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Dataset on Confidence-Building Measures: User's Manual

Contents of the dataset download package:

- CBM-Dataset_Manual.pdf (this document)
- CBM-Dataset_1.0.dta (Dataset, STATA 10.1 format)
- CBM-Dataset_Codetable_1.0.xls (coding table for all CBMs in this dataset with web addresses of source documents)

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Introduction to the CBM Dataset

The CBM Dataset represents the result of an original data collection / generation effort on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) conducted at the Institute of Political Science at the Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen in the years from 2007 to 2009.[1] Confidence Building Measures are international agreements in the form of bilateral or multilateral treaties or organizational membership. CBM treaties are most often concluded between states that have a history of mutual antagonism (actual or

[1] Funding for this project was provided by a generous grant by the German Research Foundation (DFG).

former rivalries) and are established to prevent future escalation of violent conflict. The CBM Dataset contains data on 303 treaties and international organizations that have been identified as CBMs and were coded on a five-point scale of expected effectiveness.

This document is designed to serve as a user's manual for researchers who are interested in the results of the project and wish to replicate our study or use the CBM Dataset for their own research projects. It includes a short overview of its contents and the rationale behind important conceptual and theoretical decisions, followed by a table of all variables with detailed explanations. For more details on the theory behind the CBM Dataset and a thorough descriptive exploration of its contents, please refer to the full dataset article by Bernauer, Kamis and Kasten (forthcoming)

The sample: rivalry dyads after World War 2

This dataset includes information about CBMs in dyads of states whose relations are characterized by a strategic rivalry. As empirically conflicts between rivals are more likely to escalate violently than those between non-rivals, the focus on strategic rivalries allows us to concentrate on a sample of the most violent, and thus most politically relevant, dyads (Diehl and Goertz, 2000). From a rational choice perspective, rivalry dyads create a greater need, and thus greater incentives, for confidence building measures than other dyads. Therefore, we can expect to find a higher total number of CBMs in rivalry dyads that in dyads without a strategic rivalry (ceteris paribus). Also, we assume that the strategic rivalry context will make it easier to differentiate between CBMs and other forms of international interaction. Previous research on interstate rivalries has produced two dominant operationalizations of the rivalry concept. One is the conflict density approach which relies on the number and frequency of MID occurrences to identify rivalries (Diehl and Goertz, 2000, Klein et al., 2006). The other approach is a more inductive definition of "strategic" rivalry proposed by Thompson (2001) and Colaresi et al. (2007) which relies on perceptions of threat, competition and enmity, as identified in historical documents, to identify rivalries.

There are two relevant arguments for using the strategic rivalry concept proposed by Thompson, instead of a conflict density approach. First, relying on the historical data collection efforts by Thompson limits the available data on rivalries to the period before 1999, but allows us to include cases where no force was used despite a deep mistrust of the rivals toward each other. These instances of politically managed rivalry without violent escalation are relevant and interesting cases which should not be excluded from this research effort. A dyad in which both sides expect violent conflict but none occurs may point to a successfully implemented program of CBMs. The conflict density approach would a priori exclude such a dyad from the sample and would allow no collection of data on such cases. The second advantage of Thompson's data is the smaller number of dyads it identifies as rivalries. Thompson (2001: 570) provides a list of 173 strategic rivalries since 1816, as opposed to Diehl and Goertz's 290 identified dyads (Klein et al., 2006: 340). The smaller number of dyads makes the daunting task of collecting primary sources on potential CBMs more feasible.

The aforementioned reductions in sample size leave the dataset at a total of 125 strategic rivalries since 1939. A comprehensive list of these dyads is included in Table 2 at the end of this document. The sample consists of all dyads that experienced an interstate rivalry in or after 1939. We chose the year 1939 as our start date for identification of relevant rivalry dyads, because it allowed us to include post-second world war reconciliation efforts between rivals who fought each other in the war. At the same time, the start date of 1939 excludes the different setup of the international system and its institutions before the war. The unit of observation in the CBM Dataset is the dyad-year. The 125 rivalries resulted in a total N of 5959 observed dyad years.

Confidence-Building Measures: theory and concept

The working definition of Confidence-Building Measures for this dataset conceptualizes them as *reciprocated measures that reduce the potential for military surprise*. This theoretical concept of CBMs is based on a rationalist theory of interstate war and conflict management. We use Fearon's (1995) theory of interstate war as a starting point to hypothesize possible causal effects of CBMs. The underlying question asked by Fearon is why states fight wars to settle conflicts although the same settlement could generally be reached without bearing the costs of armed conflict. To answer this question, Fearon points at three causes for war in a dyad of rational actors. First, the concept of private information refers to the fact that states cannot be certain about the intentions and capabilities of their opponent. This uncertainty can provide incentives to misrepresent one's own intentions and abilities, for example by exaggerating the capabilities of one's military. Second, commitment problems arise from the fact that agreements are easy to conclude but hard to enforce. Therefore, it may be a rationally sound decision for states to renege from agreements even though this behavior leads to disadvantageous results when compared to those stipulated by the agreement. The third problem is the indivisibility of issues, which points to the fact that states tend to conflate contentious issues, which makes it more difficult to come to a mutually satisfying agreement.

CBMs are international agreements that are designed to perform an inhibiting function for each of these causes of interstate war. To address the problem of private information, CBMs should divulge substantial information on states intentions, policies and capabilities. This information should be of some relevance for the security of the dyad, and it should be costly to send, i.e. divulging it should increase the vulnerabilities of the sender (Fearon, 1995, Fearon, 1997). Second, CBMs should help to reduce commitment problems by providing reliable information and ensuring repeated interactions in which cheating can be punished. This would reduce the security dilemma between the states and provide a means of punishment for cheating short of defection (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985, Axelrod, 1984). Finally, CBMs should disaggregate antagonistic rivalries into smaller but more substantive issues for which cooperative solutions are generally more available and easier to negotiate.

It should be noted that these three beneficial functions of CBMs are a priori independent of specific issues. The logic of their effects should be observable across different kinds of international agreements, from arms control treaties to border settlements and forums for regular information exchange. However, we added the requirement of "security relevance" for CBMs to exclude purely economic and

cultural measures.[2] For empirical and theoretical reasons, we also chose a rather narrow definition of "measures" as international agreements that are formalized in a treaty or founding document.

In summary, CBMs are security relevant formal international agreements that ameliorate the effects of private information, commitment problems and issue conflation. Based on these functions and a formal definition, we devised a five-point scale of expected CBM effectiveness. We assume that a measure will be more effective in instilling confidence the higher the costs of the signaling it entails for participating states: the costlier a signal is, the less likely it is that a state would send it without being really concerned with pacifying relations. The cheapest and least effective type of CBM is the exchange of a single piece of valuable information. Committing to or refraining from a certain action or type of action places greater constraints on policy and is a more costly signal. Verification measures and assurances of iterated interaction impose additional costs as they impede cheating and facilitate retaliation. Ultimately, placing some aspect of one's decision making capacity under shared control with the other state by means of political or military integration implies the most costly signal. This hierarchy of costs yields the following 5- point ordinal scale of expected CBM effectiveness levels:

1. A single exchange of information; e.g. declaration of peaceful intentions, border settlement.
2. A single instance of codified behavioral constraint; e.g. renunciation of a class of weapons, withdrawal of troops from border region.
3. Institutionalized/iterated exchanges of information; e.g. periodic meetings, reports to be sent after some specified trigger event(s).
4. Institutionalized/iterated behavioral constrains with verification; e.g. verifiable arms limitations, observer missions for military exercises.
5. Defense/foreign policy integration; e.g. common troops, weapons procurement, planning, collective defense.

The CBM dataset also includes information on some additional properties of CBMs that may be useful for future analyses. First, we arrange CBMs in three broad classes: bilateral treaty CBMs (BCBMs), multilateral treaty CBMs (MCBMs) and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs). We further differentiated regional MCBMs and IGOs from global ones, depending on the geographical distribution of their membership.

In sum, the coded CBMs can be distinguished along three dimensions:

- "level of expected effectiveness" (5- point ordinal scale),
- "scope of participation" (regional vs. global)
- "level of organization" (bilateral, multilateral treaty or IGO)

Given these three dimensions, our dataset provides many options for asking specific research questions by excluding or including various types of CBMs. As an example, please refer to the article "Confidence-Buílding Measures are the Missing Link in the Democratic Peace" by Hasenclever, Bernauer and Kamis (under review at "International Organization") for a fine-tuned study which uses the additional CBM properties discussed here to limit the CBM sample to bilateral treaties and regional

[2] See Bernauer, Kamis and Kasten (under review at "International Studies Quarterly") for a more in-depth discussion of the term "security relevance".

organizations. Table 1 provides some examples for the variety of agreements that have been coded as CBMs in this dataset.

Level	BCBMs	MCBMs	IGOs
1	Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (China-India, 1991)	African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights	Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia [3]
2	Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (India-Pakistan, 1992)	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials	Zangger Committee
3	Agreement on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas (USSR-USA, 1972)	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty)	East African Community
4	Agreement on the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy (Argentina-Brazil, 1991)	Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization
5	Memorandum of agreement between the Department of Defense United States of America and the Federal Ministry of Defense the Federal Republic of Germany concerning a cooperative program for extended air defense (USA-Federal Republic of Germany, 1989)	Framework Agreement between the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning measures to facilitate the restructuring and operation of the European defence industry	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Table 1: Example CBMs

Data collection and coding principles

Although most types of CBMs also required some specific coding rules and procedures, there are many basic coding principles that are constant across all types in the dataset. First, the unit of observation for all CBMs is the dyad year. Second, all CBMs consist of publically available, codified international agreements. We collected CBM data for all 125 rivalry dyads in Thompson's dataset that were active in or after 1939 from 1945 to 2006. 1945 is a suitable start year for empirical reasons, as international organizations started to exert autonomous influence for the first time after the Second World War. Pragmatically, our main source, the UN Treaty Series, only provides reliable and complete documentation of international agreements after

[3] While it may seem counter-intuitive to code an IGO as a "single exchange of information", the CICA did not meet our criteria for regular exchange of information, which required at least one meeting on the ministerial level per year. Therefore, it was relegated to a level one CBM.

1945. While Thompson's rivalry data ends in 1999, our continuing data collection let us analyze the relationship between rivalry and CBMs with a certain delay to capture efforts to build peace after the rivalry ends.

We used the date of signature to determine the starting dates of CBMs, as we assumed this to be the first clear commitment to the provisions of an agreement by a state. This was deemed sufficient expression of states' preferences and intentions. Any alternative would probably have required us to analyze each states doctrine of incorporation to see how and when measures become binding. Establishing the starting date for BCBMs is generally straightforward, as this type of agreement is usually signed by both participants at the same time. For MCBMs, the first year in which both states of a rivalry dyad were signatories of the agreement was coded as the starting year. The same principle was used for IGOs, with the additional stipulation that only full membership was considered to require any significant costly signaling. Accordingly, the first year in which both states of a dyad were full members of an IGO was coded as the starting year. For each year of joint membership in a CBM, the corresponding CBM level was entered into the dataset, while each CBM that was not active in the dyad-year of observation was coded as a missing value. In most cases, there was no need to code exit dates for CBMs. We assume that dyads where reneging occurs regularly will be characterized by a small number of CBMs in the first place. Also, our primary data source did not include any data on CBM exits. Available data on IGO exits however shows that this is a relatively rare event (Bernauer, Kamis and Kasten under review at "International Studies Quarterly"). Hence, we assume that the omission of CBM exit dates does not pose a major problem for the quality of the data.

The CBM level was coded based directly on the respective treaty text or founding document of the agreement at hand, as found in the United Nations Treaty Series online database.[4] Additional source documents that were mostly used to code IGOs were pulled from the MTOPS database, the *Inventory* of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies[5] and the SIPRI yearbooks. Each coding decision was made based on specific paragraphs / articles in the collected treaty texts, and was documented with an explicit reference to the article or provision that proved crucial. These salient articles for each CBM in the dataset and supplementary WWW links to the full treaty documents are provided in the Codetable.xls Excel sheet which is also part of the download package. To ensure inter-coder reliability, all coding decisions that required interpretation of legal documents were reviewed by a senior member of the project staff, and every questionable coding was reexamined with the original coder until a unanimous result was achieved.

The coding of IGOs required us to take into account that they can change their institutional design over time, which could imply a change in CBM levels. This was not an issue for treaty CBMs as older treaties are either superseded by new ones or new treaties constitute separate CBMs. In intergovernmental organizations, however, institutional change can require members to accept new commitments or to delegate new powers to international bodies, requiring a reassessment of the expected CBM effectiveness. Because of this, we upgraded 12 out of a total 55 IGOs to a higher level once, while one, the OSCE, was upgraded twice.

[4] http://treaties.un.org [rev 2009-11-16]
[5] http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/index.htm [rev 2009-11-16]

The differentiation of regional MCBMs and IGOs from global ones seemed to provide a useful additional dimension to our data. Empirically, most violent conflict is fought between geographically close adversaries, and most of our rivalries are between adjacent or close pairs of states. "[T]hreats, particularly political and military ones, are most strongly felt when they are at close range" (Buzan, 1991: 188). For instance, a regiment of modern tanks may be an effective threat against a neighboring state, but it isn't likely to cause much disquiet in a state which is separated from the would-be aggressor by ocean. Also, many sources of conflict, such as territorial and maritime disputes, have a strong geographical determinant (Vasquez, 1993). Accordingly, it seems plausible that regionally circumscribed CBMs could be more effective in reducing threats and building trust than CBMs of global scope. This could be due to greater regional familiarity with the issues of the dispute, the smaller number of members, or a greater similarity of the members' preferences. The coding of multilateral CBMs as global or regional was decided based on an agnostic understanding of regions without a strict definition of regional boundaries. We examined the list of signatories for perceived coherence of geographic blocks. To provide an adequate level of reliability, two coders conducted this process independently; the results were compared and disagreements were reexamined until unanimity was achieved.

All in all, the dataset identifies a total number of 303 CBMs in the period between 1945 and 2006, with N= 5959 dyad years. 187 of these CBMs are bilateral treaties; 61 are multilateral treaties, and 55 are international organizations.

Conditions of use

This dataset is free to use. Please cite as follows:

> *Bernauer, Eva, Philipp Brugger, Andreas Hasenclever, Ben Kamis 2010: Dataset on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), version 1.0, available at http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/fakultaeten/fakultaet-fuer-sozial-und-verhaltenswissenschaften/institute/institut-fuer-politikwissenschaft/lehrende/internationale-beziehungen-friedens-und-konfliktforschung-professuren-diez-und-hasenclever/forschungsprojekte/laufende-projekte-hasenclever/cbm.html*

If you find any errors, omissions or other discrepancies while using this dataset in your research, please email a description of the possible errors to Andreas Hasenclever at andreas.hasenclever[at]uni-tuebingen.de. We will examine the problem and try to correct any mistakes as soon as possible.
Finally, we would ask that you inform us about any research you publish using this data, preferably by sending a copy of your article or book chapter to Andreas Hasenclever at the aforementioned email address.

Version History

This user's manual corresponds with the first published version of the CBM dataset (1.0)

Variables and coding rules

As a general rule, all missing values are coded as a period (.) in the dataset

General and geographical variables

These general variables identify countries and dyads in the dataset as well as their geographic location. Information provided in these variables can be used to analyze regional subsets of the whole dataset.
In order to trace the relations between states in enduring rivalries across major changes in the international system, we modified the Correlates of War data on membership in the international system in such a way as to maintain uninterrupted country codes in cases of unification, separation and succession. This was a necessary step, for otherwise some enduring rivalries would have ended abruptly in 1990 / 1991 due to the exit of one of the states from the international system. Our modifications to address this issue are listed below:

- Germany (ccode: 255) was coded as the successor to the Federal Republic of Germany, while the German Democratic Republic (265) exits the system in 1990.
- The Czech Republic was coded as the successor to Czechoslowakia (315), Slowakia (317) entered the system as a new member in 1993.
- Yemen was coded as the successor to the Yemen Arab Republic (678). The Yemen People's Republic (680) was included as a new member in 1990.

Variable	**Description**
dyadc	Dyad code for a dyad of countries A and B, combination of **ccode_a** and **ccode_b**. Zeroes were added to 1-or 2-digit values of ccode_b in order to avoid confusion.
ccode_a	Country code for country A as assigned by the Correlates Of War dataset
countrya	Full name of country A
ccode_b	Country code for country B as assigned by the Correlates Of War dataset
countryb	Full name of country B
year	Year of observation

Primary CBM Variables

Each CBM was assigned its own variable, which we assigned a missing value (.) if a CBM was not active and the appropriate CBM level if it was active in the dyad-year of observation. Please refer to the Codetable.xls Excel document for a breakdown of CBM codes (BCBM_x, MCBM_x) and their corresponding formal documents.

Variable	Description
BCBM_1 - BCBM_187	Variables indicating joint membership in bilateral treaty CBMs No 1 through 187. Values 1 through 5 correspond to the 5-point ordinal scale of expected CBM effectiveness described above; missing values (.) indicate that the CBM was not active in the dyad-year of observation.
MCBM_1 - MCBM_61	Variables indicating joint membership in multilateral treaty CBMs No 1 through 61. Values 1 through 5 correspond to the 5-point ordinal scale of expected CBM effectiveness described above; missing values (.) indicate that the CBM was not active in the dyad-year of observation.
abacc - zc	Variables indicating joint membership in IGOs, abbreviations sorted alphabetically from ABACC (Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) through ZC (Zangger Committee). Values 1 through 5 correspond to the 5-point ordinal scale of expected CBM effectiveness described above; missing values (.) indicate that the CBM was not active in the dyad-year of observation.

Aggregated CBM Variables

These are aggregations of the original CBM data which were generated in the course of the research project; they are presented in different degrees of aggregation based on regional membership exclusiveness and organizational character.

Variable	Description
bcbm_no_y	Number of newly signed bilateral treaty CBMs in the year of observation.
bcbm_high_y	Highest CBM level reached in newly signed bilateral treaty CBMs in the year of observation.
bcbm_sum_y	Sum of the CBM levels of all newly signed bilateral treaty CBMs in the year of observation.
bcbm_no_s	Cumulative number of all bilateral treaty CBMs of the dyad up to and including the year of observation.
bcbm_high_s	Highest CBM level reached in all bilateral treaty CBMs up to and including the year of observation.
bcbm_sum_s	Sum of all bilateral treaty CBM levels up to and including the year of observation.
mcbm_no_s mcbm_high_s mcbm_sum_s	Variables along the lines of **bcbm_no_s**, **bcbm_high_s**, **bcbm_sum_s**, but for multilateral treaty CBMs.
org_no_s org_high_s org_sum_s	Variables along the lines of **bcbm_no_s**, **bcbm_high_s**, **bcbm_sum_s**, but for international organizations.
multi_no_s multi_high_s	Variables along the lines of **bcbm_no_s**, **bcbm_high_s**, **bcbm_sum_s**, but for all multilateral CBMs (that is, treaties and

multi_sum_s	organizations)
reg_no_s **reg_high_s** **reg_sum_s**	Variables along the lines of **bcbm_no_s**, **bcbm_high_s**, **bcbm_sum_s**, but for all regional multilateral CBMs (that is, treaties and organizations)
glob_no_s **glob_high_s** **glob_sum_s**	Variables along the lines of **bcbm_no_s**, **bcbm_high_s**, **bcbm_sum_s**, but for all global multilateral CBMs (that is, treaties and organizations)
mreg_no_s **mreg_high_s** **mreg_sum_s**	Variables along the lines of **bcbm_no_s**, **bcbm_high_s**, **bcbm_sum_s**, but for regional multilateral treaty CBMs.
oreg_no_s **oreg_high_s** **oreg_sum_s**	Variables along the lines of **bcbm_no_s**, **bcbm_high_s**, **bcbm_sum_s**, but for regional international organizations.
mglob_no_s **mglob_high_s** **mglob_sum_s**	Variables along the lines of **bcbm_no_s**, **bcbm_high_s**, **bcbm_sum_s**, but for global multilateral treaty CBMs.
oglob_no_s **oglob_high_s** **oglob_sum_s**	Variables along the lines of **bcbm_no_s**, **bcbm_high_s**, **bcbm_sum_s**, but for global international organizations.
total_no	Cumulative number of all CBMs of the dyad up to and including the year of observation.
total_high	Highest CBM level reached in all CBMs up to and including the year of observation.
total_sum	Sum of all CBM levels up to and including the year of observation.

Appendix: List of rivalry dyads

Rivalry		**First Year of Observation**
United States	Germany	1945
United States	Russia	1945
United States	Japan	1945
Honduras	El Salvador	1945
Honduras	Nicaragua	1945
Costa Rica	Panama	1945
Colombia	Venezuela	1945
Ecuador	Peru	1945
Brazil	Argentina	1945
Bolivia	Chile	1945
Chile	Argentina	1945
United Kingdom	Germany	1945
United Kingdom	Italy	1945
United Kingdom	Russia	1945

United Kingdom	Japan	1945
France	Germany	1945
France	Italy	1945
Germany	Poland	1945
Germany	Czechoslovakia	1945
Germany	Russia	1945
Poland	Czechoslovakia	1945
Poland	Russia	1945
Poland	Lithuania	1945
Hungary	Czechoslovakia	1945
Hungary	Yugoslavia	1945
Hungary	Romania	1945
Italy	Yugoslavia	1945
Italy	Russia	1945
Italy	Ethiopia	1945
Italy	Turkey	1945
Albania	Greece	1945
Yugoslavia	Greece	1945
Yugoslavia	Bulgaria	1945
Yugoslavia	Turkey	1945
Greece	Bulgaria	1945
Greece	Turkey	1945
Bulgaria	Romania	1945
Bulgaria	Turkey	1945
Russia	China	1945
Russia	Japan	1945
Iran	Iraq	1945
Iran	Afghanistan	1945
Iraq	Egypt	1945
Iraq	Saudi Arabia	1945
Saudi Arabia	Yemen Arab Republic	1945
China	Japan	1945
Iraq	Syria	1946
Egypt	Jordan	1946
Syria	Jordan	1946
Jordan	Saudi Arabia	1946
Afghanistan	Pakistan	1947
India	Pakistan	1947
Nicaragua	Costa Rica	1948
Yugoslavia	Russia	1948
Iraq	Israel	1948
Egypt	Israel	1948
Syria	Israel	1948
Jordan	Israel	1948
China	India	1948
North Korea	South Korea	1948
United States	China	1949
Germany	German Democratic Republic	1949
China	Taiwan	1949
Netherlands	Indonesia	1951
Thailand	Vietnam	1954
Vietnam	Republic of Vietnam	1954
Iran	Egypt	1955

Spain	Morocco	1956
Cambodia	Republic of Vietnam	1956
Egypt	Saudi Arabia	1957
United States	Cuba	1959
Mali	Burkina Faso	1960
Mauritania	Morocco	1960
Cote d'Ivoire	Ghana	1960
Ghana	Togo	1960
Ghana	Nigeria	1960
Somalia	Ethiopia	1960
Iraq	Kuwait	1961
Egypt	Syria	1961
Burundi	Rwanda	1962
Morocco	Algeria	1962
Malaysia	Indonesia	1962
Uganda	Sudan	1963
Kenya	Somalia	1963
Chad	Sudan	1964
Tanzania	Malawi	1964
Zambia	Malawi	1964
Argentina	United Kingdom	1965
Ethiopia	Sudan	1965
Zambia	Zimbabwe	1965
Zambia	South Africa	1965
Venezuela	Guyana	1966
Chad	Libya	1966
Yemen Arab Republic	Yemen People's Republic	1967
Uganda	Tanzania	1971
Equatorial Guinea	Gabon	1972
Yemen People's Republic	Oman	1972
Libya	Egypt	1973
China	Vietnam	1973
Libya	Sudan	1974
Cameroon	Nigeria	1975
Democratic Republic of Congo	Angola	1975
Angola	South Africa	1975
Mozambique	Zimbabwe	1975
Mozambique	South Africa	1976
Cambodia	Vietnam	1976
Kenya	Tanzania	1977
Nicaragua	Colombia	1979
Iran	Israel	1979
Iran	Saudi Arabia	1979
Zimbabwe	South Africa	1980
Belize	Guatemala	1981
Uganda	Kenya	1986
Bahrain	Qatar	1986
Guinea-Bissau	Senegal	1989
Senegal	Mauritania	1989
Kenya	Sudan	1989
Croatia	Yugoslavia	1991
Armenia	Azerbaijan	1991
Sudan	Egypt	1991
Uzbekistan	Kazakhstan	1991

Croatia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992
Yugoslavia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992
Eritrea	Sudan	1993
Ethiopia	Eritrea	1998

Table 2: List of rivalries

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