election is about whether and in which form to adopt the Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement policy (ECFA) (兩岸經濟合作架構協議). Therefore, Ma's 2008 overwhelming winning means that the majority of people in Taiwan acknowledges that China's market is so important to Taiwan so it is necessary to seek more economic cooperation with China and secure the potential economic benefit by signing a bilateral formal treaty.

[Figure 2 is about here.]

[Figure 3 is about here.]

The fact that in 2012 Ma won the presidential election again despite his poor economic performance in his first term further demonstrates that the majority of people still consented to his China policy. In the 2012 presidential election, Ma still obtained 51.60% (6.89 million votes) of all the votes, while the DPP candidate Yingwen Tsai (蔡英文) got 45.63% (6.09 million votes), in spite of the fact that the four-year average of economic growth rate in his first term is 3.39% in terms of nominal GDP⁶ and is only 0.35% in terms of real GDP per capita.⁷ This is a strong evidence showing that, at least until 2012, most of people in Taiwan still support him

⁶ Data from the National Statistics Website of Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, R.O.C. (Taiwan). <http://www.stat.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=4>. Last accessed on June 5th, 2015.

⁷ Data from the Penn World Table 8.0 (Robert C. Feenstra, Robert Inklaar, and Marcel P. Timmer, "Penn World Table," 2013). Data is available for download at <http://www.gdc.net/pwt> (last accessed in August, 2014) and calculated by the authors.

to keep promoting signing ECFA and the agreement with China.

If most of the people still support ECFA and the agreement and so re-elect Ma to let him fulfill his China policy in 2012, then why does the Sunflower Movement take place after two years in 2014? And what does the Sunflower Movement mean in terms of future Cross-Strait relations? Generally speaking, there are two popular opinions in Taiwan about the influence of the Sunflower Movement on the future Cross-Strait relations. The first one contends that this movement is only an ephemeral phenomenon resulting from people's disappointment toward President Ma's performance and will not have a long-lasting effect on the Cross-Strait relationship, and the other saying that this movement, if has any influence in the long run, foresees a negative impact on the future Cross-Strait relations since it demonstrates Taiwanese people's reluctance of further engagement, neither politically nor economically, with China. Different from the two popular points of view, I argue that the Sunflower Movement represents a more long-term trend of people's attitudes toward China and that it should not have a negative impact on future Cross-Strait economic cooperation. In the rest part of this section, I will buttress my argument by, on the one hand, answering the question of why the Sunflower Movement takes place even most of the people still support ECFA and the agreement (so they re-elected Ma in 2012 to let him fulfill these policies), and on the other hand, demonstrating that Taiwanese people's attitudes toward China are not getting worse after the Sunflower Movement, even among the young generation who is alleged by most of the political analysts to hold a more negative attitude toward China than all the other generations. I will demonstrate that, actually, the young generation are even more positive toward further economic cooperation with China under a certain precondition – as long as the institutionalized Cross-Strait cooperation is supervised by a transparent and democratic procedure.

2.2 The six events that tilts the scale during Ma's second term

With the increase of Taiwan's economic reliance on the global market, the increasing inequality as well as the stagnated labor wage has gradually become an important political issue on the table.⁸ As Taiwan's most important trade partner, China has long be blamed for deteriorating Taiwan's economy deliberately by some people in Taiwan, especially by the Pan-Green supporters. However, the redistribution issue has never become the main political debate in Taiwan's party politics before recent years for two main reasons. First, the profound social cleavage of national identity in Taiwan's society precludes this redistribution issue from being noticed by both of the two camps. Furthermore, the adoption of the single member district

⁸ Wu 2014.

plurality (SMDP) voting system since 2007 further prevent all the other small parties who stands for redistribution issues from being voters' practical choices. As a consequence, not until recent years does the redistribution issue become a salient debate in Taiwan's political arena.

Given the facts that claiming independence or unification is not a doable choice and that it is impossible for Taiwan to abandon the China market, the national identity factor become less and less relevant for people in Taiwan when it comes to whether to have a more enhanced economic cooperation with China.⁹ More and more people acknowledge that it is necessary to institutionalize the Cross-Strait economic activities in order to secure the economic benefits of Taiwanese people who conduct business in China. That's why Ma's ECFA and the Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services policies gain the support of the majority.

However, the following six events happened during Ma's second term rapidly tilt the scale and soon make people put into doubt Ma's Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services as well as all his China policies. First, the 22k monthly salary issue (22k 爭議) since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis during Ma's first term highlights the long-lasting discontent in Taiwan's society that low wage and long working hour has been a severe phenomenon in Taiwan, especially for the young generation who can only has a low wage and long working hour and would probably never be able to buy the extremely expensive house.¹⁰ The fact that the privileged military officers, public servants, and educational personnel enjoy a very high pension due to KMT's cronyism further angers the young generation. Second, the anti-media monopoly movement in 2012 (反媒體壟斷事件) largely increases people's doubt about Ma's true intention of his China policy when the KMT government allows the big China consortiums to amalgamate Taiwan's media companies. Third, the Chungchiu Hong event in July 2013 (洪仲丘案) further ignites people's anger toward the unjust KMT government. Allegedly, there are 250 thousands of people went to the street in front of the Presidential Hall to protest against the KMT government for its incapability of finding out the truth. This so-called "White-Shirt Military Movement," the largest social movement initiated by Taiwan's civil society ever, reveals that people's wrath toward the KMT government has reached to a significant peak. Fourth, the Miaoli County Dapu case (大埔案) and the scandal of the KMT head of county in Miaoli in 2013 also reinforce people's impressions that the KMT is still a very corrupt party and mainly caters to the big consortiums. What the case reveals is that the KMT has

⁹ Huang and James 2014; Magcamit and Tang 2015.

¹⁰ According to many surveys conducted by many governmental and nongovernmental units, Taiwan's housing affordability in the city is the worst among all the advanced countries around the world.

cooperated with the big consortiums to sacrifice common people's welfare in most, if not all, of the urban development plans. Fifth, the political struggle between President Ma and the legislative speaker Wang (馬王九月政爭) in September 2013 resulting from Wang's unwillingness to help Ma to pass his Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services in the legislating process largely draws Ma's approval rate down. Most people read this event as that Ma wants to hastily integrate Taiwan with China or even that Ma wants to "give Taiwan to China," despite the fact that the agreement is actually Ma's main China policy which he had publicly emphasized for many times when he ran the two election campaigns in 2008 and 2012.

The last and also the most important issue in the background is the increasing social inequality, which further makes people blame China and KMT for making their daily life tougher and tougher. Figure 4 and Figure 5 demonstrate the trend of social inequality in Taiwan since the government has recorded this information. Although in Figure 4 the problem of social inequality seems not too severe because the degree of inequality has remained at a stable degree since 2001, actually the income ratio of the richest 5% to the poorest 5% has rapidly increased, especially during Ma's presidency. As Figure 5 shows, from 1998 to 2008, this ratio increased from 32.74 to 65.97, or a 3 unit increase per year. However, since Ma became the president in 2008, it rapidly deteriorates from 65.97 in 2008 to 96.56 in 2011, or a 30 unit increase per year, ten times than before. Most people attribute the cause of the rapidly deteriorating social inequality to Ma's China policy and KMT's relationship with the big consortiums. Overall, the increased inequality along with the previous five influential events during Ma's presidency become the main reason that accounts for the occurrence of the Sunflower Movement.

[Figure 4 is about here.]

[Figure 5 is about here.]

2.3 The meaning of the movement and its impact on the future Cross-Strait relations

According to the previous analysis, the movement should be caused largely by people's disappointment at President Ma and the KMT government rather than by

people's negative attitudes toward China. The most salient evidence is that in the 2008 and the 2012 presidential elections the majority of people still support Ma's China policy. It is Ma's poor performance along with the six social events that lead to the onset of the movement. If my argument holds, the following hypotheses should be verified by empirical evidences.

Because the movement shows that people worry about Ma's intention of his China policy, especially among the young generation, we should see that when all things being equal, the young generation is less likely to support unification than the older generations after the movement.

Hypothesis 1: The young generation is less likely to be pro-unification than the middle and the old generations after the 2014 Sunflower Movement.

Since I argue that neither the Pan-Blue nor the Pan-Green camp responds well to the newly-rising social inequality issues (thus angers the young generation), we should see that none of the two camps are able to attract the support of the young generation. That is, when all things being equal, the young generation are not more or less likely to support or not to support any of the two camps.

Hypothesis 2: The young generation is not less likely to support the pan-blue camp than the middle and the old generations after the 2014 Sunflower Movement.

Hypothesis 3: The young generation is not more likely to support the pan-green camp than the middle and the old generations after the 2014 Sunflower Movement.

Similarly, since I argue that the movement is mainly caused by the young generation's distrust of Ma and of the KMT government rather than by their general resentment against China, we should see that when all thing being equal, the young generation is not more likely to worry about China or prefer to lessen the bilateral economic relationship. That is, the young generation is not more likely to hold a negative attitude toward China than the older generations.

Hypothesis 4: The young generation is not more worried about China's use of economic coercion against Taiwan than the middle and the old generation after the 2014 Sunflower Movement.

Hypothesis 5: The young generation is not less likely to prefer to lessen Taiwan's economic ties with China than the middle and the old generation after the 2014 Sunflower Movement.

Hypothesis 6: The young generation is not more likely to hold a net negative

attitude toward China than the middle and the old generations after the 2014 Sunflower Movement.

Lastly, if all the previous hypotheses are supported by empirical evidence, then we should expect that, generally speaking, the movement does not have a negative impact on the future Cross-Strait relations in terms of people's attitudes toward China. In the next section, I will test all the hypotheses derived from my argument using the TNSS data.

3. Research Design and Statistical Analysis

3.1 The dependent variable

When it comes to Taiwanese people's attitude toward China, previous research has found that many people actually hold contradictory attitudes, depending on which kind of issues are on the table, especially issues about national security and economic interest. Therefore, to better conceptualize their attitude toward China, we have to take both the security and the economic aspects, a two-dimensional issue space, into consideration to get the whole picture.¹¹ Thankfully, the TNSS data provides two questions that match the requirement. I construct three dependent variables based on the two questions to conceptualize people's security and economic attitudes toward China.

National security concern is a dichotomous variable based on the following question: "Some people say that if Taiwan relies on China too much economically, China will use economy to force Taiwan to make political concessions. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?" It is coded as 0 if the respondent's answer is "agree" or "strongly agree," and 1 if "disagree" or "strongly disagree." Therefore, 0 means that the respondent is worried about China's economic coercion against Taiwan, and 1 means that the respondent is not worried about it. This question is included in the 2003, 2012, 2013, and 2014 TNSS.

Economic interest concern is a dichotomous variable based on the question: "In our society, some people advocate that we should strengthen the economic and trade relationships with China, and some people advocate that we should lessen such relationships. Which view do you agree more?" I code 0 if the respondent's answer is to lessen the relationships and 1 if it is to strengthen such relationships. Thus, 0 means

¹¹ Hsueh and Hsieh 2013.

that the respondent feels that the economic ties with the Mainland are too close while 1 means that he/she believes that there is room for improvement. This question is included in the 2004, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 TNSS.

Overall attitude toward China is an ordered variable summarizing the previous two variables. I code -1 if the respondent is worried about China's economic coercion against Taiwan and would like to lessen the economic ties between the two sides across the Taiwan Strait, that is, he/she obviously holds a net negative attitude toward China; code 0 if the respondent is worried about China's economic coercion against Taiwan but still want to strengthen the cross-Strait economic ties or if he/she is not worried about China's economic coercion but still want to lessen the economic ties, which implies that the respondent has an ambiguous attitude toward China; and code 1 if the respondent is not worried about China's economic coercion and would also like to strengthen the ties between the two sides, that is, he/she apparently holds a net positive attitude toward China. These two questions are both available only in the 2012, 2013, and 2014 TNSS. Table 1 demonstrates how we construct this variable to conceptualize Taiwanese people's overall attitude toward China and Table 2 is the distribution of the respondents in the two-dimensional issue space.

Table 1 Constructing Taiwanese people’s overall attitude toward China

		Economic interest Concern	
		Not Enhance	Enhance
National Security Concern	Worry	Net negative	Contradictory
	Not Worry	Contradictory	Net positive

Source: Taiwan National Security surveys.

Table 2 Taiwanese people’s overall attitude toward China in the TNSS data

Year	Taiwanese people’s overall attitude toward China (%)		
	Net negative (Worry and not enhance)	Contradictory (Not worry but not enhance; Worry but enhance)	Net positive (Not worry and enhance)
2012	37.0	39.6 (31.2; 8.4)	23.5
2013	40.9	37.6 (27.9; 9.7)	21.5
2014	38.1	33.1 (27.7; 6.4)	28.8

Source: Taiwan National Security surveys.

Figure 6 demonstrates the change of people’s attitude toward China before and after the 2014 Sunflower Movement. We can find in Figure 6 that actually the Sunflower Movement, as a very influential social event in Taiwan, does not make people in Taiwan more hostile or unfriendly toward China: the percentage of people who hold a negative attitude toward China (the green line) and who do not want to strengthen the Cross-Strait economic relationship (the brown line) is decreasing after the movement, and the percentage of people who hold a positive attitude toward China (the blue line) is increasing after the movement. In the following analysis, I will use statistical analysis to see whether this fact still holds after controlling for many other factors that may have influence on people’s attitude toward China.

[Figure 6 is about here.]

3.2 Explanatory and control variables

To construct the generation variable, I pick two years as cutoff points to distinguish among the various generations. One is the year 2000. In that year, there was a presidential election, and the DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian defeated the KMT candidate Chan Lien (連戰) and the KMT-turned independent James Soong (宋楚瑜) in a three-way race. This marks the first time since 1949 the KMT lost the governing power. The change of the governing party and the Taiwanization policies promoted and implemented by the new DPP government may have some impact on people's self-identification concerning the status of the island vis-à-vis China and their attitudes toward many related issues. Another year is 1987. This is the year in which martial law was lifted, signifying the beginning of the transition to democracy on the island. This is obviously a turning point in Taiwan's political history, which may have impacted people's political attitudes.

I assume that an individual's experiences in his/her formative years, say, ages 14 to 22, often have a strong effect on his/her political attitudes later on. I take the midpoint, 18, as the determining year to distinguish between generations.¹² So, for example, when there is a change of government in 2000, those who were 18 or younger would have spent more time in the new political atmosphere than in the old style of politics in their formative years, and they might thus develop different political attitudes as compared to those who were older. Similarly, those who were 18 or younger in 1987 might as well have different socialization experience as against those who were older. With two years, 1987 and 2000, we thus create three generations: (1) those who were born in 1982 and afterwards; (2) those who were born between 1969 and 1981; and (3) those who were born before 1969. Apparently, most of those who participated in the Sunflower Movement belong to the first category. I will analyze the TNS data to see whether there are differences between the young and the old in their attitude toward the national identity issue, their partisan identification, and their attitude toward the economic interests vs. national security issue from 2003 to 2014 to see whether the Sunflower Movement really deteriorates people's attitudes toward China, especially among the young generation.

To make sure my argument can still hold after taking other reasons and rival explanations into consideration, I also control for the factors that may alter people's

¹² For a discussion of the generational variable, see, for instance, David Denemark, Robert Mattes and Richard Niemi (eds.), *Growing up Democratic: Generational Change in Post-Authoritarian Societies* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner)(forthcoming).

attitudes toward China. These control variables include the economic influences (**Retrospect, Prospect**), people’s personal experiences (**Travel, Business, Education**), and other demographic factors (**National identity, Pan blue, Pan green, Mainlander, Minnan, Gender**). The TNSS has all these questions ready for use. The detailed coding rule of all the explanatory and control variables used is shown in Table 3.

Table 3 Explanatory and control variables and their coding

Variable	Characteristic	Coding
Young	Dummy	0: If the respondent was born before 1982 1: If the respondent was born in 1982 or afterwards
Middle	Dummy	0: If the respondent was born before 1969 or after 1981 1: If the respondent was born between 1969 and 1981
Travel	Ordered	0: If the respondent never goes to China 1: If the respondent occasionally goes to China (less than three times) 2: If the respondent often goes to China (from three times to eleven times) 3: If the respondent very frequently goes to China (more than eleven times)
Business	Dummy	0: If the respondent or any of his/her family member has never gone to or planned to go to China to study, work, conduct business, or reside 1: If the respondent or any of his/her family member has gone to or planned to go to China to study, work, conduct business, or reside
Retrospect	Ordered	-1: If the respondent feels that compared to a year ago, the current economic condition of his/her family is getting worse 0: If the respondent feels that compared to a year ago, the current economic condition of his/her family is about the same 1: If the respondent feels that compared to a year ago, the current economic condition of his/her family is getting better
Prospect	Ordered	-1: If the respondent feels that the economic condition of his/her family will get worse in the next year 0: If the respondent feels that the economic condition of his/her family will be about the same in the next year 1: If the respondent feels that the economic condition of his/her family will get better in the next year

National identity	Ordered	-2: claim independence as soon as possible -1: maintain status quo now and then move toward independence 0: maintain the status quo indefinitely 1: maintain status quo now and then move toward unification 2: promote unification as soon as possible
Pan blue	Dummy	0: If the respondent supports Democratic Progressive Party or Taiwan Solidarity Union 1: If the respondent supports Kuomintang, People First Party, or New Party
Pan green	Dummy	0: If the respondent supports Kuomintang, People First Party, or New Party 1: If the respondent supports Democratic Progressive Party or Taiwan Solidarity Union
Mainlander	Dummy	0: If the respondent's father is not a mainlander 1: If the respondent's father is a mainlander
Minnan	Dummy	0: If the respondent's father is not a Minnan Taiwanese 1: If the respondent's father is a Minnan Taiwanese
Gender	Dummy	0: If the respondent is male 1: If the respondent is female
Education	Ordered	1: If the respondent is illiterate or has an elementary degree 2: If the respondent has a middle school degree 3: If the respondent has a high school or a junior college degree 4: If the respondent has a college or higher degree

Source: Coded by the authors.

3.3 Statistical analysis

[Table 4 is about here.]

Table 4 is the test for the first hypothesis which states that the young generation is less likely to be pro-unification than the middle and the old generations after the 2014 Sunflower Movement. The dependent variable is people's national identity which spans from -2 (independence, as soon as possible) to 2 (unification, as soon as possible). As we can see in Table 4, the 2014 Sunflower Movement did have an

impact on the young people in terms of their national identity and made them more reluctant to support unification.

[Table 5 is about here.]

Table 5 is the test for the second hypothesis which states that the young generation is not less likely to support the pan-blue camp than the middle and the old generations after the 2014 Sunflower Movement. The dependent variable is whether the respondent support the pan blue camp which spans from 0 (no) to 1 (yes). As we can see in Table 5, although the young generation is less likely to support the pan blue camp in the recent years, they do not remain so after the 2014 Sunflower Movement. This is a strong evidence to suggest that the young generation acknowledges that it is unavoidable for Taiwan's economy to seek a more enhanced economic cooperation with China after the movement.

[Table 6 is about here.]

Table 6 is the test for the third hypothesis which states that the young generation is not more likely to support the pan-green camp than the middle and the old generations after the 2014 Sunflower Movement. The dependent variable is whether the respondent support the pan green camp which spans from 0 (no) to 1 (yes). As we can see in Table 6, the young generation is not more likely to support the pan green camp, even after the 2014 Sunflower Movement. The facts that the young generation is less likely to support the pan blue camp in the recent years and that they do not turn to support the pan green camp further suggest that what they are discontent with is Ma's performance and the KMT's corruption and incapability of dealing with inequality issues, rather than with KMT's China policy *per se* (with is the agreement).

[Table 7 is about here.]

Table 7 is the test for the fourth hypothesis which states that the young

generation is not more worried about China's use of economic coercion against Taiwan than the middle and the old generation after the 2014 Sunflower Movement. The dependent variable is whether the respondent worries about that China will use economic coercion against Taiwan if Taiwan relies on China too much economically (**National Security Concern**), which spans from 0 (worry) to 1 (not worry). The dependent variable spans from 0 (worried) to 1 (not worried). As we can see in Table 7, since 2013 the young generation is not only not more worried about China's economic coercion against Taiwan, but also more likely to be unworried about it than the middle and the old generations. This is a strong evidence to suggest that the 2014 Sunflower Movement does not result from the young generation's reluctance to have more economic ties with China. Instead, they hold an even more positive attitude toward a more enhanced cooperative relations. If so, then what the movement represents is that the young generation wants a "conditional engagement" with China, as the leaders of the movement have claimed for many times during the whole movement,¹³ not that they do not want to have more engagement with it.

[Table 8 is about here.]

Table 8 is the test for the fifth hypothesis which states that the young generation is not less likely to prefer to lessen Taiwan's economic ties with China than the middle and the old generation after the 2014 Sunflower Movement. The dependent variable is whether the respondent wants to strengthen Taiwan's economic and trade relations with China (**Economic Interests Concern**), which spans from 0 (not to strengthen) to 1 (to strengthen). As we can see in Table 8, only in 2005 and 2011 are the young generation more likely to want to enhance Taiwan's economic ties with China, and this phenomenon never appears again after 2011. Besides showing that the young generation is not less likely to prefer to lessen the Cross-Strait economic relationship, the result also shows that they are not more likely to support to strengthen it, either. These two facts confirms that the young generation does prefer a "conditional economic engagement" with China.

¹³ During the whole movement the two student leaders, Feifan Lin (林飛帆) and Weiting Chen (陳為廷), have announced for more than once that what they want is not "not to have more enhanced economic cooperation with China", but "to have more enhanced economic cooperation with China under a strong democratic supervision."

[Table 9 is about here.]

Table 9 is the test for the sixth hypothesis which states that the young generation is not more likely to hold a net negative attitude toward China than the middle and the old generations after the 2014 Sunflower Movement. The dependent variable is people's overall attitude toward China based on the political-economic two-dimensional issue space (**Overall Attitude toward China**), which spans from -1 (the respondent is worried about China's economic coercion against Taiwan and does not want to strengthen the Cross-Strait economic and trade ties) to 1 (the respondent is not worried about China's economic coercion against Taiwan and want to strengthen the Cross-Strait economic and trade ties). As we can see in Table 9, the young generation is not more likely to hold a net negative or a net positive attitude toward China than the middle and the old generations. This shows that, different from the popular conjecture which contends that the Sunflower Movement represents young Taiwanese people's hostile feelings to China, actually they are not any more friendly or hostile than the older generations towards China.

Overall, all the analyses demonstrate that all the sixth hypotheses derived from my main argument is verified by the TNSS data. These hypotheses together suggest a more complete picture about the meaning of the Sunflower Movement on the future Cross-Strait relations: what most Taiwanese people want, especially among the young generation, is not to lessen the economic ties with China. Instead, most people have acknowledged that the China market is too important for Taiwan to abandon, so Taiwan cannot afford not to seek a more enhanced and institutionalized economic cooperation relationship with China, even doing so will also give China more leverage to use economic coercion against Taiwan when both sides encountering a conflict issue. These hypotheses also suggest that the traditional pan-blue and pan-green cleavage and the independence-unification discrepancy are losing their attractiveness to Taiwanese people,¹⁴ especially for the young generation. As a consequence, what the China government will face in the future may no longer be a "pro-independence/anti-China DPP government" like it of President Shui-pien Chen (陳水扁) during 2000 to 2008 or a "pro-unification/pro-China KMT government" like it of President Ying-chiu Ma during 2008 to 2016, but a "pro-democracy and pro-engagement" government which prefers to have more economic cooperation with China while at the same time have stricter and more transparent supervision on the bilateral agreements.

¹⁴ Huang and James 2014 and Magcamit and Tang 2015 also have similar findings.

Then, what will China do in terms of its Taiwan policy if the future Taiwan government is a “pro-democracy and pro-engagement” one? Previous Cross-Strait engagement experience shows that China typically adopt a more hardline policy when dealing with the DPP government and a more cooperative policy when the government is controlled by the KMT in order to suppress the independence force and punish the DPP who stands for independence. However, if as time goes by when the young generation and their political standpoint become a mainstream public opinion, both the DPP and the KMT would have to revise their standpoint from independence/unification to “democratic status quo” in order to win the election. That is, the future Taiwanese government may very likely be neither a pro-independence nor a pro-unification one. Accordingly, China’s old Taiwan policy – punish the pan green camp and reward the pan blue camp – may have to change to deal with the Taiwan issue as well, since there is not much independence force for China to punish and not much unification force for China to seek cooperation with. To curb Taiwan from drifting away in the future, China again has to “cross the river by feeling the stones”¹⁵ and to reform a new Taiwan policy to deal with the new situation.¹⁶

4. Concluding remark: relative power as a bad news to Taiwan

The goal of this research is to find out the possible influences of the 2014 Sunflower Movement on the future Cross-Strait relations. By investigating the causes of the movement and Taiwanese people’s attitudes toward many relevant issues, I argue that the 2014 Sunflower Movement neither represents that Taiwanese people have a high degree of hostility toward China (even among the young generation) nor indicates that Taiwanese people do not want to have more economic ties or cooperative relationship with China. Instead, what the movement means is that, generally speaking, Taiwanese people actually prefer to seek a more enhanced economic cooperation with China, meanwhile they also want the Cross-Strait cooperation relationship been secured and supervised by a proper democratic procedure.

[Figure 7 is about here.]

¹⁵ This is a famous maxim by Xiaoping Deng (鄧小平) when he described how China should process the “reform and open” policy in the late 1970s.

¹⁶ For the possible forms of future Cross-Strait cooperation agreements, see Saunders and Kastner 2009.

However, the information the movement conveys also means that it takes time for both sides to develop a legally institutionalized framework to achieve a more enhanced economic relationship. This may not be a good news to Taiwan because time is in favor of China, not Taiwan, if the bilateral cooperation relationship cannot be further advanced and Taiwan cannot make advantage of China's growing market. Figure 7 demonstrate the relative GDP share between China and Taiwan from 1960 to 2011. As we can see, after the 1995-96 Cross-Strait Missile Crises, Taiwan's share of the total bilateral GDP has kept declining till the present. This is a very strong signal revealing that Taiwan is getting weaker and weaker compared to the rising China. The GDP share has two important implications. First, GDP is a direct measurement of national power, and national power means how many resources the state has to promote its foreign policy. Second, the growth rate of GDP is also a measurement of how confident a nation is when resisting a strong competitor. If the nation does not have enough resource and confidence, there will be a strong debate in its domestic politics between the dovish faction and the hawk one, which will further wear down the state's capability to compete with the competitor. As a consequence, as time goes by, Taiwan will have less and less bargain power when negotiating with China to seek a more favored term of economic cooperation. Therefore, according to my analysis, what will be in the future in terms of the Cross-Strait relationship is that, Taiwan will try to seek more institutionalized economic cooperation with China without changing its political status quo, while China can postpone it and wait to build up more economic leverage against Taiwan. In conclusion, what the impacts of the 2014 Sunflower Movement are on the future Cross-Strait relationship is that, while the movement may not make the bilateral relationship get worse, it may defer the institutionalization of bilateral economic cooperation and consolidate Taiwan's preference of maintaining the status quo.

Reference

- Chen, Dean P. 2015. "Security, Domestic Divisions, and the KMT's Post-2008 'one China' policy: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 15(2): 319-365.
- Ho, Ming-Sho. 2015. "Occupy Congress in Taiwan: Political Opportunity, Threat, and the Sunflower Movement." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 15 (1): 69-97.
- Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng. 1994. "Chiefs, Staffers, Indians, and Others: How Was Taiwan's Mainland China Policy Made?" in Tun-Jen Cheng, Chi Huang, and Samuel S.G. Wu (eds.), *Inherited Rivalry: Conflicts across the Taiwan Strait* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 137-52.
- Hsueh, Alex Chienwu and John Fuh-sheng Hsieh. 2013. "Guns and Butter in the Cross-Strait Relations: Public Opinion in Taiwan." paper presented at the Conference on the Security and Prosperity: Challenges for Taiwan, Center for Taiwan Studies, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, April 27, 2013.
- Huang, Chin-Hao and Patrick James. 2014. "Blue, Green, or Aquamarine? Taiwan and the Status Quo Preference in Cross-Strait Relations." *The China Quarterly* 219 (September 2014): 670-692.
- Ling, L.H.M., Ching-Chane Hwang, and Boyu Chen. 2010. "Subaltern Straits: 'Exit,' 'Voice,' and 'Loyalty,' in the United States-China-Taiwan Relations." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 10(1): 33-59.
- Magcamit, Michael I. and Alexander C. Tang. 2015. "Crouching Tiger, Lurking Dragon: Understanding Taiwan's Sovereignty and Trade Linkages in the Twenty-First Century." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 15(2): 81-112.
- Saunders, Phillip C. and Scott L. Kastner. 2009. "Bridge over Troubled Water? Envisioning a China-Taiwan Peace Agreement." *International Security* 33(4): 87-114.
- Wu, Yu-Shan. 1999. "Taiwanese Elections and Cross-Strait Relations: Mainland Policy in Flux." *Asian Survey* 39(4): 565-587.
- Wu, Yu-Shan. 2014. "Paradigm Shift in Taiwan's Politics: from Identity to Distribution." Paper presented at the Conference on Democratic Governance, Cross-Strait Security and Prosperity, Taiwan and Asia Program, College of William and Mary, October 13, 2014.

Appendix 1: Figures




Figure 1 The two-dimensional security-economy quadrant (the circled area denotes the majority of people's standpoint)

Source: Drawn by the author.




Figure 2 Taiwanese people's ethnic identity, 2003~2014

Source: Taiwan National Security Surveys




Figure 3 Taiwanese people's national identity, 2003~2014

Source: Taiwan National Security Surveys




Figure 4 The ratio of the richest 20% family to the poorest 20% family (blue line) and the GINI Index (red line), 1964~2011

Source: The National Statistics Website of Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, R.O.C. (Taiwan). <http://www.stat.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=4>. Last accessed on June 5th, 2015.




Figure 5 The ratio of the richest 5% to the poorest 5%, 1998~2011

Source: The National Statistics Website of Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, R.O.C. (Taiwan). <http://www.stat.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=4>. Last accessed on June 5th, 2015.




Figure 6 The change of people's attitude toward China, 2012~2014

Source: Taiwan National Security Surveys.




Figure 7 Taiwan's share of bilateral total GDP, 1950~2011

Source: Penn World Table 8.0

Appendix 2: Tables

Table 4 Multiple Regression Models of National Identity

Dependent Variable: National Identity (from -2 to 2)								
	2003	2004	2005	2008	2011	2012	2013	2014
Young Generation	0.004 (0.054)	0.032 (0.046)	-0.032 (0.054)	0.005 (0.058)	-0.041 (0.051)	-0.045 (0.056)	0.057 (0.054)	-0.217*** (0.066)
Middle Generation	0.044 (0.135)	-0.028 (0.087)	-0.059 (0.099)	-0.068 (0.085)	-0.204*** (0.065)	-0.106 (0.076)	-0.114 (0.074)	-0.074 (0.053)
Travel	0.046 (0.031)	-0.012 (0.025)	-0.006 (0.052)	0.028 (0.028)	0.049* (0.025)	0.096*** (0.027)	0.037 (0.024)	0.046** (0.021)
Business	0.094 (0.068)	0.214*** (0.059)	0.277*** (0.066)	0.144** (0.067)	0.059 (0.052)	-0.021 (0.064)	0.053 (0.063)	0.110* (0.060)
Gender	-0.069 (0.047)	-0.026 (0.039)	0.058 (0.046)	0.092* (0.049)	-0.057 (0.042)	-0.025 (0.048)	0.033 (0.046)	-0.016 (0.043)
Education	0.045 (0.029)	0.008 (0.025)	0.058** (0.028)	0.017 (0.031)	0.019 (0.029)	0.028 (0.032)	0.027 (0.031)	0.009 (0.019)
Mainlander	0.162* (0.086)	0.142** (0.072)	0.328*** (0.086)	0.018 (0.096)	0.143* (0.086)	0.219** (0.096)	0.289*** (0.089)	0.072 (0.083)
Minnan	-0.148** (0.072)	-0.201*** (0.056)	-0.036 (0.070)	-0.193** (0.077)	-0.007 (0.066)	-0.103 (0.072)	-0.063 (0.068)	-0.170*** (0.061)
Constant	0.031 (0.105)	-0.013 (0.087)	-0.343*** (0.118)	-0.143 (0.118)	-0.201* (0.109)	-0.231* (0.121)	-0.291*** (0.111)	-0.107 (0.088)
Adjusted R ²	0.028	0.041	0.054	0.022	0.022	0.038	0.032	0.038
Number of Observations	1,121	1,349	1,100	993	1,045	954	1,007	1,035

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: Taiwan National Security surveys.

Table 5 Logit Models of the Pan-Blue Camp

Dependent Variable: Pen-Blue (0: No; 1: Yes)								
	2003	2004	2005	2008	2011	2012	2013	2014
Young Generation	0.311 (0.371)	0.231 (0.263)	-0.766** (0.325)	-0.222 (0.247)	-0.499** (0.205)	-0.557** (0.237)	-0.693*** (0.252)	-0.226 (0.226)
Middle Generation	0.090 (0.150)	-0.228 (0.147)	-0.350** (0.163)	-0.379** (0.165)	-0.555*** (0.163)	-0.316* (0.167)	-0.372** (0.170)	-0.267 (0.176)
Travel	0.080 (0.087)	0.013 (0.078)	0.235 (0.153)	0.183** (0.079)	0.030 (0.080)	0.034 (0.079)	0.161** (0.075)	0.144* (0.068)
Business	0.284 (0.187)	0.434** (0.177)	0.250 (0.191)	-0.055 (0.190)	0.125 (0.167)	0.148 (0.189)	0.133 (0.198)	0.373* (0.193)
Gender	0.247* (0.133)	0.054 (0.124)	0.232 (0.141)	0.305** (0.141)	0.511*** (0.135)	0.367** (0.146)	-0.251* (0.147)	0.247* (0.145)
Education	0.183** (0.084)	0.150* (0.080)	0.126 (0.087)	0.104 (0.091)	0.229** (0.092)	0.242** (0.098)	0.236** (0.102)	0.109* (0.065)
National Identity	0.649*** (0.092)	0.973*** (0.102)	1.255*** (0.118)	1.035*** (0.113)	0.775*** (0.110)	0.626*** (0.109)	0.772*** (0.115)	0.794*** (0.122)
Mainlander	0.589** (0.238)	0.360* (0.216)	0.222 (0.247)	0.576** (0.278)	0.694** (0.279)	0.838*** (0.279)	0.665** (0.269)	0.508** (0.255)
Minnan	-0.119 (0.200)	-0.284* (0.172)	-0.808*** (0.204)	-0.458** (0.214)	-0.514** (0.203)	-0.327 (0.207)	-0.284 (0.212)	-0.471** (0.194)
Constant	-1.372*** (0.305)	-0.958*** (0.279)	-0.658* (0.355)	-0.258 (0.337)	-0.590* (0.344)	-1.191*** (0.368)	-1.208*** (0.362)	-1.062*** (0.291)
Pseudo R^2	0.069	0.098	0.172	0.131	0.098	0.084	0.100	0.091
Number of Observations	1,121	1,349	1,100	993	1,045	954	1,007	1,035

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Source: Taiwan National Security surveys.

Table 6 Logit Models of the Pan-Green Camp

	Dependent Variable: Pen-Green (0: No; 1: Yes)							
	2003	2004	2005	2008	2011	2012	2013	2014
Young Generation	-0.450 (0.481)	0.128 (0.285)	0.513* (0.303)	0.611** (0.279)	0.207 (0.222)	0.337 (0.238)	0.108 (0.236)	-0.275 (0.222)
Middle Generation	-0.005 (0.170)	0.095 (0.159)	0.216 (0.179)	0.216 (0.203)	0.164 (0.183)	-0.020 (0.186)	0.172 (0.177)	0.135 (0.173)
Travel	-0.023 (0.101)	0.127 (0.085)	-0.160 (0.192)	-0.141 (0.102)	-0.056 (0.093)	-0.041 (0.090)	-0.183** (0.084)	-0.142** (0.070)
Business	-0.329 (0.235)	-0.551** (0.229)	-0.397 (0.262)	0.332 (0.245)	-0.009 (0.189)	0.248 (0.209)	-0.077 (0.215)	-0.205 (0.210)
Gender	-0.524*** (0.153)	-0.245* (0.134)	-0.324** (0.156)	-0.774*** (0.177)	-0.596*** (0.150)	-0.341** (0.156)	-0.153 (0.150)	-0.277* (0.142)
Education	0.034 (0.093)	-0.126 (0.083)	-0.149 (0.091)	-0.025 (0.110)	-0.118 (0.100)	-0.120 (0.103)	-0.147 (0.098)	-0.045 (0.063)
National identity	-0.720*** (0.100)	-1.149*** (0.103)	-1.130*** (0.109)	-1.310*** (0.121)	-0.978*** (0.116)	-0.845*** (0.110)	-0.766*** (0.107)	-0.879*** (0.109)
Mainlander	-1.055*** (0.349)	-0.751** (0.299)	-1.207*** (0.359)	-1.562*** (0.558)	-0.944** (0.477)	-0.844** (0.422)	-0.762** (0.377)	-0.736** (0.326)
Minnan	0.310 (0.233)	0.397** (0.195)	0.006 (0.222)	0.734** (0.300)	1.143*** (0.273)	0.523** (0.247)	0.500** (0.230)	0.334 (0.204)
Constant	-1.061*** (0.338)	-0.877*** (0.295)	-0.485 (0.391)	-1.721*** (0.438)	-1.406*** (0.403)	-1.055*** (0.402)	-0.838** (0.363)	-0.696** (0.290)
Pseudo R^2	0.093	0.140	0.167	0.218	0.137	0.101	0.089	0.092
Number of Observations	1,121	1,349	1,100	993	1,045	954	1,007	1,035

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Source: Taiwan National Security surveys.

Table 7 Logit Models of the National Security Concern

Dependent Variable: National Security Concern (0: Worry; 1: Not worry)								
	2003		2012		2013		2014	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Young Generation	-0.002	(0.402)	-0.378	(0.257)	0.411*	(0.243)	0.389*	(0.223)
Middle Generation	0.049	(0.156)	-0.181	(0.174)	0.061	(0.176)	0.083	(0.179)
Travel	0.187**	(0.087)	0.204**	(0.082)	0.087	(0.078)	0.029	(0.071)
Business	0.295	(0.187)	-0.080	(0.200)	0.183	(0.200)	-0.025	(0.205)
Gender	-0.170	(0.138)	0.117	(0.152)	0.211	(0.150)	0.129	(0.147)
Education	-0.028	(0.088)	-0.365***	(0.099)	-0.339***	(0.103)	-0.333***	(0.067)
Pan Blue	0.258*	(0.140)	0.685***	(0.159)	0.888***	(0.161)	0.750***	(0.158)
National Identity	0.253***	(0.091)	-0.000	(0.104)	0.390***	(0.110)	0.451***	(0.115)
Mainlander	0.135	(0.240)	0.407	(0.290)	-0.059	(0.270)	0.127	(0.264)
Minnan	-0.428**	(0.203)	-0.184	(0.219)	-0.593***	(0.208)	-0.689***	(0.199)
Constant	-0.484	(0.312)	0.124	(0.375)	0.115	(0.358)	0.673**	(0.296)
Pseudo R^2	0.036		0.060		0.078		0.090	
Number of Observations	1,038		902		958		955	

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Source: Taiwan National Security surveys.

Table 8 Logit Models of the Economic Interest Concern

Dependent Variable: Economic Interest Concern (0: Not enhance; 1: Enhance)

	2004		2005		2008		2011		2012		2013		2014	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Young Generation	0.380	(0.312)	0.710**	(0.345)	0.149	(0.316)	0.631***	(0.233)	-0.001	(0.254)	0.344	(0.250)	0.137	(0.260)
Middle Generation	0.115	(0.163)	0.098	(0.198)	0.564**	(0.231)	0.102	(0.192)	0.072	(0.195)	0.183	(0.183)	-0.017	(0.207)
Travel	0.019	(0.090)	0.169	(0.212)	0.197*	(0.116)	0.333***	(0.098)	0.036	(0.094)	0.240***	(0.085)	0.309***	(0.086)
Business	0.845***	(0.241)	0.512*	(0.263)	1.117***	(0.324)	0.505***	(0.194)	0.654***	(0.228)	0.653***	(0.226)	0.469*	(0.244)
Gender	-0.270*	(0.139)	-0.048	(0.172)	-0.022	(0.192)	-0.476***	(0.162)	-0.124	(0.165)	-0.309**	(0.157)	0.219	(0.171)
Education	0.513***	(0.091)	0.417***	(0.113)	0.448***	(0.125)	0.363***	(0.116)	0.360***	(0.115)	0.326***	(0.113)	0.099	(0.079)
Pan blue	0.463***	(0.154)	1.415***	(0.209)	1.233***	(0.216)	1.762***	(0.169)	1.310***	(0.180)	1.298***	(0.180)	1.529***	(0.196)
National Identity	0.600***	(0.104)	0.849***	(0.122)	1.204***	(0.144)	0.791***	(0.129)	0.731***	(0.121)	0.671***	(0.119)	0.847***	(0.137)
Mainlander	0.342	(0.290)	0.872**	(0.364)	1.094**	(0.438)	0.841**	(0.335)	0.663*	(0.371)	0.649**	(0.326)	-0.223	(0.346)
Minnan	-0.518**	(0.205)	-0.056	(0.256)	0.423	(0.285)	0.018	(0.242)	-0.238	(0.239)	-0.325	(0.225)	-0.630**	(0.249)
Constant	-0.581*	(0.317)	-1.227**	(0.477)	-1.309***	(0.468)	-2.069***	(0.445)	-1.232***	(0.431)	-1.381***	(0.405)	-0.355	(0.377)
Pseudo R^2	0.121		0.228		0.263		0.233		0.174		0.178		0.206	
Number of Observations	1,139		867		851		922		778		858		765	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Source: Taiwan National Security surveys.

Table 9: Generalized Ordered Logit Models of the Economic Interests vs. National Security Concerns, 2012~2014

	Dependent Variable: Economic Interests vs. National Security Concerns (-1: Negative; 0: Ambiguous; 1: Positive)																	
	2012						2013						2014					
	Pr(y=-1)=0.3417		Pr(y=0)=0.4715		Pr(y=1)=0.1868		Pr(y=-1)=0.3771		Pr(y=0)=0.4512		Pr(y=1)=0.1718		Pr(y=-1)=0.3352		Pr(y=0)=0.4215		Pr(y=1)=0.2433	
	dy/dx	S.E.	dy/dx	S.E.	dy/dx	S.E.	dy/dx	S.E.	dy/dx	S.E.	dy/dx	S.E.	dy/dx	S.E.	dy/dx	S.E.	dy/dx	S.E.
Young Generation	-0.000	(0.059)	0.074	(0.058)	-	(0.056)	-0.046	(0.060)	0.049	(0.062)	-0.003	(0.045)	0.008	(0.062)	0.041	(0.062)	-0.049	(0.048)
Middle Generation	-0.069	(0.045)	0.131**	(0.046)	-	(0.056)	-0.045	(0.044)	0.041	(0.045)	0.004	(0.031)	-0.007	(0.050)	0.060	(0.051)	-0.053	(0.040)
Travel	-0.008	(0.023)	-0.020	(0.023)	0.028*	(0.022)	-	(0.021)	0.023	(0.021)	0.019	(0.014)	-	(0.020)	0.037*	(0.021)	0.012	(0.016)
Business	-	(0.048)	0.141**	(0.052)	-0.015	(0.048)	-	(0.049)	0.096*	(0.053)	0.020	(0.037)	-0.032	(0.057)	0.002	(0.059)	0.030	(0.048)
Retrospect	-	(0.042)	-0.000	(0.042)	0.098**	(0.042)	-0.055	(0.040)	0.030	(0.040)	0.024	(0.026)	-	(0.041)	0.045	(0.042)	0.101**	(0.035)
Prospect	-	(0.037)	-0.003	(0.037)	0.101**	(0.037)	-	(0.037)	0.066*	(0.037)	0.109**	(0.025)	-0.062	(0.039)	0.010	(0.040)	0.053	(0.035)
Gender	0.015	(0.039)	0.002	(0.040)	-0.017	(0.039)	0.075*	(0.039)	-	(0.039)	0.119**	(0.027)	-0.007	(0.040)	-0.056	(0.041)	0.063*	(0.034)
Education	0.033	(0.027)	-0.030	(0.027)	-0.003	(0.027)	0.011	(0.028)	0.007	(0.029)	-0.018	(0.020)	0.036*	(0.020)	-0.011	(0.020)	-0.025	(0.016)
Pan Blue	-	(0.037)	0.145**	(0.041)	0.128**	(0.037)	-	(0.038)	0.098**	(0.044)	0.170**	(0.036)	-	(0.038)	0.161**	(0.044)	0.148**	(0.039)
National Identity	-	(0.026)	0.068**	(0.027)	0.041*	(0.026)	-	(0.029)	0.109**	(0.029)	0.049**	(0.021)	-	(0.030)	0.035	(0.030)	0.117**	(0.027)
Mainlander	-0.140*	(0.075)	0.104	(0.079)	0.036	(0.077)	0.041	(0.080)	0.021	(0.078)	0.020	(0.048)	-0.002	(0.088)	-0.043	(0.088)	0.045	(0.065)
Minnan	0.044	(0.055)	0.025	(0.056)	-0.069	(0.055)	0.108**	(0.052)	-0.007	(0.054)	-	(0.043)	0.140**	(0.054)	-0.043	(0.060)	-0.097*	(0.053)
Pseudo R ²	0.1408						0.1552						0.1515					
Number of observations	710						806						685					

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Source: Taiwan National Security surveys.