Constructing the West in Russian Cinema of the 1990s

Stanislav Govorukhin's Tak žit' nel'zja (You Cannot Live Like That, 1990) and Aleksej Balabanov's Brat (Brother, 1997)

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Introduction: It was, but it is gone

Budut drugie v žizni dni, (There will be other days in life)

Solnce udači ne ostylo. (The sun of luck has not cooled down)

Ty dolgo v serdce ne chrani (Do not keep in your heart for too long)

Vse, čto ran'še bylo, vse, čto ran'še bylo. (Everything that once was, everything that once was)

Bylo, bylo, bylo, bylo, no prošlo, o-o-o, o-o-o (It was, it was, it was, but it is gone, o-o-o, o-o-o)

-Софія Ротару (Sofija Rotaru), 1987

Sofija Rotaru's catchy pop song tells us how one should not hold on too long to a nostalgia of a bygone love. Yet the contents of this song explain the symbolic weight of the late 1980s and 1990s in Russia so well that it seems like its lyrics talk about more than individual heartbreak. This song was released one year after the *Perestroika* was announced, and it was part of the soundtrack of the 1988 movie *Malen'kaja Vera* (*Little Vera*). The movie was popular because it became the first official Soviet movie to feature an explicit sex scene. The eroticism that accompanies a portrayed adolescent romance is juxtaposed to the domestic violence of Vera's family, both previously taboo subjects in Soviet art. The young people in the rusty old Soviet town wear clothes from the West, listen to music from the West, construct another world based on the West to escape the criminal sphere they are trapped in. In a casual conversation scene, Sofija Rotaru's song starts playing over the radio, as if the characters were oblivious of the inadvertent symbolism that we retroactively project on the lyrics. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, as well as the return of a de facto autocracy in 1993, led the Russian people to be nostalgic of better times, at least in their memory. The Soviet Union was, *bylo*, but it is gone, *no prošlo*. In 2005, Putin called the dissolution of the Soviet Union the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. Perhaps he also kept too long in his heart what was long gone, and this led him to establish a totalitarian, criminal Russia to 'make it great again'? No doubt, he has been using the criminal energy of the 1990s to achieve his goals.

Of course, there is a logical fallacy in suggesting that Sofija Rotaru's pop song foreshadowed the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. Yet the symbolic weight of the chaotic years towards the end of the USSR seems so neatly organised that it *feels* difficult to not apply that lens. The brief period of 'Perestroika' from 1986 to 1991, the 'wild' 1990s, and the start of the new millennium accompanied by Putin's presidency make for textbook eras. The constantly changing Russia in

wake of its everchanging cultural politics in relation to itself and the West have provided a strong narrative set for academic research (for example, see: Gilburd, 2018; Yurchak, 2005). An acknowledged important vessel for these cultural reflections in Russia has been its cinema from the 1920s on, when the technological advancement of the Soviet film began to shape Soviet politics, and vice versa. The comparison of movies in between multiple eras, especially because the cinema of its time reflects the state Russia is in, may lead to today's nostalgia that leads to heartbreak, and consequently legitimise crime to restore the past one has lost. It is no coincidence that Svetlana Boym, in her ever-prominent essay 'Nostalgia and its discontents' describes nostalgia through a cinematographic lens:

> A cinematic image of nostalgia is a double exposure, or a superimposition of two images – of home and abroad, of past and present, of dream and everyday life. The moment we try to force it into a single image, it breaks the frame or burns the surface. (Boym, 2007, p. 1)

A superimposition of ideas about East and West, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, fantasy of wealth and actual poverty, lead to a burning sensation in the collective memory of the Russian people. The year 2022, and the full-scale assault on Ukraine, indicate the extent of Russian nostalgia. After all, the Ukraine may join the West, even though it was perceived as an essential part to the Russian Empire. This rhetoric is also upheld by a fear of the NATO, CIA, and Fascism. Svetlana Boym makes numerous references to Russian history when she discusses nostalgia, showing how nostalgia has become a Russian tradition:

> In 1733 the Russian army was stricken by nostalgia just as it ventured into Germany, the situation becoming dire enough that the general was compelled to come up with a radical treatment of the nostalgic virus. He threatened that "the first to be sick would be buried alive." This was a kind of literalization of a metaphor, as life in a foreign country seemed a lot like death. This punishment was reported to be carried out on two or three occasions, which happily cured the Russian army of complaints of nostalgia. (No wonder longing became such an important part of the Russian national identity.) (Boym, 2007, pp. 4–5)

The battle with nostalgia has prevailed up until the 1990s, as it superimposed an image of a new Russia with the Russia that was destroyed in the beginning period of the Soviet Union:

> In post-Soviet Moscow the beginning of the nostalgic turn in the public realm was marked by the reconstruction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior (1994-7), which had been brutally destroyed in the 1930s. The initial fruitful debate about the architectural possibilities for the site, which inspired various grand projects and much destruction, was closed off with the

> construction of an exact replica of the Cathedral in concrete and the erasure of all contested political and architectural memories connected to the site. (Boym, 2007, p. 15)

Grand narratives of Russian nostalgia have widely been reproduced through film. To show which movie genres depicted the Russian society of the 1990s, academic literature often point out documentaries and mafia thrillers (for example, see Engel, 1999, pp. 308–327). My master's thesis aims to fill a gap in our understanding of Russian documentaries of the 1990s, and to reread the importance of mafia thrillers afterwards. To investigate Russian documentaries, I will look at Stanislav Govorukhin's work, specifically his *You Cannot Live Like That* (*Tak žit' nel'zja*) trilogy from 1990/1992/1994. For Russian mafia thrillers, I will look at Aleksej Balabanov's most famous movies, *Brother* (*Brat*) and *Brother 2* (*Brat 2*). Both film series depict the criminality of Russia's 1990s in such a memorable way that they have become essential to Russian cultural memory.

Western Research has not yet considered the documentary work of Stanislav Govorukhin at all, which shows that his cultural and political influence in Russia is significantly underestimated in academia. He was born in 1936 in Russia and graduated with honours from the VGIK in 1966, which means that he began his career during the thaw period. It was an era which stood for Russian nationalism and cinematic excellence, but also opposed Stalinism and its cinematic canon. When Govorukhin's crime drama *The Meeting Place Cannot Be Changed* (*Mesto vstreči izmenit' nel'zja*) released in 1979, it became a Soviet cult classic.[1] A popular Russian saying goes: 'When *The Meeting Place Cannot Be Changed* aired, the crime rate dropped, because even the bandits sat in front of the TV to see what happens next'. It is about two detectives, one who returned from the Soviet German front in 1945, and one who stayed in Moscow during the war, solving together the crimes perpetrated by a big underground crime network. It dismantled the fantasy of a righteous Stalinist Moscow through a famous star cast, symbolically loaded action scenes, and the opposing philosophies of an idealist and a jaded detective. *The Meeting Place Cannot Be Changed* shaped Vladimir Putin as well, he stated that it is one of his favourite movies of all time ("Putin nazval svoi ljubimye fil'my," 2016). When in 1979/80 Boris Durov's *Pirates of the 20th Century* (*Piraty XX veka*) released, it became clear that Govorukhin had a

[1] Govorukhin's legendary TV show remains relevant to this day in the cultural memory of the post-Soviet people. As of November 2024, its Russian Wikipedia page received the award as the best Wikipedia article of 2024. Perhaps this is due to the ongoing discourse about how the movie was mostly produced by the Odessa Film Studio, and Stanislav Govorukhin's controversial support of Putin in 2014.

talent for crafting narratives that would capture the hearts of the Russians. He wrote the script for Durov's movie, and with 87.6 million viewers, it became the most popular Soviet movie of all time (Norris and Seckler, 2016, p. 202). Stanislav Govorukhin found his talent in portraying crime in Russia.

The timing of Govorukhin's documentary trilogy is noteworthy in its political context. The first entry, *You Cannot Live Like That* (*Tak žit' nel'zja*), was released in 1990 towards the end of the Soviet Union. It is a typical *Glasnost'* movie, criticising the October Revolution and the current government. It was praised by Michail Gorbačëv and received several Nika-awards. The second entry, *The Russia We Have Lost* (*Rossija, kotoruju my poterjali*), was released in 1992 was released one year after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It goes into detail in how spectacular the achievements of Tsarist Russia were and how morally wrong the October Revolution was. While this movie was not as recognised as the first movie, it still became a canonical documentary on Russian history. The third entry, *The Great Criminal Revolution* (*Velikaja kriminal'naja revoljucija*), was produced in 1994 one year after El'cin's coup. The most significant period of artistic freedom was between Gorbačëv's proclaimed *Glasnost'* in 1986 and El'cin's coup in 1993, which is why the 1994 movie was poorly timed and not accepted for television broadcast. Still, it illustrated Govorukhin's personal worries about the future of the Russian Federation which are important to consider in order to understand contemporary Russia's worldview. As an avid cinephile, Putin recognised the potential of Govorukhin's filmography and his talent for crafting national grand narratives. Therefore, Stanislav Govorukhin became Vladimir Putin's election campaign manager in 2012. Govorukhin died in 2018, and he would not see the extent of his national narratives in the full-scale assault on Ukraine in 2022, and Putin's edit of the constitution which makes it possible for him to stay in power until 2036.

In his trilogy, Govorukhin tries to investigate the crime complex in 1990s Russia and to compare it to its historic opponent, the West. While the West has often been constructed through fantasies and set pieces within the Soviet Union, it was possible for Govorukhin to film in the West on site. For example, his documentary *You Cannot Live Like That* featured lengthy scenes in New York and Hamburg. The 1990s saw a depiction of the 'actual West' in Govorukhin's movies. Another director was also famous for his depictions of the West, Aleksej Balabanov. His movies Brother and Brother 2 are among the most prominent examples of Russia's view of the West. The first movie takes place in St Petersburg, which contains figures that represent different criminal Russian archetypes influenced by the West. The sequel takes place in the deep, 'actual

West'. The first hour of the movie plays in the crime capital of the Russian Federation, Moscow, before the main cast moves to Chicago, the historic crime metropole of the United States of America. While the influence of the *Brother* duology became essential in research of Russian 1990s cinema, the *You Cannot Live Like That* trilogy has not been looked into yet in the West. Govorukhin's investigative documentary on Crime in Russia and the West was clearly influential to Balabanov's fiction of crime in Russia and the West. Therefore, it is important to introduce Govorukhin's trilogy into our research on 1990s crime movies, and to reread Balabanov's duology consequently. An important difference to consider are the somewhat different eras the movies were filmed in, even though they share their context of the wild, criminal 1990s. While Govorukhin's trilogy were produced in the contexts of Glasnost', the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the coup of 1993, Balabanov's duology revolves around the two Chechen wars. *Brother*, which was released in 1997, features a veteran of the first Chechen war (1994-1996), whereas *Brother 2* was released in 2000 during the second Chechen war (1999-2009).

I argue that Stanislav Govorukhin's Soviet *You Cannot Live Like That* documentary trilogy offers one of the most fundamental constructions of Russia and the West that has persisted into the 'wild 1990s' of post-Soviet Russia, and perhaps even until today. It becomes evident during the documentaries that while crime also exists in Western countries like the USA and the FRG, they are more efficient in fighting it, making it a wealthier and desirable place to live in as opposed to the criminal and corrupt Russia of the 1990s. It is *avant la lettre* in a sense that it foresaw the 1990s crime epidemic that the Russian Federation has been suffering even during the existence of the Soviet Union and must lead us to reread canonical movies of the 1990s like Aleksej Balabanov's *Brother* duology. While Balabanov's movies recognise and stylise the overwhelming Russian crime in contrast to Western crime, it seems like the West is not a place to take example off. Govorukhin and Balabanov recognise similar archetypes in Russian and Western crime but come to different results in how Russia should treat its Western counter example.

The art of the Soviet Union was quite reactive to the politics and culture of the West. This makes sense, considering how the establishment of the Soviet Union itself was a counterproposal to the capitalism of the West. This master's thesis will pick up on many expressions of the West that the Soviet Union has artistically responded to, both inside and outside of the imperial territory. A significant form of the West that the Soviet Union reacted to was European fascism. In his 1935 core text *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*, Walter Benjamin

concludes with this dynamic to underline the power of mass media within fascism and communism:

> Mankind, which in Homer's time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order. This is the situation of politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic. Communism responds by politicizing art. (Benjamin, 1935, p. 20)

Following the argument of Walter Benjamin, the power of ideological film decides over life and death of whole cultures and ideologies, and the very people that live under them. The 'aura' of reality fades, and in its place, ideologies form through film the meaning and fate of man. Film has become the great vehicle to mobilise the Soviet people against a fascist Europe that sought beauty in genocide. This is important to keep in mind when I introduce sophisticated Soviet movies like Tat'jana Lioznova's 1973 movie series *Seventeen Moments of Spring* (*Semnadcat' mgnovenij vesny*) and Ėlem Klimov's 1985 movie *Come and See* (*Idi i smotri*). While both movies accept that Nazi Germany was the opposite evil of a good Soviet Union, their criminal acts of war are portrayed quite aesthetically and with high cinematographic effort. As I will argue, this leads to a more nuanced view of Germany in Russian cultural memory than the WW2 movies B-movies in Putin's '*Victory TV*' would like us to believe. This for example would explain why both Govorukhin's and Balabanov's movies depict Germans quite positively, for example as a tidy capitalist paradise (Hamburg in *You Cannot Live Like That*) and Germans in St Petersburg as a spiritual guide to an alienated Russian war veteran (Hoffmann in *Brother*). To acknowledge the artistic value of Soviet Union that constructed an imaginary West helps us understand the cultural memory expressions in Govorukhin's and Balabanov's movies, as well as observe the artistic regression in Putin's movies to Stalinism in contrast.

Based on Jan Assmann's theory of collective memory and cultural identity, I want to briefly summarise the importance of 90s criminal movies in Russian cultural memory and identity.

> '1) "The concretion of identity" [...] The objective manifestation of cultural memory are defined through a kind of identificatory determination in a positive ("We are this") or in a negative ("That's our opposite") sense.' (Assmann, 1995, p. 130)

Simply put here, the 'we' I will analyse here is the expression of 'We are Russians' in opposition to 'That's our opposite, the West'. This simple premise was of course transformed throughout history:

> '2) its capacity to reconstruct. […] Cultural memory works by reconstructing, that is, it always relates its knowledge to an actual and contemporary situation. True, it is fixed in immovable figures of memory and stories of knowledge, but every contemporary context relates to these differently, sometimes by appropriation, sometimes by criticism, sometimes by preservation or by transformation.' (Assmann, 1995, p. 130)

'Russia' took on many forms throughout history. Especially relevant for my master's thesis are the institutions of Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation. Special periods of time include transformative eras like the Octobre Revolution, *Glasnost'*, and the year 1993. These exemplary brief transitional periods are quite significant in the Russian cultural memory. The West existed in different shapes as well, for example a Europe unified under Napoleon, a Europe unified under Nazi Germany, and a Europe unified under a NATO which means a close alliance with the USA. A logical conclusion to the reconstruction is the formation of identity and memory:

> '3) Formation. The objectivation or crystallization of communicated meaning and collectively shared knowledge is a prerequisite of its transmission in the culturally institutionalized heritage of a society.' (Assmann, 1995, p. 130)

Further on, Russian memory and identity needed to be organised after they reestablished their power in between their significant transitional periods:

> '4) Organization. With this we mean a) the institutional buttressing of communication, e.g., through formation of the communicative situation in ceremony and b) the specialization of the bearers of cultural memory.' (Assmann, 1995, p. 131)

Meticulous research on the 'institutional buttressing of communication' already exists in the various research that I already previously introduced. In my master's thesis, I will mostly focus on one specialised bearer of cultural memory, which is the movie director. As I already argued, Russian film has been significant to the mass politics that we want to analyse around the criminal 1990s.

> '5) Obligation. […] The binding character of the knowledge preserved in cultural memory has two aspects: the formative one in its educative, civilizing, and humanizing functions and the normative one in its function of providing rules of conduct.' (Assmann, 1995, pp. 131–132)

The 1990s crime movies by Balabanov and Govorukhin are especially performative in this step. In his *You Cannot Live Like That* trilogy, Govorukhin educates the Russian public on how criminals have been disrupting Russian civilisation and humanises people both in the (pre- and post-) Soviet space and the West. Consequently, he wants his audience to be educated about the consequence of the great crimes committed in 1917 and 1993, and to be willing to reform Russian society into a less criminal one. Balabanov uses his *Brother* duology to humanise the alienated war veteran Danila. He makes the audience aware of how such individuals have no other options apart from resorting to crime, and how people like him alienate themselves even more. How these 1990s are remembered today are a subject of the next step:

> '6) Reflexivity. […] Through its cultural heritage a society becomes visible to itself and to others. Which past becomes evident in that heritage and which values emerge in its identificatory appropriation tells us much about the constitution and tendencies of a society.' (Assmann, 1995, pp. 132–133)

Towards the end of my master's thesis, I will show how the cultural expression of the 'wild 1990s' has been holding up in the Russia of the 21st century.

There are two important factors to consider in my analysis of the movies. First, there is a media bias from my literary studies perspective. I will mostly resort to the analysis of movie stills, occasional quoted passages, and trans-medial comparative readings. Other possible elements of analysis would be to e.g. investigate the sound design, economic circumstances, and political consequences in greater detail. This is not an admission of how my literary studies perspective would be lacking. Instead, it is an invitation for an interdisciplinary analysis of the movies that I introduce and analyse. I argue throughout my master's thesis that to some extent, which is difficult to quantify, that the criminal 1990s movies have a significant influence on contemporary Russia's contemporary politics. Since this political situation affects us all, I would wish that my introduction of Govorukhin's documentaries in research is only the beginning of a greater discussion about how his movies influenced the greater narratives of contemporary Russia. A second important factor to consider for my analysis is my own German Russian perspective. I was born and raised in Germany, but also had access to Russian television. This gave me the possibility to grasp what sort of movies would be emphasised on Russian television, and how Russian cultural memory and identity was formed throughout the decades. My academic education shaped my understanding and knowledge of Russian cultural knowledge as well, and the combination of these factors led me to discover and introduce the *You Cannot Live Like That* trilogy here.

A modus operandi of analysis that contains my circumstances is Erwin Panofsky's classic model of Iconography and Iconology from 1939. Both a subjective and an objective eye are needed for a dialectic view of Russian movies. Therefore, I will use his table to summarise afterwards the chapter structure of my master's thesis: (own translation of Panofsky, 1979, p. 223):

Object of Interpretation	**Act of Interpretation**	**Equipment for the Interpretation**	**Corrective Principle of Interpretation (History of Tradition)**
I *Primary* or *natural* Sujet – (A) in a factual manner, (B) in an expressive manner – which forms the world of *artistic themes*	*Pre-iconographic description* (and pseudo-formal analysis)	*Practical experience* (familiarity with objects and events)	History of style (insight into the manner of how *objects* and *events* were expressed through *forms* under changing historical conditions)
II *Secondary* or *conventional* Sujet, which forms the world of *images*, *anecdotes*, and *allegories*	*Iconographic analysis*	*Knowledge of literary sources* (familiarity with specific themes and ideas)	History of *types* (insight into the manner of how specific *themes* or *concepts* were expressed through *objects* and *events* under changing historical conditions)
III *Actual meaning* or *sense*, which forms the world of "symbolic" values	*Iconological interpretation*	*Synthetic intuition* (familiarity with the essential tendencies of the human spirit), shaped by personal psychology and "*worldview*"	History of *cultural symptoms* or "*symbols*" in general (insight into the manner of how essential *tendencies of the human spirit* were expressed through specific *themes* and *ideas* under changing historical conditions)

Chapter 1 will contain a pre-iconographic description of Govorukhin's and Balabanov's crime movies. I will show canonical movies from the 1920s on that likely influenced the *You Cannot Live Like That* trilogy and the *Brother* duology. By investigating the Soviet history of cinematographic style, it will become clear which artistic themes the 1990s directors allude to and how they later subverted them. The leading question will be: Who lost Russia? This phrase

commonly refers to the West's failed attempt to make Russia a democratic, neoliberal cooperative partner in the 1990s, leading to the reestablishment of an authoritarian regime. By using Soviet film history to answer this question, I showcase the potential of answering political problems from a Russian cultural memory and identity perspective. Chapter 2 and 3 will deal with the *You Cannot Live Like That* trilogy and *Brother* duology respectively. I will apply interdependent iconographic analysis and iconological interpretation with the context knowledge we have established from the pre-iconographic description from chapter 1. This will help us comprehend the overarching history of style that is formed throughout the genre and find similarities and differences within their history of cultural symptoms and symbols. Chapter 4 will be a continued iconological interpretation of both movie series from today's perspective. How have these 1990s crime movies contributed to the nostalgia of the Russian people, and how has it been influencing Putin's politics until today? The conclusion will summarise my interpretation of the 1990s crime movie genre, and to what degree we can determine its influence for the future course of the Russian Federation.

1. Who Lost Russia? – The West in Russian Cinema from the 1920s to 1990s

The 'wild' 1990s have been a subject of scholarly discussion for their sudden dissolvement of the Soviet Union and the lost chance of making Russia a democratic nation, which would wilfully be a part of the international community and cooperate with the West. Russian heads of state that were key figures were Michail Gorbačëv and Boris El'cin. Gorbačëv was the last man to lead the Soviet Union and introduced the policies of *Glasnost'* and *Perestroika* in 1986, which seemed promising to tear down the Iron Curtain. El'cin, the first President of a newly democratic Russia formed in 1991, seemed as if he wanted to take inspiration from the West. Jeffrey Sachs, a then economics professor at Harvard University, was called by Gorbačëv and El'cin to introduce the infamous 'shock therapy'. Russia was to receive a rapid transition from a centralised to a liberal economy. Unexpectedly, El'cin dissolved the Russian parliament in 1993, reintroducing authoritarian politics. The West watched from afar, as the Russian economy declined, and the Russian head of state rose in power again. The West let their giant opponent

go off worse than ever before into the new millennium. The liberal period from 1986 to 1993 was brief, begging the question: Who lost Russia?[2]

We should reframe the same question and try to answer it from a Russian perspective. The Western approach was a neoliberal one, suggesting that one knew all the objective parameters to bring order to the Russian chaos. Looking at the 'failed' results, it becomes evident that the West did not know enough about Russia to 'fix' it. The untamed bear of the wild 1990s breached into the new millennium and currently devours Ukraine, a nation that truly does seek to align with the West. An important view to consider is not solely a geopolitical or an economic one. Instead, the cinematic lens will to an extent further our understanding of the Russian theatre of war. Russian cinema helps us understand not only *who* lost Russia, but also what *Russia* is, and what it means to *lose* it. Furthermore, these definitions have been made in relation to its foreign policy with the West, and Russia's own history of the 20th century in which its nation took many forms.

In this section of my thesis, I argue that Russian cinema contains answers to the question 'Who lost Russia?', making it an important parameter to consider in the relationship between Russia and West. It is important to acknowledge that great Western research exists on Russian cinema, for example in the canonical works 'Geschichte des sowjetischen und russischen Films' (Engel, 1999) and 'A Companion to Russian Cinema' (Beumers, 2016a). Yet the question of 'Who lost Russia?' helps us fill the gaps in our Russian cinematic canon, revealing movies that help explain the problem. A central overlooked movie trilogy was made by Stanislav Govorukhin. He was the head of Putin's campaign headquarters for his re-election of 2012, and Putin said that his movies were among his favourites (Anastasija, 2024). Putin most likely referred to Govorukhin's classics like *The Meeting Place Cannot Be Changed* (1979). Yet Govorukhin's historical rigour and love for his motherland may be observed in *You Cannot Live Like That* (1990), *The Russia We Have Lost* (1992), and *The Great Criminal Revolution* (1994; not approved for TV). Govorukhin greatly played with the audience's expectations of what they knew about Russia and the West through the media. Therefore, it is important to illustrate a brief history of how Russian cinema throughout the times has shaped the question: Who lost Russia?

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[2] Such discourse was also quite popular in US media (for example, see "Is Russia lost? — with Leon Aron (1999) | THINK TANK," 1999).

1.1. October Revolution and the Great Patriotic War

Year	Director	Movie	Prizes / Recognition
1924	Lev Kulešov	The Extraordinary Adventures of Mr. West in the Land of the Bolsheviks (Neobyčajnye priključenija mistera Vesta v strane bol'ševikov)	Influential editing techniques
1925	Sergej Ėjzenštejn	Battleship Potemkin (Bronenosec «Potëmkin»)	Highly praised at Expo '58
1926	Dziga Vertov	A Sixth Part of the World (Šestaja čast' mira)	Highly praised by Pravda
1934	Georgij Vasil'ev & Sergej Vasil'ev	Chapaev (Čapaev)	Stalin watched it 38 times; Putin's favourite movie
1938	Sergej Ėjzenštejn	Alexander Nevsky (Aleksandr Nevskij)	The director received the Order of Lenin and Stalin prize
1950	Michail Čiaureli	Fall of Berlin (Padenie Berlina)	The film crew received numerous Stalin prizes

The years 1917 and 1941 have become legendary through the first phase of Soviet cinema.[3] They both form Russia in relation to another group. The revolutionary year 1917 defines Russia in a battle of the revolutionary 'Reds' against the counter-revolutionary 'Whites', showing that its self-definition is rooted in a binary conflict. The West has been an opponent of the revolutionary Russia as well. Foreign troops landed in Vladivostok to increase their sphere of influence, and Lenin famously sought refuge in Switzerland, before a German train took him from West Geneva to the Finland station. It was not until the year 1933 that the USA recognised the Soviet Union, which was founded in 1922. And while World War II began in 1939, the infamous 'Great Patriotic War' in Moscow's historiography begins in 1941 with Hitler's attack against Stalin. With the Reds being victors over the Whites, the West became the new opponent. Much like Nazi-propaganda proclaimed a unified attack of the West against a barbarous Russia,

[3] Most information about the movies' prizes and recognition have been taken from multiple, publicly available databases like for example imdb.com, wikipedia.org, or the websites of the respective movies and award givers. Since this information is not attributed to any authors, I would say that the most reliable resource in this case remains a Google search. Perhaps in the future, an extensive, reliable database for Soviet cinema might be established.

the Soviet Union incorporated this world view under their own propaganda. Similar to when Russia had to defend itself against a unified West under Napoleon in 1812, it had to once again defend itself against its ever long opponent from 1941 to 1945. Numerous research exists on how flexible Russia and its opponents are in cinema (see Norris, 2016).

The current research literature has made vast observations and interpretations of how Soviet cinematography helped shape Soviet politics and vice versa. Moscow and the Soviet Union have been constructed and edited in Russian cinema through the set pieces that was a demolished post-revolutionary capital to portray a new utopia (Beumers, 2016b; Engel, 1999, pp. 26–29). Richard Taylor suggests that the Soviet government sought to promote entertaining ideological movies to influence the masses. The doctrines of 'socialist realism' and 'revolutionary romanticism' were gradually more conveyed on relying on sound film and amplified through the musical genre (Taylor, 2016). As we can see, socialist politics and the technical progression in cinematography have influenced one another.

The Extraordinary Adventures of Mr. West in the Land of the Bolsheviks

The significance of the mounting film of the soviet film-avantgarde is widely recited in research, as we can see from Evgenij Margolit's contribution in 'Geschichte des sowjetischen und russischen Films'. He explains how the director Kulešov was known for his 'Americanism', in which he took technical inspiration from US-American movies. In his movies, he constructed the USA, a country he had never been to, and a new post-revolutionary Soviet Union. The building pieces for both these nations consisted of footage from a 'quiet, patriarchal, provincial Moscow', seemingly incompatible with the 'sujet and genre-mask of the American movie' (Engel, 1999, pp. 26–29).

The title of the movie itself, *The Extraordinary Adventures of Mr. West in the Land of the Bolsheviks*, already clearly defines the constructed actors. Mr. West, who is the director of the YMCA, is a caricature of the West. Russia is no longer the Land of the tsar, but has evolved into a larger Soviet Union, the land of the Bolsheviks. Before his travel, Mr. West fears the image he has of the Soviet Union, as he worries that it might be barbaric. He then arrives to Moscow with his trusted friend, Cowboy Jedd. A group of criminals find out that the wealthy Mr. West has arrived, planning to scare him by enacting the stereotypes that he learned from his magazines at home. Of course, the bandits are misfits that resemble the enemy, the Whites, whom the Bolsheviks have beaten in the revolution. They seem brutish, and especially the former countess gives off a pretentious persona. While Mr. West is being fooled by the whites,

Cowboy Jedd engages in numerous action and chase sequences with the police, bringing an US-American dynamic into Moscow. The movie ends on a "positive" note, as a Red, a Soviet police man, arrests the group of bandits. He shows Mr. West the newly built Moscow. He is convinced of the Soviet greatness and asks his wife to hang up a portrait of Lenin at home.

Kulešov is aware that Russia is not only constructed through Soviet Cinema, but also through the eyes of the West, making it important to win them over. This early classic is an acknowledgment of how crime persisted both in the West, in form of the chaotic Cowboy Jedd, and how crime remained after the Octobre Revolution, in form of the counterrevolutionary bandits. It shows that the 1990s crime movies utilise a theme that persists since the beginning of Soviet film.

Battleship Potemkin

Western intellectuals have become gradually more curious about the newly formed Soviet Union, so they began to visit. The travel literature to the Soviet Union has become its own genre, including Walter Benjamin's *Moscow Diary*. His documentation shows how the Soviet Union treated visitors from the West. Benjamin was shown multiple movies during his stay in Moscow, but under dire circumstances. His experience of watching Battleship Potemkin was quite dire:

> [24th January 1927:] It was quite a chore sitting through that many films in succession with no musical accompaniment and in a small screening room where we constituted virtually the entire audience. (Benjamin, 1985, p. 103)

What Walter Benjamin saw was the fictional mutiny on the eponymous *Bronenosec «Potëmkin»*. Movies were still silent, and the absence of any accompanying music must have made the image of the revolutionary uprising more intense. The sailors of the battleship underwent the *izdevatel'stvo*, the mockery, of their superiors. An iconic image was how the crew only had access to rotten meat. It was finally time to resist, which is why the director Sergej Ėjzenštejn glorifies the successful revolt. In an infamous scene, the tsarist soldiers begin to shoot down on civilians as they flee downstairs. The revolution seems just, given how cruel the old order was. It is no wonder that this was one of the movies that was shown to Western travellers, since the Soviet Union wanted to be acknowledged for its heroic revolution. The perpetual cycle of fighting violence with violence is also a theme in 1990s crime movies. In *Brother*, the protagonist Danila acts like his violence is justified, since he wants to fight the

violence that he deems worse. In *You Cannot Live Like That*, the idealisation of violence since the Octobre Revolution is declared to be the main cause of the 1990s crime epidemic.

A Sixth Part of the World

In his *Moscow Diary*, Benjamin explains how he also wanted to see Dziga Vertov's new movie *A Sixth Part of the World*. Unfortunately, it proved to be difficult, as he heard that the movie was involved in some sort of scandal:

> [25th January 1927:] Whereupon he [Pansky] began feeding me the most abstruse line: the film was not to be mentioned abroad, its footage contained clips from foreign films, their precise provenance was not even clear, and complications were to be feared – in short, he was making an enormous issue out of it. (Benjamin, 1985., p. 104)

The technical movie relied heavily on its montage to tell its story. The film crew took footage all over the Soviet Union, even in its periphery, to show the vastness of it. Diversity became strength in the nation that spanned more than a sixth of the world. The multicultural utopia had one enemy: The West.

It makes sense that much footage was quite likely 'borrowed' from the West to show the various developments they have documented about themselves. On a 'negative' note, the movie shows the effects of capitalism in its colonialism and imperialism. Images of colonial masters discipling their slaves shows another necessity for the Soviet Union to interfere. On a 'positive' note, revolutionaries around the world, especially the United States and Germany, rally the masses to join the global socialist cause. The massive Soviet Union prepares to free the West from its capitalist chains. The only reliable way to show footage of the West was to use their footage, since it was near impossible to leave the Soviet Union. The West was either depicted through their own film material, edited together, or constructed altogether 'at home'. This should underline the significance of the 1990s crime movies that were able to film in the West themselves.

Chapaev

The legendary cinematic revolutionary war hero Čapaev might be the prototype of what Russian dictators aspire to be. Although this sound movie did not fully conform to all ideals of the socialist realism, its depiction of a beloved hero with a good heart led Stalin to watch this movie a minimum of 38 times (Youngblood, 2016, pp. 392–97). The significance of this movie is widely acknowledged in academic literature, the book 'Geschichte des Sowjetischen und Russischen Films' uses a still of this infamous character as its cover. This classic red and white

story also holds up in modern times: In 2014, Vladimir Putin announced that Čapaev is his all-time favourite movie. The beloved war hero that leads the masses for a just cause is an archetype that links the movie lovers Stalin and Putin together and is often reproduced throughout the Soviet and post-Soviet Russian cinema. No doubt can we see parallels between Čapaev and Danila from Brother, who are charismatic protagonists who employ excessive violence to achieve their goals.

Alexander Nevsky

In times of the Great Purge under Stalin, director Sergej Ėjzenštejn was given a chance to survive, both as a person and artist. Even though he favoured portraying the heroic actions of the masses, as it was evident in *Battleship Potemkin*, he agreed to create a new cinematic hero: Aleksandr Nevskij (Schlegel, 1998, pp. 290–293). The movie was loosely based on the real Aleksandr Nevskij from the 13th century and is the logical conclusion to the heroic movies that Stalin loved. The medieval war between Germans and Russians has been stylised into an allegorical portrayal of the contemporary tensions between these two Nations, making it an effective propaganda film a year before the start of World War II. The Germans are portrayed as brutish fools. When they are not busy throwing babies into fire, they would be lured onto thin ice, only to break into the freezing water because of their heavy armour. The movie ends with an exclamation that Russia would always stand together against any foe they would encounter. It seems like Russia stands forever united, and the internal conflict between the reds and whites is no longer worth mentioning. Hitler from the exterior West becomes the Soviet Union's biggest historic threat.

Fall of Berlin

After World War II, the Soviet Union has won a significant victory against its fascist opponent. This was commemorated a lot through the personality cult of Stalin and engraved into the propaganda movies of its time. In *Padenia Berlina*, neither the masses nor the romanticised historical figures like Čapaev or Aleksandr Nevskij were the heroes of the Soviet Union. Instead, a carefully selected actor portrays Stalin as the victor over the West. Michail Čiaureli constructs a united West under Hitler. In a glamorous assembly that Hitler attends, the Soviet viewer learns that Germany's sole enemy was the Soviet Union: The United States, the United Kingdom and even the Vatican State (!) sided with the Nazis.

This leads to inadvertently humorous scenes for today's viewers. For example, as the Nazis begin to execute dissidents, one of the prisoners exclaims: 'Stop, how dare you! I am an

American, don’t shoot!’. Becoming aware of their ‘mistake’, the Nazis let their US-American ally live. The Nazis themselves are also portrayed as fools again. They speak broken Russian with little bits of German sprinkled into their vocabulary. The highlight of the movie is of course the battle over Berlin, and Stalin arrives afterwards to greet the many people that run towards him from many cultures. He thanks his Generals, Žukov is of course not included because Stalin began to distrust him. In this movie, a powerful Soviet Union is constructed, along with it a duty to fight off the rest of the West who supposedly ‘supported’ the Nazis. This movie is quite radical in its binary world view and sets the stage for the Cold War.

The following Thaw period after Stalin’s death in 1953 gave rise to more authentic and sophisticated depictions of the West. Instead of gross overgeneralisations of the West, it becomes an admirable foe to the Soviet Union.

1.2. Cold War and Thaw

Year	Director	Movie	Prizes / Recognition
1966	Andrej Tarkovskij	Andrei Rublev (Andrej Rublëv)	1969 FIPRESCI prize in Cannes
1966/67	Sergej Bondarčuk	War and Peace (Vojna i mir)	Grand Prix at Moscow International Film Festival; Golden Globe & Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film
1973	Tat’jana Lioznova	Seventeen Moments of Spring (Semnadcat’ mgnovenij vesny)	Cult TV-series in Soviet pop culture
1979	Andrej Tarkovskij	Stalker (Stalker)	1979 Prize of the Ecumenical Jury at Cannes
1979/80	Vladimir Men’šov	Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears (Moskva slezam ne verit)	1981 Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film

With the end of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ in the year 1945, the Allies established a new world order. The writer George Orwell, who was aware of the inner and foreign politics of Stalin, feared how the world would change if the Soviet Union eventually acquired nuclear weapons. He coined the term ‘Cold War’ to underline that such a conflict would have consequences for how their involved cultures developed. While the Soviet Union’s conflict against a constructed,

homogenised West was not new to its citizens, it became clear that an inner conflict persisted between Stalin and his people that he reigned over. With the death of Stalin in 1953, his ‘cold’ totalitarian politics would slowly fade away. In the year after, Il’a Ėrenburg published his novel *Ottepel’*, to be translated as *The Thaw*. This term meant a feeling of gradual freedom that people felt during the destalinisation under Nikita Chruščëv. Literature was fundamental in crystallising the eras that the Soviet people lived in, and many famous movies of the Thaw period are also adaptations of famous novels.

By the time when Leonid Brežnev came to power from 1964 onwards, it became clear that much has changed in the Soviet cinema. A new generation of directors that did not build up their fame during Stalinism wanted to entertain and educate the Soviet public. While the relations between East and West were still cold, it seemed like a gradual thaw brought freedom in the arts. In February 1986, Gorbačëv would retroactively criticise the reign of his predecessor Brežnev for its *zastoj*, meaning stagnation. Therefore, the period of stagnation had more artistic freedom than in the past but would still be seen as restrictive from 1986 on. Perhaps it was this certain balance of new freedom and still intact boundaries that influenced the unique style of cinema during the period of stagnation. Films have become more diverse, yet the West remained mostly unreachable. To answer the question of ‘Who lost Russia’ from a perspective of the era of stagnation becomes more complicated, as the soviet cinematography has become more nuanced. It is all the more interesting to see which themes have been maintained, and how they were transformed.

Andrei Rublev

In the West, director Andrej Tarkovskij and his works are often recited in the Soviet film canon. His philosophy on film became influential, next to his cinematographic skills he discussed the relationship between the artist and the audience:

> The relationship between artist and audience is a two-way process. By remaining faithful to himself and independent of topicality, the artist creates new perceptions and raises people's level of understanding. In its turn a society's growing awareness builds up an energy supply which will subsequently cause a new artist to be born. (Tarkovskij, 1989, p. 166)

Therefore, the art of a society becomes a mirror of what said society is. Since the art during the period of stagnation was quite sophisticated, one could be sure that the Soviet society began to prioritise quality in art, even if it was still political, to a larger degree. To further define what

Russia is, it is important analyse the prevalent relationship between artist and audience that is built through art.

While many historicised film heroes like Čapaev, Aleksandr Nevskij, and even Stalin have been constructed in the past to convey simple ideological messages, Andrej Tarkovskij's *Andrej Rublëv* is a very nuanced one by comparison. The story is loosely based on the eponymous real-life artist from the 14th/15th century. Throughout the movie, Rublëv is torn on the medieval horrors he sees, which he then processes in his art. Tarkovskij meant to illustrate the importance of the artist:

> This was the theme of Audrey Rublyov. It looks at first sight as if the cruel truth of life as he observes it is in crying contradiction with the harmonious ideal of his work. The crux of the question, however, is that the artist cannot express the moral ideal of his time unless he touches all its running sores, unless he suffers and lives these sores himself. That is how art triumphs over grim, 'base' truth, clearly recognising it for what it is, in the name of its own sublime purpose: such is its destined role. For art could almost be said to be religious in that it is inspired by commitment to a higher goal. (Tarkovskij, 1989, p. 68)

Therefore, the artist must be aware of his surroundings, meaning that he must also recognise the negative aspects of his society and incorporate it into his art. Govorukhin and Balabanov were clearly affected by the wild 1990s, which is why their movies are so authentic. Their protagonists are deeply embedded in the crime infested Russia, and there is no escape except through deep philosophic discourse.

War and Peace

Sergej Bondarčuk's *War and Peace* series is not only interesting for its iconic construction of Russia and the West, but also for its production circumstances. The West is unified under Napoleon, which makes it an institution of wonder and cruelty. After all, the Russian nobility adopts French culture in their language and etiquette. Even more gruesome is the French invasion in Russia, which P'er (Pierre), played by the director Bondarčuk, witnesses. At the same time, the Russian identity gets emphasised through Bolkonskij's masculine war heroism and Nataša's feminine Russian folk dance. The production costs of this movie series were exorbitant, and the movie quality was supposed to trump King Vidor's *War and Peace* adaptation from 1956. Bondarčuk's 1966/67 adaptation was daring because it constructed a pre-revolutionary Russia to oppose the ever-looming threat of 1812. Through the digital Mosfilm restoration, these motives do not seem as progressive anymore, as the multiple reruns in cinema and publication on YouTube make the Russian identities fit right into Putin's propaganda. The

beloved Soviet film series is 'recycled' in Putin's propaganda, and loses its 'aura' that was constructed in the Thaw period (Bartasevic, 2023). It is no wonder that Putin calls Bondarčuk's War and Peace adaptation one of his favourite movies of all time (Anastasija, 2024). The nuanced depiction of a wonderful, but threatening West becomes a common theme in the cinema of the Thaw period and becomes a fundamental tradition that is also upheld in the 1990s crime movie genre. Still, Putin's recycling of these classics is not exclusive to War and Peace, as I will discuss in chapter 4 on how Govorukhin's and Balabanov's movies are used in Putin's politics.

Seventeen Moments of Spring

A popular Russian saying about this monochromatic TV series goes: 'Whenever Stierlitz roamed the streets of Berlin, the streets of Moscow were empty'. Max Otto von Stierlitz, or rather Maks Otto fon Štirlic, is a fictional Soviet spy in Nazi Germany in 1945. He is played by Vjačeslav Tichonov, who also played Bolkonskij in Sergej Bondarčuk's *War and Peace*. This cult TV series shows a very nuanced understanding of the West. The Nazis are depicted as a highly civilised, educated society. Therefore, Štirlic must put in great efforts to survive as a Soviet spy in a Nazi uniform. He must have perfect table manners, know everything about German and Italian culture, and overall emit confidence. In great difference to Stalinist movies like 'Fall of Berlin', the West consists of diverse international actors with different goals and cultures. Still, *Seventeen Moments of Spring* shows the grave mistake that the Nazis did with their Holocaust and their attack on the Soviet Union. Many key characters die during air raids in Berlin, including underground allies of Štirlic. Also, the TV series features brief documentary investigations on the crimes of key Nazi figures. Nazi Germany becomes an opponent to feel empathy for, even though the audience is made aware of their crimes at the same time. It shows the influence of the female director, which was quite rare in Soviet cinema. As I have explained in my introduction to this master's thesis, this TV series became essential to the depiction of Germans in Govorukhin's and Balabanov's movies. The Russian people are aware of their crimes, yet they understand that the world is not as black and white as Putin's propaganda would like everyone to believe. Perhaps even more important to mention is the individualism that is portrayed in the cinema of the Thaw period. For example, both Andrej Rublëv and the protagonists of *War and Peace* are nuanced characters as opposed to the revolutionary heroes before the thaw period. What is especially interesting about Štirlic is the isolation and nostalgia he experiences in the West. One of the most legendary scenes in Russian cinema is when he sits in a German café, 'Café Elefant'. In an arranged meeting, he is allowed to briefly see his wife

from a far. As they exchange eye contact, we see Štirlic in his Nazi uniform, and his pain of not being allowed to approach her. The feeling of nostalgia and isolation becomes a key theme in Balabanov's *Brother* duology.

Stalker

Andrej Tarkovskij's *Stalker* is an abstract, but also arguably the most important philosophical construction of Russia and the West in Soviet cinema. At a first glance, the science fiction movie seems entirely unrelated to the Soviet perception of the West. An alien object lands on earth, and the whole area becomes restricted. People label it 'the Zone', and it defies physical laws and is generally inhospitable. So called 'Stalkers', self-proclaimed guides of the Zone, offer tours into the unknown. A writer and a professor agree on such a tour to find their inner most desire and embark on a cinematic journey filled with long tracking shots and imagery that may only be titled metaphysical in nature. A fundamental research text on this Thaw classic is Slavoj Žižek's 1999 essay 'The Thing from Inner Space'. He explains how the Zone is symbolically loaded in the context of Soviet history:

> For a citizen of the defunct Soviet Union, the notion of a forbidden Zone gives rise to (at least) five associations: Zone is (1) Gulag, i.e. a separated prison territory; (2) a territory poisoned or otherwise rendered uninhabitable by some technological (biochemical, nuclear...) catastrophe, like Chernobyl; (3) the secluded domain in which the nomenklatura lives; (4) foreign territory to which access is prohibited (like the enclosed West Berlin in the midst of the GDR); (5) a territory where a meteorite struck (like Tunguska in Siberia). The point, of course, is that the question "So which is the true meaning of the Zone?" is false and misleading: the very indeterminacy of what lies beyond the Limit is primary, and different positive contents fill in this preceding gap. (Žižek, 1999, p. 8)

In a sense, the contents of the Zone are a 'mish mash' of the inner most desires and fears of a Soviet citizen. The inaccessibility to the own Soviet territory contradicts the Russian and Soviet unity that was proclaimed before in Soviet cinema. After all, biohazards and politics prohibited the Soviet citizen from travelling entirely freely. The West as an inaccessible 'zone' has become a subject of cultural research on the average Soviet citizen, making the West a zone of desire and wishes, like in the chapter on 'Imaginary West: The Elsewhere of Late Socialism' in Yurchak's 'Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More' (Yurchak, 2005, pp. 158–206).

With 'the Zone', Andrej Tarkovskij gave us a wonderful concept to explain the archetype of the isolated Russian in the West. If we look at Maks Otto fon Štirlic from *Seventeen Moments of Spring*, he must navigate the Zone as well, a Soviet director's version of what Nazi Germany

in 1945 was. The famous Café Elefant scene shows an overwhelming sense of nostalgia in the Zone, and it underlines how lonely he is in the West. He is just as affected by the bombing of Berlin because his underground allies die as well. As the narrator suggests, Štirlic is aware of the danger when he introduces himself to new potential allies. After all, if he as a spy is compromised, he will immediately be executed. Yet the isolation within the Zone is unbearable, and he must take the risk. Danila from *Brother*, a war veteran from the Chechen War, returns to the Zone as well. The civilian world fears him, and he only attains agency through violent means in the criminal world. He must do this, since otherwise he would die of the isolation in St Petersburg. This city is also gradually taken over by Western influences, which challenge both his positive and negative believes about the West.

Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears

With 85 million Soviet viewers (Norris 202), Vladimir Men'šov's *Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears* became a classic that depicted an average Soviet Russian's life and their fascination with the West. It released around 1979/80, in the same years as Stanislav Govorukhin's cult TV series *The Meeting Place Cannot Be Changed*. We may observe some interesting similarities between both movies:

1. Both depict an unromanticised Moscow from the past.
2. Both present a cruel Soviet society in which the protagonists only way to be happy is by having a family.
3. Both movies seem to willingly criticise Soviet ideology by showing protagonists that despite their honourable careers, must come to terms with the injustices set by the Soviet Union.

Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears is about three female protagonists who move to Moscow from the countryside in 1958. The movie's narrative focuses mostly on the life of Katerina Tichomirova. She works in a factory and keeps studying at night so that she can eventually attend an institute. Through a love affair, she gets pregnant. She asks the man to get her an abortion, a clear allusion to the *blat* system in which services were only available through networks. He denies, and in the end of the first part of the movie, she is seen crying in her bed. The second part of the movie starts in 1978. She has become the director of her factory. She owns a car and lives in a huge apartment, which suggests that she lives in Soviet luxury. She has also raised her daughter quite well. Yet she is unhappy about the uncaring nature of the

Soviet people. One day, a man falls in love with her and marries and supports her emotionally, showing that happiness can only be found in a family, not society.

The Meeting Place Cannot Be Changed is about the WW2 veteran Vladimir Šarapov, who arrives back home in the Moscow of 1945. He joins the Moscow Crime Unit to investigate the underground crime network of the 'Black Cat'. He is mentored by the senior detective Gleb Žeglov. The director Stanislav Govorukhin shows the Moscow Crime Unit completely helpless against the criminal conspiracies of underground Moscow, which leads to many philosophical discussions between the idealist Šarapov and the jaded Žeglov. A famous expression by Žeglov was 'The criminal belongs in prison!', which indicates that people must be arrested by any means. Šarapov on the other hand risks his life to obtain evidence of the actual perpetrators of the crimes, and Žeglov rescues him when Šarapov leads his captors to a crime scene. Disillusioned by how things work in the nation that he fought for, he goes home, only to see that his love interest holds his baby.

The most influential Thaw movies gradually moved away from Soviet ideology and turned towards the lives of everyday individuals. As both movies show, the concerns of both sexes are taken seriously, and the directors hope that their audience holds together against anything that 'the Zone' might confront them with. The West is no longer an explicit enemy of the Soviet system. Instead, the West just contribute multiple requisites and set pieces to both movies and blend in with the rest of the discussion about Soviet identity. *Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears* shows multiple scenes of cultural everyday life in Moscow, and among the readings of Soviet poets 'that everyone is bored to listen to', the audience sees the excitement of when a French film festival takes place. When the 'cool' teenage daughter of Katerina naps away in front of her desk, we hear Boney M.'s 'Daddy Cool' blasting through her headphones. Govorukhin's *The Meeting Place Cannot Be Changed* became a buttress to his ideals that he expressed through his 1990s documentaries, to show that Russia suffers from crime and that the greatest victims are the people. Who cares about the West as the biggest enemy anymore? Sure, the West is a great set piece for the spectacle in Bondarčuk's *War and Peace*. But when the audience sees the war veteran Šarapov, they are not shocked by the already known atrocities of the Nazis, they are shocked about their own nation's history that is uncovered by Šarapov!

1.3. Reconstruction, Transparency, and the Wild 1990s

Year	Director	Movie	Prizes / Recognition

1985	Ėlem Klimov	Come and See (Idi i smotri)	1985 FIPRESCI prize at the 14th Moscow International Film Festival
1987	Karen Šachnazarov	Courier (Kur'er)	1987 Special Jury Prize at the 15th Moscow International Film Festival
1988	Vasilij Pičul	Little Vera (Malen'kaja Vera)	1988 Special Jury Prize at the Montreal World Film Festival; FIPRESCI Prize at the 1988 Venice Film Festival; 1989 Best Actress (Natalya Negoda) Nika Prize

The appointment of Michail Gorbačëv as the head of the Communist Party in 1985 meant fundamental changes for the people in the Soviet Union. The consequences of his policies may be summed up with these three terms:

a) Transparency / 'voicing how it is' (*Glasnost'*)
b) Reconstruction (*Perestroika*)
c) Wild 1990s (*Lichie 90e*)

In 1986, his *Glasnost'* policy removed many restrictions upon the free speech of the Soviet people, whereas his *Perestroika* initiated a transition from socialist to capitalist market structures. Movie Directors still enjoyed the cinematic momentum of the Thaw period, which rewarded grandiose cinematographic depictions of individualism. With many restrictions gone and a new societal change to talk about, movie directors produced most likely the peak of Soviet cinema. Yet the failure of the new policies meant a slow dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and a return to authoritarian politics under El'cin in 1993. The Soviet late 1980s movies were great in voicing structural failures in the Soviet Union and buttressed the philosophical discussions of Govorukhin's and Balabanov's 1990s crime movies. Yet the problems voiced in the Soviet late 1980s movies have not been resolved even until today. The voices of the directors who grew up under Tarkovskij's cinematographic philosophy were quieted down. Instead, the

1990s were filled with cheap, exploitative mass media. The 2000s and 2010s were gradually shaped by Putin's retroactive continuity that devalued the deep philosophy of *Thaw* and *Glasnost'* movies in favour of a war industry propaganda apparatus.

The greatest worries of the late 1980s directors have become the future of their country, and therefore their youth. Three prominent movies from the late 1980s, *Come and See*, *Courier*, and *Little Vera* feature children, adolescents and young adults as their protagonists. This was a trend that influenced Govorukhin's and Balabanov's 1990s movies as well. As we will see, the *You Cannot Live Like That* trilogy puts great emphasis on the young people of Russia, whereas the *Brother* duology features a young adult veteran as a protagonist.

Come and See

Ėlem Klimov's *Come and See* is the epitome of an authentic depiction of WW2 in Soviet cinema and released in 1985, the year of Gorbačëv's appointment as the head of the Communist Party. The protagonist is a young Belorussian boy in 1943, Flëra. Even though this movie is far from science fiction, the dismal WW2 scenery looks akin to Tarkovskij's 'Zone'. Playing around a deserted battlefield, he excavates a rifle. He brings it home and enlists himself into a Soviet skirmish unit. Arriving at the base, he is ordered to stay and defend, while the 'adults' go to the front line. What happens for the remainder of the movie may only be described as existential horror. Flëra meets a traumatised girl, and he sets out to protect her with his rifle. When they witness how their base is bombarded by the Luftwaffe and paratroopers land to seek out any survivors, the narration turns Flëra's enthusiasm into a constant flight scenario. They return to his village, only to find the whole population murdered. Later, Flëra and his companion visit another village. From there on, the movie shows in great detail the systematic mass murder committed by the SS. Flëra survives, and later in his flight, he sees piles of Nazi corpses. In the most pivotal scene towards the end, a group of civilians and the Red Army encircled the perpetrators of the crime. Out of a gut instinct, some civilians want to burn them alive as well. Instead, the Red Army officer pleads the civilians to listen. An SS officer, full of fear, explains his ideological motives of why he had to murder as many people in the East as possible. The Nazis get shot, and Flëra, not having fired his rifle for the entire movie, shoots a portrait of Hitler. He then imagines if he was able to shoot baby Hitler to prevent the War and realises, he could not. Flëra will not murder anyone.

This movie is more philosophical than ideological. Its pacifism emphasises the horrors of war and deconstructs the heroism of the Red Army and the villainy of the Nazis. Instead, human

nature is the real perpetrator of the crimes. WW2 is depicted as a core reason for how much the Soviet people have lost, even down to the ethnicities that constituted it. The whole movie focuses on the Belorussian people, who lost around three quarters of their population in WW2.

Courier

Karen Šachnazarov's *Courier* is a coming-of-age movie about Ivan Mirošnikov, a teenager in 1986 Moscow. It begins with the divorce of his parents, which leaves him raised by his mother. Ivan turns increasingly nihilistic and lost, his mother is disappointed that he was unable to be admitted to an institute. He picks up a job as a courier and delivers mail to a wealthy family. What ensues is a love romance between Ivan and the daughter of a professor, which inevitably falls apart due to the pain in class difference. Throughout the movie, Ivan discusses bits of philosophy, only to be constantly reaffirmed that his future is hopeless. The West becomes a vessel of escapism, breakdance and skateboards are gifts from 'the Zone' that offer him some relief amidst the hopelessness of his future. The concluding scene depicts a Soviet soldier wounded from the Afghanistan War (1979-1989), exchanging depressed glances with Ivan. In *War and Peace* and *Seventeen Moments of Spring*, experienced actor Vjačeslav Tichonov played war heroes in different eras of Russia. But *Come and See* and *Courier* feature amateur teenage actors that do not play war heroes, but victims of war. *Glasnost'* movies exchange war heroism with pacifism and wish for a future for upcoming generations. Govorukhin and Balabanov are critical of romanticised violence in movies and depict the real consequences for many generations. There are no winners in wars, only losers.

Little Vera

On the 28th of June 1986, a televised discussion between people from Leningrad and Boston led to a Russian meme about prude Soviets. A woman from the United States explained that their TV adverts mostly revolved around sex, and if it was the same in the Soviet Union. A Russian woman answered that they didn't have sex and that they were categorically against it, elaborating that they had love instead (Telemost, 1986). Her statement was cut short to 'There is no sex in the USSR', which became a Russian catchphrase, yet oversimplifies the complexity of the discussion.

An important example on discussions about sex is the 1988 movie *Little Vera*. Natal'ja Negoda plays Vera Marinina, a teenage girl who grows up in an abusive home. She has a passionate relationship with her boyfriend, which leads to the first explicit sex scene in Soviet cinema. Western clothes, music and TV shows become part of their adolescent culture in a violent Soviet

environment, yet they hold their hopes up to marry and be happy together. Vera must constantly escape violent admirers, police brutality, and most importantly her family. Her parents constantly fight and berate her, and all sorrows are drowned in alcohol. One day, Vera's father stabs her boyfriend, and her parents force her to lie to the police. When Vera's boyfriend gets out of the hospital, he finds her incredibly depressed. She abuses alcohol and drugs to numb her pain.

Despite the movie's focus on how violence ruins Little Vera's future, many people merely recognise this *Glasnost'* cult classic for its explicit sex scene. The actor of Vera, Natal'ja Negoda, famously partook in a photoshoot with the US-American Playboy magazine. In an article of the May 1989 issue, she explains what she thinks of this hypocrisy:

> She [Natal'ja] recalled the furor Little Vera had set off because in it "a Soviet woman shows her tits in public. At the Moscow premiere, during the sexual scene, they were yelling, '*How dare you*?' Don't forget, we are a hypocritical society. The sex was criticized much more than the film's social content." ("That Glasnost Girl," 1989)

To her astonishment, Natal'ja Negoda was told that the people in the USA hold the same attitude towards sex and violence. While we may attribute pornography to vice, it is interesting to see how similar people who are open minded about pornography think across different cultures, even East and West. Camille Paglia comes to mind when I think of a woman with a pro pornographic attitude that sees the importance to acknowledge man's inner most desires:

> Far from poisoning the mind, pornography shows the deepest truth about sexuality, stripped of romantic veneer. No one can claim to be an expert in gender studies who is uncomfortable with pornography, which focuses on our primal identity, our rude and crude animality. Porn dreams of eternal fires of desire, without fatigue, incapacity, aging, or death. (Paglia, 2011, p. 66)

What does the explicit sex scene in Little Vera entail? A deep desire for a loving, lighthearted, fun relationship despite the violence of the industrialised Soviet city. What has been alluded to in *Moscow Does not Believe in Tears* and *The Meeting Place Cannot Be Changed* is fully depicted here, an act of passion and belonging. And when Vera flirts with her boyfriend, it is in Western clothes, listening to Western music. The final 'Zone', sex, has been entered. Yet the extremely violent Russian pornography of the 1990s (see Husband, 2015) has become the logical conclusion to decades of cinematographic propaganda and individualism. The 'Zone' has been broken open, and what was found is the violent behaviour of the Russian people that breaks into sexual expression. From the 1990s on, Russian generations pass on violence

genetically (sex and family) and mimetically (propaganda). Govorukhin's *You Cannot Live Like That* trilogy and Balabanov's *Brother* duology are a direct artistic investigation of how crime inevitably made everyone lose the future Russian generations to institutions like Putin's regime.

2. Govorukhin: Tak žit' nel'zja

Stanislav Govorukhin's documentary *You Cannot Live Like That* did not go unnoticed, neither in the Soviet Union nor in the USA. On the 11th of June 1990, the LA Times report:

> 'A film that equates criminals who rape and murder without mercy or regret with the Communist Party's actions during 72 years is already a sensation before it opens at Moscow movie theaters.' (Goldberg, 1990)

Tak žit' nel'zja does the unthinkable and ties individual crimes to a broader systematic issue caused by decades of Communist party regime. Previous Soviet movies have only implied this connection, yet Govorukhin used the momentum of the *Glasnost'* period to voice his critical opinion of the whole Soviet system. He was ready. He knew how to write a script about crime for the masses, as he proved with the box office success of Duvrov's *Pirates of the 20th Century*. He knew how to deconstruct the Soviet heroism to uncover the underlying crime networks, as he proved by directing *The Meeting Place Cannot Be Changed*. *You Cannot Live Like That* would become the voice of the 1990s generation. He formulated his philosophy in a 1989 essay titled 'WAR ON CRIME', published in the *Sovetskaja Kul'tura*. For example, he emphasises the procreational and generational aspect that we are already aware of from the *Glasnost'* movies:

> Proper resistance to crime can be organized only in a morally healthy society. But what kind of moral health of a nation could there be if for decades the best genetic stock of the country was being entirely and deliberately destroyed? […] The sick cells devoured the healthy ones. (Govorukhin et al., 1989, p. 105)

Through this lens, the movies from the *Octobre Revolution* and the *Great Patriotic War* become lies. The people were promised hope, yet only the people remained that caused a violent revolution and fought a violent War against the West. Violence became quintessential to the Russian culture, and the biggest crime was perpetrated by a personality cult in WW2, as Govorukhin explains in his movie:

> The main crime of the Stalinist regime was the creation of a new type of person. Raised in an atmosphere of lies, treachery, servile loyalty to the leader, brought up in a society in which the

meaning of many concepts was shifted and took an opposite meaning (white became black, honor and nobility were faults, and informing on neighbors a civic duty). (Govorukhin et al., 1989, p. 105)

Govorukhin especially sees the replacement of the Christian institution with Socialism as a fundamental problem for the ethic mentality of his compatriots:[4]

> For 1000 years a great nation lived according to the moral "Christian" precepts. These were proclaimed harmful and meaningless, and scoffed at. And now: kill, steal, bear false witness, create idols, do not honor either your father or your mother. (Govorukhin et al., 1989, p. 105)

Due to the critical nature of his documentary, Govorukhin is surprised by Gorbačëv's positive response, as he is quoted by the LA Times: '"For the life of me, I can't understand how Gorbachev could like it," he said, sounding distressed' (Goldberg, 1990). Still, Govorukhin remained pessimistic about any future hope for his country in 1990:

> " Personally, I'm a pessimist," he said. "I have no basis to think everything will get better quickly. There's no one in this whole country except absolute idiots who doesn't think tomorrow will be worse. And when people have no hope, and God has been taken away from them, what can you expect?" (Goldberg, 1990)

Govorukhin concludes his essay with his worries about future generations. He thinks that gradual reforms are not enough, and that swifter changes are needed to save the nation:

> The result is the following: While we, through slow reforms, are trying to organize a normal life, a tremendous percentage of young people will become forever lost to society. (Govorukhin et al., 1989, p. 106)

2.1. You Cannot Live Like That (1990)

Govorukhin's documentary begins with crime. Immediately, the viewer is introduced to a title card for the first part of *You Cannot Live Like That*: "Part 1: What is Crime? The Soviet Militia and the International Experience of the Fight against Crime". The title cards throughout the movie suggest an argumentative, essayistic structure meant to convince the audience:

[4] The replacement of Christianity with Socialism and its disastrous consequences is also a common theme in the respective works of Nobel Prize laureates Aleksandr Solženicyn (awarded 1970) and Czesław Miłosz (awarded 1980).

- Part 1: What is Crime? The Soviet Militia and the International Experience of the Fight against Crime
- Part 2: Criminals in Power. An attempt to analyse crime
- Part 3: You Cannot Live Like That
- Part 4: Front Notes (A Peripheral Report)

While the imagery aims to closely portray reality, they are also staged and edited together for Govorukhin's line of argumentation. This is quite similar to the mounting movies of the 1920s, which leads Govorukhin to construct a new cinematographic reality. Crime becomes a central question as to why one cannot live like that, and it seems like it can only be answered if one compares the universal experience of crime and justice, law and order, with other nations of this world. Given the geopolitical situation this movie was produced in, the viewer could already reasonably assume that Russia's fight against crime would probably be compared to the West. As we know from the Russian film canon, such comparisons are not only meant to construct an image of the others, but also one of themselves. Therefore, the fight against crime begins with a scene in Russia.[5]

A man in blue reports a crime that a woman in red has witnessed. The beige-carré flooring seems nostalgic and quite Soviet in its design, setting the scene of the domestic violence that

[5] I have included the time stamps for each individual screenshot for reference in my bibliography towards the end of my master's thesis.

must be fought. The window only allows little light to fall into the room, yet it accentuates the contours of both the man and woman. In a literal sense, this documentary is supposed to shed light on the people themselves. The light also shines upon the notepad that the militiaman uses to document the crime, making him able to see what he writes. A double meaning lies in this visible notepad. On the one hand, the transperency of the *Glasnost'* era must provide the means of documenting the commited crimes, and to find its perpetrator. On the other hand, it underlines the mission of the documentary *Tak žit' nel'zja* to shed light on the crimes of Russia and to document it precisely. Yet the darkness visualises the problem of the investigation. The viewer can barely see anything in the darkness, because the Soviet Union supposedly built a society of lies and deception within which it is difficult to find the truth. The auteur of the documentary, Stanislav Govorukhin, makes a commitment to shed light on the crimes of the Soviet Union. The viewer is held accountable to keep their eyes open and to watch closely at the criminality that Govorukhin exposes.

Afterwards, the camera pans through the room. Some figures investigate the crime scene, some are lost in it. The darkness hides their identities, meaning that much of the truth finding process lies in the shadows. A flashlight illuminates parts of the crime scene. A bookshelf becomes briefly visible, and a person in shock. The light in the darkness of a murder scene categorises *Tak žit' nel'zja* as a realist murder mystery, which acknowledges the hardships of finding the truth and underlines the importance of searching for it. Afterwards, the documentary shows a series of graphic images of corpses. The portrayed homicide is not stylised, it shows the chaotic poses that the many corpses fell into. Some of the women clearly fell victim to sexualised crimes. The Russian language clearly underlines the importance of pride and shame in its culture through vocabulary like *izdevatel'stvo*, which roughly translates as a mockery of someone. Therefore, showcasing a series of brutally murdered victims should evoke a particularly strong response in Govorukhin's Soviet audience. Afterwards, the light is shed upon the criminals of the nation.

A flashlight shines upon the face of a Russian murderer. His blue shirt signifies his masculinity that is associated to many of the brutal crimes in the Soviet Union. Still, while a tendency of male violence is made clear in Govorukhin's documentary, it must also be noted that occasional female perpetrators are shown as well. Their crimes are usually quite gendered as well, for example they let their own children die out of their own insanity. The insanity of the murderers becomes evident through their hectic eye movements, as it is visible in the facial expressions of the young man above. Through very colloquial Russian expressions, he slurs that he would not be responsible for any such crimes. Indeed, the flashlight shines light upon the perpetrators that lurk in the dark of the deceptive Soviet Union. It is also important how the criminals look like as opposed to their victims, since Govorukhin builds up his reasoning on race and politics.

In the beginning, the documentary establishes two acting groups that are fundamental for the rest of the movie: The perpetrators and the victims of the crime. The viewer of *Tak žit' nel'zja* sides with the auteur Stanislav Govorukhin to uncover the violent crimes of the villains of the Soviet Union, the criminals. Therefore, the *us* vs *them* in *Tak žit' nel'zja* is first and foremost *our* country that is destroyed by *their* criminality. The criminals are portrayed as mad people who do not belong in Soviet society, neither by their looks, nor by their expressions, nor by their criminal deeds. The victims of the crime on the hands are portrayed in such a way that the viewer is made to sympathise with them.

For example, this photo which is used at a woman's funeral, shows clear and soft light. It is important to note that the photo is monochrome. Throughout the documentary, many passages that depict the past are monochrome as well. This person whom the viewer would rather sympathise with is now dead, while the depicted murderers with their unsettling tics are alive and well. Clearly, the criminal *urody* (freaks) of the Soviet Union are on a murder spree against the regular *ljudi* (folk) of the country. The family mourns around the grave of the young woman, and the camera shows the snowy cemetery that the young woman was buried in. The documentary makes the viewer aware of the issue that the 'bad people' kill the 'good people'.

To highlight the abundance of criminals in the Soviet Union, Govorukhin shows how women are longing for their incarcerated boyfriends in front of a prison. Judging by how they look, these women are quite ordinary. They are 'normal people' waiting for their lovers to come out. Their hair styles are curly and grandiose, as it was usual for the period of the 1980s/1990s, and their fashion sense is well put together. They are noble women staring proudly at their lovers' cages. The contrast of how normal these women look as opposed to the idea of criminals that we were given at the beginning of the movie causes an absurd effect. It becomes humorous as the women begin to communicate with their imprisoned lovers via sign language. A freeway separates the women from their men even more. The cars create an ear numbing experience, and the hectic flow of traffic make it seem like the women must play peekaboo with their men. Even for the viewer, it is very difficult to see how the men communicate back through their barricaded prison windows.

Govorukhin comments on how young the numerous women are. He begins to interview one of them. She is 19 years old and married to her imprisoned husband who is 26. He will be imprisoned for about eight more years, and she plans to wait for him. He was charged for crime '146', robbery. He had assaulted a young woman, trying to steal any gold she had been wearing. This case is quite characteristic for a Russian crime: A man attacks a woman; he tries to steal something of value.

A cinematic strong point of the documentary is its commitment to realism, showing many minute details of Russian everyday life. To communicate quicker, the prisoners scribble little

notes to their women into a newspaper. Afterwards, they throw it outside their window onto the freeway. The young women are reckless enough to run up on the freeway and pick up the rolled-up newspapers. This scene shows how ruthless the antisocial criminals are, bringing their girlfriends and wives in danger. The young women, dressed accordingly to civilised societal standards, are drawn to the brutal behaviour of their men through their adolescent naiveté. A truly tragic sight for both the director and the viewer, as the *urody* of this nation conquer the hearts of the beautiful young women that are so easily beaten and murdered. Later, the documentary shows women in another context. The scene begins in a strip club, with women dancing erotically in alluring lingerie. Govorukhin starts to explore the vices of the Soviet Union.

A dark alleyway is illuminated by bright billboards. The adverts are changing between brands that are popular in the West like ‘Berghaus’. Most importantly, another service can be bought from the alleyway: Prostitution. Govorukhin and his team approach the sex workers to enquire about their services and prices. The moral decline that hides in the darkness is easily uncovered in front of the viewer, since its source shines brightly in the background. The mise-en-scène that puts everyone in front of the capitalist adverts, and the occasional focus of the camera on said symbols, suggest that the imported Western capitalism might be the source of evil. Govorukhin plays with the freedoms of the era the documentary is produced in to touch on politically sensitive topics. The suggestive content of his investigation is not entertaining, instead it is exposing a dire societal problem. The discourse about *Little Vera* incited to shine a

light on the sexual vices of the Soviet people, and Govorukhin's thorough investigation of violence and sex foreshadows the violent pornography and sex trafficking of the later 1990s. Sex is inevitably tied to procreation, and since Govorukhin investigates how violence and crime are passed on from generation to generation, he emphasises the role of women in society. To 'sell' sex is likely an idea that was more so tied to capitalism, which is why the Western billboards in the background only make sense. We see the gradual liberalisation of the markets through the *Perestroika* in this scene and voiced through the freedom of speech granted by the *Glasnost'* policy.

So far, Stanislav Govorukhin puts the Soviet Union into a negative light. It is a place engulfed in darkness, and deeper insights only reveal murder and vice. Mostly men who seem atypical in their behaviour are the perpetrators of the crimes, and young, gullible, beautiful women fall for them. They are in constant danger and give a lot to men, be it with their patience and recklessness in front of a prison, or ready to undress and sell their bodies in a strip club or alleyway. What remains are the elder people who mourn for their young victims, all the while the creepy culprits remain alive and well. In this picture, we see two important figures who gradually uncover the crimes of the Soviet Union. On the left is Aleksandr Nevzorov, the news anchor of Leningrad TV's 600 Seconds that showed the crime of the USSR. He sits next to Govorukhin, and both are aware of the many victims of the crimes. Govorukhin has set an interesting introduction of Soviet Russia in the late 1980s, before he presents the viewer how crime and punishment work in the far away New York.

The viewer gets a glimpse of New York, then they are shown the title card: ‘*Gorod Želtogo D’javola*’, the ‘city of the yellow devil’. This is an allusion to the eponymous short story collection by Maksim Gor’kij from 1906. It is a famous Russian depiction of the United States and represents the common scepticism for working solely for ‘the Yellow Devil – Gold’ (Gorky, 1977, p. 11). Afterwards, the screen shows how the camera is zoomed in closely to a New York skyscraper. The camera focuses on the bright yellow light that reflects from the skyscraper, before the camera zooms out slowly and reveals the skyline of New York. The light holds a contradictory meaning here. While the Golden shimmer reminds the viewer of ‘the Yellow Devil’, the bright US-American light is also antithetical to the criminal darkness that the Soviet Union is engulfed in. To understand the deeper meaning of the juxtaposition, we must compare the depiction of Gor’kij’s New York in 1906 to Govorukhin’s New York in the 1980s:

> ‘This is a city. This is New York. Twenty-storeyed houses, dark soundless skyscrapers, stand on the shore. Square, lacking in any desire to be beautiful, the bulky, ponderous buildings tower gloomily and drearily. A haughty pride in its height, and its ugliness is felt in each house. There are no flowers at the windows and no children to be seen… From this distance the city seems like a vast jaw, with uneven black teeth. It breathes clouds of black smoke into the sky and puffs like a glutton suffering from his obesity.’ (Gorky, 1977, pp. 8–9)

What both depictions have in common is grey hue that surrounds the tall skyscrapers, and the seeming lack of any nature or people. Yet the skyscrapers are no longer as blockish in the 1980s New York, perhaps it is also a matter of personal taste if the buildings have become more

beautiful or not. Furthermore, the viewer can be sure that New York is depicted here in a positive light. The jazz music in the background sets a positive tone, the sky above the ‘vast jaw with uneven black teeth’ is as clear and blue as the water below. Govorukhin had full control over when and how to film the New York skyline, and the bright warm light reflecting of the skyscrapers surrounded by a blue hue seems inviting and exciting to the viewer. Another positive point Govorukhin shows is the activism for various things in the United States, including US-Americans who protest the sale of fur clothing. This is of course a stark contrast to what the Soviet Union had previously been used to in their freedoms to protest, before *glasnost’* gradually allowed more freedom of speech.

What Govorukhin remarks in New York are the numerous cash rewards for citizens as an incentive to report and fight crime. Suddenly, money is not just the ‘yellow devil’ anymore, but also a pragmatic means of solving crime. New York aims to protect her police officers through this scheme. Later in the documentary, when Govorukhin interviews some police officers, they point out to him that they receive a large salary for their dangerous jobs and that their family would receive a large payoff from their life insurances, should something happen to them. Even the churches, which are heavily vandalised in the Soviet Union as Govorukhin later shows, are protected in New York by cash rewards to fight vandalism and vice.

Govorukhin proceeds to show a less beautiful area of New York, the Bronx. Showing their worn-down buildings and interviewing survivors of crime, the director states that the Bronx have long been a source for Soviet journalism to report on crimes in the West. Thereby, he

acknowledges what picture of the United States the audience has, before he continues to show what kind of things work in the West as opposed to the Soviet Union. He then proceeds to talk about the source of crime. These would mostly occur in districts inhabited by Latin-Americans and by the *Negry*, the African Americans. It is important to stress that in the Russian language, what we express as the N-word is still the common name for people of colour. He then says that statistically, *Cvetnye*, 'the coloured', commit 90% of US-American crimes. This is important to keep in mind, considering Govorukhin's thought that criminality is passed on genetically. He points out the irony that the white US-America would cry about the crimes committed by the people they had enslaved in the past.

The documentary begins to show New York at night. Everything is engulfed in silent darkness, but numerous NYPD police cars bring light and noise to a crime scene. Apparently, two African Americans tried to assault a prostitute and to drag her in their car. The criminals have no chance against the overwhelming police force. Light shines upon a white female police officer talking to a young African American in a bright red outfit that is labelled with a 'Guardian Angels' logo. Through the hectic camera movements, it becomes unclear whether the young man in shiny clothing is a culprit, or just a witness. Nevertheless, the police force has full control over the situation. How could they not, with the police being so well equipped and staffed? That is at least the message that the documentary's footage and editing suggest. In contrast to the women that are portrayed in the Soviet Union, the US-American women may feel safer, given that the NYPD is so reliable. Furthermore, the police officer in the image above is a woman, meaning

that women in the US can defend their gender by themselves as well. A stark contrast to the gullible women in Russia, that would run across a highway for the love of their life.

In Gor'kij's New York, the police force also has a full watch over the city at night. They are positioned well and waiting for any crime to happen:

> 'Policemen in grey hats stand motionless at street corners with clubs in their hands. They chew tobacco, their jaws moving slowly. The man walks past them, past the telephone poles and the multitude of black doors in the walls of the houses – black doors, their square jaws yawning sleepily. Somewhere far away a streetcar clatters and wails. The night suffocates in the deep cages of the streets, the night is dead. The man walks with a measured stride, swaying his long, bent frame. There is something about him showing a mind at work, something undecided, yet decisive… I think he is a thief.' (Gorky, 1977, pp. 19–20)

A new addition in Govorukhin's New York is the fact that the night is no longer dead. Bright billboards and police sirens light up the metropole, and the clattering and wailing of some streetcars are widely amplified by the noise that the contemporary NYPD produces.

Contrary to Moscow, the police are so abundant that they even arrive when there was no crime involved. For example, they appear when the ambulance is called, 'just to be safe'. The female police officer conveys confidence, as she is backed by a powerful police force that watches over New York day and night. From a Russian perspective, the West is constructed as a positive example for law enforcement.

The funerals of police officers show how much they are valued by their respective nations. The image on top shows that a massive ceremony is held for a killed police officer, after the narration explained how much money their family is given for compensation. The image at the bottom shows how the Soviet funeral pales in contrast. Only few police officers attend their funeral, and helpless elder family members cry in the consequent shots. The director's admiration of the US law enforcement suggests his need for a competent law enforcement at home.



Govorukhin doubles down in his argumentations by pointing out details that may be remembered as anecdotes. He asked a police officer in Moscow and in New York to show him how long it takes them to draw their gun. The Soviet police officer struggles as he needs to unpack his pistol from his bag, which makes the process last dozens of seconds. The US-American police officer shows how her gun is holstered to the inside of her jacket, making the whole act last only a couple of seconds.

Germany becomes the most interesting example of Western efficiency. When he asks a German police officer from Hamburg about his gun, he notes how he never had to use it in his life. The depiction of New York was already an interesting surprise for the Soviet audience; yet the depiction of the FRG, the successor to Nazi Germany, seems to be the most civilised of them all. The West, the forbidden ‘Zone’, seems to be way more progressive than the Soviet home. When Govorukhin shows the impoverished Čeboksary in contrast, it is a depressing sight for the audience.

Govorukhin constructed an optimistic picture of the West and established that the true problems lie at home in the Soviet Union. It is interesting how the West was seen before both as space for metaphysical desires, but also as an inaccessible sphere that causes problems for the Soviet Union. Yet the auteur Govorukhin navigated this mysterious zone with such confidence that some sort of disillusion must have happened for the Soviet audience. With this imagery, Govorukhin shows the next title card: 'Part 2: Criminals in Power. An attempt to analyse crime'. The intergenerational aspect remains within his argumentation, but it is important to distinguish the institutions he criticises. Before, he made an argument based on race, both for Russian criminals *(Urody*) and US-American criminals (*Negry*). The US-American government is portrayed in some sense as a capitalist police state, but on a positive note because they can fight crime effectively. Govorukhin begins to criticise the Soviet government and its historic roots.

Supposedly, the Octobre Revolution is the root cause for the violent culture in the Soviet Union and its fiscal mismanagement. Govorukhin shows the many different statues in the Soviet Union that keep up a cult of personality around e.g. Lenin and explains the exorbitant costs that the Soviet government pays to place and upkeep those monuments. The director's cinematography validates his facts by showing how Govorukhin navigates extensive archives that show many facts and figures. The aesthetics of the archival investigations are a reoccurring theme throughout the *You Cannot Live Like That* trilogy that warrants further research but are unfortunately beyond the scope of my master's thesis that focuses on the construction of the West here. The audience becomes gradually involved in Govorukhin's thorough investigations, and the director makes them aware of how the Soviet Union's institutions perpetuate criminal behaviour and poverty. The director criticises the socialist education from childhood on through institutions like the *Komsomol*, further reinforcing his point on how children are an important aspect for shaping the future of the Soviet Union.

Through vivid imagery, Govorukhin shows the consequences of the government's failures in the following scenes.

The top image shows a camera drive through the shopping streets of Hamburg. Govorukhin narrates how these shops are not only there for decoration, but people may also actually shop there with their money. The lines in the Soviet Union however have become iconic, and a subject of concern when he compares the happiness of Russians to the West in his ‘WAR ON CRIME’ essay: ‘But how could a nation standing in line, looking at the back of the neck of the person in front, be cheerful? We spend one-quarter of our lives waiting in line’ (Govorukhin et al., 1989, p. 105).

To step up the discussion about the cruelty of the Socialists, Govorukhin explores the GULAG system and the demise of the church. Govorukhin shows the vast GULAG complex in the Soviet Union, its statistics, and how his family was affected as well. This is in line with the *Glasnost'* cultural discourse. The dissident Aleksandr Solženicyn published his book *The Gulag Archipelago* first in 1973 in France, and then it was officially released in the Soviet Union in 1989. The church as an important ethic institution has fallen to ruins in the meantime, as Govorukhin demonstrates.

Govorukhin enters a church and shows how the Soviet people have lost their moral values during the atheist policy of the Soviet government. The place is engulfed in darkness and has not been maintained. Contrary to the socialist monuments that Govorukhin showed earlier, no money has been put into the church. Socialism replaced Christianity, and far more resources went into the upkeep of the GULAG. Inscribed on the wall behind the upset director are lewd notes. For example, the word *pizda* is a curse word (so called *mat* vocabulary) for female genitals. The combination with 'capitalist' words on the wall, brand names like 'Scharp' and 'Toyota', links female sexuality to prostitution. While capitalism honours, protects and empowers women in the West, the socialist system devalues women. The struggles of women were prevalent in Thaw and *Glasnost'* movies like *Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears* and *Little Vera*. Govorukhin elevates the protection of women to a Christian value.

Govorukhin ultimately deconstructs the Soviet Union’s moral superiority over the West when he begins to compare the Octobre revolutionaries with the Nazis. He explains that while the Nazis were tried during the Nuremburg trials, no equivalent would have happened for the Soviet Union. It was the cinema of the *Glasnost’* period that disregarded the traditional Soviet heroism in favour of addressing the government’s failures. As we have seen in the Hamburg scenes, Govorukhin even sees a positive example in Germany for the Soviet Union to follow. The backwardness of the Soviet Union becomes especially clear in the airport scene.

In the international Moscow airport, Govorukhin shows how the Soviet people cannot access the international market. Food, Jewellery, and souvenirs are all on display for international tourists. When Govorukhin tries to pay with Rubels, the cashier must decline. Apparently, only international and a special local airport currency are allowed for the purchase of goods, as one could not afford anything by paying with Rubels. The Western brands that are so easily accessible in Hamburg, and occasionally decorate the backgrounds of Moscow, are out of reach for ordinary Soviet citizens.

The next part of the movie, 'Part 3: You Cannot Live Like That', explains briefly that the rest of the world sees the Soviet Union as a regressive nation.

Part 3 contains only this small excerpt from comedian Michail Žvaneckij, which lasts about ten seconds:

> 'Вот я и думаю, а может нас для примера держат? Весь мир смотрит и польцам показывают: Видите, дети? Так жить нельзя!'
>
> [Thus, I think, maybe they see us an example? The whole world watches, as they point their finger at us and say: You see, children? You cannot live like that!]

Govorukhin's choice of the title *You Cannot Live Like That* suggests that the Soviet people always need to be aware of how they are perceived by the West, a tradition that exists in Soviet cinema since *The Extraordinary Adventures of Mr. West in the Land of the Bolsheviks*. Therefore, the national identity is constructed through the eyes of the West as well.

The final section of the movie, ‘Part 4: Front Notes (A Peripheral Report)’, highlights the Soviet military’s inability to maintain order and protect people outside of Russia. Govorukhin shows how the Armenians mourn after the January 1990 genocide in Baku, Azerbaijan. In the subchapter ‘Lessons from the Berlin Wall’, Govorukhin shows the graveyards of murdered East Germans who tried to cross the Berlin Wall. One of his concluding speeches summarises his political stance towards socialism, as he depicts people watching the East:

> ‘Поразительно, как люди свободного мира смотрели на это за колючей проволокой. Зачем они заперли себя в тюрьму? Что они собираются защищать? Идеалы социализма? А может быть бедность от богатства? Рабство от свободы? Догму от творческой мысли? И почему это надо зачищать штыками? История со стеной навевает на любопытные размышления. Мне кажется, мало кто из ответственных товарищей предчувствовал грядущие перемены. Вот что значит не понимать, что такое сила народного возмущения. Это недопонимание обескураживает, но, как ни странно, внушает и надежду.’
>
> [We can only wonder what the people of the free world thought when they watched this from behind a barbed wire. Why did they put themselves into prison? What do they plan to protect? The ideals of socialism? Or do they want to protect their poverty from wealth? Slavery from freedom? Dogma from creative thought? And why would you defend these things with bayonets? The history behind the wall leads to curious reflections. It seems to me like only few of the responsible comrades foresaw the gradual changes. This is what you get for underestimating the power of the people’s complaints. This lack of understanding is discouraging, yet strangely leads to hope.]

By the end of the documentary, Govorukhin reinterprets the city Berlin from a symbol of victory for the Soviet Union to a symbol of failure for socialist values. He subverts the narrative of the Communist party that was reproduced both in politics and cinema. The 1950 movie *Fall of Berlin* painted the German capital as a beacon for an evil West, from the USA to Nazi Germany, that conspires together against Moscow. The 1973 TV series *Seventeen Moments of Spring* declared that the Nazis were civilised people who made a grave mistake by committing the Holocaust, and that not the whole West was involved in the Nazi crimes. Both movies still signal Soviet heroism, be it the soldiers in the 1950 movie who conquered the *Reichstag*, or Max Otto von Stierlitz who spied against the Nazis. Here, Govorukhin instead joins the other directors of the *Glasnost'* period to deconstruct Soviet heroism and moral superiority.

It is no longer about what the Soviet Union thinks about the West, it is about what the West thinks about the Soviet Union. A man with a movie camera films what happens behind the barbed wire, and we see the Brandenburg Gate from the West Zone, with a massive peace sign drawn on it. By stating that 'You Cannot Live Like That', Govorukhin holds a mirror in front of the Soviet audience. They must think about how they live, and what example they set for the world.

2.2. The Russia We Have Lost (1992) and The Great Criminal Revolution (1994)

In 1991, the Soviet Union fell apart, and Govorukhin received wide recognition for his documentary. He received the 1990 Prix du Festival at the Montréal World Film Festival ‘For the contribution to the understanding of history’, as well as 1991 Nika awards for Best Director, Best Screenplay, and Best Documentary (imdb.com, 2024a). In 1992, Govorukhin followed up with the movie *Aleksandr Solženicyn*. It was an interview with the eponymous Russian conservative. It became clear that Govorukhin and Solženicyn would together highly regard Russia, and that the Soviet Union was a massive mistake in the great scheme of things. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of *Glasnost’*, people like Govorukhin and Solženicyn would enter a period of Russian conservatism. They defined the Russian cultural identity by the greatness of the Tsarist Empire, and by denouncing the Soviet Union.

With *The Russia We Have Lost*, Govorukhin made a sequel that offered a very meticulously researched, but admittedly dry documentary.[6] Govorukhin edits together many scenes of Tsarist Russia to show its greatness and narrates over it in an academic manner. The contents are more than interesting and should be studied more extensively, since Govorukhin shows how he accesses multiple archives that are closed off today. Still, the overly historic approach is what most likely did not give him any more awards and recognition. The arguably most famous sentence in the movie, ‘*Rossija - zagadočnaja strana* [Russia is an enigmatic country]’, summarises well how aware Russian intellectuals are of their history and has also become an internet meme when mocking the weird aspects of Russia. It seems like for once, Govorukhin made a movie that was not aimed at convincing the masses, but to use the freedoms in archival research.

The Russia We Have Lost shows the potential for Russia that was lost and dismantles the personality cult of Lenin. The movie features long scenes of Alaska, which was sold off cheaply, and shows royal ties to the West which were manifested in the architecture from Paris to Moscow. Western Europe became a hideout for Lenin who used the party funds to live in exile, money that was robbed from the Tsarist Empire.

[6] In the third entry of his documentary trilogy, Govorukhin becomes gradually offensive in his investigations. Throughout the confrontations, people would constantly recognise him as the ‘director of *You Cannot Live Like That*’, but never for the sequel of the first entry.

Lenin resided at ‘La Closerie des Lilas’, a fancy restaurant in Paris. He talked to various intellectuals, and some supposedly mocked Lenin’s intelligence. Therefore, the socialist icon Lenin becomes a person that was attracted to Western decadence and intelligence. Govorukhin deconstructs Lenin’s personality cult by showcasing his shortcomings. At the same time, Lenin seems like an opportunist when Govorukhin narrates: ‘*Lenin prazival revoljuciju* [Lenin yawned away the revolution; a Russian idiom to suggest that he missed the revolution out of laziness]’. It makes the audience wonder if he ever cared about the needs of the proletariat.

The second entry of Govorukhin's documentary trilogy became a niche movie and marked Govorukhin's fading influence as a director in the 1990s. He was quite successful when he rode the cinematographically liberal momentums of the Thaw, *Glasnost'*, and democracy periods of Russia. Yet it was 1993 that caused a great restriction on freedom of speech when El'cin took over the power of the Russian Federation through violent means. Images of a smoking Duma after the army fired at it marked the television landscape. Govorukhin remained dedicated to the thorough investigations of Russian culture and history, but it became obvious that he could no longer garner attention for his movies. In 1994, Govorukhin finished the movie *The Great Criminal Revolution*. Under the El'cin government, the movie was not approved for television broadcast, and was mostly distributed through niche channels like video stores (see Ruščënko, 2010). It concludes Govorukhin's documentary trilogy: *You Cannot Live Like That* showed the present, *The Russia We Have Lost* showed the past, and *The Great Criminal Revolution* predicted the future. This time, Govorukhin showcases actual connections between crime syndicates and their rise to politics. This most likely led to the censorship and restriction of the movie.

While the movie could not have significantly influenced other Russian directors or the Russian people, *The Great Criminal Revolution* shows a realistic depiction of Russian crime in the 1990s that is worth studying. It shows the failed foreign policy of the Russian Federation in terms of economics and geopolitics as well as the increasing domestic corruption. For example, Govorukhin underlines the chaotic nature of the dissolution of the Soviet Union by showing the brutal civil war in Tajikistan from 1992 on. Russia also wastes resources to fill the purse of the corrupt politicians. Many raw materials were sold for very cheap prices to the West and to China. Govorukhin even shows the Russian Chinese border to show how quickly the Russian resources are depleted, and how quickly and efficiently the Chinese people use them to build entire new city districts. Some resources are wasted entirely, like the Soviet arms just left behind in the former GDR.[7]

[7] The 2024 Nobel Prize laureates in economics have shown how a corrupt government, and the consequent loss of trust in national institutions, leads to long lasting poverty (The Royal Academy of Sciences, 2024). Russia is here just another case study for this dynamic. Govorukhin uncovers the corruption of the Russian government from the Octobre Revolution to the 1990s, and how it affects the mentality of the regular people. The historic corruption of Russia has led to a system of crime and poverty, making the 1990s 'chaotic'.

Govorukhin’s focus on raw materials and his religious attitude become iconic for his Russian conservatism. In this image for example, he showcases aluminium, and how it is sold beyond the international standard prices to make quick money. The background is decorated with religious imagery that looks like it is ready to be sold as well, which emphasises how even modern Russia is ready to sell away their ethics for quick profit. This depiction of ‘raw economics’ confirms that Govorukhin wants to stray away from historical fiction and wants to shape the future of his nation instead. He takes known imagery from Russian culture and crystallises them to communicate through investigative research that the Russian people are obligated to save their future. Govorukhin begins to build the narrative that ‘Russia is getting robbed’. While Putin uses a similar narrative to justify his war of aggression today, it seems entirely arbitrary compared to Govorukhin’s line of conservative argumentation. Govorukhin does not blame the West, or China, for the robbery of Russia. Instead, it is the vile mismanagement of resources that leads to the depletion of Russia’s rich lands.

Govorukhin tries to create direct footage of criminal actors in Russia. He interviews many corrupt politicians, for example mayors who work together with crime syndicates. But the focus lies on the criminals on the streets. The image at the top depicts some criminals parking next to each other, while the camera man hides behind a corner. The image at the bottom shows an interview with a high-ranking criminal, his face is censored here. Govorukhin's investigative documentary captures the imagery of 1990s crime on film.

Since the Rubel has become quite worthless during the economic recession of the 1990s, criminals began to forge dollars to maximise their wealth. Govorukhin shows in detail how accurate the false money is.

Finally, the movie ends by showing children that steal raw resources for low sums of money. The multiple stills show the impoverished youth who tries to get by on a day-to-day basis, and willingly resorts to crime. Govorukhin shows that the future Russian generations are lost.

3. Balabanov: Brat

Aleksej Balabanov's *Brother* duology is arguably one of the most iconic depictions of crime in the Russian wild 1990s. It's importance for the Russian cultural identity, as well as Russia's dynamic relationship with the West, makes it a prominent in Western research (for example, see: Beumers, 2016b; Engel, 1999; Norris and Seckler, 2016). The accompanying music is a mixture of Western and Russian influences, intra- and extradiegetic, and sets a memorable theme for the wild 1990s (Österberg, 2018). The complex dynamics between Russia and the West are often read as a 1990s power fantasy (see Hashamova, 2007).

My aim here is to reread the *Brother* duology with the knowledge that we have acquired from the *You Cannot Live Like That* trilogy. We want to understand the formation of Russian identity and the construction of the West with the context of the themes Govorukhin introduced between 1990 and 1994. In these aspects, the cinematography of Brother and Brother 2 were crucially influenced by their respective budgets. *Brother* had a budget of 250.000$, whereas its sequel *Brother 2* had a budget of 1.500.000$ (Norris and Seckler, 2016, pp. 207–208). Therefore, different means were used to depict the influences of the West on the protagonist of both movies. For example, the first entry plays in St Petersburg, a historic gateway to the West. It features people influenced by the West, and Western branding. The sequel has its first half playing in Moscow, and its second half in New York and mainly Chicago.

3.1. Brother (1997)

The protagonist Danila Bagrov returns as a veteran from the Chechen War to Moscow. His mother speaks of old times, for example how great Danila's father was and how great of a son Danila's brother Victor Bagrov is. Danila sets out to visit his brother in St Petersburg. As a war veteran, he feels alienated from society and cannot settle in the city. Only when he resorts to violence to solve the problems of others, he finds new friends. His friends are people like Hoffmann, a German beggar; Sveta, a woman who lives with her violent husband; and Kèt, a techno girl addicted to the Western lifestyle. He finally meets his brother to find out that he is involved in crime as well, and Danila helps him with multiple hit jobs. In the meantime, he loves listening to 1990s Russian music with clear Western influences. Danila tries to solve everyone's problems with gradually more violence, yet everyone becomes so scared of him that they do not wish to see him anymore. Hoffmann despises Russian violence, Sveta does not need another violent boyfriend, and Victor is scared for his life. He leaves St Petersburg, and the audience is left wondering what is supposed to happen with this isolated, young war veteran.

In the beginning of the movie, Danila inadvertently stumbles through a film set. The cheap bottles and cups with Western branding, and the Sony TV suggest that the depicted director most likely produces uninspiring movies based on Western popular trends. A group of thugs attempts to remove Danila from the scene. Balabanov comments here on the role of movie directors in the 1990s, suggesting that they only care about cheap mass media entertainment, and no longer the well-being of Russians in trouble. Even though Balabanov resorts to fiction, he commits like Govorukhin to Tarkovskij's principle of depicting the pain of their time.

The Bagrov brothers experience different sides of Russian identity. Danila is welcomed home by his mother in Moscow, but she seems abusive and dismissive to him. It shows again that violence is not only passed on through wars and revolutions, but also within the family. Yet the Russian food on the table seems inviting. Victor works for his mob boss, who owns Western technology like a computer. Small Western props signify violence and crime throughout the movie.

Western pop culture offers a sense of escapism for everyone involved with crime. The mob boss Kruglyj has an US-American model hanging on his wall. The erotic content suggests that Kruglyj objectifies women, given the Russian cinematographic context which links pornography to violence. Danila on the other hand values women. He respects the music saleswoman who offers him both Western and Russian music. The background is decorated with women like Courtney Love, spelled in Cyrillic.

The top image of a lonesome Danila sitting in St Petersburg is quite prevalent in Russian cultural memory. Danila saunters around the intercultural St Peterburg, and while he and the audience feel connected to the sights, he is entirely isolated. He breaks his alienation from society when he rescues Hoffmann from being racketeered. Danila is open minded about Germans but mentions that he dislikes Jews. The cemetery becomes a lively connection hub between the Russian war veteran and the German beggars.

Western tourists have become quite common in St Petersburg, and it helps Danila to build a cover for his assassination missions. Danila is directly confronted with the West when he meets Kèt, who gives directions in English for two seemingly clueless tourists. Danila receives the mission to assassinate a Chechen mob boss, meaning that he is thrown into situations similar to his deployment in the Chechen war. He buys his iconic Western clothes from Littlewoods to distract from his Russian identity and scout out the Chechen's location.

Western props become violent vessels to commit crime. It is implied that Danila was part of a special force unit in Chechnya, which is why he builds improvised weapons. Here he uses a Sprite bottle to construct a silencer for a revolver he stole in St Petersburg. Kruglyj's henchmen even use Western cars to pursue Sveta, since they need information about Danila who allegedly double crossed them during the Chechen assassination.

Music remains an important refuge for Danila. The top image shows how Danila is trapped between two women after a concert by Nautilus Pompilius, a band he listens to throughout the whole movie. Sveta on the left represents a traditional Russian woman, whereas Kèt conveys a modern Western attitude. Danila's interest in music keeps increasing, and the bottom image shows how he visits a group of musicians and artists while he is actually supposed to hold someone hostage in the same apartment.



Towards the end of the movie, Danila is ambushed by a henchman and his Discman catches the bullet. His fascination with music saved his life, perhaps because art is supposed to free people from the violent society. It is revealed throughout the movie that Kruglyj ordered to rape Sveta, and to hold Danila’s brother hostage. Danila finds Kruglyj’s location and murders the mob brutally. Pornography is running in the background, emphasising the decay of society that was partly imported from the West. Danila sets out on a self-justice spree, and scares off his friends.

Danila thinks that he can solve all problems with the money that he stole from Kruglyj, but his friends do not want to accept his help anymore. The final person who seems like she wants to remain is Kèt. Danila offers her money at a McDonalds, but she just accepts the money and takes off. Indeed, violence from the Russian tradition and money from the Western tradition both do not suffice as a moral solution to the wild 1990s that Balabanov portrays. Balabanov comes to the same conclusion as Govorukhin: The youth is stuck in a violent, hopeless culture.

3.2. Brother 2 (2000)

Aleksej Balabanov won many awards for *Brother*, notably the FIPRESCI Prize at the Toronto International Festival of Young Cinema (imdb.com, 2024b). Another movie following up on the success of *Brother* was the 1998 movie *Of Freaks and Men* (*Pro urodov i ljudej*). It also won many prizes, including the 1999 Nika Awards for Best Film and Best Director (imdb.com, 2024c). *Of Freaks and Men* plays in Tsarist Russia around the fin de siècle and depicts the demise of Russia due to the rise of spanking pornography. This was no doubt an allegory to the wild 1990s, which saw a rise in violent spanking pornography as well (see Husband, 2015). While Stanislav Govorukhin depicted the West as a relatively positive example for Russia to follow, Aleksej Balabanov gradually constructed a West that interwove itself with Russian culture to a negative effect. *Brother* portrays Western influences in St Petersburg in an ambivalent way: Russians are in awe with the new technology and culture that bring joy, but also give rise to an obsession over money and crime. *Of Freaks and Men* is more decisive in its evaluation of Western influences. The development of technology leads to a mass medialisation of violent pornography. Around the fin de siècle it was the evolution from photography to movies, and this is a metaphor from the 1990s shift to pornography available online. At the end of *Of Freaks and Men*, the audience sees how the Russian pornography is mostly consumed in the West.

Balabanov's most dense depiction of Russia's stance towards the West might be *Brother 2*. The success of Balabanov's previous movies literally earned him the means to film Danila's adventures again, this time in Moscow for the first half of the movie, and New York and Chicago for the second half of the movie. It was marketed extensively, also through a website that featured a violent video game.[8] The plot of the movie is not too important, it is more the individual themes and archetypes that play together to form an entertaining action flick of Danila entering the criminal world of the USA. The sequel from the year 2000 shows the new reality of Russians that no longer live behind the Iron Curtain:

> As Danila wanders through Brighton Beach and even Chicago, he is, essentially still at home in Russia. Russia is everywhere and Russians are everywhere. There is no more distinction into neat categories, as in the Soviet Era, of us and them. It is, perhaps, this aspect of the film that its

[8] The website and video game are no longer accessible, but playthroughs of the game 'Brother 2: Return to America' may be found on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uuJQXnaRDgE&ab_channel=ALEXGAMETV.

> viewers in Russia most celebrated. Long separated from the rest of the world, Russian viewers can now participate in the larger global culture, whether vicariously through the Internet, or up close and personal by traveling abroad. Wherever they go, however, they are likely to be able to find themselves not far from home – in the company of Russians with whom they can drink vodka and lament the lack of spiritual values anywhere but in Russia, at the same time that Russians in Russia lament the lack of spiritual values now in Russia. (Rifkin, 2002, p. 578)

While Govorukhin looked at a West that was still inaccessible to most Russians, Balabanov now shows that they can interact with it. When Danila uses a taxi in Moscow, he gets a humorous monologue from the taxi driver about how Gorbačëv ruined the country. When Danila takes a cab in New York, he listens to the cab driver how Gorbačëv ruined the country. More than anything, *Brother 2* offers a fantasy for Russians to finally explore the world. It is also an accumulation of themes and tropes about Russia and the West. The audience was educated about both spheres through extensive documentaries by Govorukhin, and now they are ready to artistically play with their desires and wishes. Research tends to categorise *Brother 2* as a problematic movie that enables a power fantasy to restore a supposed national pride (see Hashamova, 2007). I need to disagree and explain how the movie's humour plays with Russians' attitudes about Russia and the West.[9]

[9] Still, I understand how *Brother 2* may be posthumously interpreted as a problematic movie with the context of Putin's current politics. This is a point I want to pick up later in Chapter 4 of my master's thesis.

When Danila and his friends need weapons to fight of a gang in Moscow, they go to ‘the Fascist’. The room is decorated with Third Reich flags and the Fascist offers them heavy armoury. This shows how much Russians still remember the brutal nature of the Nazis. It has been a common theme in Soviet cinema, for example *Come and See* is one of the most explicit depictions of the brutal Nazis. Nonetheless, in an effort of self-reflection, Russian cinema has removed the Germans as the absolute enemy to also consider the problems and brutalities that Russia offers. When Danila briefly cooperates with the Fascist to fight off the Russian mob, it means that the ‘historic enemy’ is not as bad as the current crime that goes on in the 1990s. Govorukhin subverts the viewers expectations when the Fascist reveals that he is not even German, but Russian. This humoristic moment shows that Russians are just as capable of committing atrocities.

A decade ago, Govorukhin showed the skylines of the USA, and now Danila confronts the beast itself. The Chicago skyscrapers form the teeth and the jaw of the Yellow Devil that puts money above all else. Danila attempts to have a covert trip to Chicago so that the Russian mob cannot find him on his way to the villain. This again puts him into isolation like in St Petersburg. The West remains a hostile zone, but just like Štirlic, he survives it with grace.

To break his isolation, Danila throws himself in front of a car so that someone must take care of him. He is brought home by a woman of colour who is a news anchor on US television. She has a strong appearance when she takes care of him. Danila takes on a powerful position when he seduces her afterwards. Balabanov acknowledges the powerful position that women have in the USA and portrays a Russian sexual fantasy to seduce them.

While Russian mobsters also patrol the United States, the guest appearance of ‘black pimps’ that mistreat their sex workers upholds a Russian assumption about US-American crime. As

Govorukhin explained, people of colour commit the most crimes in the USA. Of course, this is a racist stereotype in our eyes. Here, it is just important to acknowledge Balabanov's exaggerated play with tropes and archetypes is a direct expression of the Russian cultural memory of how they perceive the USA. When Danila is beaten to a pulp, the police rescue him, and they interrogate him. He explains to the white officers that the people of colour, the '*negry*' attacked him unprovoked. The police let him go, and a white police officer insults Danila's attacker with the US-American N-word as well. Perhaps both the Russians and the white US-Americans have a certain racism in common, but Balabanov's narrative only acknowledges the US-American racism. Later in the movie, Danila and his friends get in trouble when they keep accidentally assaulting people of colour with the term '*negry*'. After they have scared the provoked people of colour off with pistols, they start talking about how this term is normal to them, and that they learned it in school.

In the most legendary scene of Brother 2, Danila confronts a crime boss in a skyscraper. Danila conquers the skyscraper, the US-American symbol of capitalism, to confront the US-American crime boss with Russian philosophy:

> Tell me, American, where is the power? Is it really in money? My brother says it's in money. You've got lots of money, so what? I think that power is in truth. Whoever has right on their side is stronger. You cheat someone, you get your hands on some money. Does that make you stronger? No. You're not stronger. Because you don't have truth on your side. And the person you cheated has got truth on his side. That means he's stronger. Right?

Ultimately, Balabanov's narrative concludes that the crime of the 1990s has been entirely useless to the Russian culture. Since the violence mostly revolved around materialism, Danila's speech demonstrates that other values must be more important than the violence and crime that he grew up in. Both Govorukhin and Balabanov see that the Russians are at fault for ruining Russia. While Govorukhin emphasises the Octobre Revolution as the origin for the Russian violence, Balabanov portrays the West as the origin of materialistic evil. Still, both directors see the problems of the respective other sphere as well. Govorukhin subtly acknowledges how capitalist structures show themselves in the devaluation of the church and the prostitution of women, whereas Balabanov's war veteran is subjected to violence both by his family and his government. Ultimately, both directors who are fundamental for the cinematic 1990s crime genre declare that the future of young Russian generations is hopeless.

4. The 1990s in Putin's Russia

With 53.44%, Vladimir Putin won an overwhelming victory in the Russian presidential elections of 2000. Stanislav Govorukhin also tried to get elected as president, yet only received 0.44% of the popular vote. His opinion about Putin was quite clear:

> Рабской психологии народа: покажи ему нового царя, он за него и голосует. Вряд ли сформируется какая-то новая группа, которая будет влиять на Путина: останутся те, кто уже есть. Я всегда знал, что Путин будет защищать интересы олигархов, а не народа. (Govorukhin, 2000)
>
> [The people's slave mentality: show them a new tsar, and they will vote for him. It's unlikely that a new group will form that will influence Putin: the ones already in place will remain. I've always known that Putin will protect the interests of the oligarchs, not the people.]

It was clear Govorukhin could not warn the population early enough about the future new 'tsar'. His movies gained less attention the more the 1990s passed on, and the 2000s would mark the beginning of a new cinematographic era that would never favour Govorukhin's narratives and politics: 'The ascension of Vladimir Putin as president in March 2000 marked the beginning of a new era for Russia: an era of state-sponsored nostalgia, in which television played the central role' (Khinkulova, 2012, p. 94). Putin set a new order for cinema to comply to his politics, and television would become the most efficient way to influence the masses.

In 2007, Russian 'Channel 5' organised a small document documentary about Balabanov's *Brother* duology in the format '10 Years Later'. Apparently, he had been accused of racism and

antisemitism for his movies, and *Brother 2* was especially problematic. Danila's monologue on top of the skyscraper has been remembered as a pivotal scene of Russian chauvinism. Personally, Balabanov stated that the passage was stupid, and that he would not have written it today ("Živaja istorija. «Brat. Desjat' let spustja» 2007 god," 2007). Balabanov tried to portray the desires of the Russian cultural memory, and did not consider that he would perpetuate Russian authoritarian structures. In the year 2008, Putin's presidency ended for a while before he would be reelected in 2012. In the meantime, the effects of *Brother 2* are clear even abroad. Rockstar released the video game Grand Theft Auto IV. The player follows the story of Nico Bellic, who follows a story of revenge in a fictionalised New York (Liberty City) and discusses philosophical topics about crime and money. The art style, humour, and depiction of East and West are clearly inspired by *Brother 2*. When the game was released, it even contained much of the soundtrack from *Brother 2*. The mass appeal of Grand Theft Auto is well known, and it is interesting that so many players worldwide played a story set in the constructed West from Russia's perspective. Just as the West became an important paradigm in Russian cinema, the Russian 1990s crime genre began to influence art in the West as well.

From 2008 to 2012, Vladimir Putin remained the Prime Minister of Russia and continued to enforce his authoritarian politics. He attempted to gain popularity by answering direct questions from the Russian people on TV. When he was asked about the prison sentence of the oligarch Michail Chodorkovskij, Putin just stated in 2010: 'Vor dolžen sidet' v tjur'me' [The bandit must sit in prison] (Krečetnikov, 2010). This was a direct quote from Govorukhin's *The Meeting Place Cannot Be Changed*, in which the senior detective Žeglov explains that criminals must be imprisoned at all costs, even if it means that evidence must be forged. This shows that Putin wanted people to understand that he takes on a heroic role by imprisoning 'the bad guys' at all costs as well. Of course, Govorukhin's 1990s documentaries were not compatible with Putin's politics, but it shone through that Putin admired his ability to speak to the people through cult classics like *The Meeting Place Cannot Be Changed*.

In 2010, Govorukhin was also invited by the Russian Channel 5 to talk about *You Cannot Live Like That* in the '20 Years Later' format. In the show, he is surrounded by intellectuals and artists who recall the 1990s. They remember that the time from 1986 to 1993 was especially liberating in art, and that Govorukhin's documentary fit right in. It was apparently a difficult watch, as some state that they entered the movie theatre drunk. Despite the enriching conversation, Govorukhin seems shameful of the legacy he left behind. He regrets that he criticised Russia when it was already down, and that he should have given people hope to move

on. Further, he explains how the *Intelligencija* was filled with prostitute. He calls himself a prostitute as well, otherwise he would not have appeared to this TV show, he says. It seemed like Govorukhin could not handle the fact that he lost his popularity through his movies, especially when he explains that no one would care about documentaries anymore. Therefore, he tried to gain as much attention and influence as possible again (Govorukhin, 2010).

It is perhaps when he took on the role of Vladimir Putin's 2012 election campaign manager when Govorukhin completely sold off his values. In an interview with lenta.ru, he denounced Putin's opposition as foreign funded, emphasised Russia's need to dominate Eurasia, and believed in Putin's ability to restore order to the chaos that emerged from the 1990s. His opinion on reforming the governmental structures were only slight in contrast, and his belief that Putin did not need to participate in debates because he spoke directly to the people via live TV reinforced Putin's authoritarian stance (Govorukhin, 2012). It is not directly documented in what ways Govorukhin influenced Putin as the election campaign manager. However, the interview suggests that Govorukhin invented or refined many of Putin's propaganda techniques that uphold his power until today. Clearly, Govorukhin's views contradicted his beliefs from the 1990s far more than they were similar to his Russian conservatism and his wish for greater Russian superiority. I would speculate that Putin, a cinephile, was always aware of Govorukhin's ability to craft powerful and detailed narratives that would touch the hearts of the Russian people. Most likely, Putin offered him a great deal to let Govorukhin continue with his investigative and artistic skills. With 64.35%, Putin was re-elected in 2012 as the President of the Russian Federation. This time, Govorukhin 'won' with him. When Aleksej Balabanov was asked about his opinions on either El'cin or Putin, he said that he did not care about either of them. He was a Russian patriot, but would never care about putting Russia above all other countries (Gračëv, 2012). Balabanov died in 2013 and would not see Russia's attack on Ukraine in 2014.

Putin's obsession with WW2 movies became gradually clearer and would fill up more and more screen time on Russian TV (Norris, 2022). Putin declared nostalgia as a state doctrine by focusing on movies that traditionally portrayed the West as hostile, thereby slowly regressing from the Russian cinema that slowly swayed away from a Russian chauvinism:

> [Putin:] «Что касается моих личных предпочтений, то я люблю хорошее кино: очень много у нас патриотических фильмов, посвященных нашим героям Великой Отечественной войны, старых советских, очень хорошо представлена классика» ("Putin nazval svoi ljubimye fil'my," 2016)

> [[Putin:] As for my personal preferences, I enjoy good cinema: we have a lot of patriotic films dedicated to our heroes of the Great Patriotic War, old Soviet films, and the classics are very well represented.]

If the apolitical Balabanov had witnessed the beginning of Russia's full-scale assault on Ukraine in 2022, he would have regretted his vocabulary in his *Brother* scripts even more. Putin partly quoted Danila from *Brother 2* when he emphasised Russia's willpower to fight in a speech to his nation in 2022:

> [Putin:] Мы стали сильнее, потому что мы вместе! За нами правда, а в правде — сила, а значит — победа. Победа будет за нами! (Putin, 2022)
>
> [[Putin:] We have become stronger, because we are together! We are on the side of truth, and in truth lies power, and this means victory. We will be on the side of victory!]

Govorukhin died in 2016, and was honoured in a state funeral personally by Putin (kremlin.ru, 2018). His documentary trilogy was honoured for a long time in Russian academia for its deep historical research and impressive cinematographic skills (see Ruščёnko, 2010; Široboko and K.B., 2016; Širobokov and Baryšnikov, 2017). But in the current years, Govorukhin's critique of the Soviet Union contradicts Putin's ideology that must uphold the Soviet Union as the best historic country in the world because it won WW2. These points are prevalent in today's Russia's academia (see Ostapenko, 2024). I speculate that if Govorukhin were alive today, he would criticise the current war. He would look at Russia's current economy, how its young people are sent to a certain death on the front line, how the whole World pities and hates Russia, and say: You cannot live like that. But Govorukhin already fell into obscurity, and contemporary critics of Russia's war on Ukraine are viciously silenced. Aleksej Naval'nyj, who also made great documentary films and admired the West's freedom, died in a Russian prison camp in February 2024. Putin did not bring order to the wild 1990s but gave Russia something worse. His newest changes to the constitution allow him to be the president of Russia until at least 2036. The wild 1990s never ended, they just reach their logical conclusion in a brutal war.

Conclusion: Quo Vadis, Russia?

With the formation of the Soviet Union, film directors became specialised bearers of the Russian cultural memory. The technical progression in film made it easier to convince the people of ideological narratives. The Octobre Revolution was romanticised, and World War II was remembered as the Great Patriotic War. Both key events became essential in forming the

identity of the Russians, this time in form of the Soviet Union. Tsarist Russia was posthumously vilified, and the West was imagined to be a homogenised, capitalist, fascist sphere that was out to disrupt the socialist utopia. The film medium was a perfect tool to construct these identities, even when they strayed far away from reality. With the Thaw period, film directors made use of the steady technical progression in cinematography and new freedoms in artistic expression. They were gradually more allowed to craft compelling stories that featured a nuanced West and deep philosophical discussion about the Soviet identity. While directors were always bound to at least some ideological guidelines, the focus of the Thaw cinema lied in the sophisticated discussion of individualism that was shaped differently through socialism, capitalism, and fascism. The Soviet audience could witness a film canon that even featured metaphysical depictions of their deepest desires. The West became a zone of potential desires and dangers. The *Glasnost'* period allowed directors to voice their concerns about the youth of the nation. The West became an artistic paradigm that was intertwined with the youth culture of the Soviet Union. It marked something different for the young generation that suffered from divorces and domestic violence at home, and a constant danger to be drafted to war.

Stanislav Govorukhin's *You Cannot Live Like That* trilogy (1990-1994) is special because it picks up on the important issues of the Russian people as it was expressed through Soviet cinema. Through historical research, he reconstructs the qualities of Tsarist Russia and criticises the systematic violence from the Octobre Revolution on. The young and bright people of Russia were murdered in the revolution, and now the criminals who formed the Soviet Union reproduced themselves to form the chaos of the 1990s. Govorukhin goes directly to the West, to places like the USA, Germany, and France to make an important argument. He shows the Russian people that while they thought that the West is a vicious place, it is actually quite progressive in comparison. It would be important to understand the West's perspective on Russia to understand that Russia was a bad place to live in. Therefore, the West and Tsarist Russia become positive examples for Russians on how to live. Finally, Govorukhin worries about the future of the young people as well, before his own career as a politician and historian fall into obscurity.

Aleksej Balabanov picks up Govorukhin's torch and produces the successful *Brother* duology (1997-2000). Govorukhin predicted the demise of the Soviet Union even before its collapse and manifested the wild 1990s through meticulous historical research and direct footage of crime. Balabanov takes on a fictional approach instead to portray the unpleasant circumstances of the wild 1990s. Danila, the war veteran, is entirely alienated from the society that he returns to. The

only modus operandi he knows is violence, which is how he temporarily gains friends in St Petersburg. They represent both Western and Russian archetypes, yet they are already so intertwined that it might not be considered as any political commentary in the narrative. Danila tries to solve his friends' problems with violence, only for them to be more scared of him. Even with money he cannot keep any of them, which is why he leaves St Petersburg alone. When he goes to New York and Chicago, Danila finally can solve all problems with violence. He encounters multiple stereotypes who are put together in such a humoristic way that it is a relief to the Russian audience which has been living with their ideas of Russia and the West for a long time. The movie mocks both Russian and Western stereotypes and is a raw crystallisation of Russia's cultural memory. Govorukhin emphasises the Octobre Revolution as the source of Russia's demise, whereas Balabanov focuses on Western influences as a problem. Still, both directors subtly acknowledge the other perspective in their respective movies. What Govorukhin and Balabanov have in common is that they take on the responsibility of a Russian film director to show the hardships of society, in this case the Russia of the 1990s. Both are patriots and wish the best for their nation, but they worry that the young generation is lost and led astray. Ultimately, the problem lies not solely with the West, but with Russian crime.

Govorukhin's and Balabanov's movies therefore dialectically form the Russian 1990s crime film genre. Unfortunately, they miscalculated how their work would be misused by the future President of Russia, Vladimir Putin. Govorukhin helped Putin get reelected as the President in 2012. He hoped that Putin would bring back order and that Govorukhin himself would get more influence as a cultural and political figure again. Still, he betrayed his own values when Govorukhin constructed and improved Putin's propaganda machinery. Suddenly, a homogenous West was the enemy again, and the people had to answer to Putin directly instead through democratic debates. The TV became a vessel to transport Putin's nostalgia: The Great Patriotic War is central to the Russian identity again. Govorukhin helped Putin to commence a regression of Russian cinema, which goes back to Stalinist values and at the same time devalues Russian classics by reinterpreting them to conform to Putin's narrative. Govorukhin could not live to see today's Russia which would have been his personal nightmare, and his truly thoughtful approaches from the 1990s to shape a better Russia have fallen into obscurity. Balabanov stayed apolitical, but he could probably not foresee how his movies would be reinterpreted for jingoist narratives as well, rather than to acknowledge the artistic value of his action movies. The wild 1990s never ended: Govorukhin and Balabanov only documented the beginning of the horrors

that happen now. Their reflections on Russian identity and the West may remain in Russian cultural memory, but are drowned out by Putin's centralised propaganda.

Masterarbeit in den Internationalen Literaturen, betreut von Prof. Dr. Schamma Schahadat und Prof. Dr. Jürgen Wertheimer.

Empfohlene Zitierweise:

Christian Bartasevic: Constructing the West in Russian Cinema of the 1990s. Stanislav Govorukhin's Tak žit' nel'zja (You Cannot Live Like That, 1990) and Aleksej Balabanov's Brat (Brother, 1997). In: Laboratorium. Studentische Arbeiten des Slavischen Seminars der Universität Tübingen [Januar 2025]. URL: XXX Datum des Zugriffs: xx.yy.zzzz

Time Stamps

1) You Cannot Live Like That: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Spm2rsNPncQ&ab_channel=%D0%9A%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%22%D0%9C%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%84%D0%B8%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BC%22 [Channel: **Киноконцерн "Мосфильм"**]
2) The Russia We Have Lost: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Aygl7ybmlg&ab_channel=%D0%9A%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%22%D0%9C%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%84%D0%B8%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BC%22 [Channel: **Киноконцерн "Мосфильм"**]
3) The Great Criminal Revolution: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qW2b_kSWDz8&ab_channel=veshugnet [Channel: **veshugnet**]
4) Brother: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDaaCGZz-Ok&ab_channel=%D0%9A%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F%22%D0%A1%D0%A2%D0%92%22 [Channel: **Кинокомпания "СТВ"**]
5) Brother 2: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R0O3jnLvBxw&ab_channel=%D0%9A%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F%22%D0%A1%D0%A2%D0%92%22 [Channel: **Кинокомпания "СТВ"**]

MOVIE	TIME STAMP (in order of appearance in my thesis)
1	0.00.52
1	0.01.38
1	0.04.35
1	0.09.58
1	0.10.28
1	0.13.33
1	0.18.12
1	0.21.12
1	0.22.32
1	0.25.32
1	0.26.58
1	0.29.08
1	0.29.21
1	0.32.23
1	0.32.58
1	0.38.30
1	0.39.17
1	0.55.21
1	1.01.40
1	1.13.04
1	1.17.18
1	1.26.44
1	1.37.04
1	1.45.24
1	1.46.10
2	0.54.53
2	1.06.00

3	0.06.48
3	0.36.24
3	0.37.21
3	0.38.53
3	1.34.27
4	0.01.24
4	0.01.33
4	0.05.38
4	0.07.00
4	0.07.54
4	0.10.05
4	0.10.26
4	0.13.25
4	0.15.55
4	0.22.52
4	0.28.05
4	0.37.19
4	0.46.17
4	1.05.03
4	1.14.06
4	1.21.23
4	1.31.41
4	1.33.31
5	0.27.47
5	1.17.11
5	1.21.42
5	1.23.43
5	1.53.04

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