



“Arab Youth: From Engagement to Inclusion?”

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1. Project Partners

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


2. Context and Research Questions

- Lasting Crisis of Legitimacy of authoritarian regimes in the MENA region with negative region-wide consequences for social peace and political stability;
- Young people (ca. 18-35 yrs) as central actors of the protests and unrests since 2011;
- Simultaneously, this group remains largely excluded, both politically and socio-economically;
- Yet, it is the numerically most relevant age cohort in the region, and any future policies that disregard their demands and aspirations will be doomed to fail and postpone necessary re-construction of state-society relations;
- Potentially dramatic consequences: developmental stagnation; political unrest and instability; economic failure; ...



Demography & Corollaries



- Precondition for sustainable socio-economic and political future in the region is the greater inclusion of the youth through:
 - a new formula for state-society relations towards a stronger inclusion of the key protesting force of the “Arab Spring” and most important societal segment;
 - offering more participation of this age group through larger degrees of fundamental civic rights and political freedoms.



Context & Research Question

- Diverging socio-political trajectories during and after the so-called “Arab Spring”, with various consequences for political mobilization and the shaping of state-society relations across the MENA region:
 - Change of regime / in regime through protests “from below”; (e.g. Tunisia, Egypt)
 - Reforms by incumbent regime “from above” (e.g., Morocco, Algeria, Oman);
 - Armed conflict / civil war (e.g., Libya, Syria);
 - Unchanged survival of authoritarian regime (e.g., UA Emirates, Qatar, Saudi-Arabia).

Overarching Research Question:

To what extent do the first two trajectories (regime change from below vs. regime-initiated reform from above) bear the promise of greater inclusion and participation of the youth in political decision-making and thus for sustainable political stability?



3. Project Design

Framework:

- 4 pilot projects funded during 2012-2014 (TÜ; BN; BO; HH)
- so-called “accompanying research”, not *on...* but *with...*
- the actors, events, and consequences of the “Arab Spring”
- in our case with the goal of
 - a) documenting and analyzing current trends in the political mobilization and participation of young people, their relationship towards “the state”, and on the role of external actors in the (re-) formulation of this relationship;
 - b) identifying contexts and actors that impact positively/negatively on either trajectory (change from below vs. reform from above).



Three-partite project structure:

- **Research Task I:** Political engagement and protest behavior among young people: motives, demands, repertoires of action
- **Research Task II:** The youth and the state: governmental policies for youth participation and their perception of such measures
- **Research Task III:** Goals and perceptions of external actors' efforts at promoting youth and democracy after the "Arab Spring"



Research Task I: Political engagement and protest behavior of the youth

- Responsibility: AUC, UMV (respective case studies)
- Sub-Questions:
 - Who are the politically engaged youth?
 - In what formal and informal structures do they organize?
 - What are their motives for engagement and their demands?
 - What are reasons for non-engagement and for disengagement during / in the aftermath of the “Arab Spring”?
 - What trends can be discerned for the time-period between 2011 and 2013?



Research Task II: The youth and the state

- Responsibility: UT, AUC, UMV
- Sub-Questions:
 - What measures have governments/regimes taken towards achieving greater inclusion and participation of the youth?
 - To what extent are young people represented in the public space and within the political arena?
 - How do public institutions and established decision-makers manage the demands of the protest movements?
 - What are the underlying motives for the respective political strategies and policies?
 - How are these strategies and policies perceived by the youth?



Research Task III: Goals and Perception of external actors' efforts at promoting youth participation and democracy

- Responsibility: UT
- Sub-Questions:
 - What strategies and approaches do external actors pursue when they say they promote youth participation and democracy?
 - How do they define their own roles in the local contexts of reform/revolution?
 - How helpful is their support from the viewpoint of the state(s)?
 - How are they and their efforts perceived by young people, and in particular by the activists of the protest movements?
 - Do their potential and their capacity for support of participation increase due to the changing political contexts?



4. Methods

- Case Selection:
 - Regime Change after mass protests from below: Egypt
 - Reforms from above by the regime itself: Morocco
- Explorative research design: primarily hypothesis generation (in contrast to hypothesis testing)
- Actor centered approach (with a focus on the level of interaction between different actors)
- Methods triangulation:
 - quantitative survey;
 - qualitative interviews;
 - document analysis.



4.1 Quantitative Survey

- **Sample: Students in public universities** (→ population segment most likely to be representative for participation in protests; [selection of universities and disciplines])
- Instrument: Standardized questionnaires in paper form (Arabic and French versions);
- Presence of researchers during the filling in of questionnaires by respondents;
- Sample size: 700 Egypt (return rate = 93.7 %; n=656) / 1000 Morocco (return rate = 96.0 %; n=960) → high return rates = results highly significant for the sample;
- Statistical data analysis with SPSS software



301.4 I don't really care who is as I can live peacefully					فيها 301.4 / لا اهتم كثيرا من سيكون في الحكومة أو خارجها طالما أعيش في سلام
302. Please tell us if you	302 – فيما يلي عبارات عن أشكال المشاركة السياسية، من فضلك حدد مدى اتفاقك أو اختلافك مع كل منها				
302.1 Political parties general					
302.2 Political parties are not	أرفض بشدة	لا أوافق	أوافق	أوافق بشدة	
302.3 Having a greater number would make political parties young people					302.1 / بشكل عام، تحافظ الأحزاب السياسية على وجودها 302.2 / الأحزاب السياسية لا تقم بقضايا الشباب
302.4 If political parties used social would become more influential					302.3 / وجود عدد كبير من الأعضاء الخريجين من الشباب يجعل الأحزاب السياسية أكثر جذبا للشباب
302.5 If political power holders against the interests of the but to protest					302.4 / إذا استخدمت الأحزاب السياسية وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية، قد يصبح الشباب أكثر اهتماما بالأحزاب السياسية
302.6 Civil society organizations the elite					302.5 / إذا اتخذ من يدهم مقاليد السلطة السياسية قرارات ضد مصلحة الشعب، فليس لدى خيار سوى التظاهر
302.7 Civil society organizations advancing this country through					302.6 / منظمات المجتمع المدني لا تقدم سوى مصالح النخبة
302.8 Religious based organizations than civic organizations					302.7 / منظمات المجتمع المدني أكثر نشاطا لتنمية الدولة من الأحزاب السياسية
302.9 Protests and strikes are					302.8 / للمنظمات التي تقوم على أساس ديني أكثر مصداقية من منظمات المجتمع المدني. 302.9 / لنظارات والإضرابات تضر بالدولة



4.2 Qualitative Interviews

- **3 groups of interviewees (qualitative selection of respondents → case diversity vs. representativeness)**
 - **I. Young people** (~ 80 interviews per case)
 - 1/3rd active politically and/or in protest movements
 - 1/3rd formerly active politically and/or in protest movements
 - 1/3rd politically inactive (middle class [well-educated and well-off], poor-but-educated, marginalized [no or little formal education])
 - **II. Representatives of government and state institutions** (no benchmarks set because access difficult)
 - **III. Representatives of international and non-governmental organizations** as well as bilateral **donor agencies** with a focus on promoting youth participation and democracy (ca. 30 per case as target-feasibility to be seen)



- Instrument: Semi-structured interview guidelines structured according to thematic issue areas (in different variations for the five sub-sets of interviewees);
- minimization of interview effects through different profiles of interviewers (i.e. nationality, language, sex);
- Recording and transcription of interviews if and when interviewee agreed (in Moroccan dialect, Egyptian dialect, French, and English);
- PC-supported, qualitative content analysis (structured content according to themes and actors)
- Software to be used: atlas.ti



Interview Guidelines – Extract:

Axe III. How do they perceive politics in Egypt?

14. How did you perceive the 18 days uprisings and what political developments did you expect to happen at the time?
15. What do you think of the state reactions to the protests so far, were the main demands (“food, freedom, dignity”) responded to?
16. Looking back, do you think the protests were the main reason why Mubarak had to step down? If yes, was his resignation an adequate reaction to the problems at the time? If not, why did he have to step down?
17. Do you think that some people would have participated in the protests of the 18 days but did not do so because of particular reasons? If yes, what were their reasons?
18. How do you perceive the protests taking place today? Why do you think there are less people demonstrating today?
19. What are the most important political developments in Egypt at the moment and what do you think of these developments?
20. How much influence do you think people like you have on political decisions in Egypt today?
21. The events we have witnessed since 2011 are often praised as an important step in Egypt's democratization process. Would you say that Egypt is more democratic now than before the protests?
22. Do they think the future is going to be more democratic?
23. What is democracy for you?

Axe III. How do they perceive politics in Morocco?

14. What are, from your point of view, the most important political developments in Morocco since early 2011?
15. How did you perceive the state reaction to the protests (constitutional reform, raising wages, elections...)?
16. Do you think the constitutional reform was a direct response to the demands of the protestors? If yes, was it an adequate reaction? If no, what triggered the reform and what do you think about it?
17. During the protests, there were incidences where the police used violence against the protestors, and there were also incidences of violence between different groups of protestors. How did you perceive these incidents?
18. Do you think that some people would have participated in the protests but did not do so because they were afraid that this might have negative consequences?
19. How do you perceive the protests taking place today? Why do you think there are less people demonstrating today?
20. How much influence do you think people like you have on political decisions in Morocco?
21. Do you expect the current reform context to increase possibilities for political participation? If so, in what ways?
22. The reforms undertaken since 2011 are often praised as an important step in Morocco's democratization process. Would you say that Morocco is more democratic now than before the protests?
23. What is democracy for you?



4.3 Document Analysis

- Types of documents: public statements, reference papers / policy-papers, action plans, reports by organizations;
- PC-supported, qualitative content analysis (structured content analysis according to themes and actors);
- Software used: atlas.ti



5. State of our research and data collection

April 2012	Kick-off meeting in Rabat (MOR)
April – September 2012	Establishment of approaches and instruments for data collection
October 2012	DAVO-Conference Erlangen
Oct. 2012 – March 2013	Data collection Phase I (quantitative survey, interviews with youth + representatives of “international actors”)
April 2013	Mid-term meeting in Cairo (EGY)
April 2013 – Sept. 2013	Data analysis, Start data gathering Phase II (interviews with representatives of governmental institutions)
Oct. 2013	MESA-Conference New Orleans
Oct. 2013 – Dec. 2013	Finalization of data gathering and analysis
Jan. 2013 – March 2014	Data analysis and finalization of reports
April 2014	Final Meeting Tübingen, policy-workshop Berlin





6. First Results: Protests and the perception of state and international actors in EGYPT

I. Protests prior to and after “Revolution 1.0”

Table 1: Political Orientation of Protesters

	Liberal	Islamist	Socialist	No preferences	Other	Total
„Pre-Revolution“	18,81%	22,77%	7,43%	48,02%	2,97%	100%
„Post-Revolution“	31,58%	5,26%	36,84%	26,32%	0%	100%
Total (incl. non- and disengaged)	16,47%	26,55%	2,85%	51,43%	2,69%	100%

From a political perspective, how do you categorize yourself? (n=656)



Table 2: Preferred form of political order according to protesters

	Sharía	Islamic Democracy	Civil Democracy	Strong state (no matter what/ how)	Socialist state	Total
„Pre-Revolution“	8,49%	33,96%	31,13%	22,17%	4,25%	100%
„Post-Revolution“	8,7%	8,7%	47,83%	17,39%	17,39%	100%
Total	7,48%	36,76%	30,06%	24,3%	1,4%	100%

In your view, what is the state model which should be followed by your country? (n=656)



Table 3: Priority issues for the immediate future (total sample)

Rank	Issue	Mean (4= very important; 1= not at all important)
1.	Create employment opportunities	3,89
2.	Improve access to education	3,85
3.	Reduce corruption	3,82
4.	Assure political stability and public order	3,81
5.	Respect human rights	3,77
6.	Finalize the constitution	3,56
7.	Reduce social inequality	3,54
8.	Increase possibilities for political participation	3,49
9.	Increase gender equality	3,39
10.	Increase personal freedoms	3,38



Table 4: Variables Impacting on Protest Behavior (Pre-Revolution)

Variables		Regression coefficient B	Standard error	Wald	Df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	Engaged in party	1,287	,445	8,366	1	,004	3,621
	Religious Org.	,531	,535	,986	1	,321	1,701
	Civil Society Org.	-,009	,449	,000	1	,985	,992
	Liberal	,031	,287	,011	1	,915	1,031
	Islamist	-,230	,272	,715	1	,398	,794
	Socialist	2,099	,846	6,162	1	,013	8,162
	Twitter	,899	,211	18,141	1	,000	2,457
	Parents provide	-1,429	,385	13,799	1	,000	,240
	Father educated	,851	,387	4,827	1	,028	2,343
	Father engaged	,635	,216	8,619	1	,003	1,887
	Gender	-1,305	,209	38,846	1	,000	,271
	Constant	1,332	,572	5,418	1	,020	3,787

n=591 (196) / Nagelkerkes R-Quadrat: **0,31**



Table 5: Variables Impacting on Protest Behavior (Post-Revolution)

Variables		Regression coefficient B	Standard error	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	Engaged in party	1,811	,710	6,515	1	,011	6,117
	Religious Org.	2,732	,981	7,752	1	,005	15,362
	Civil Society Org.	,691	,775	,796	1	,372	1,996
	Liberal	,684	,606	1,272	1	,259	1,982
	Islamist	-3,423	1,386	6,098	1	,014	,033
	Socialist	2,947	,714	17,040	1	,000	19,050
	Twitter	,114	,525	,047	1	,828	1,121
	Parents provide	-1,339	,652	4,219	1	,040	,262
	Father educated	,965	1,138	,719	1	,396	2,625
	Gender	,140	,546	,065	1	,798	1,150
	Constant	-4,014	1,490	7,259	1	,007	,018

n=654 (23) / Nagelkerkes R-Quadrat: **0,33**



II. Young People and the State

Table 6: Perception of „Democracy“

	“Egypt is democratic” (agree + strongly agree)	“Egypt is still lacking democracy” (agree + strongly agree)	“Justice and equality cannot exist without democracy” (agree + strongly agree)
Total	47,78%	79,73%	90,09%



Table 7: Religion and Politics

	“Religion and Politics should not be mixed” (agree + strongly agree)	“Politics should be based on religion” (agree + strongly agree)	“I can cooperate with people from different religious backgrounds” (agree + strongly agree)
Total	70,88%	39,38%	88,27%



Table 8: State Institutions

	„How efficient do you consider the following means of participation to influence political outcomes? [Vote in national elections]“ (efficient + strongly efficient)	“If political power holders take decisions against the interests of the people, I have no choice but to protest” (agree + strongly agree)	“The police would never use violence against innocent people” (agree + strongly agree)	“The Military will always protect the security of the people” (agree + strongly agree)
Total	80,22%	41,62%	25,0%	84,91%



III. Perception of international actors

Table 9: Desire for LESS Cooperation of Egypt with...

	EU	US	Gulf-States
Total	26,83%	48,17%	5,48%

Question: “Should Egypt cooperate more or less with the following countries or regions?” (A little less + much less)

Table 10: Criticism and Desires...

	EU interferes too much through their funding (agree + strongly agree)	Gov’t should be more careful when accepting US funds (agree + strongly agree)	It would be good if Egypt received more funding from Gulf-States (agree + strongly agree)
Total	76,83%	92,53%	32,93%




7. Outlook

Next steps that need to be taken:

- Interim report
- Finalization of survey analysis Egypt
- Analysis of survey data Morocco
- Finalization of youth interview transcripts
- Conducting field research phase II
- Coding and analysis of interviews along the three research tasks
- Drafting of papers, organization of edited volume, submission of journal articles
- ...



Thank You!



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