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**Is Chinese Regime on the Road to Transformation? A
View from the Perspective of the Utilitarian Model of
Governance and Governmentality**

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Is Chinese Regime on the Road to Transformation? A View from the Perspective of the Utilitarian Model of Governance and Governmentality

Abstract

This paper deals with the issue of modernization and democratization in contemporary China, putting into the background the classic modernization theories and using instead the utilitarian theory of governance and Michel Foucault's governmentality. Both concepts constitute the basic instrument for practicing of governance and exercising of power in nowadays West so they are transferred during the modernization process (adopting of Western-style ordering of the political and social systems). The main goal of this paper is to show that the modernization process and adopting of the utilitarian model and governmentality does not have to lead to setting up of the Western liberal democracy at all. Instead, we will assert that the modernization process can foster the contemporary authoritative feature of Chinese system and can help establishing a hybrid regime which combine Western as well as Chinese (or Asian) ideas, norms, and mechanisms. This hybrid regime is then stable so there is very small chance that it will change, and powerful so there is no problem in fulfilling the present Chinese assertiveness.

Key words: China, governance, governmentality, modernization, utilitarianism.

Introducing the problem

Discussions about democratization and westernization of non-democratic or simply non-western countries are quite old, yet still discussed, topic in many social science disciplines (mainly in political science, international relations, sociology, and anthropology). Among classical approaches to this problem belong for instance modernization theories, development studies, migrations theories, or ethnicity theories. All these concepts are used and applied quite often during many occasions,

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however, the main issue is probably a question if a non-democratic country after establishing deeper contact with the West (receiving investments and adopting norms) automatically set course to the path of democratization. I would like take this issue as the main research question and apply it on the case of China because its democratization is being nowadays often discussed in the academic spheres. The core of discussions lies in a dichotomy whether the fact that China's economic boom due to the incoming investments from the West (which also means broader and deeper contacts) will put China on track to democracy of Western type or not. We will bolster the first view, albeit I would like to show that China's much deeper contact with Western democracies does not necessarily lead to a transformation of the political and social system to the concept of liberal democracy (that is, to a system whose main aspects are free elections, market rationality, and pluralism). Rather, my goal will rest in offering of a view based on an assumption that China is adopting some Western social and political mechanism in order to avoid stagnation and future collapsing of the regime. Thus, the modernization is very selective and it has the only purpose to reproduce at least a part of the system by introducing new dynamical but non-threatening aspects. In doing so, China is then transforming into some kind of hybrid regime.

As for the analysis, I would like to put aside the classic theories of modernization and transition to democracy as there is plenty of studies based on applying of these theories. I want to use and introduce two other concepts that are not usually applied in the analyses, yet they are, I believe, key for the Western approach to the issue of governance. These concepts are the utilitarian model of governance and Michel Foucault's governmentality. While the concept of governmentality is quite well known and reflected, the utilitarian theory of governance is a concept which I formulated and derived from the work of Jeremy Bentham and its interpretations. As we will see later, Bentham's linkage of his utilitarianism with the issue of governance and representative democracy have determined the basic setting of the Western social and political systems. Nevertheless, as Foucault showed, there were power transformations in the utilitarian system so that it has absorbed governmentality as the main instrument for exercising power. Thus, both concepts plays a significant role in Western governance and they are also "distributed" during the modernization and democratization process in the first place (and often secretly) as they are firmly tied with the principles of representative

democracy, good governance, and free market. Yet, both concepts are also very flexible so that their accepting does not automatically mean shifting to a liberal democracy. On the contrary, its acceptance could rather foster the existing regime.

Regarding structure and methodology of the text, the first section of the project will be dedicated to deeper analysis and introduction of above mentioned concepts of utilitarian model of governance and governmentality. We will focus not only on theoretical aspect of both theorems but also on their use in praxis; the goal will be to bring both theories to the contemporary social reality in maximal possible extent. However, we will not be discussing both concepts too thoroughly as we do not have space for it, thus we will take the discussion as some introduction to the issue and as conceptualization and operationalization of both concepts. To analyze theories we will use both primary and secondary literature plus literature describing real specific social situations. We should then gain a coherent, intelligible and further applicable characterization of the utilitarian model and governmentality out of this analysis. In the second section we will look on a social and political praxis in China to point out selective modernization and liberalization of the regime. In this light, we will utilize both reflexive literature about the Chinese contemporary regime and a critical content analysis of the Chinese political institutions' documents since year 2000. It is worth pointing out that the mere existence of these documents (moreover in English) is outlining the fact that China gradually adopting the utilitarian model of governance (if it would be typical authoritarian regime, no or minimum documents will be either available or necessary). All of that should give us good picture of Chinese contemporary political and social situation. The third section will merge two previous sections, so we will use a comparative method and compare utilitarian model and governmentality with the Chinese regime to find out if China adopted at least some aspects of the both concepts. This should prove that, thanks to utilitarian model and governmentality, China is selectively getting closer to the West by adopting both concepts while does not necessary transforming into a Western-style liberal democracy.

Introducing the concepts of utilitarian governance

Utilitarianism is well known for its ideas based on consequentialist thinking about social and political issues and as a movement pursuing liberal political a social reforms in 18th and 19th century. Within this scope, we will discuss thoughts of

Jeremy Bentham as apparently the most significant proponent of utilitarianism and the reforms. Bentham is famous for his view of human nature as nothing more than seeking of pleasure and avoiding of pain as he writes in his book *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*:

‘Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. [...] They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it’ (Bentham, 2007: 1).

As we can see, every human being is acting in accordance with the principle of utility defined as an effort to calculate in every life situation in order to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Moreover, every person is determined by this principle and cannot, even deliberately, avoid it, thus, for Bentham, everyone calculates whenever it is possible to gain maximum of utility (Bentham, 1999: 45). The principle of utility is often used as a concept in issues regarding ethics, applied ethics, or mere deliberation about actions of agents. We put aside these topics and pursue Bentham’s faith that human nature defined this way could serve as a center point for the research of human behavior or society itself. Therefore, we will look on applying of the principle of utility on the other actors in society, especially on a government and its actions.

Applying the principle of utility on a government means that it should make calculation just like individuals, but there is a problem with this assumption. Bentham at first glance speaks about the calculation as a mechanism used by individuals for their own sake, thus, people calculate egoistically and do not involve other agents into the calculation (Bentham, 1999: 34). However, egoistical calculations cannot be used as a guiding principle for governments since it would simply lead to governance exercised for members of government, not members of society. While Bentham (2007: 30) suggests in one passage that every calculation should be based on utility of all involved people, generally, he defines the whole process of calculation more vaguely as approving or disapproving an action on the basis of increasing or decreasing of the utility of the party whose interest is in question; and this party then defines ambiguously as either a community or an individual (Bentham, 2007: 2). Furthermore, Bentham (2007: 310-311) directly divides ethics into personal ethics

(the art of self-conduct) and legislative ethics (the art of government or public ethics) in other passages. Therefore, it is possible, as suggests David Lyons (1991: 30) that Bentham wanted to draw strict and bold line between the acting of individuals and government. Based on this assumption, Lyons offers the interpretation that Bentham uses some kind of ethical dualism – the personal utility is important for individual ethics and the social utility for the actions of governments. Nevertheless, Lyons is criticized by James Burns (2005: 50-51) who is convinced that Bentham regarded calculation strictly in altruistic way. We cut short discussion sticking with the position of Lyons in the rest of this paper since, as we will see, it fits more perfectly into the Bentham's conception of government and society based on the principle of utility.

Government then should govern according to the principle of utility and take into the consideration the social utility. In the other and more known words, it should promote as much utility as possible for as many people as possible (Bentham, 1843a: 5). More concretely, government should maximize the utility of society by rational enacting of laws and policies (Bentham, 2007: 70). Bentham regards making of legislature and policies as a key aspect for society to reproduce itself since if there is no dynamical element which would push society forward it would stagnate and eventually disintegrate (Bentham, 2007: 322). Moreover, the process of enacting of legislature and policies creates specific legitimization cycle – a government pursues maximization of utility through legislation and policies, and *vice versa*, laws and policies legitimize a government if they are maximizing utility. Legislation activity itself was perhaps the most important aspect of utilitarian governance for Bentham. He had been living in times when a lot of harsh and brutal public sentences were applied for often only a banal breaching of law. Thus, Bentham wanted to reform penal system to be more rational, sentencing convicted with purpose of preventing repetition of crime and discouraging potential criminals. In this light, Bentham suggested using the principle of utility and mechanism of calculations for determining not only laws themselves but also the content of laws. It is then obvious that penal system and its reform was an area where calculations could be utilized in a great extent (Bentham, 1838c: 396-398). Nevertheless, the actual importance of the penal system rationalization lies elsewhere. We can see this importance if we take the interpretation of Herbert Hart.

According to Herbert Hart (1983: 220), the actual praxis of the rational legislation has two levels. The first level involves actively influencing a citizen's

behavior through the vision of a possible sentence or reward, or in other words, it consists of setting specific social limitations. However, this first level cannot function properly without the second, which influences citizens passively by exercising these sentences. Nevertheless, Hart does not reflect one important fact – the certainty of punishment. Therefore, it is rather plausible to interchange these levels. The first level, then, would apply adequate sentences and passively influence citizen's behavior, teaching them that they will be punished in the event of breaking the law. However, this mechanism cannot function properly without general consciousness of the certainty of punishment. The certainty would then be guaranteed by the second level that actively directs the citizens by supervision. This supervision, conducted by social institutions and other citizens, would ensure that every citizen knows about this certain punishment in the event of breaking the law. Yet, as we will see later, supervision does not only ensure obedience to laws as formal norms but also obedience to the informal ones. In summary, we can see that both levels are reciprocally dependent on one another.

Furthermore, an effort to somehow normalize citizens did not emerge only in a sphere of criminality and penal system. As points out Foucault (1995: 169), a tendency to discipline and normalize people emerged also in other spheres, especially in armies, schools, factories, and other similar institutions. The main goal of using discipline was creating a state which worked as a machine – effectively and economically. Foucault (1995: 61-62) sees the reason why political power allowed penal reform and focused on discipline in an effort to find new means for exercising of power. The mentioned harsh public sentences gradually became a destabilizing phenomenon in societies as people did not fear of them anymore and started to sympathize rather with convicted people. Therefore, the exercising of power was transformed from public punishment to the prevention of crime in order to put the exercising itself to the background (Foucault, 1995: 93-94).

As we can see, the purpose of utilitarian government lies in enacting laws and policies with the help of calculations and in directing and educating people to make them compliant with generally set norms. But how can government know what law or policy should be enacted and how can ensure the functioning of rational penal system and discipline? The answer rests in the necessity to implement some system of supervision above citizens, ensuring the application of disciplinary techniques and utilitarian governance. Without this supervision, the whole system would collapse

because the government would not know what legislation it should ratify and it would not be able to exercise and legitimize its political power. To solve this issue, Bentham proposed the ideal system for supervision – the Panopticon.

The Panopticon was to have been a building designed with the main purpose of enabling easy supervision over the people located in it. This easy supervision was achieved by designing a special place that made it possible to observe the whole interior of the building. The panoptically designed building, then, serves as an instrument for continuous and ever-present supervision ensuring that no individual goes unwatched or at least instilling the feeling that there is a very high chance of being watched throughout the building. Under this supervision, everyone either controls or learns how to control his or her own behavior. This teaching is based on adhering to the rules set in the Panopticon, and if someone breaks the rules, he or she will be punished (Bentham, 1838d: 39-40, 44-45). However, much more importantly, we should focus on solely on the principle of the Panopticon since it is applicable to society as a whole and to every one of its segments. Therefore, as Foucault (1995: 205) puts it, we should not take the Panopticon as some kind of idealistic theory or architectural oddity. On the contrary, panoptical architecture has been gradually becoming the main criterion for building since the 17th century, leaving behind the opulence that had previously been in fashion. In this light, not only prisons but factories, hospitals, schools and other facilities have been built for the detailed controlling of personnel, workers, patients, pupils and so on (Foucault, 1995: 172-173). Moreover, as Foucault (1995: 178-179) points out, the specific phenomenon of an 'infra-penalty' is emerging in the mind of everyone who is exposed to the Panopticon. This infra-penalty is the self-regulation of behavior or actions, however, unlike laws, it fills space unregulated by formal or informal norms. Everyone who is being panoptically watched, then, creates an automatic awareness that, for example, improper behavior, unpunctuality, untidy appearance, or any other social aspect not formally regulated, would trigger some kind of sanction. However, sanctions are not of a physical character but of a psychological one (humiliation, overlooking, taking away some privileges etc.). Moreover, an infra-penalty has a tendency to incorporate itself into everyday processes and procedures (for example into working process), making itself natural after some time for individuals who then often cannot perceive that the discipline is being applied on them. This whole

situation makes the exercising of power in the form of discipline well hid and yet very influential (Foucault, 1995: 206-207).

It is obvious from the previous pages that the principle of the Panopticon is a very important part of utilitarian governance. The panoptical supervision over society secures the continual intake of data needed for enacting of legislature and policies (this kind of data is obtained, for instance, through the camera systems, mass media, surveys, questionnaires, statistics, the Internet and so) and fulfills the functions of education and normalization. However, the government's freedom in enacting legislature (in case of a good utilitarian argumentation) and potentially paternalistic supervision of citizens are very dangerous instruments for governing. Bentham by himself was also aware of these possibilities since he was worried about government's excessive intervention into individuals' lives and about the loss of government's responsibility (Hume, 1981: 117-118; Rosen, 2003: 121).² To prevent these scenarios, Bentham made an effort to balance the positions of government and citizens. This resulted in the formation of two other social and political mechanisms – the exposure of government to the same supervision from citizens and enforcing individual freedom based on economic activity as the main goal of utilitarian governance.


The first mechanism was to be enacted by the public through elections as well as through the panoptical supervision of government. As a consequence of this supervision, government should fulfill its duties (act in accordance with the principle of utility), be faithful to its citizens, hear the pleas of its citizens, and be composed of educated and capable members (Bentham, 1843b: 310-312; Schofield, 2006: 259).

The second mechanism has one serious problem – it may potentially collide with the above outlined *status quo* since the enforcing of individual freedom could end up with individuals influencing decision making of government and, therefore, disrupting the principle of utility. To prevent this collision Bentham began to support economically defined individual freedom. Civil freedom was, in this light, reduced to electing members of political institutions who were the only ones with the right to care about social wellbeing (utility). By this move, Bentham utilized the fact that the sphere

² Although it would be needed we will not discuss more closely the specific issue about the intervention of a government into society. Bentham (1838b: 33-35) himself did not hold a firm stance since in his theoretical thoughts he suggested minimal interventions but in more practical writings he proposed a greater interventions. Thus, there is room for various interpretations, for example Ian Shapiro (2003: 27) asserts that Bentham wanted to utilize radical material redistribution from the rich to the poor.

of economy was unoccupied thanks to the economic transformations of the European societies in his time. Moreover, money fits perfectly into utilitarian calculations since it should play the main role of an intuitive and objective medium in calculus deliberations (Harrison, 1999: 154). Bentham (1999: 47), therefore, supposed that money is the clear and easily understandable (although not entirely accurate) criterion of maximization of utility. Besides that, by maximizing their own utility by

Figure 1



Source: Author

accumulation of money (for money itself or as an instrument to achieve something else) citizens also indirectly maximize the social utility (welfare) because it is made up of the sum of the individual utilities (welfares). Therefore, the welfare of society (and state) is composed of the economic activity of citizens, however Stephen Engelmann (2005: 36, 42) points out that economic activity plays an even more important role as a central point needed for enacting legislation. This role consists of creating specific expectations that should be reflected in legislature and policies for maximizing the social utility. It is entirely seemly, then, that the economic rationality plays a very important role in the utilitarian theory of governance.

Beside the economic rationality and its importance, we can see that Bentham very logically and effectively divided roles in the whole system. Politicians are responsible for the maximization of utility through the process of enacting legislation

and policies; and citizens are obliged to create social welfare through the economic activity, which consists in the maximization of individual welfare and of creating suggestions to the government.

If we should generalize everything that we have written so far, a very broad definition of utilitarian governance could be given in the following way: the main purpose of utilitarian government lies in the maximization of utility through ensuring security by legislative and regulative activity and by collecting data. Thus, citizens are responsible for controlling government and the economic activity that maximizes their utility and subsequently their social utility. Moreover, this basic specification creates a particular power *status quo* characterized by dividing society into the political and socio-economic sphere. Politicians are the only ones who have the right to make decisions in the political sphere while the other citizens participate only in the socio-economic sphere. Both spheres use panoptical supervision to each other controlling themselves to function properly. Moreover, the political sphere uses the Panopticon to gain politico-economic and statistical data needed for enacting norms and policies. On the other hand, the socio-economic sphere elects politicians, which is practically the only civil liberty and expression of civil society.

Utilitarian governance clearly determines society and its spheres as well as the roles of every individual in society. Furthermore, it also defines situations, mechanisms, and conditions under which both spheres can influence each other. This includes the formal ones (laws and policies on one hand and elections on the other) and the informal ones (infra-penalty on both sides). It must be said, however, that government has a stronger position in the system since it has a greater possibility to use panoptical supervision and it can, therefore, more easily influence the socio-economic sphere. Moreover, out of the disciplinary logic and Bentham's practical thoughts, it arises that government does not play a minor role in the system, but quite on the contrary, it attempts to influence a broad number of social aspects. Nevertheless, there is one remaining question – is this system has some relevancy? It would not have unless it would be connected with representative democracy by utilitarians. Therefore, the sole application of representative democracy as a political system means applying mentioned mechanisms of the utilitarian governance.

For better orientation, please see figure number one, which depicts the utilitarian theory of governance.

Governmentality

Let us now have a look on the Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality which is quite well known so we will discuss it more briefly than the utilitarian theory of governance. Foucault derives governmentality out of historical studies regarding transformations in European societies. We have already seen the change of exercising of political power in connection with the abandoning of public sentences as one of these transformations. Nevertheless, Foucault goes on and offers an analysis of another transformation, this time it is connected with a birth of the above-mentioned concept of discipline. Thanks to discipline and its high efficiency in organizing of institution where it had been applied, the phenomenon of capitalism has emerged in the 18th and 19th century. Capitalism changed possibilities of exercising of political power again since the specific circulations of goods, people, and services, which were out of the control of the disciplinary exercising of power, have emerged due to capitalism. Therefore, the political elites had to find some other way to exercise power and to control and gain advantage from these circulations (Foucault, 2007: 15, 20, 63-65). Thus, as it seems the utilitarian model of governance was self-defeating in some way but not as a whole, on contrary some aspects are very resilient (such as the division of society into the spheres). Nevertheless, this resulted in the emergence of the new exercising of power called as the security apparatus by Foucault. The 'security' in this expression comes from the fact that the exercising of power secures the circulations and optimizes their operation while preventing social randomness (Foucault, 2003: 246). In this light, statistics as a goal of the panoptical surveillance and political economy as an instrument for processing the gathered data were empowered by this situation and they were slowly beginning to become the most important parts of social sciences. Both aspects helped to minimize randomness and chaos since they ensured the data and its interpretations in order to find out how circulations would develop, who the main actors are and how they will act, and so.

The governance therefore turned from discipline and prescribing of how things should go to a looser control that was meant to ensure a desirable end of things. This (controlled) leaving of things to flow by themselves is specific for liberalism as a system that puts emphasis on the ideal of the free market. Therefore, political power, somehow burdened by liberal ideas, began to focus on how they could use the circulations and liberal freedom for their own means. This resulted in an effort to set

the conditions under which the circulations and freedom were exercised by specification of what was 'normal'; so the normal conditions and normal outcomes of the circulations were determined. However, this type of normality was not applied to individuals primarily, as was the disciplinary mechanism, but to the overall population. Furthermore, Foucault explains the link between normality and statistics with the case of adopting new measures (vaccination and inoculation) against epidemic of diseases. Adopting of an inoculation meant monitoring the whole population and monitoring an epidemic – this meant controlling how people are developing, who is infected and who is not, how high the mortality rate is, and so on. Statistics, for example, on how high the mortality of children who live in cities is, were created from these findings. Based on these partial statistics, the generally normal mortality then crystallized as the goal to which governance should direct its steps. This setting of normality has two main advantages – normality is connected with a reflected reality, therefore it is not created artificially, and it has a greater legitimacy in a liberal system (Foucault, 2007: 57-63). Foucault then calls governance based on supervision of the population and the monitoring of statistics, which at some point relates to human naturalness, as 'biopolitics.' Biopolitics ensures easy forming of the population to a desired result; moreover, statistics have revealed that there is a broad variety of interdependencies between social phenomena. For example, to support the export of goods means also to support an economic growth and rise of welfare through the creating of working positions, but it also means growth of the population through this increasing welfare. Similar interdependencies are very potent instruments for exercising power since they make it possible to camouflage a broad variety of the political power's intentions behind the effort to improve a social situation (or rather of social statistics) (Foucault, 2007: 72; Foucault, 2003: 243-245).

While a population could be very easily formed and manipulated thanks to the (biopolitical) complexity of the whole system of governance, individuals are, in this light, unreliable because of the liberal ideas regarding individual freedom. Therefore, it is necessary to invent another mechanism that would allow the application of the security apparatus (and statistical normality) also on the individuals. At this point, we return to Bentham's basic utilitarian idea that every individual is determined by the efforts to satisfy his or her desires at all costs. In the notion of the security apparatus, this naturalness of all individuals can be used for means of controlling and directing them. Political power, then, can set and support the 'good' (desirable, plausible,

normal) human desires and the 'bad' (abnormal, deviant, undesirable) ones and, through this mechanism, it can reliably influence the individuals too (Foucault, 2007: 71-73). Political power exercised in this manner is obviously a very elegant method since it leaves the individuals to make their own decisions and, yet, it determines the possible choices and often even the sole decision made by these individuals. Even more importantly, political power furthermore determines the basic characteristics of an environment where the individuals grow up and live. This kind of directing and controlling is very effective since the individuals often cannot reflect it, and they take it as being natural and free (for similar, albeit not so deep, studies of illiberal practices of the Western liberal governments see for example Lukes, 2005 or Bachrach, Baratz, 1967).


Everything that we have written up to the present in this chapter is pointing to the emergence of a specific type of governance, which Foucault calls 'governmentality.' Governmentality is a very flexible instrument for governance since it is a combination of discipline and security apparatuses. The security apparatus allows governmentality to govern a population in a non-repressive way in accordance with the politico-economically and statistically constructed normality. In addition, the security apparatus allows for the same method of governance above individuals through the establishment of good and bad desires. The disciplinary apparatus then appears when there is an individual (or group of individuals) who escapes from the influence of governmentality. These people are taken out of the population, which is considered to be the normal environment, normalized by the disciplinary apparatus, and then returned back to the population. As it is obvious, governmentality associates institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics as instruments that can be used for exercising of power. Foucault (2007: 108-109) himself defines governmentality in the following manner:

'By this word 'governmentality' I mean three things. First, by 'governmentality' I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. Second, by 'governmentality' I understand the tendency, the line of force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has constantly led towards the pre-eminence over all other types of power – sovereignty, discipline,

and so on—of the type of power that we can call ‘government’ and which has led to the development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses (*appareils*) on the one hand, [and, on the other] to the development of a series of knowledges (*savoirs*). Finally, by ‘governmentality’ I think we should understand the process, or rather, the result of process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually ‘governementalized.’”

To give an example of such governmental tactics, calculations, analyses and so, a government can use the market to define the general view of the concept of

Figure 2



Source: author

freedom in society; and this supporting of the market ensures that only some type of ideas and activities could be enforced in society (obviously only profitable ones) (see

for example Marcuse, 2007). In addition, a government can support specific social goals as desirable (for example, economic activities and money accumulation) through its policies. In this light, maybe the most promoted desirable social goal is consumerism in contemporary Western societies. Consumerism has then a great influence on citizens depriving them of critical abilities (see for example Barber, 2007 or Bauman, 2007). Government can furthermore even, with the help of supporting specific fields of knowledge (for example technical ones), stimulate an awareness that it is desirable for young people to study technical disciplines because they will be subsequently successful in the market. Nevertheless, the goal of political elites is rather to weaken potential critique which could come with much more greater probability from people who are in contact with the social sciences. Political power can also utilize the tactics of discrediting potentially 'dangerous' individuals and groups by giving them the label of deviant (see Becker, 1966). There are a myriad of similar strategies and unfortunately there is not room here to discuss them all (it is rather necessary to analyze a specific case). Moreover, ideologies also play an important role since they influence the selection of norms and values, which are regarded as normal, as well as used tactics. Therefore, neoliberal political power uses the tactics of occlusion of the (unsuccessful) individuals to legitimize the system, while liberally egalitarian political power pursues rather the inclusion of individuals. However, despite the limited analysis of concrete governing due to the limited space for it in this thesis, it is obvious how powerful and flexible the utilitarian governance connected with governmentality actually is. We can say that this style of governance is a game whose goal is to gain consent of citizens with the help of virtually any instrument. In this regard, political power can utilize even entirely opposite ideas and values; if they are used in some strategic and tactical manner (for example, in setting what is normal), this construction can be very powerful and potent.

For a better understanding of the whole concept, see figure 2, where the modified version of the utilitarian theory of governance (supplemented by governmentality) is depicted. It should be entirely evident that utilitarianism in connection with representative democracy has set and institutionalized the basics of modern governance while governmentality constitutes a functional mechanism of that governance.

Contemporary China – in transition?

Analyzing the issue of China's political and social transformation has nowadays become some sort of ever present phenomenon as China has gradually gained an important role in world's economy and therefore also in international relations. The authors of many analyses are trying to characterize contemporary Chinese social and political situation and to predict the fate of the transformation. The main question researched in the papers corresponds with the heading of this chapter very often – is China heading towards a transition to liberal democracy? Out of these analyses, the conclusions are somehow binary, China is either on the road to adopting the liberal democracy (see for example Jianjun, 2008; Gabriel, 2006; Feng, 2004; Zhengxu, 2007) or remains an authoritarian regime, albeit with some minor changes (see for example Pearson, 2011; Redding, Witt, 2007; Wright, 2011; Hsieh, 2003). Some of the analyses are more complex as their authors point out a possibility that China will not be the 'old' authoritarian system after the transformation and it will not be liberal democracy either (for example Chow, 2010; Bramall, 2009). Some of the authors focus on "externalities" of transformations, such as vacuum regarding the legitimization of the system and its norms (Jiang, 2011; Bell, 2006; Zhengxu, 2011; Xiaoqin, 2003). As we can see from this micro listing, conceptualizing the course of contemporary China is rather complicated task. Nevertheless, we will try to construct the image of contemporary China as a combination of mentioned (and also other) views in order to show that China has selectively adopted some Western mechanism to fulfill its hegemonic tendencies and to (partially) silence some of the regime's critiques. Among these mechanisms, it is the utilitarian concept of governance and at least some governmental techniques in the first place. With the help of these two flexible concepts China can be "westernized" and yet it can keep some of the authoritarian traits.

Generally, it is commonly accepted that it was the year of 1978 and the figure of Deng Xiaoping that were the key aspects of China's leaving of Maoism and adopting a more favorable attitude towards the Western economic liberation. Deng, as Chinese vice-premier, had recognized that China needed some new impulse for its pushing forward and preventing of stagnation that was caused by the old regime (Xiaoqin, 2003: 180). The stagnation could be characterized as a decline of communism as the principal ideology and need of ensuring wellbeing to Chinese

people (Feng, 2004: 244; Redding, Witt, 2007: 6-7). Of course, the move could be also interpreted as deliberate act from the political elites who had recognized that China started to transform and that it would be necessary to take some measures to keep an opportunity to exercise power. In any case, the economic and technological modernization, regarded as the least harmful for stability of Chinese society, took place in China (Xu, 2004: 184). Probably the main outcome of the modernization was adopting the concept of market economy which replaced central planned economy. The transition was deeply controlled and directed (and, in fact, it still is) by political power that wanted to stay in touch with everything. This caused very steady change of Chinese economy characterized at the first glance by dual-track system which consisted in combination of a classic five-year plan and the market for allocation of the outcomes. In this phase, all of the relevant firms were still in state ownership and they were fulfilling the plan (Naughton, 2007: 92). In the next phase (in 1990's), the planning was abolished in economic terms but remained as a mechanism for implementing policies in more general and broad way. That also meant a proliferation of non-state owned firms and newly also corporations that have breached the national borders (Naughton, 2007: 101). But more importantly, as puts in Jianjun Zhang (2008: 4), the market logic has expanded to every social field enforcing the creation of the utilitarian system we have discussed above. The expansion was supported also by Chinese intellectuals who in 1990's regarded liberalism primarily as an economic doctrine, not political (Feng, 2004: 230). The next important events for keeping set course in China were the opening Chinese market to the world and China's entering to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The market logic in China could be then also supported by foreign capital and investments and the possibility of abolishing the market economy was minimized (Naughton, 2007: 104-105; 388). In praxis, the privatization took place and private enterprises have been gradually given recognition and legitimacy. The number of private firms has been rising and in 2000 there were already more private firms than enterprises owned by the state. Because of this steep increase, the former Chinese Prime Minister Jiang Zemin officially recognized entrepreneurs (and other social positions connected with the market) as social class that plays an important role in Chinese society and that should have not been exposed to discrimination (Feng, 2004: 247; Naughton, 2007: 106).

In these days, Chinese political power often declares that it is building the market economy with Chinese characteristics. This suggests that the political elites,

as puts in Xiaoqin Guo (2003: 182-183), have clearly abandoned Maoism as a central point for regime legitimization. Feng Chongyi (2004: 245) even argues that Chinese communist party has ideologically transformed into social-democratic or liberal party. Out of these two options, the liberal one makes perhaps more sense if we take into consideration the voices that pointing out that contemporary Chinese economic and social system is basically the same as the British one in 19th century. China is regarded as an 'assembly workshop of the world', producing most of the mid- and low-quality products, adapting to the needs of the market, and using low-cost labor (Redding, Witt, 2007: 122). As for the last point, Satyananda Gabriel (2006: 65-67) states that the working conditions in China often include 10-16 working hours in six days a week, sometimes even 18 hours and seven days a week. The situation is furthermore worsened by the fact that there is no real pressure on firms to make the conditions better since there are plenty of people who are willing to work under the mentioned poor conditions (Gabriel, 2006: 54). The poor conditions do not apply only to workers but also to products produced with quality problems that are often connected with the health issues (mainly with the using of forbidden materials) (Yasheng, 2008: 290). Nevertheless, Chinese government tolerates and sometimes supports these conditions since they are very important for the Chinese power-economic ambitions. Thanks to cheap and very effective labor, China can play the role of world's factory and it can attract the foreign investors who are helping with a technological modernization (Gabriel, 2006: 49; Naughton, 2007: 410). In this light, according to Barry Naughton (2007: 398), Chinese economy is currently the largest and most dynamical market in the world and, according to Gordon Redding and Michel Witt (2007: 227), it can maintain this position in the future.

Now, let us have a look on the consequences of China's marketization and privatization. Looking on contemporary economic situation, we can see that Chinese economy is privatized in a great extent. In fact, private firms forms the majority of Chinese economic subjects although the percentage expression is sometimes very misleading as the state still plays a significant role in a lot of strategically important firms (Redding, Witt, 2007: 107; Yasheng, 2008: 277). In this light, Margaret Pearson (2011: 28-29) argues that Chinese economics has three tiers – the strategically vital enterprises where the state has the main decision right; the important firms that are directed by the state but private managers too; and the last group is constituted by vast number of small companies that are either private or state. Redding and Witt

(2007: 81-82) offer another, more general, division of Chinese economy into the state owned sector, the local sector, and the private sector. In any case, the link between the state and private sector, in some extent typical for every society, is emerging, however in China with some specific issues. Among the aspects, typical for Western societies, belong for instance lobbying, corruption, and generally a greater influence of economic actors on political ones. As shows Scott Kennedy (2011: 116), the decision making of China's politicians is quite deeply influenced by economic elites and important economic actors. In some cases, as point Redding and Witt (2007: 119), the politicians were even directly co-opted into the economic interests. Moreover, Yasheng (2008: 285) emphasizes the emerging of the phenomenon of corruption of high politicians and other high government officials, typical for Western systems. This can be somehow surprising as we can rather meet with referring to a significant influence (or even a directive approach) of the political sphere (for instance Pearson, 2011).

The success of Chinese industry in lobbying lies in careful strategic approach to the whole issue of pushing through its interests. Similarly as the Western firms, also Chinese ones are trying to influence the institutions that have the decision right instead of lobbying the members of communist party. The membership and ideological affiliation are therefore practically suspended and the only what matters is (mainly economic) interest on both sides (Kennedy, 2011: 118-119). In this light, the companies often offer a "win-win" strategy which consists in mutual benefits resulting from corresponding decision. However, sometimes the companies apply approach that is more aggressive and try to push through a point that is in contradiction with general interests of political elites (Kennedy, 2011: 121). This means that the Chinese companies, and the industry in general, have very strong position which is comparable to the position of the Western industries in their societies. Also, it means that the decision process is very similar the western one and that the relation between the political and economic sphere is rather reciprocal, not biased on the one or the other side. Jianjun (2008: 12) conveys David Wank's specification of this relation as symbiotic clientelism since the government and businessmen mutually support each other. Businessmen need favors from the government in form of licenses, permissions, tax advantages, protection, and so, and, on the other hand, the government needs the stimulation of economy from businessmen in order to legitimize its governance. This link moreover points on some paradoxical situation,

asserted by Gabriel (2006: 153), which rest in dependence of the communist party and its governance on an economic growth and adopting capitalistic reforms, thus on economic actors and their effort.

Let us turn to the specific Chinese issues connected with the link between the political and economic sphere. Based on the marketization and mentioned greater influence of economic actors on the political sphere, the strong middle class should have arisen and it should have led the democratization process (Jianjun, 2008: 5). However, as it is obvious from the above, it has not (yet) happened since, as stress Kellee Tsai (2011: 139-140), the economic elites and even members middle class do not automatically support democratization in the sense of Western liberal democracy. In fact, they support the option which is at most favorable towards them, and if their wellbeing is dependent on the symbiosis we mentioned above, they will not breach it and they will rather support the current conditions. Thus, asserting of the democratization must be somehow advantageous for both actors. Exactly the same situation prevails in contemporary China. As many authors (for instance Jianjun, 2008: 12; Tsai, 2011: 149; Xiaoqin, 2003: 160-161) emphasize the Chinese economic elites and the middle class do not want to change current system as it brings a profit, or wellbeing respectively, to them. Out of this situation, the weakest actor is civil society that is directed by interests of the political and economic elites. Even the members of middle class who are materially relatively secured do not commit some protest action or make an effort to change the things. They simply fear of losing their positions. Furthermore, the symbiosis between the political and economic elites fosters, as argues Jianjun (2008: 235), current Chinese conditions and it is actually threatening to the process liberalization.

However, let us discuss the situation about civil society more thoroughly. As points Edward Gu (2004: 30-32), formally, there are quite favorable conditions for public expression of opinion in China since this right is embedded in the constitution. But in praxis, the set conditions (requiring of registering social organizations and subsequent control of the registered ones) are, on the other hand, unfavorable towards the public actions. Despite the fact, the number of non-government organizations whose personnel is not under a direct control of officials (they only

control acting of such organizations) is increasing.³ Nevertheless, according to Gu (2004: 39) the increase is rather unintentional as the intellectual elites are trying to emancipate from the influence of the state, they do not intentionally pursue some change. Quite similar situation predominates in a sphere of journalism. Looking on the issue of China's modernization, journalists played an important role in replacing the planned economy with the market (Yuezhi, 2004: 45). However, after the adoption of the market, media gradually started to lose its position as a critical element which reflects the situation in China and supports changes. On the contrary, the press uncritically favored marketization and privatization without stressing out mentioned corruption, clientelism, and the other illegal activities coming with marketization (Yuezhi, 2004: 47). Despite the fact, the situation could get better with commercialization of media and communication sphere since it could have ensured the creation of new independent and critical newspapers. But such media started to be controlled by the market (and the economic elites in cooperation with the political ones) so, in general, journalists became maybe the most co-opted intellectual group in China as they are promoting the interests of politician as well as businessmen (Yuezhi, 2004: 50-51). The main interest of both actors promoted by media is fostering of consumerism or consumer lifestyle and the identity of businessman as an example suitable for following by the other people. Besides that, getting rich is being often promoted as a life-goal and ideal for everyone and rich people are regarded with great respect (Redding, Witt, 2007: 130). In this light, media are a vital instrument for supporting consumerization; for example, the image and identity of a common Chinese as a loyal worker building socialism was replaced by the image of Chinese as a successful businessman wearing a "Western" suit, talking to a cell phone, and driving a brand new car. The consumerist discourse is therefore blending with general consciousness and becoming one of main social aspects (Gabriel, 2006: 55). Nevertheless, there are media and journalists who are trying to fulfill a critical role and point out some social problems. However, they do not an insufficiently strong position within the society to change the things and blame high positioned politicians or businessmen. Usually, they only make visible cases connected with lower officials or small businessmen (Yuezhi, 2004: 54, 58-59). Yet generally, the role

³ It is worth mentioning of GONGO phenomenon that has emerged in China. GONGO's are non-governmental organizations whose personnel are at least partially chosen by officials though (Gu, 2004: 32).

of media and especially of journalists is very conform and uncritical as the small media are powerless and the big ones are supported by the foreign media conglomerates (Yuenzhi, 2004: 67).

Let us have a look on attitudes of Chinese citizens now. We can say that they act in accordance with the above discussed consumerist life-style. As point Zhengxu Wang (2007: 567, 569) and Jie Chen and Chunlong Lu (2011: 707), Chinese citizens support democracy as suitable political system capable of resolving contemporary social problems in China. They are favorable towards the individual rights protection, especially of the rights to work, to education, to free information, to travel abroad, and to have some privacy. The majority of Chinese also supports the China's transition and overall changes since Chinese believe that their society and country have become more democratic. But if we look on the opinions regarding the political sphere (and political rights) we will realize that Chinese' idea about democracy is very different from the Western one. The ordinary Western social and political mechanisms, such as pluralism of opinions or the political process based on conflict and confrontation, are not accepted very well and, in fact, the majority quite strongly rejects these principles. The main concern lies in potential instability, in breaching the social harmony, and in erosion of the role of the central authority that should be the most significant actor in China's public space. Moreover, Chinese also denounce public involvement to the decision-making process (Jie, Chunlong, 2011: 708-710; Zhengxu, 2007: 568-571). The same applies also on elections – the majority sees the competition of political parties as non-desirable (yet paradoxically sees no problem in competition of individual politicians) (Jie, Chunlong, 2011: 710). Therefore, as puts it John Fuh-sheng Hsieh (2003: 378), Chinese even do not mind that communist party manipulates the parliament elections and that there is no real alternative option. Besides the consumerism and focusing of Chinese on keeping of their wellbeing, there is also another reason, as stress Zhengxu (2007: 578), Hsieh (2003: 381), and Redding and Witt (2007: 86) why China's people take their passive role (which, actually perfectly fits to the utilitarian model), and that is Confucian tradition.

Confucian thoughts (or to some extent ideology) are traditional and typical for whole Asia and, of course, especially for China where the doctrine originate. Yet, Confucianism was abandoned during adopting Maoism as a new type of social rationality, to be rediscovered again after the transformations we have mentioned. This rediscovering is due to the China's social rationality crisis after the beginning of

Deng's reforms (and condemning the rationality of Maoism) and in the same time due to the general disinclination to the Western liberal system. According to Cong Riyun (2009: 831, 834, 837), the three new schools of thought have appeared in this light: the new-left, nationalist, and Confucian. Followers of the new-left are trying to reverse the reforms, nationalist are radically anti-liberal (that is, against Western liberalism), but we will focus on Confucianism as maybe the strongest of the mentioned lines of thinking. The Confucian ideas are embraced by government and the political elites (this will be obvious from the document analysis) but they are not only rhetorically promoting Confucian values but also embracing some practical Confucian mechanism, which are not so visible. As puts it Daniel Bell (2006: 155), communist party uses Confucian mechanism of raising the high officials through the university studies and competitive exams required for holding a public position. In other words, the bureaucratic system and its smooth functioning are dependent on the Confucian system of professional and effective officials who earn their position by learning and accomplishing exams (Xiaoqin, 2003: 156). However, Confucianism experiences also a revival in the sense of a value theory. Confucian ideas and values are taught at the universities, media are giving space to Confucian scholars, and there are either new or re-edited books about Confucianism that are selling well (Ruichang, 2011: 33). But Jiang Qing (2011: 17) argues that the restoration of Confucianism is insufficient because there is a specific trend to link it with the Western liberal doctrine and form neo-Confucianism as a successive doctrine. Problem lies in the fact that neo-Confucianism does not have any practical concepts how to, for example, create socio-political institutions based on Confucian thoughts. Thus, there is a problem with a weak spreading and cultivating of the Confucian values and with weak legitimacy of the political system based on Confucianism (Jiang, 2011: 18). For these reasons, Jiang proposes adopting a tri-cameral parliamentary structure, ensuring the proper legitimacy for the system. Each house should represent one type of legitimacy; while there is classic legitimacy derived from people, the other two houses represent historical (path-dependency) legitimacy and legitimacy derived from Confucian ideas. None of the houses should possess a greater power than the other and decisions should be made by a broad and general consensus between the houses (Jiang, 2011: 25; Bell, 2011: 143-144).

We will not continue in this discussion as it is not the main goal of this paper and the purpose why we have been looking into the issue of Confucianism has been

already shown. As a matter of fact, Confucianism is something that is completely new in the utilitarian model of governance and governmentality. Although Jiang's concept could pose a quite serious problem to the utilitarian governance (actually, the government would just make a greater effort to adapt), a tri-cameral parliament is rather marginal project. On the contrary, Confucian values are being used by the political elites to foster contemporary situation (and utilitarian governance and governmentality). Especially Confucian ideas to uncritically respect the authority and keep harmonious society help to the political elites in a great extent to keep division of the roles in society according to the utilitarian model.

The analysis of the government's documents

If we look on the documents in more general way, we will realize that without the affiliation we would not be able recognize if they belong to China since the documents are written in 'Western' way. The content of the documents is mostly dedicated to three main topics: the economic growth (including adopting the basic social security), the increasing of the rate of consumerism (including the vital role of the Internet and electronic transactions), and the economic transformation (including China's opening up to the world and modernization). Furthermore, the content of every document is formed also by statistics, statistical data, and political economy's implication in great extent; that is typical for Western governance based on improving of the statistics, in other words on biopolitics. Beside these topic that are, as we will see, vital for our analysis, we will also look on how Chinese officials and institutions define China as a political system. This is important because it will tell us to what extent China has adopted the utilitarian model and governmentality. The three mentioned topic will then tell us if the Chinese government uses governmentality to exercise power and to make legitimacy.

Let us start with the defining of a political system. Officially, China is defined in the documents as the people's democratic dictatorship where the people have the main part of the governance and, on the other hand, political power is there for fulfilling the interests of the people. The one of key aspects of this system is democratic centralism which lies in gathering of people's demands that are then reflected by political power (The State Council, 2005a). Thus, we can say that it is basically a definition of the classic Western representative political system. What is different, however, is the constitution of political power. Unlike in the West, where is

usually a pluralistic competition of political parties, in China there is so called multi-party system under the leadership of the Chinese communist party. This system is characteristic by a privileged position of communist party, determined by historical development and the people, and consultative position of another eight political parties. In praxis, any of the parties can initiate the decision-making process (adopting law or policy) but the last word about adopting of a law or policy in question has the communist party. The parties also supervise and control each other in order to improve the governance (The State Council, 2007). Although the decision-process itself is called as scientific (that is, in fact, some reminiscence of Marxism-Leninism whose main trait was a scientific quality), description of it shows that it is mere Western mechanism based on a consequentiality and consultations with the experts (The State Council, 2005a).

Chinese government declares that it has partially inspired from the West and idea of democracy in construing this system. The concept of democracy is, at least rhetorically, generally highly regarded in all the documents; there is, for instance, a statement that democracy is the goal of all human societies in *Building of Political Democracy in China* (The State Council, 2005a). Another glorification of democracy is in *China's Political Party System* where is a statement that without democracy it could not be possible to build China as it is nowadays (The State Council, 2007). At least partial bond between China and Western democratic notion can be also documented by Chinese stressing of adherence to the concept of human rights. According to Chinese institutions, the human rights are important for building harmonious society and for foreign cooperation (China is closely cooperating with the OSN and the OHCHR on the issue of human rights) (The State Council, 2010a). However, Chinese political power refuses the co-optation of the Western democratic system as a whole, emphasizing the building of socialistic democracy with Chinese characteristics. These characteristics are ideologically based on Marxism-Leninism, Mao's thoughts, and Deng's modernist visions; practically then, on economic transformations (modernization), the market logic, and a harmonious and stable notion of society (the government stresses the Confucian values but does not call them as Confucian) (The State Council, 2011). From the contemporary optics, Chinese government has committed to guiding and controlling of a non-public sector's development (taken together with leading role of the communist party in society, it means that the political sphere defines the form of the socio-economic

sphere), enforcing the law, and securing of human rights (The State Council, 2008). Nevertheless, contemporary main goal for Chinese governments should be maintaining of economic development and transformations (The State Council, 2007). Actually, this is very usual goal of the most of Western governments that are often talking about increasing of economic growth. There are some phenomena perceived as problems by Chinese political power that are coming with the Westernization though. The most striking is probably the high corruption (that is, of high officials) which is Chinese government aware of and takes some precautions against it (The State Council, 2010b). The second 'Western' problem is disrespecting of intellectual property and the Chinese political elites are trying very hard to eradicate this issue. Nevertheless, we can also understand the efforts as a mean for making contacts with foreign countries and fostering cooperation with them (The State Council, 2005b).

To sum up, it is obvious that China adopted the utilitarian model of governance splitting the society into the political and socio-economic spheres and creating the specific roles along with it. As it is mentioned above, the political sphere is responsible for governing utilizing the scientific decision-making process (in fact, the utilitarian) for making laws and policies. The socio-economic sphere elects the deputies (and it is not so important that elections are not free or competitive) and has consultative right. Nevertheless, we have also seen in the preceding chapter that economic elites who are trying to influence the political sphere breach these roles. Thus, adopted utilitarian model is transforming and adopting some mechanism of governmentality (again, in the preceding chapter, we have been stressing out an enforcement of the market logic, consumerism, and some Confucian ideas). This will be even more obvious in the next section, where we will discuss economic activity as the main role of citizens and concrete using of governmentality by political power to preserve contemporary system.

Regarding the first issue – the economic growth –, it is the first thing that is mentioned by Chinese prime ministers in annual reports on government. The economic growth and successful economic transformations are always framed as huge successes achieved by the government (Wen, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012; Zhu, 2003). In 2003, Zhu Rongji (2003) pointed out that his government achieved improving of the standard of living and mentioned a necessity to create wide social security, such as pensions and medical insurances for everyone, and maintain general rate of people's wellbeing. Wen (2010, 2012) after him already introduces

nationwide system of social security as a one of the government's achievement. Nevertheless, people's wellbeing is also understood as an opportunity to work so Wen (2010) stresses also increasing of employment as the main instrument for making welfare. In this light, the flexible labor market, personal entrepreneurship, and privatization are often described as 'remedies' for problems connected with unemployment (Zhu, 2003; Wen, 2007, 2010; The State Council, 2002). The ensuring of wellbeing can be therefore understood rather as promoting and ensuring of the functional market logic, as indirectly says Wen (2011). The promotion of the market logic is even more obvious in specific language used in connection with the problem of employment. People who are potential workforce are called as 'human resources' (this designation is common in the contemporary West) and these human resources should be educated in a compliance with the market and its needs. Thus, the market should be the main actor in allocating human resources (The State Council, 2010d; The State Council, 2002). Beside the employment, the government should also support the development of technologies and corresponding education as a vital instrument for increasing of wellbeing (Zhu, 2003; Wen, 2010, 2011). Supporting of technology research should be, according to Wen (2012), employed in correspondence with social development. Thus, the talented citizens should pursue technical education and get through in science instead, for instance, studying social sciences. On the other hand, the wellbeing is often limited by emphasizing the social harmony and stability (Zhu, 2003; Wen, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012). Yet again and in the same time, the increasing of wellbeing and economic efficiency should be the main and base goal for every Chinese government (Zhu, 2003; Wen, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012).

The second issue, consumerism, is related to the wellbeing as Chinese could hardly consume without some accumulated welfare. Again, the necessity to support consumerism and to increase the rate of consumerism is present in every analyzed report (Zhu, 2003; Wen, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012). Quite new aspect regarding consumerism was introduced by Wen (2011) in 2011 when he appealed on development of the Internet consumerism (shopping and making payments through the Internet). This was one of the reasons why Chinese government started to support the introduction of the Internet. Since then, the usage of e-commerce has increased and a general rate of consumerism too. Beside this, the Internet should play the role of a source of information not only for citizens but also for political and

economic elites who can share their knowledge and problems with elites in other states and, thus, more easily keep their position and exercising power. As for citizens, they can supervise the government and complain about its bad work through the Internet. Therefore, citizens can participate on decision-making process more easily and make the work of government better. Moreover, the Internet is plausible tool for fostering the process of modernization that is of the main goal of the Chinese government. However, the Internet pose a risk for political power as it offers alternative sources of information and critical views on a broad spectrum of social issues. Because of this, the Chinese government adopted a censorship of the Internet, stressing that the Internet should help to fulfill goals discussed above. Yet, maybe more important and effective instrument of regulating of the Internet is specific infra-penalty that the government has adopted through the Internet Society of China (ISC). ISC has published a series of self-regulation norms (for example, about non-distribution of pornography, vulgarities, viruses and so) and it is constantly monitoring the Internet for discovering the trespassers. The majority of Chinese do not go against the norms due to the fear of resultant punishment so they regulate the Internet by themselves (The State Council, 2010c). Keeping the high rate of consumerism is very important for Chinese (as well as for any Western) governments since it is a good and vital tool for governance legitimacy. This importance can be documented by an effort of Chinese government to keep prices low so that some minimal rate of consumerism is accessible for middle- and low-income people. Moreover, the government is eager to intervene to the market (otherwise taken as a desirable phenomenon) in order to ensure an economic growth and consumerism for a broad mass of people (Wen, 2011, 2012).

The economic transformation as the last often mentioned problem in the reports is connected mainly with promoting the market logic as the key instrument for allocation and increasing of welfare and resources (Wen, 2010, 2012). In this light, the fostering of the market as the main regulation mechanism has become the vital issue of Chinese governments (Zhu, 2003; Wen, 2007). Moreover, the market behavior should be socially standardized and lobbying should be promoted as a medium for communication between the government and interest groups (The State Council, 2000). To achieve this, Zhu (2003) suggested separating the political and economic sphere by supporting non-state firms and personal entrepreneurship. While we have seen that it is not true in praxis, the supporting of privatization and private

firms has become one of key goals of Chinese government. Therefore, the supporting non-state firms, private investments, and modernization are regularly among the main goals of the governments (Wen, 2010, 2011, 2012). However, Wen (2011) rightly recognized that China could not develop further without opening up to the world and without receiving foreign investments. For that reason, the Chinese government took for success acceptance to the WTO (Zhu, 2003; Wen, 2007). But while in 2003 Zhu (2003) quite modestly appealed for attracting of the foreign investments, Wen (2012) in 2012 (although he had spoken similarly as Zhu in 2011) already wanted to establish close technological cooperation with abroad and he even encouraged the Chinese firms to expand abroad and become global. China then gradually started to take over the Western economic way how to hegemonize other countries.

As we have seen, the Chinese government deliberately supports the economically defined role of citizens, exactly in correspondence with the utilitarian concept. Citizens are encouraged to be economically active, especially in pursuing personal entrepreneurship, or at least in adapting to the needs of the market as so-called human resources. The economic activity should ensure wellbeing to citizens but also it is increasing the welfare of the China. Wellbeing is then crucial in the political elites' promoting of consumerism that should suppress the critical voices and thinking. The Critical stances are furthermore suppressed by supporting of the market logic and behavior since it gives citizens economic freedom that fits perfectly into contemporary Chinese situation (and, in fact, it is often sufficient in the West too).

Final remarks

Chinese government and also society have completely taken their roles in the fashion of the utilitarian logic. Chinese government is (as it is clearly seem from the analysis of the government documents) responsible for making the conditions for citizens who are responsible for making their and also social wellbeing. Moreover, the government (in cooperation with the economic elites) uses governmentality for supporting these roles. As stress Gabriel (2006: 56), consumerism is promoted by the government through the media as one of the main social aspects, ensuring a non-critical stance of Chinese people who take hard work and spending money as something which given and natural. Chinese public therefore does not have an interest to change anything because it has absorbed the role and responsibility for

the making of welfare (Xiaoqin, 2003: 160). On the other hand, Chinese government poses itself as a body responsible for leading China and Chinese society to a greater public good. This government's position is caused by the reforms which started in 1970's since the political elites had realized that reforms are necessary for them to keep opportunity to exercise power. Pearson (2011: 41) points out that the political elites have made use of these transformations for gaining a new legitimacy that enabled them exercising of power. In this light, we can also understand the co-optation of economic elites into the political sphere as a governmental move that could have ensured good controllability of the newly emerging economic actors who gained opportunity to exercise power (Tsai, 2011: 154). This position and role of the political elites is so strong that they will henceforward direct the China's changing in the future (Jianjun, 2008: 233; Xiaoqin, 2003: 180). However, as imply Redding and Witt (2007: 233), the goal of the direction does not have to be necessarily the concept of liberal democracy.

As we have seen, China is adopting some Western mechanism but only very selectively and for the purpose of avoiding system's stagnation as well as keeping an opportunity of the political elites to exercise power. The utilitarian model of governance supplemented with governmentality poses a great instrument for such strategic modernization. It allows China to modernize in the Western style (and cooperate with the West due to the same economic interests) and yet to keep the power relations practically the same as before. At the same time, adopting of both concepts at least partially silenced the critics of Chinese regime. There are, however, potential problems which can break the utilitarian model and governmentality in Chinese conditions. These problems are especially Confucian values and ideas and democratic dictatorship (whose main characteristics are the leading role of communist party and the absence of competitive elections). Yet, there is, on the other hand, the flexibility of the both concepts and especially Governmentality ensures absorption of these problems into the system. The government can use, for example, the mechanism of construing the desirable social goals (for instance, it is desirable to have a harmonious society) or it can use the Confucian idea of respecting the authorities for legitimizing the leading role of the communist party. Of course, there are still quite strong repressions against the political and social dissent that we have not been discussing (see for example Stern, Hassid, 2012 or Cai, 2008). These repressions are, however, rather a specific residuum of the past and they are

compatible with the utilitarian model which is, as we have written, on the decline in the way of exercising of power and it supplemented by governmentality. It could be expected then that the repressions will be put into a background and governmental governance will be used instead.

Thus, we can see that China is a specific hybrid regime consisting of Western political and social mechanisms (the utilitarian governance and governmentality), Confucian ideas and values, and mechanisms from old Maoist regime (democratic dictatorship). As we have written, these seemingly contradictory ideas and values can exist together and constitute a construct that can be used for gaining citizens' consent and for preserving of the system. If the Chinese political power uses this construct tactically and deliberately, that is, if it emphasizes and sidelines the specific norms, ideas, and values according to the situation, it can gain consent of citizens without any serious dissent. This combination then makes China very stable, yet powerful, and it is unrealistic that China will change in the near future.

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