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**A Path-Dependency of Culture-led Urban Development Strategies
in Taipei, Shanghai and Hong Kong**

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**A PATH-DEPENDENCY OF CULTURE-LED URBAN DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGIES IN TAIPEI, SHANGHAI AND HONG KONG**

文化引導的城市發展策略之研究：以台北，上海及香港為例

Research Paper

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Introduction

In the last few decades, the concept of culture-led urban development has become an increasingly ‘fashionable’ (Kong 2009) and significant trend across different cities around the world. A vast number of cities in East Asia, regardless of their size and location have also shifted their policies in an attempt to pursue the status of the ‘creative city’, ‘cultural capital’, or ‘cultural and creative metropolis’.

A number of different reasons account for a cultural and creative in Asian cities. First, as noted above, the rise of interest in cultural and creative development is a global phenomenon with cities around the globe routinely relying on cultural and creative initiatives as public policy tools that are expected “to address a broad array of urban issues” (Grodach & Silver 2012: 2). Many Asian cities, like their counterparts in the West, are experiencing the shift from manufacturing to service economy and the development of creative economy and cultural infrastructure in the city are now seen as the most reasonable and somewhat alluring remedies “to transcend a reliance on manufacturing” (Kong et al. 2006: 184) and to attract a creative workforce to the cities (Florida 2002). It also should be acknowledged that for the last two decades many East Asian countries have witnessed a particularly fast pace of urbanization. In effect, the number and size of large Asian cities has significantly expanded. For these cities, the promotion of culture and creativity assists in voicing their aspirations for a ‘world city’ status and international recognition (Kong et al. 2006, Yeoh 2005). In a sense, many of them seem to be convinced that the ‘successful’ adoption of global trends could pave their path towards a ‘world’ or ‘global’ city title. On the other hand, however, it is generally understood that one model cannot fit all, and that certain adjustments “need to be made in order for it to work elsewhere” (McCann & Ward 2010: 176). Undoubtedly, the notions of ‘creative city’ or ‘cultural and creative capital’ as well as international formats of arts and film festivals have reached East Asian cities from the West. However, I argue that the translation and utilisation of these ‘foreign’ concepts differ depending on the historical, cultural, economic and political settings of the city.

Drawing upon policy document analysis and semi-structured interviews with policy makers, academics and practitioners in Taipei, Shanghai and Hong Kong, this paper explores the rationale behind cities’ culture-led urban development policies, specifically those related to the large-scale cultural events. Large-scale cultural events

here are defined as one-time or cyclical series of related occurrences that provide cultural experience to national and international publics through the display of local and foreign cultural production. Study findings contribute to the academic discourse on the instrumental role of culture (Bennett 1998), and also demonstrate a path-dependency of ‘imported’ cultural policy concepts as they continue to transform in accordance to the historical, political and economic settings of the city.

Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei were selected for this study due to a number of reasons. First, at present they all share very similar aims, that is, to become the centers of culture and creativity in the region (see, for example, Hui 2007, Florida 2002, Kong 2009). Second, all three cities seem to have the capability of pursuing this vision. The cities are economically developed, diverse, cosmopolitan, densely populated and culturally prolific. Third, these three case studies are particularly interesting given both the cultural and ethnic affinities that bind them together, and historical and political differences that divide them. The cities are all predominantly Chinese and seem to share similar cultural roots and social practices. On the other hand, due to the historical and socio-political differences they cannot be treated as homogeneous Chinese cities. Lastly, in a broader context, three Asian cities were picked to partially fill a gap in academic research that exists in discussing the development trends of the urban cultural policy in Asia.

Governance structure of urban cultural policy: who supports who, and how?

In order to investigate the instrumental role that is attached to culture, we first need to understand the governance structure of urban cultural policy.

The urban cultural policy is still a relatively concept that dates back only thirty years (Grodach & Silver 2012) whereas before, cultural domain was subject to the national jurisdiction of a state. In the context of the nation-state, British cultural critic Raymond Williams (1984) identified three senses of the state in relation to the governance of culture that include the following:

- *State as patron*, where state is primarily focused on supporting those organisations and individuals who are “already operating” (p. 4). In other words, the state is more interested in promoting and strengthening a well-established cultural fields (often limited to the realm of so-called ‘high’ culture), like fine arts or classical music, rather than investing in facilitation

and augmentation of new forms of culture, like modern dance or contemporary music.

- *State as promoter of active cultural policy (hard version)*, in which “the policy includes a preliminary definition – often from outside the arts – of what kinds and styles of art are to be promoted” (p. 4). In other words, the state is actively involved in cultural sector, showing a particularly explicit support to certain areas of culture (with a clear preference to ‘high’ culture) in an attempt to preserve and protect them from the cultural market.
- *State as promoter of active cultural policy (soft version)*, in which the development and management of cultural policy agenda involves certain public or semi-public agencies. Williams (1984) questions the credibility of such institutions arguing that their choices are “often disguised behind counters of argument which are very difficult to specify” (p. 4).

These senses contribute to the primary question of this section, that is, *who supports who, and how*, and reflects on the varying degrees of authority that the nation-state exercises over culture.

Chartrand and McCaughey (1989) provide some additional insights in regard to this question. They suggest four models of the state in relation to the arts support, including (a) State as Facilitator, (b) State as Patron, (c) State as Architect, and (d) State as Engineer. In the Facilitator State, such as the USA, the arts are funded through tax deductions and donations. The Facilitator State does not raise any specific standards or guidelines what forms of arts should be supported and the entire ‘selection’ as well as funding process is conducted by private sponsors and businesses (Chartrand and McCaughey 1989). In other words, the patronage of the arts is utterly depended upon the changing tastes of private donors. The Patron State (such as the UK) funds the arts through the arm’s length institutions. In this case, the state provides funds, whereas the decision whom to support lies in the hands of the board of trustees that are “expected to fulfil their grant-giving duties independent of the day-to-day interests of the party in power” (Chartrand and McCaughey 1989). In the Architect State (such as France), the arts and culture are funded directly through the Ministry of Culture. As a result, government officials and bureaucrats guide the selection process of what forms of arts deserve public funding and what don’t. Inevitably, the arts and culture become a part of general public policy and is aimed at

gaining certain economic or social objectives (Chartrand and McCaughey 1989). In the Engineer State (such as former Soviet Union, North Korea, and to certain extent China), all means of artistic production are owned by the state. As Chartrand and McCaughey (1989) puts it:

The Engineer State supports only art that meets political standards of excellence; it does not support the process of creativity. Funding decisions are made by political commissars and are indeed to further political education, not artistic excellence. The policy dynamic of the Engineer State tends to be revisionary; artistic decisions must be revised to reflect the changing official party line. (...) All artistic enterprises are state-owned and operated; that is, all artistic means of production belong to the State.

In other words, in the Engineer State, the arts and cultural sector is subservient to the political and economic objectives of the central government. This does not only restrict creative freedom of the local artists, but also affect the quality of their work.

It should be recognised that these are ‘pure’ models of public support for the arts. As Chartrand and McCaughey (1989) indicate, they can be clearly divided only in theory, whereas in practice, “most nations combine some or all of them”. For instance, till the late 1990s, China was playing the role of the Engineer State. However, it seems that now it is striving to find the balance between two largely distinct modes of the state, that of the Engineer and, to some extent, the Facilitator. Although owning large share of the cultural sector, it is increasingly encouraging private initiatives and donations to the arts and cultural sector.

Some important parallels can be traced between Williams (1984) and Chartrand and McCaughey’s (1989) works. The Patron State model largely corresponds to what Williams (1984) described as a soft version of cultural policy promotion, the Architect State model resembles the sense of the ‘State as patron’, whereas the Engineer State model seems to relate to the hard version of the ‘State as promoter of active cultural policy’.

It could be argued that the role of urban governments in the cultural sector, particularly in the context of large or global cities to some extent resembles that of the state. In an attempt to define social, economic and political implications of urban cultural policy, I suggest three models of the city in relation to the cultural policy:

1. *City as Architect*, where the city government is directly (or through designated bodies) guiding the development and funding process of the arts and cultural sector. It clearly demonstrates its leanings to certain areas or groups of the sector and seeks to maintain and strengthen their position in the market. In this case, government officials, that is, bureaucrats, are those guiding promotion, assessment, policy and funding decisions.
2. *City as Promoter* (soft version of Architect), where the management of already established projects as well as distribution of the public funds is conducted by somewhat 'neutral' semi-public body. The chief members and associates of this body could be referred to as cultural 'elites' as they are the ones responsible for the distribution of funds. In this case, the government serves as somewhat a visionary leader that provides responsible agencies with broad direction or guidelines, thus clearly specifying its leanings, but do not restrain their actions and implementation strategies.
3. *City as Trustee*, in which city government is largely dependent on and influenced by the national cultural policy. In this sense, local particularities are not taken into account – the city almost blindfold follows national guidelines that often provide a specific directions to what areas of culture should obtain more attention (as well as funds) than others and what cultural forms should be more promoted than others. This results in somewhat of a discrimination of certain areas of culture and eventually may lead towards the recession and stagnation of the entire cultural sector.

As noted before, in practice, none of these three models exists on its own. In fact, empirical findings indicate that the traces of each of them could be found in every city and their functions may intertwine - what differs, is the extent and the intensity of their impact. It is essential, however, to detect a 'combination' of prevailing senses that each city contains, because it also contributes to our understanding of the instrumental role that policymakers attach to culture. In other words, this 'combination' could be argued to *precondition* the instrumental roles of cultural policy.

The role of culture: from 'proper' to 'display'

Williams (1984) identified two important aspects of the role that cultural policy is expected to play in relation to the state, that is culture as *display* and as *public power*.

In case of the former, the arts and culture are employed in public performances of power and serve as display. As for the latter, cultural policy turns out to be “not a policy for the arts, but a policy for embellishing, representing, making more effective a particular social order or certain preferred features in it” (Williams 1984: 3). In other words, the arts and culture are used as means to achieve a number of public policy objectives, including but not limited to urban regeneration, economic growth, social cohesion, and other. Both of these roles can be attached to the concept of ‘instrumental cultural policy’ that Australian sociologist Tony Bennett introduced in 1998.

As this study revolves around the large-scale cultural events, I am particularly interested in probing in culture-led concern with *display*. The nation-state, according to Williams (1984), has always embodied dual and, it seems, frequently overlapping competencies: the state as central organ of *power* and the state as central organ of *display*. Display, in Williams (1984: 3) words, is “the public pomp of a particular social order” where culture is employed to publicly demonstrate certain aspects of the state’s power. McGuigan (2004) supports this argument indicating that culture ‘as display’ reflects on “the ritual symbolization of nationhood and state power” (p. 62). The sense of culture ‘as display’ is inherited from history, and thereby can be traced in different countries around the globe. Paradoxically, due to its self-evidence, culture’s application for display tends to be ignored or dismissed, because “we absorb it so very early that we can hardly recognize it as cultural policy at all” (Williams 1984: 3). Some examples of culture ‘as display’ at the national level include the Queens Coronation in the UK, the Inauguration Day in the USA or the Emperor’s Birthday celebration in Japan.

In accordance to Williams (1984) argument, McGuigan (2004) divides cultural policy into two categories that he identifies as cultural policy ‘proper’ and cultural policy ‘as display’. Cultural policy ‘proper’ embodies more explicit policies that address public patronage of the arts, media regulations and construction of cultural identity, whereas cultural policies ‘as display’ are characterized as somewhat implicit and latent policies that are typically aimed at national aggrandizement and the reduction of culture to economy (McGuigan 2004). National aggrandizement is embodied by ceremonies and pomp and is well reflected by flagship projects (e.g. Guggenheim museum in Bilbao) or hallmark events (e.g. World EXPO, Olympic Games).

Economic reductionism is represented through different business propositions that are concerned with the application of culture in economic, technological and social development. McGuigan (2004) indicates that these propositions are getting “increasingly pronounced in rationalizing public cultural investment” (McGuigan 2004: 63). This takes us back to Williams (1984) argument on the public policy objectives for culture. It seems that to McGuigan (2004), cultural policy ‘as display’ is not only the policy concerned with the display of power, it is *instrumental* cultural policy at large. For instance, although the primary function of culture in the context of mega-events is that of ‘display’, for city government it is also an opportunity to strengthen city’s economic growth, to showcase certain forms of culture and to attract private investors and donors.

Although cultural policy ‘as display’ has not entirely replaced cultural policy ‘proper’ (and probably it never will), in recent years it has received a high degree of attention among policymakers, particularly those working at the local or regional levels. In contrast to cultural policy ‘proper’, cultural policy ‘as display’ is not associated solely with the jurisdiction of the nation-state and has also been widely adopted in culture-led urban development policies around the globe. This changed as a result of the increased pace of globalization and neoliberalism that have weakened the decision-making power of the nation-state, in effect enhancing the role of the cities in global arena simultaneously exacerbating inter-urban competition and urban entrepreneurialism (Castells 1997; Comunian 2011; Landry 2000; Harvey 1989). As McGuigan (2004: 65) puts it:

Since the welfare state- and particularly social-democratic-model of anything has been so undermined over recent decades by neo-liberal ideology and global capitalism, there is endemic uncertainty about the value of cultural policy ‘proper’ everywhere. Hence, much effort is put into mapping its contours and, also, in evaluating its usefulness to interested parties. This in itself is frequently an exercise in cultural policy as display, demonstrating symbolically that something worthwhile is actually happening.

This indicates that cultural policy ‘as display’ provides policymakers with somewhat more tangible results that they can then demonstrate to the city stakeholders. A growing trend for cities to launch their own ‘world-class’ film, arts and fringe

festivals, design weeks, and arts biennales over last few decades, is one of many examples showing us how culture ‘as display’ is employed to showcase the efficiency of the cultural sector and to enhance the international reputation of the city.

In 1989, David Harvey critically addressed an intense inter-urban competition and urban entrepreneurialism that, in his opinion, result in growing trend among cities “to appear as (...) innovative, exciting, creative, and safe place[s] to live or to visit, to play and consume in” (p. 9). This does not only present us with probably one of the first attempts to introduce the concept of city branding (or, in Harvey’s terms, ‘city boosterism’), but also confirm how culture ‘as display’ is increasingly employed in urban branding practices. In other words, for all cities seeking “to develop attractive images and symbols and project these effectively” (Landry and Bianchini 1995: 12) culture, frequently alongside creativity, becomes one of the key reference points. As a result, cultural flagships and large-scale cultural and creative events are now recognised as indispensable tools for promoting the character of the city (Ashworth and Voogd 1994; Li 2011; Kavaratzis and Ashworth 2006). Some scholars criticize this trend arguing that culture-led city branding might narrow down the cultural depth of the city with government officials becoming those to decide what counts as culture, creativity or art (Leslie 2005). Previous section demonstrates, however, that decision-making power of what culture should do does not necessary lie in the hands of local policymakers. Decisions can be subject to the central government guidelines, semi-public or private organisations opinions, or, in some cases, even to the public demand depending on the governance structure of cultural policy.

Three decades ago, Williams (1984) expressed his discontent with the instrumental role of culture and suggested to move beyond it through the reinforcement of either transnational cultural dimension or urban cultural dimension. He believed that these two dimensions could displace the limitations of state cultural policy by linking it to “an actual community rather than to a relatively abstract and centralized state” (Williams 1984: 5). With globalization making its way for transnational cultural dimension and cities around the globe being widely recognised as ‘cultural crucibles’ (Hall 1999: 6) and major drivers of cultural sector, state-centred cultural policy is increasingly losing its previous dominance. However, has anything changed? Is cultural policy now focused on cultural needs of ‘an actual community’ as Williams (1984) has envisioned more than three decades ago? In my opinion, there is no one

answer to this question. On the one hand, urban cultural policy demonstrates an enlarged concern towards the public cultural needs – in fact, there are many culture-led projects taking place that are claimed to be driven primarily by this objective. On the other hand, a large number of studies suggest that due to growing intercity competition for investment, talents and tourists, cities tend to lean towards cultural policy ‘as display’ in order to obtain economic and political goals. In other words, it seems that contrary to Williams (1984) belief, the decentralisation of cultural policy did not bring a decline in the instrumentalism of culture, but increased it.

Research rationale and methodology

The focus of this research is a comparative analysis of the instrumental role(s) that are attached to the large-scale cultural events in relation to the promotional and relational politics of their host cities. In other words, this study seeks to examine how different political and economic settings affect the rationale for culture ‘as display’. Three Chinese cities here provide the context through which the relationship between the cultural policy ‘as display’ and other policy areas is articulated. Large-scale cultural events, including Design Year or Film and Art Festivals were chosen as important agents of culture as ‘display’ practices and served as key reference points for the analysis of a path-dependent instrumentalism of culture in Taipei, Hong Kong and Shanghai.

As this qualitative study seeks to examine the official discourse on urban cultural policies, the textual analysis of local policy documents and semi-structured interviews were regarded as essential sources of first-hand information on this issue. A diverse range of local policy documents, including annual policy statements and guidelines, policy reports, laws, white papers and research papers that specifically deal with government research or policy directly related to the urban cultural policies, large-scale cultural events or creative and/or cultural city discourse have been selected for the analysis. The semi-structured interviews have been conducted with the key members of the institutions responsible for the management and supervision of the large-scale cultural events in Taipei, Shanghai and Hong Kong, including government officials, senior executives and organisers of major film festivals (Hong Kong International Film Festival, Taipei Film Festival, and Shanghai International Film Festival), arts festivals (Hong Kong Arts Festival, Taipei Arts Festival, and Shanghai China International Arts Festival), and design-related events (Hong Kong Year of

Design 2012, Taipei World Design Capital 2016 and Shanghai UNESCO City of Design), policy advisors, academics, and practitioners. In total, I've conducted 31 interviews (five of those were written responses).

Data analysis was based on the concurrent evaluation of policy documents and interview transcripts. Study findings have been divided into two large clusters, that is (a) *City to Culture* (the role of the city in relation to culture), and (b) *Culture to City* (the role of culture in relation to the city), both of which contribute to my understanding of city-culture relations.

City to Culture presents six different governance models of the city in relation to the large-scale cultural events support and cultural policy at large. In other words, this cluster reflects on the planning, management and funding mechanisms of cultural and creative sector. This enables me to identify (a) what actors are involved in the planning and management of the events, (b) what relations they form, and why; and (c) what position do large-scale cultural events occupy in cities' political agenda. In short, these models contribute to one of the principal questions of my investigation: *who supports who, and why?* The *Culture to City* cluster identifies the roles that policymakers tend to attach to the large-scale cultural events. This assists me in addressing other key questions of this study, that is, (d) what arguments are used to justify the need for the large-scale cultural events, and why, and (e) how do different economic and political settings shape the role attached to the large-scale cultural events. To put it more broadly, the identification of roles contributes to the second principal question of this research: *What purpose does the cultural policy 'as display' serve, and why?*

City to Culture: Governance models of culture in Taipei, Shanghai and Hong Kong

In the earlier sections of this paper, drawing on the existing literature I have identified three models of the city in relation to cultural policy, that is, City as Architect, City as Promoter, and City as Trustee. The research findings have expanded this initial framework, revealing three additional governance models of culture, that include City as Facilitator, City as Global Player, and City as Advocate (see Table 1).

Table 1. *Six city governance models of culture*

Model	Description	TP	HK	SH
City as Global Player	City adopts a global neoliberal script of creative cities, in an attempt to ‘fit’ in, and to gain (or maintain) a competitive advantage in the global network of cultural and creative cities.	✓	✓	✓
City as Trustee	City government follows and adheres to the script of the national cultural policy agenda.	✓	✗	✓
City as Architect	City government is an active player in the arts and cultural sector. It clearly demonstrates its leanings to certain areas or groups of the sector and directly (or through designated bodies) supports them in an attempt to maintain and strengthen their position in the market. In this case, government officials, that is, bureaucrats, are those guiding promotion, assessment, policy and funding decisions.	✓	✓	✗
City as Promoter <i>(soft version of Architect)</i>	Although city tends to lean towards certain areas or groups of the cultural sector more than others, the management of already established projects as well as distribution of the public funds is conducted by somewhat ‘neutral’ semi-public body. The chief members and associates of this body could be referred to as cultural ‘elites’ as they are those responsible for the distribution of funds. The city government provides the dedicated agencies with broad guidelines/directions, thus serving as somewhat a visionary leader. The implementation strategies or funding distribution decisions, however, are not restrained.	✓	✓	✓
City as Facilitator	City strongly supports the development of the entire cultural sector and provides a platform and funding for those projects/artists that have developed as bottom-up initiatives. The selection of specific projects/artists and management of the entire (or certain groups of) cultural sector, as well as distribution of the public funds, is conducted by ‘neutral’ semi-public or private bodies (cultural ‘elites’).	✓	✓	✗
City as Advocate	While the ultimate decision-making authority still rests within the government officials, they seek to ensure that the decision gains a public approval, or rather, is successfully accommodated to public opinion. In other words, the city government positions itself as an advocate of the public will. As a result, the aims and direction of the arts and cultural policy of the city are largely driven and shaped by the public demands.	✓	✗	✗

Note. TP stands as abbreviation for Taipei, HK stands as abbreviation for Hong Kong, and SH stands as abbreviation for Shanghai.

The empirical findings clearly conform to my initial assumption that some (or all) of these models are interwoven and may occur simultaneously. However, the strength and structure of the relationship they form is largely influenced by political ideologies and economic considerations. For instance, in authoritarian China, the Shanghai government has very limited (if any) decision-making power, thus it acts primarily as a Trustee of the Central Government. In Hong Kong, where the government since 1971 adopted a non-interventional approach towards the private sector, the city is increasingly taking the neoliberal stance in cultural development of the city, and operates as Promoter or Facilitator of culture. Taipei city is not only granted a high degree of autonomy from the national government, but also performs as a primary agent in Taiwan's public and cultural diplomacy practices. In effect, the primary role of the Taipei City Government in relation to culture entails the combination of two functions, that is, an Architect and Promoter.

Taipei: Global Player, Architect, Promoter and Advocate

In relation to culture, Taipei seems to blend in with all governance models listed above. However, the roles of City as Architect, Promoter, Advocate, and Global Player are those that could be identified as the most accurate 'fit' in regard to Taipei government's positioning towards the large-scale cultural events.

Over the past decade, in order to design and evaluate Taipei's cultural development strategies, the city government has funded a handful of research studies (see, for example, Liu 2002, Xin et al. 2001, Liu et al. 2003). They include a large amount of 'success' (and only 'success'!) stories from other global (e.g. London, Tokyo, Paris, New York) and non-global (e.g. Manchester) cities in the region and across the globe. As a Global Player, Taipei has then incorporated the experiences of those cities in Taipei's cultural policy agenda. The adoption of international formats into the large-scale cultural events also reflects on this trend. The events are regarded as important elements allowing the city to 'fit-in' the global pattern of the cultural and creative city. All large-scale cultural events in Taipei derive from their 'successful' prototypes in other countries. For instance, the Edinburgh Arts Festival serves as a model for the Taipei Arts Festival, whereas the Edinburgh Festival Fringe has set a foundation for Taipei Fringe Festival. In addition to the case studies, Taipei City Government also employs one of the chief advocates of the 'creative city' concept, Charles Landry,

who serves as their policy consultant and advisor. This has prompted a harsh critique among some academics in Taipei who argue that the city should focus on differentiating itself instead of following a western script. As one interviewee puts it:

Hire this guy to come to... to copy westernised or like... London style or like some European very limit[ed] vision about the creativity and try to copy that to Taipei. But I think we do lack knowledge about our own land, our own city and our own people and our own industry. We need to rebuild from the knowledge, but the government they don't feel interest[ed] about rebuild that kind of knowledge (Academic A, personal communication, Taipei, January 12, 2015).

The reasons behind policymakers' fascination with the notions of 'creative' or 'cultural' city across the globe have been widely explored in the literature (see, for example, Sassen 2006, Hubbard 2006, Pratt 2008). These include, for instance, intercity competition, deindustrialization, economic restructuring, reduced role of the nation-state, and high levels of labor mobility (Comunian 2011, Landry and Bianchini 1995, Mommaas 2009, Oakley 2009).

All regular large-scale cultural events in the city, including Taipei Arts Festival, Taipei Film Festival or Taipei Fringe Festival have been initiated and launched by the Department of Cultural Affairs. However, today they are co-organized together with the semi-public body, the Taipei Culture Foundation that is responsible for fund distribution and management of the events. Since the establishment of the Taipei Arts Festival and the Taipei Film Festival in 1997 and 1998 respectively, every year there were different groups of people responsible for planning, programming or marketing of these events in Taipei, because under the Government Procurement Act (*Zhengfu caigou fa*), the Department of Cultural Affairs was obliged to procure all services for the large-scale cultural events on the annual basis. This has not only affected the growth and quality of the events, but has also proved to be time-consuming and impractical. To tackle this issue, in 2008 the City Government placed the large-scale cultural events under the jurisdiction of the semi-public body, Taipei Culture Foundation, which then became a formal curator and funding agency of the festivals. This brought a great deal of stability in the organizational structure and significantly raised the professional standards of the events. At present, the teams responsible for the organization of events appear to be granted a relatively high degree of flexibility

and decision-making power. The evidence from my research indicates that the Department of Cultural Affairs plays a very symbolic role in their supervision and intervenes only in cases of mismanagement of funds, bad media exposure or public complaints. This suggests the Promoter role of the government in relation to culture. On the other hand, this also means that now the distribution of public funds rests in the hands of a relatively small and largely static group of people that one respondent refers to as ‘cultural elites’ (Academic A, personal communication, Taipei, January 12, 2015).

There are some events, however, that are planned and organized directly by the city government. One of the most prominent examples here could be the World Design Capital Taipei 2016 (WDC 2016), a large-scale cultural event that will be held and hosted by the Department of Cultural Affairs with a the Deputy Mayor-led Commission rigorously overseeing the planning process of the event (City as Architect). One reason for attaching such a huge importance on the WDC 2016 is the scale and international significance of the event. The event will last for a whole year and has a record budget of nearly NT\$1 billion (€29.8 million) that is almost 40 percent larger than Helsinki’s budget of the World Capital of Design 2012 (€17.8 million). The event also marks the golden age of design industry in the island. In recent years, the design industry has become one of the pillar cultural and creative industries in Taiwan, and is currently one of the most rapidly developing industries in the country. As a result, the government sees the WDC 2016 as an excellent opportunity to promote the achievements of the industry to the world. Another important reason for attaching such a great importance to the event lies in the political significance of the WDC 2016. A large number of interview respondents indicate that to Hau Lung-Pin, now former Mayor of Taipei, every opportunity to host an international event in the city serves not only as promotional tool for the city, but also as political legacy.

Since the introduction of direct elections for the Mayor’s Office in 1994, the city government has become very active in pursuing a two-way communication with its citizens (Official A, personal communication, Taipei, July 30, 2014). The government understands that public opinion reflects the views of the electorate, and therefore, seeks to portray itself as an Advocate of public will. Local citizens are involved in the

decision-making process through various workshops, public forums, 1999 Citizen Hotline and council members as their representatives. Regardless of how many people choose to engage in, for many, a perceived ability to influence policy change can be equally important.

Shanghai: Trustee, Promoter and Global Player

It is a common tendency for the cultural sector to be concentrated in large cities. China seems comply with this trend as we witness an active promotion and development of cultural policies in such Chinese metropolises as Shanghai and Beijing. At first glance, this seemingly should strengthen their position at the national and international levels. However, in reality, the role of the local authorities in Shanghai appears to be very limited as the decision-making power remains strictly in the hands of the central government (Lai 2012). This, as Zhang (2003) indicates makes it “very difficult for them to affect structural transformation in its true sense” (p. 1569). In other words, in this context, the state plays the role of the Architect, whereas municipal governments serve as operators or Trustees that are obliged to strictly follow the guidelines induced from the top. This corresponds with Hill and Kim’s (2000) argument that state-centered world cities do not fit into the frames of the ‘world city’ theory, which views world or global cities as key points of command and control (Sassen 2006).

However, even as trustees, some cities might enjoy a higher degree of autonomy than others. For instance, in Beijing the approach to the arts and culture seems to be less restricted than in Shanghai, because Beijing Municipal Bureau of Culture has more direct links, or so-called *guanxi* (connections), with the Ministry of Culture (Practitioner A, personal communication, Shanghai, November 17, 2014). Shanghai, on the other hand, has a very limited (if any) decision-making power. This tendency is clearly reflected in the organizational structure of the large-scale cultural events in Shanghai. Such major events as Shanghai International Film Festival, Shanghai Design Week or Shanghai China International Arts Festival are funded and coordinated by the Ministry of Culture with the Shanghai Municipal Culture, Radio Broadcasting, Film and TV Administration acting as somewhat an operator or mediator between the central government and the agency that is responsible for the

organization of the event. As senior government official from the Shanghai Municipal Culture, Radio Broadcasting, Film and TV Administration puts it:

Our management of the large-scale cultural events is also subject to the central government's decrees. Therefore, such events like Film Festival, TV Festival, they all are organized directly by the central government. Directly guided by the central government. [Our Administration] in Shanghai is like...like an operational department. (Official B, personal communication, Shanghai, November 19, 2015)

Centralized decision-making leads to greater restrictions on freedom of artistic expression and creativity. This also raises a broader question of whether an *urban* cultural policy actually exists in China, or is it merely a still reflection of the national cultural policy agenda? This point is important to consider whilst discussing the rationale behind the large-scale cultural events in Shanghai, because unlike in most other global cities, here the role of events is less affected by market fluctuations and more by the ideologically prescribed frameworks of cultural value that are focused on strengthening hierarchical authority and power.

For more than three decades now, since Deng Xiaoping's launch of an 'Open door' policy (*menhu kaifang zhengce*) that has shifted a traditional 'China-centered world' perception (Fairbank 1960) into a multi-polar world perspective (Wang and Zheng 2008), China has been aiming to be re-recognized as one of superpowers in the world (Wang 2011). China's rapid and relatively stable economic growth has been the major tool to 're-engage' with the world, and it has helped to regain its economic influence and power. However, since the late 1990s China has become increasingly concerned with its national image abroad that despite of country's economic achievements remained largely negative (Wang 2011). In the pursuit of a more favourable national image, in 2007 the central government formally adopted the notion of 'cultural soft power' (*wenhua ruanshili*) as one of key national initiatives. The major goals for this, include:

[Making] the country more *influential* politically (*yingxiangli*), more *competitive* economically (*jingzhengli*), more *appealing* in its image (*qingheli*), and more *inspiring* morally (*ganzhaoli*). (Wang 2011: 8)

Some of the means for achieving these goals include hosting international forums and large-scale events, and fostering a so-called the Chinese culture 'Going out' (*Zhongguo wenhua zouchuqu*) policy practice that is predominantly centred on

showcasing Chinese culture and arts to the international community, and expanding the international presence of cultural and creative industries. This demonstrates that China's cultural development, specifically in the form of large-scale cultural events, is an important aspect of country's 'opening up' policy. Through bringing the world to China and vice versa, they help to raise the international reputation of the country and assist in promoting their host cities as modern and international metropolises.

As Trustee, Shanghai adheres to the national pattern regarding the expansion of culture-led international influence and acts as Global Player in relation to the cultural policy 'as display'. The city has not only adopted international festival formats (like film or arts festivals), but is also actively pursuing the ambition to turn Shanghai into "innovative and lively cultural metropolis" (Translated from SMPG, 2009) that in later policy documents is more commonly referred to as 'Socialist Cultural Metropolis' (*Shehui zhuyi wenhua da dushi*) or 'International Cultural Metropolis' (*Guoji wenhua da dushi*, SMPG, 2010). In 2010, Shanghai also joined the UNESCO Creative City network as UNESCO 'City of Design'. As one senior government official indicates:

We aim to become one of the front-ranking cities in the world. World-class city. In particular, in the field of culture. In the field of culture, we are now learning from some other foreign... certain international world-class cultural metropolises serve as...as models [for us]. For instance, now our focus lies on researching London, New York. In Asia, it's Tokyo. These [cities] serve as certain benchmarks for us. (Official B, personal communication, Shanghai, November 19, 2015)

This suggests that the government seems to perceive the imitation of the global trends as a key platform towards a global-city status.

The city also acts as a Promoter in terms of supporting a group of cultural organisations (semi-public or private) that initiate their own cultural events, such as the Shanghai International Contemporary Theatre Festival (ACT) or Shanghai Dance. These events might be smaller in scale than those supervised directly by the city government, but they have already established an international reputation among industry professional and artists, and thus, they too correspond with the national culture 'going out' policy. It should be noted, however, that if compare to the substantial funding provided to the Chinese prototypes of international large-scale cultural events, like film or arts festivals, the financial support to this group of events

is very low and accounts for 20 percent (or less) of their total budget (Practitioner B, personal communication, Shanghai November 14, 2014). This again indicates that the government's priorities lie within those events that can guarantee international visibility and media exposure. As senior government official puts it, "we are not pursuing the numbers [of events], we are, in fact, reducing the numbers (...) we are pursuing the quality and the international impact of events" (Official B, personal communication, Shanghai, November 19, 2014).

Overall, it could be argued that cultural policy 'as display' like other areas of culture in China are under the jurisdiction of the central government, and Shanghai in this regard, acts as a transmitter and administrator of all laws and regulations enacted from the top. Likewise, the city's roles as Global Player or Promoter are also merely a reflection of national cultural agenda.

Hong Kong: from Architect to Promoter and Facilitator

Hong Kong government is both, praised and criticized for its non-interventional approach to cultural affairs that is sometimes referred to as 'the absence of cultural policy' (Practitioner C, personal communication, Hong Kong, October 31, 2014, see also Ooi 1995).

Although now the government acts primarily as a Facilitator and Promoter, until 2000 culture governance model resembled that of the 'City as Architect' as all major cultural organizations were integral parts of the Home Affairs Bureau, and were managed and supervised by the government officials and bureaucrats. However, even then culture was not among government's top priorities. The Home Affairs Bureau has a very wide spectrum of tasks, including, for example, human rights, legal aid, gambling, building management and many others, and cultural affairs was only one of them. This was one of the reasons what prompted the decision to corporatize cultural organizations (including the Hong Kong International Film Festival). This has also allowed the government to save some time, manpower and money. As one respondent from the Hong Kong International Film Festival recalls:

...these companies, organizations, in old days they are all funded by the government. (...) But one by one the government want to get rid of this burden... a little burden. At least freeze this level of subsidy at a certain level. So the government, kind of

urged them to go independent, to become corporatized. Film Festival too. Yeah. Now we still receive subsidy every year through a government department, Commerce Trade and Development Bureau, but subsidy level almost freeze, like 10 years ago, for example. So with the inflation, the government is actually cutting back the subsidy, they urge you to find more sponsors from the private sector, for example. (Practitioner C, personal communication, October 13, 2014)

The government was expecting that in a few years time after the re-organization, these cultural organizations will be able to function on their own and government funding could potentially be terminated (Official C, personal communication, Hong Kong, October 14, 2014). However, it did not take long for the government to realize that cultural sector cannot be treated as any other industry, and it is unable to sustain on its own. As a result, public subsidies remain a substantial source of funding for the major cultural organisations and events, accounting for more than 30 percent of their annual budget.

Today the Hong Kong government adopts somewhat a combination of both Promoter and Facilitator approach to culture. As Promoter, it supports the work of former public cultural entities, and at times, encourages them to focus on certain policy prerogatives, such as, for example, the development of design industry. In addition to this, cultural groups and artists remain highly dependent on the government in terms of infrastructure and venues (Official C, personal communication, Hong Kong, October 14, 2014). As Facilitator, the Hong Kong government also supports bottom-up or private initiatives, such as, for instance, Hong Kong Arts Festival, and overall, grants a great deal of decision-making freedom and flexibility to all cultural entities. It should be noted, however, that after the ‘privatisation’ of cultural sector in Hong Kong, the financial burdens of cultural organisations have increased significantly with many finding themselves struggling to balance a new market-oriented approach to culture with the quality of artistic merit. As a result, some large-scale cultural events are calling for more concentrated and better calculated efforts from the government. It seems that in many cases, the major issue is not about the amount of funds injected to the cultural sector, but rather about their distribution that is not as effective as it could be, that is, money is not always reaching those people who need them most. This example echoes Ooi’s (1995) study, where the author maintains that by “not having

an official cultural policy, the Hong Kong government has managed to ignore the needs of the cultural sector” (p. 282).

In sum, it could be argued that the government’s non-interfering approach to culture appears to be a double edge sword: whilst providing a high degree of creative freedom and independence, it fails to protect the most vulnerable groups in the sector that feel increasingly threatened by the local, regional and global competition.

Culture to City: the role of cultural policy ‘as display’

This study has identified a number of different roles that policymakers tend to attach to large-scale cultural events, including culture as promotion or ‘display’, culture as platform, culture as symbolic power, culture as global node, and others (see Table 2). It should be noted, however, that in every city, the extent and degree of importance attached to these roles differ. In Shanghai, for instance, the large-scale cultural events are aimed primarily at city promotion, whereas in Hong Kong, the events are seen as somewhat educational tool to augment and expand the population of cultural consumers in the city. What determines these variations in roles? I argue that it is the governance structure of urban cultural policy that preconditions the instrumental roles and functions attached to the large-scale cultural events.

I will further examine this question in relation to the culture as promotion or ‘display’. The promotional role was considered an appropriate point of departure for this discussion, because whilst driven by different political agendas, in the context of all three cities it has appeared among the key responsibilities that policymakers attach to the large-scale cultural events. In addition, the display of power and a pursuit of international recognition is one of the top instrumental roles associated with cultural policy ‘as display’ at large (see McGuigan 2004). Therefore, the investigation of the agenda behind the promotional function of the large-scale cultural events allows us to better understand a growing impact of cultural policy ‘as display’ on the urban policymaking.

Table 2. *Culture to city: the roles of large-scale cultural events*

Roles	Description
Culture as art	Large-scale cultural events serve as an expression of what is perceived as the intrinsic value of art, they enrich and illuminate people's spiritual life.
Culture as global node	Large-scale cultural events tend to be interlocked in the global networks (e.g. the global network of film festivals), and function as global nodes This provides an opportunity for the city to either become a part of the global community, or to strengthen its position within it.
Culture as promotion or 'display' (external)	Large-scale cultural events are used to promote the city and raise its profile and reputation at the national, regional or global levels. However, as they have far less international impact than mega-events, the integrated set of regular events is needed to generate a substantial and long-lasting effect, and to promote the city as a powerful entity in regard to culture and creativity. They can also be employed to exhibit an overall growth and advancement of the city.
Culture as promotion or 'display' (internal)	Large-scale cultural events are used to raise self-esteem and confidence of the local citizens, and to build a stronger sense of community and belonging. In return, this is expected to provide a certain degree of social stability, certainty, and solidarity.
Culture as symbolic power	Here culture becomes somewhat of a symbolic power that can be employed to gain a higher position in the urban hierarchies. In a sense, 'Culture as symbolic power' is in part an upgraded version of 'Culture as display or promotion (external)'. However, whereas the latter is primarily about showcasing and presenting the achievements and capabilities of the city, 'Culture as symbolic power' is about gaining an actual position and power in the urban hierarchies due to these achievements. In other words, it's not about merely <i>putting</i> the city on a map, it is about <i>highlighting</i> the city on a map. Regular cultural events give sense of stability: if city is able to keep them going year by year it means the city has enough resources, experience and capabilities to do so.
Culture as platform	Cultural events provide a platform for local artists and industries to showcase and promote themselves. It is also a platform to collaborate (and compete!) with foreign artists.
Culture as business	Large-scale cultural events are regarded as enterprises that should be self-sufficient. Ideally, they should generate some excess returns that could then be used to measure their 'usefulness'. In other words, the events are increasingly urged to move towards self-sufficiency and financial independence, and away from public funding.
Culture as playground	The events are expected to satisfy a growing public demand for new experiences and sensations. The provision of an abundant number of different choices and the creation of new exciting experiences is the major competitive advantage of cities (Pratt 2004, Scott 2006). In addition, culturally vibrant city life is seen as an integral part of quality living, and may result in attracting and retaining larger numbers of creative talents (Florida 2002; Grodach and Silver 2012; Sassen 2006). Cultural events for people it's not so much about the actual attendance, but more about having a choice.
Culture as public empowerment	Cultural realm is one of a few areas where the city government is willing to encourage and stimulate community participation, thus empowering the public to contribute to the planning and assessment process of the events. In other words, the citizens are involved, or at least feel involved, in public affairs and are

repeatedly assured that their demands are being heard. Although in academic literature, community engagement is often included among instrumental roles of culture (see for example, Pratt 2009; Comunian 2011; Grodach and Silver 2012), community empowerment in this regard is less discussed.

Culture as educator

Large-scale cultural events are used to foster arts education and cultural awareness among locals, particularly youth. This reflects on policymakers' attempts to increase the number of consumers of the arts and culture and to boost the demand for cultural goods and services. In other words, they serve as a means to lift and sustain cultural production and consumption (Pratt 2009; Cole 2012; Mommaas 2009). It is worth noting, however, that events tend to be more commonly treated as a tool for persuasion rather than a tool for education, that is, the audience is merely informed about what is considered to be *good* for them. Also, in some cases, not only the public, but policymakers themselves can become the receptors of 'Culture as educator'.

Culture as political campaign

For some policymakers, large-scale cultural events may also be an arena for maintaining important contacts, establishing useful partnerships and building a political legacy. In media and research interviews, the WDC 2016 is often labelled 'Hau Lung-Pin's event' that ultimately, as one respondent argues, may lead to his success in the 2016 Presidential Election.

As noted before, Taipei enjoys a high degree of autonomy from the central government. Due to Taiwan's international status, the city also plays a very important role in Taiwan's foreign affairs acting as a primary agent of public diplomacy (Chu 2011). Therefore, Taipei has always been concerned about its position in the world, particularly since the rise of China. As one former senior government official puts it:

We want to join a global, large community. We want to join it. We want to become a city that the whole world would be talking of as one...as one... at very least, we want to belong to the world, to be acknowledged by the world. (...) In this case, our self-esteem will rise, won't it? (Official D, personal communication, Taipei, August 19, 2014)

This quote indicates a feeling of marginalization that might be generated by Taipei's 'second-tier' city status, international isolation, and growing intercity competition in the region. The city government, as both, the Global Player and the Architect, attempts to tackle this issue by imitating more 'success' stories from other different (and in many respects distant) cities. In this context, for Taipei the adoption of global formats of the large-scale cultural events, provides a chance to demonstrate to the world that the city (and the entire island) has already reached a high development level in both, cultural and economic terms, and that it is standing alongside other major cities in the region. Events also serve to promote the city to foreign participants and industry professionals attending the event, and most importantly, to encourage

collaboration between local and foreign artists (City as Promoter). These all reflect on Taipei's efforts of becoming an integral part of the global community through culture and creativity.

It should be noted, however, that as Advocate, Taipei is particularly concerned over satisfying the needs of the local citizens. Here the events are regarded as essential tools to entertain, educate and engage local audience, as well as to raise their self-esteem, confidence and sense of belonging. Therefore, in Taipei, the cultural events also serve as an internal city branding practice. Policymakers anticipate that this, in return, could lead to higher favourability ratings among likely voters. The narrative of the 'international impact' of the large-scale cultural events is also often exploited to strengthen the image of the city amongst the local citizens. The government seems to attempt to 'sell' the idea of Taipei as a truly international city, the city that is capable of hosting high-level arts and film festivals just as any other large city in the world.

The evidence from the interview data suggests that in Shanghai, the primary function of the large-scale cultural events is to promote the city and to put it on a map as a 'world city'. On the one hand, this shows that Shanghai shares similar insecurities with Taipei, specifically in terms of intercity competition and marginalisation. It does not feel confident in its 'global city' status, and employs culture as one of the means towards what it sees as a truly 'global city' model. It should also be noted that Shanghai seeks to strengthen its position in the global cities network not only to counter the intercity competition from outside, but also from that from inside of China, particularly Beijing. Internationalism and cosmopolitanism of Shanghai has always been recognised as city's major strengths in regard to other cities in China, and Shanghai is striving to maintain this position for as long as it can.

As a result, large-scale cultural events in Shanghai are focused on magnitude and international impact. The government always opts for the 'best', 'the greatest', 'world-class' performers, somewhat conforming to Jim McGuigan's (2004) argument that one of the cornerstones of cultural policy 'as display' is national aggrandizement. As most of the local talents and artists still 'fail' to meet the 'world-class' benchmark they are often excluded from these events with foreign performers occupying the stage (Academic B, personal communication, Shanghai, November 18, 2014). In other words, in this context, the events become a platform for foreign cultural and

creative industries to enter local market rather than for local artists to promote themselves. To certain extent, we witness the same thing in Hong Kong, however, here it is somewhat more organic, because Hong Kong is truly multicultural city, whereas in Shanghai this process seems to be more forced as city continues to seek for the status of 'International cultural metropolis'. As a result, local cultural production is increasingly adapted to fit a 'foreign taste' (Practitioner D, personal communication, Shanghai, January 23, 2015).

In terms of audience, contrary to Taipei, the Shanghai Municipal Government seems to completely disregard the interests of locals. The tickets to the Shanghai International Arts Festival, for example, start from around €12 and go up to €250. In Shanghai, where a current minimum wage is merely RMB 1,820 (€270) per month, a vast majority of people still cannot afford such luxury. For those who can, getting a ticket can prove challenging, because, as few respondents note, a large share of tickets are given away to government officials and festival sponsors. This again confirms that the major purpose of the large-scale cultural events in Shanghai is neither to educate local audience nor to satisfy their cultural demands. They serve as luxury goods for 'elite' audience and seem to be yet another parade of China's superiority and influence.

Hong Kong has already established itself as a 'global city' decades ago, thus it is somewhat more confident about its position in the world. On the other hand, however, for many years Hong Kong was regarded as the 'arts desert' in the region, thus policymakers are getting increasingly concerned about its position in terms of cultural and creative development. These concerns are prompted by intercity competition in the region and the shifting status of Hong Kong after its handover to China. As a result, culture as 'display' for Hong Kong as Promoter, becomes one of city's 'upgrading' strategies that ultimately is expected to lead to a global city that ticks all the boxes, the city that is not only a global financial centre, but also a creative hub and cultural metropolis. The Design Year of Hong Kong 2012, for example, served this purpose by demonstrating that in terms of design industry, the city is advancing alongside other 'design capitals' in the region.

It should be noted, however, that Hong Kong attaches less importance to the promotional role of the large-scale events if compare to Taipei or Shanghai. One

reason for this lies in the governance structure of culture. In Hong Kong, where government acts as Promoter and Facilitator of culture, a vast majority of large-scale cultural events are corporatized or privately owned. With the industry professionals rather than government officials taking control of cultural policy ‘as display’, its instrumental roles are shifting towards less political and more market-oriented objectives. This includes consumer outreach, generation of economic returns, and development of ‘flagship’ cultural and creative industries (Karvelyte 2014). Therefore, in Hong Kong, the promotional or ‘display’ role of the large-scale cultural events revolves around an international community of industry professionals where the events build city’s reputation through high level of professionalism and competence:

I think, in general, generally speaking, we [Hong Kong International Film Festival] are among the best-run film festival in the world. And people in the international film festival community knows that, and agree on that. I think this is a very good brand-building for Hong Kong as a city. (Practitioner C, personal communication, Hong Kong, October 13, 2014).

The ‘international community’ of industry professionals comprise interlocked global network. As senior staff member of the Hong Kong Arts Festival (Practitioner E, personal communication, October 31, 2014) indicates,

I don’t see myself as in the centre, I see myself as one of many players that link up in different ways at different times, work independently in different ways in different times and, you know, [this] actually gives us more scope than being a hub.

This illuminates a significance of international festival formats – they are all connected into the global networks, and the reputation they build within these networks ultimately affects the brand of the city and its status in the global community.

Conclusion

In this paper, I seek to demonstrate a path dependency of cultural policy as ‘display’, arguing that it is preconditioned by both global cultural trends and the governance structure of culture, or to put it more broadly, on the political, historical and socio-economic context of the city.

All three cities act as Global Players in terms of borrowing and adopting 'foreign' concepts and practices related to the culture-led urban development. They eagerly introduce the 'best-practices' from other cities, adopt global formats of large-scale events that are generally acknowledged as one of the most common city branding practices (Ashworth 2008), and pursue the titles of 'creative city' or 'cultural metropolis'. However, the agenda behind the city promotion differs depending on the political, socio-economic and historical contexts of the place. As a result, albeit each city adopts international festival formats that are programmed to function as city promotion practices, yet they still end up pursuing different agendas.

Governance structure of culture has a huge impact on the city governments' approach to cultural policy 'as display'. It seems that in Shanghai, a city that has very limited decision-making power and acts as a trustee for the central government (City as Trustee), large-scale cultural events are employed primarily for the external 'display' purpose, to showcase (rather than to stimulate) the cultural development of the city, to promote its cultural and creative industries, and most importantly, to persuade the world that Shanghai truly deserves a world-city status. This not only corresponds with the national cultural policy agenda (to strengthen China's image abroad), but also reflects on China's goal to become one of the superpowers in the world. In Hong Kong (City as Facilitator/Promoter), large-scale cultural events are semi-private projects, therefore largely focused on financial gains, audience augmentation, and marketing of the city's 'flagship' cultural and creative industries. Therefore, for Hong Kong the promotional role of cultural events is important in terms of keeping up with the global and regional competition, and the government here directly oversees and funds those cultural events that otherwise would not be able to 'survive' due to the low attendance rates and financial struggles. In contrast, Shanghai government strongly supports and holds only those events that are considered to be the largest and the greatest, such as for instance, the Shanghai International Film Festival or the Shanghai China International Arts Festival. This corresponds to the central government's ambition of strengthening the image and influence of China at the global level. The Taipei City Government views culture and creativity as somewhat symbolic power of Taiwan that needs to be utilized both locally and internationally. Therefore, the large-scale cultural events here become more than just an attempt to enhance urban socioeconomic assets and strengthen the brand of the city. Rather they

turn into a strategic tool for national public diplomacy and global communication, where the city, and not the state, leads the process (City as Architect). In Taipei, cultural policy ‘as display’ is also actively employed as an internal city branding tool, designed to strengthen a sense of belonging and pride among local citizens. This results in a significantly increased value of cultural and creative sector in Taipei and adds a whole new level of symbolic meaning to the large-scale cultural events in the city.

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