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Recent DFG Project
Evidentiality, epistemic modality, and speaker attitude in Ladakhi
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Ladakh

# What if the 'ego-phoric' also bears upon the non-ego – and the non-'ego-phoric' on the ego?

What is egophoricity in Tibetic, and beyond?
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1. The Problem: what is 'egophoricity'

egṓ 1sg 'I'
phorós, φορόν (< *phérō*) 'bearing; bringing on one's way, forwarding'
> reference to the *I*, first person, speaker…

>> (Benveniste: I vs. you >>) Hagège (1982: 100), "le système de l'égo-phore [est] une propriété capitale des énoncés linguistiques [qui sont] an-crés sur la situation d'énonciation. Au centre, celui qui les profère, le lo-cuteur : ego, qu'il se nomme ou non par un «je» explicite, est le point de référence." Éléments de la phrase qui se rapportent au sujet de l'énonciation.
~> ego = "I" = deictic centre of an utterance

–> Tournadre (1994): egophoric *yin, yod, byuṅ, myoṅ* + perspective shift

–> Dahl (2000, 2008): egophoric = pronominal reference to speech act participants, generic reference (!), and logophoric reference (I, you, one); –> allophoric = non-generic 3rd person

>> (linguistics, of a verb) Relating to the speaker's perspective or identity. (wictionary) or:

"The canonical pattern" (Bergqvist & Knuchel 2017: 361)

Egophoricity, as the term has come to be appropriated, refers to the special if not equal treatment of the speaker in statements and the addressee in (information-seeking) questions versus all other persons: 1 vs. 2+3 / Q: 2 vs. 1+3

Typically, an egophoric verb form occurs in statements with 1st person subjects and in questions with 2nd person subjects, whereas the non-egophoric form applies elsewhere. (Knuchel 2015)

At its very broadest, *egophoricity* is a general phenomenon of linguistically flagging the personal knowledge, experience, or involvement of a conscious self; […]. More narrowly, egophoricity is the grammaticalised encoding of the personal or privileged knowledge or involvement of a potential speaker (the primary knower) in a represented event or situation. […] Most typically, a marker that is egophoric is found with first person subjects in declarative sentences and with second person subjects in interrogative sentences. (San Roque, Floyd, Norcliffe 2017: 2)

The original use of the term for the Tibetic languages as coined by Tournadre (1991/ 1994)

– intended to differ from the syntactically oriented, person-like conceptualisation of the 'conjunct-disjunct' pattern as designed for the Kathmandu Nepal Bhasha –

applies to a set of grammatical markers that specifically refer to (or even index, Agha 1993) the 'ego' or main speech act participant (MSAP), (i.E., the speaker in statements, the addressee in questions, and the reported speaker) in whatever syntactic or semantic role.

This never meant that no other form could be used for the ego nor that the other forms would not equally participate in the perspective shift in questions.

1. markers of acquaintance or active involvement as subject: *yin* (vs. 'factual' *red*), *yod* (vs. perceptual *ḥdug*, +Lad. *rag*)

2. marker of passive, receptive involvement as a goal or affected bystander: *byuṅ* (vs. exocentric *soṅ*)

3. marker of having experienced at least once: *myoṅ*; Ladakhi mental verb *šes* 'know' as auxiliary

4. marker of endophatic experience of the subject – no longer uphold *ḥdug*, Ladakhi *rag* (though in some languages also *yod* !)

One could actually add other expressions of mental states and Tournadre & Konjok Jiatso 2001 have also pointed to the ego-related use of *dgos* 'need' and secondary directional *yoṅ* 'come' in Standard Spoken Tibetan.

It is clear that only the ego or the MSAP has epistemic authority or privileged access in these cases.

This basically *deictic* relationship crosscuts the '*evidential*' functions of these markers within the full system:

– <u>privileged access</u>: (*yin* & *yod*) concerning self and %<u>other</u>,

– <u>direct perception</u>:

   immediate perception (*ḥdug*, *rag*) of other and %<u>self</u>,
   perception of past events directed towards oneself (*byuṅ*),
   perception of past events not directed towards oneself (*soṅ*),
   first experiences (*myoṅ*),
   endopathic perceptions (*ḥdug*, *rag*),

– 'factual' or rather pragmatical hedging (*red*, *yod.red*).

– inferential and assumptive (various epistemic markers)

– quotation and hearsay (*-s(e)* < *zer* 'say', Ladakhi *lo*)

Taken together, one might say that the Tibetic 'egophoric'-'evidential'-epistemic systems differentiate between

X: fully assimilated personal experiences and/ or active involvement within one's personal sphere (primary 'egophoric'*), versus

Y: numerically limited sense perceptions inclusive passive/ /Z: receptive involvement (secondary 'egophoric'*) versus *cf. Widmer (2017)

– inferences and assumptions versus

– (attributable) second-hand knowledge

and versus

Φ: shared/ shareable knowledge and/ or pragmatic hedging.

For the abstract use of "X versus Y etc.", see Zemp (2020, workshop call https://old.linguistlist.org/issues/31/31-2972.html)

Bickel (2008) and Widmer & Zemp (2017) contrast

– epistemic *argument* marking, where the "assertor has privileged access to knowledge" in relation to "a certain participant role in a given event" (e.g., subject, goal/undergoer) with

– epistemic *proposition* marking where the "assertor has privileged access to knowledge because *she / he considers* the relevant knowledge as a part of her / his "*territory of information*"[TOI] (Kamio 1997), that is to say, her / his sphere of intimate and personal knowledge."

or rather: where the epistemic *origo* or MSAP *claims* or can be expected to claim privileged knowledge for a situation belonging to his/her TOI.

Epistemic *argument* marking has been described under the concept of conjunct-disjunct marking as early as 1973 by Hale and Watters.

Some questions would follow immediately:

1. Should we treat all so-called 'egophoric' markers on the same level or should we differentiate between the primary 'egophoric' markers **X** *yin* and *yod* (basically non-perceptual) and the secondary 'egophoric' markers **Y** *byuṅ* and *myoṅ* (basically perceptual)?

2. Can **X** be seen as a type or a subcategory of 'evidential' marking, at all (and how to define the latter)? What kind of source or access is 'privileged access'?

3. How ego-referential are **X** 'egophorics'?

4. If 'egophoric' marking is not fully 'evidential', is there an alternative interpretation available that would also account for the assumed 'non-evidential' character of the so-called 'factual' markers **Φ** *red* and *yod.red* and their dialectal counterparts?

With respect to the first question, I think that, apart from the different 'evidential' functions, an important difference is that the use of the primary 'egophoric' markers X *yin* and *yod* is highly flexible, and conditioned by pragmatic as well as subjective factors (in the sense of epistemic *proposition* marking), whereas the use of the secondary 'egophoric' markers Y *byuṅ* and *myoṅ* is highly predictible (in the sense of epistemic *argument* marking).

Note, however, *byuṅ* is not yet fully grammaticalised and may be still used as a lexical verb, cf. Chang & Chang 1981: 6, 10, Garret 2001: 168). In the dialect of Shigatse, it can be used also for 3P family members:

(i) Tibetan dialect of Shigatse (Haller & Haller 2007: 185)

phisā=ni   na̱nī̄   ʈṣēpō   na̱ː=tɕu.
child=DEF   last.year   very   be.sick=PFV.EGO.UND

'The child was often sick last year.' (Implication: The child belongs to the speaker's family)

1.1. Surface paradims (prototypical usage)

The modern Tibetic languages show quite different patterns of 'evidential' and 'egophoric' marking. The shared principles, however, are:

X *yin* and *yod* are used mainly, but not exclusively, for the MSAP. In particular, they may be used to some extent for the MSAP's possessions and 3ʳᵈ person habits in the MSAP's personal sphere. I.e., the 'egophoric' marker may be used for a non-ego.

X *yin* and *yod* are not used (with the exception of a few languages, such as Denjongke) for –control/–volitional situations the MSAP undergoes (except for habitual situations). I.e., the ego does not need to take an 'egophoric' marker.

X stands in opposition not only to the evidential markers in the narrow sense (**Y** and inferential) but also to the so-called 'factual' markers **Φ** *red*, *yod.red* (or their counterparts).

1.2. Standard Spoken Tibetan 'paradigm'

Table 1 Distribution of markers

domain	MSAP +ctr self-evident assertive (**X**)	OTHER ±ctr, MSAP –ctr (=OTHER)	
		perceptual (**Y**)	**Φ** "factual"/ shared/°-able
future	*yin*	—	*red*
identification	*yin*	—	*red*
past/ anterior	*pa.yin*	*soṅ, byuṅ*	*pa.red*
copula attribute	*yod*	*ḥdug*	*red*
existential	*yod*	*ḥdug*	*yod.red*
present/simult.	*gi.yod*	*gi.ḥdug*	*gi.yod.red*
perfect/result.	*yod*	*(ḥdug/ bžag)*	*yod.red*
all verbal domains	OTHER (& MSAP)		
	evaluative markers		second hand
	yin/yod + EM; 'indirect' *red, yod.red*		*zer*

MSAP = Main Speech Act Participant: speaker in statements, addressee in questions, only controlled actions. OTHER = all others. EM = evaluative markers for inferences, probabilities, mental distance

1.3. The Ladakhi unsystematic 'system'

The so-called 'evidential' markers and the (more) epistemic markers used in Ladakhi have a prototypical usage, as known from the standard descriptions of Tibetic 'evidential' systems, but also various non-standard, marked usages.

Table 2 Ladakhi 'evidentials' – schematic

MSAP +ctr	OTHER ±ctr, MSAP −ctr (=OTHER)		
self-evident	perceptual (±inferential)		Φ 'neutral'/
assertive (X)	visual (Y)	non-visual(Z)	shared/°able
yin / yod	*ḥdug (/ snaṅ)*	*rag*	GRD+*yin* / GEM

GRD = gerund; GEM = generalised evaluative marker

Table 3 Prototypical system of Ladakhi 'evidentials'

domain	MSAP +ctr self-evident assertive (X)	OTHER ±ctr, MSAP –ctr (=OTHER)		Φ "neutral"/ shared/°-able
		perceptual (±inferntial)		
		visual (Y)	non-vis.(Z)	
future	*yin*	—		GRD + *yin*
past/ anterior	*pa.yin*	stem II(.PA) + ø		
		(soṅ, (byuṅ))		
copula identity	*yin*	—		GEM
copula attribute	*yin / yod*	*ḥdug/ snaṅ*	*rag*	GEM
existential	*yod*	*ḥdug/ snaṅ*	*rag*	(PRF + GEM)
present/simult.	*yod*	*ḥdug/ snaṅ*	*a.rag*	(CNT+GEM)
habitual/gener.	*yod*	*ḥdug/ snaṅ*	*(a.rag)*	NLS+GEM/GRD+*yin*
perfect/result.	*yin / yod*	*ḥdug/ snaṅ*	*rag*	GEM

all verbal domains	OTHER (& MSAP)	
	evaluative markers	second hand
	yin / yod / stem + EM, SEM	*lo, zer, mol*

CNT= continuative/ progressive form; EM = evaluative markers for inferences, probabilities, mental distance; GEM = generalised evaluative/ epistemic marker with pragmatic functions; SEM = specialised evaluative marker for inferences from non-visual input

2. The Ladakhi 'system' in actual usage

X *yin* and *yod* are 'evidential' *only in so far as* they indicate intimate acquaintance and exclusive personal knowledge (none of these are categories of access!) and stand in opposition to other 'evidential' markers, such as visual (**Y**) *ḥdug* and non-visual (**Z**) *rag*, (1).

(1) Kenhat-Ladakhi (Leh dialect)

tharmos-inaŋa	*tʃa*	*daruŋ*	*dug-a?*	/	*rag-a?*	–
thermos.flask-PPOS	tea	still	exist(**Y**)-QM		exist(**Z**)-QM	

duk	/	*rak*	/	*jod*	*le*.
exist(**Y**)		exist(**Z**)		exist(**X**)	hon

'Is there still tea in the thermos flask (**3P**, **Y: have a look** / **Z: can you feel or hear by shaking**)?' – 'Yes, there is (**3P**, **Y: I had a look** / **Z: I shook it** / **X: I know, as I just filled it up**).' (The speaker need not be the owner of the flask.)

X is not only used for the MSAP, but is *regularly* used (to different degrees in the different Tibetic languages) for items that belong to the MSAP's personal sphere: family members and friends and their habits, items possessed = <u>3P</u>, <u>non-ego</u>.

(2) Kenhat Ladakhi Gya-Mīrupa (FD 2013)

pạlaŋ-a   pẹtse   ɦot.
cow-AES   calf   have(**X**)

'The cow is with a calf (**3P** = OTHER).' (**X**: The cow **belongs** to the speaker, who already knows or is responsible.)

(3) Standard Spoken Tibetan (Garret 2001: 179, ex. 82, adapted)

ṅaḥi   bu   skam.po   yod.
my   boy   thin   be/exist(**X**)

'My son is thin (**3P** = OTHER).' (**X**: about a family member, speaker is concerned.)

In Ladakhi, **X** also applies to cases outside one's personal sphere, <u>**3P**</u>, <u>**non-ego**</u>, when the speaker is actively involved and even responsible for the situation, (4), (5) b., and (8), second part.

(4) Shamskat-Ladakhi

teriŋ	*lama-s*	*ŋatʃi*	*saŋs*	*taŋ-et*.
today	lama-ERG	we.excl.GEN	purification.ritual	give-**X**=PRS

'Today, the lama (**3P! – not a family member or close friend!**) is ('EGO') performing our purification ritual).' (3P, **X**: The speaker has arranged the coming of the lama.)

As a result, **X** can be used also for items that would objectively not belong to one's personal sphere (like the lama), e.g., also when talking about items located in, or belonging to, any particular place other than one's home village, <u>3P</u>, <u>non-ego</u>

(default usage = **Y** or EM).

(5) a. Lingshetpa (Shamskat, Southern Shamma, field data 2016)

skara   gonpa+(:)
Skara   monastery-ALL

guru   rimpoʧhe+(:)   sku   *(ʒaŋ-se)-duk.
Guru   Rimpoche+GEN   hon.statue   hon.erect-CP-**Y**=PERF

'In the Skara monastery, there is a statue of Guru Rimpoche.'
(3P, **Y**: The speaker, not related to the monastery, as he is from a different, far-off village, was not involved in setting up the statue. He has apparently no reason to identify with the situation.)

b. Lingshetpa (Shamskat, Southern Shamma, field data 2016)

skara   gonpa+(:)   kargjut   seʈhiŋ   *(ʒaŋ-se)-jot.
Skara   monastery-ALL   Bkaḥ.brgyud   lineage   hon.erect-CP-**X**=PERF

'In the Skara monastery, there is the *Bkaḥ.brgyud* lineage.'
(3P, **X**: The speaker, not related, was involved as painter – and knows and is allowed to know better than the foreigner BZ.)

That means, what can and what cannot be represented by X cannot be defined objectively, but depends on factors such as acquaintance (ruled out in the first case, although it can be presumed that the speaker saw the statue everyday), active involvement (the crucial factor here), or also one's identification with, or one's positive attitude for, the situation described.

It also depends on whom you talk to. If the painter would talk to the monk community of the Skara monastery or to the locals who frequently visit *their* monastery, he would not have the right to claim his knowledge as exclusively personal.

But he might, or rather should, refer to his own work with X, at least as long as the addressee was not involved as co-actor or instigator.

(The instigator, however, can ask him whether he has done his job, and he would answer accordingly or he would report by himself that he completed his task with X.)

To some extent, active personal involvement is also crucial in other Tibetic languages:

(6) a. Standard Spoken Tibetan (Garrett 2001: 185, ex. 94, adapted)

bkra.šis-gi   bu.mo   snyiṅ.rje.po   ??yod
Tashi-GEN   girl   beautiful   ??be(X)

Intended: 'Tashi's daughter is beautiful.'

b. Standard Spoken Tibetan (Garrett 2001: 185, ex. 94, adapted)

bkra.šis-gi   bu.mo   snyiṅ.rje.po   yod
Tashi-gen   girl   beautiful   be(X)

ga.re   yin   zer-na,   ṅa.tsho   dkar.po   dmar.po   byugs-pa.yin
how   be   say-CD   we   white   red   apply-X.PST

'Tashi's daughter is beautiful, (X:) because we've put makeup on her.'

Likewise, assimilated knowledge about habits of 3rd persons including habitual –ctr situations of the MSAP may lead to the use of **X**:

(7) a. Standard Spoken Tibetan (Garrett 2001: 174, ex. 73, adapted)
ṅa phyi.logs-la ḥgro-dus rtag.par grod.khog **ltogs-gi.yod.**
I outside-ALL go-when always stomach be.hungry-**X**.IPFV

'Whenever I go out, I'm always hungry (**1P[–ctr]** = OTHER).'

b. Standard Spoken Tibetan (Garrett 2001: 177, ex. 81, adapted)
bkra.šis ga.bar ḥgro-na grod.khog **ltogs-gi.yod.**
Tashi where go-CD stomach be.hungry-**X**.IPFV

'Wherever Tashi goes, he's hungry (**3P** = OTHER).'

Inversely, in Ladakhi, one may choose to not use **X**, when rejecting any closer identification with a situation that would objectively belong to one's personal sphere.

(8) Kharnakpa (Kenhat, Southern Changthang, field data 2018)

ldat-ne *gønba* *du'*.
Ldat-ABL/LOC monastery exist(**Y**)

i *gønb+enãa* *saŋgje+(:)* *kū* *maŋbo* *hot*.
this monastery+PPOS Buddha+GEN statue many exist(**X**)

'There is a monastery in Ldat (the main settlement in Kharnak). In the monastery are many statues of the Buddha.' (The informant explained the use of **Y** *ḥdug* with the fact that the monastery was there already for a long time and that he and his family were not involved in its construction. The use of **X** *hot* for the statues, on the other hand, is motivated by the fact that they were set up more recently and that he and his family were somehow involved. – It is clear that he cannot have seen the monastery less often than the statues.)

Similar paradoxical treatments have been found in some other Kenhat dialects when stating with X that a building is very old and continuing with Y that it was there/ was built 'before I was born' – because, as one informant explicitly stated, 'how could I have seen it?' One would thus refer with Y to the time point where one became aware of the buildings existence – even 40 years later. But then, how does one know in a more personal or confirmable way that the building is old?

Such non-commitment may concern family members and <u>1P</u>, <u>ego</u>.

(9) Shachukulpa (Kenhat, Lalokpa, field data 2016)

ŋe̱	*aba-le*	*zaktaŋ*	*tʃho*	*sil-uk.*	/	*sil-at.*
I-GEN	father-hon	every.day	religion	read-Y=PRS		read-X=PRS

'My father reads religious texts every day.'
(**Y** indicates mere observation; the speaker does not consider him/herself a religious person or doesn't care about the father's habit. / **X** indicates that the speaker knows well, does the same thing, or cares about the father's habit.)

(10) Videos from Zanskar, Kenhat (Maaz Shaik, Caroline Riegel: Arte)

ŋaza	/	*ŋa*	*ɲalbatʃan*	*(hi)no'.*
we.excl		I	poor	be(Φ)

'**1P Φ:** We are / I am just poor (in contrast to you).'

(In both cases, the addressee is a foreigner, automatically considered to be much richer. The speakers make themselves smaller than they are.)

(11) Stokpa Kesar epic (Kenhat, Central Ladakhi, recorded 1996)

ta	*ŋa-niŋ*	*ama*	*gogza*	*lam+e*	*trhugu,*
now	I-TOP	mother	Gogza	Lamo+GEN	child

mõan-e	*ṣaŋthuk*	***inok.***
woman.bad-GEN	street.child	be(Φ)

ŋa+(:)	*tʃig-ek*	*mane*	***mi-rak.***
I+AES	one-LQ	ever	NG-have(Z)

ŋaza+(:)	*mane*	*sakjat*	*mane*	***mi+ruk.***	...
we.excl+AES	ever	land	ever	NG-have(Y)	

tene	*ŋa-aŋ*	*sakyat-tʃik*	*sal-yos-ok.*
then	I.AES-FM	land-LQ	hon.give-need-FUT.INF

'As for me, I'm Gogza Lamo's child, (evidentily) a street child, son of a bitch (1P Φ: bitter sarcasm). (As I can feel,) I do not possess a single thing (on my body), at all! (As I see,) we [mother and I] do not have land, at all (1P Z/Y: and this is a scandal)! … [You guys] will need to give me some land.' (Distanced stance, accusation; the speaker already knew; did not just find out. – The speaker is not responsible.)

Compare also Standard Spoken Tibetan – for different motivations, such as non-volitionality or unawareness (12) and avoidance of an assessment and/ or looking back at a different self (13).

(12) Standard Spoken Tibetan (Oisel 2017: 119, ex. 85, adapted)

ŋa̱   khōŋtro   la̱ŋ-tyˀ   ŋɛ̱ˀ   phumpa ti̱   ʧā̱ˀ-pareˀ.
I   anger   rise-when   I-ERG   vase   this   break-Φ.PST

'I [Φ: stupidly] broke this vase when I was angry.'

(13) Standard Spoken Tibetan (Ward 2016: 26, adapted)

31 *tog.tsam*   ***bsam-gyi.ḥdug***.
   little   think-Y.IPFV

32 *lo*   *chuṅ.chuṅ,*   ***red-pa***.
   year   young   be(Φ)-QT

33 *že.drag*   ***bsam-thub-kyi.mi.ḥdug***
   much   think-be.able-NG.Y.IPFV

34 *ga.ḥdra*   *ḥdra-žig*   *re-gi.yod-na*   *bsams-soṅ,*   ***red-pa***.
   how   like-LQ   become-PRS-CD   think-Y.PST   be(Φ)-QT

35 *ani*   *gžug-la*   *rgya.mi-gis*   *ṅa-tsho*   *groṅ*   –   *chuṅ.chuṅ*   ***red-pa***.
   then after-ALL chinese-ERG 1-PL   village   small   be(Φ)-QT

'[I] was thinking only a little (Y: retrospective outside observation). (Φ: As you know,/ If I look back at myself,) I was [still] small, right? I was not able to think much (Y: retrospective outside observation). I thought (Y: retrospective outside observation) ‹how, if it is getting like this?›, right (Φ: as you know)? And then, after the Chinese [came to] our village … (Φ: As you know,/ If I look back at myself,) [I] was [so] small, wasn't I?' (My translation.)

Furthermore, in Ladakhi, **X** is avoided for one's own activities (of which one knows best), <u>**1P**</u>, <u>**ego**</u>, when the addressee has been involved, since **X** would indicate that one knows better than the addressee does. Various strategies are found.

Similarly, **Y** *ḥdug* would be avoided by many speakers when both speaker and addressee are looking, and again various strategies are found.

Z *rag* can only be used for one's own personal feelings. When talking about the weather or food items observed together, **Y** *ḥdug* is then often used.

(14) a. Gya-Mīrupa (Kenhat, Upper Indus, field data 2019)

daŋ _oɣo_ *ɲēk+e* *alu* **tōn.** / *tōn-pen.*

yesterday we.incl both+ERG potato extract.**Y/Z**(PST) *extract-**X**=PST

'Yesterday, **1P, Y/Z**: <u>we both (you and me)</u> took out the potatoes [from the field].'

b. Gya-Mīrupa (Kenhat, Upper Indus, field data 2019)

daŋ _ŋatʃa_ *ɲēk+e* *alu* **tōn-pen.** / *tōn.*

yesterday we.excl both+ERG potato extract-**X**=PST *extract.**Y/Z**(PST)

'Yesterday, **1P, X**: <u>we both (but not you)</u> took out the potatoes [from the field].'

(15) a. Faδumpa (Kenhat, Central Zanskarpa, field data 2019)

ta'sa	*haɣo*	lɛha	*ʧø-in-joteno'*;	*habɣot*	*ma-taŋ!*
now	we.incl	work	do-CNT-**Φ**=CNT.PRS	laughter	NG-give=PRHB

'We (including you) **are** working now; stop laughing!' (**1P**, **Φ**: Speaker-hearer **symmetry**, the speaker has no privileged knowledge and does not know it better than the addressee does.)

b. Faδumpa (Kenhat, Central Zanskarpa, field data 2019)

ta'sa	*ŋaza*	lɛha	*ʧø-in-jot*;	*θiŋna*	*ʃo'!*
now	we.excl	work	do-CNT-**X**=CNT.PRS	afterwards	come.IMP

'We (but not you) are working (right now); [please] come later!' (**1P**, **X**: Speaker-hearer **asymmetry**, the speaker has privileged access through his/her involvement, while the addressee has not.)

For the Tibetic languages, Shefts Chang & Chang (1984: 609) observe that in Spoken Tibetan, the first person plural with the emphatic first person pronoun *ŋa̱rã̱ã-tso* only allows the copula Φ *re̱ː*, while the plural with the simple first person pronoun *ŋa̱tso* allows both Φ *re̱ː* and X *ji̱ː*. Although Lhasa or Standard Spoken Tibetan does not discriminate between inclusive and exclusive plural pronouns, the different behaviour of the two plural pronouns with respect to the choice of the copula may have to do with a certain tendency to use the emphatic first person pronoun more for the inclusive plural than for the exclusive plural.

Zoe Tribur, Sangsrgyas Tshering, and Rtamgrin Lhamo (2024) show that even exclusive plurality may have a similar effect in Amdo-Tibetan dialects.

Same knowledge base, but…

In contrastive (vulgo 'comparative') constructions, the markers depend on one's *attitude towards the contrastee*, hence the inversion of standard and contrastee can lead to a different marker, although the knowledge type concerning each element and the abstract relation of difference between the two elements remains exactly the same.

my A is X-bigger than their B, their B is Y-smaller than my A
my A is X-younger than their B, their B is Φ-older than my A

The choice of the marker does not depend on word order or on the mentioning both items or the order thereof.

Note that different types of attributes either trigger the existential linking verbs (X *yod* vs. Y *ḥdug*) or the copula (X *yin* vs. Φ: *inok/intsok*)

(16) a. Sharapa (Kenhat, Upper Indus, field data 2017)

CONTRASTEE		standard				
çar+e	*gonpa*	*lē*	*lākaŋ*	*som+esaŋ*	*tɕhuŋ-a-zik*	*hot.*
Çara+GEN	monastery	Leh	temple	new+CNTR	small-NLS-LQ	be(**X**)

'The Çara monastery is small in contrast to (> *is smaller than*) the New Temple of Leh.' (**3P, X**: The speaker talks about the monastery of her village, with which she feels related.)

b. Sharapa (Kenhat, Upper Indus, field data 2017)

CONTRASTEE		standard				
lē	*lākaŋ*	*soma*	*ŋaz+e*	*gonp+esaŋ*	*tɕhe-a-zik*	*duk.*
Leh	temple	new	we.excl+GEN	monastery+CNTR	big-NLS-LQ	be(**Y**)

'The New Temple of Leh is large in contrast (> *is larger than*) our monastery.' (**3p, Y**: The speaker does not feel related with the New Temple of Leh and/or has experienced this building only briefly.)

(17) Tagmacigpa (Shamskat, Western Shamma, field data 2019)

standard		CONTRASTEE			
domkhar-i	*gonpa-basaŋ*	*tagmaʧig-i*	*gonpa*	*r̥niŋ-ba*	*in.*
Dom.-GEN	monastery-CNTR	Tag.-GEN	monastery	be.old-NLS	be(**X**)
standard		CONTRASTEE			
tagmaʧig-i	*gonpa-basaŋ*	*domkhar-i*	*gonpa*	*soma*	*intsok.*
Tag.-GEN	monastery-CNTR	Dom.-GEN	monastery	new	be(**Φ**)

'The monastery of Tagmacik [**3P, X**: that is, ours,] is older than the monastery of Domkhar. The monastery of Domkhar [**3P, Φ**: that is, theirs,] is newer than the monastery of Tagmacik.' (Domkhar is just across the river, and most people of both villages have relatives on the respective other side. So everybody knows well.)

The question of how one has come to know about the difference, a question of 'evidentiality', matters less than one's personal subjective feeling of relatedness with each of the items.

This subjective feeling of relatedness is, of course, quite elastic: one may or may not show one's relatedness, depending on what actually is the 'we' and the 'they', cf. the graphic that I once drew up for a different context of 'identities':

Some variation to this pattern has been found. An elderly speaker from a high status family used only the 'egophoric' markers, no matter how far away from Ladakh the contrastee was thought to be, because, as he said, he would take interest. A striking exception recently came up with a speaker from Sakti who said that the villagers would use the 'egophoric' marker only if both, the contrastee and the standard would belong to 'our' sphere – and if one was talking to an outsider. The only case where the above described switch could take place would be when comparing an item of one's own sphere with one of the addressee's sphere and the other way round:

Standard	Contrastee	talking to		result
own	own	insider	>	? (*duk*, *hinak*) example missing
own	own	outsider	>	*hot*
own	theirs	outsider	>	*duk*
theirs	own	outsider	>	*duk*
own	theirs	insider	>	*duk*
theirs	own	insider	>	*duk*
own	yours	you	>	*duk*
yours	own	you	>	*hot*

A similar *relational* attitude is found with respect to the identification of items or tasks as belonging to the speaker and not to the addressee. One would expect that if one knows for sure that a particular item or task is one's own, then one would equally well know that this item or task is not the addressee's.

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However, most speakers, especially of the Kenhat dialects, would switch between **X** *yin* for their own possession and **Φ** *inok* / *hinak* / *hindak* (and to some extent *intsuk*) for the (non-) ownership of the addressee – in neutral assessments.

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khjore *man-ok*, ŋe ɦin!!!

han, ŋe man, khoe *ɦin-ok*...

ŋe ɦin, khjore man-ok!

(18) Ralepa (Kenhat, Lalokpa, field data 2023)

ṣiŋ	ṣiŋ,	tḛ	dʒola	ɲiri	**maṇdak**.	/	*maṇ.
wait=IMP	wait=IMP	that	bag	fam.you.GEN	NG.(Φ)		*NG.be(X)

ŋ+ḛ	/	ŋ+ḛ	mākp+e	**hin**.	/	*hindak.
I+GEN		I+GEN	husband-GEN	be(X)		*be(Φ)

'Wait, wait! That bag *might not be* yours (**3P, Φ: not my sphere**). / *is definitely not yours. [It] is definitely mine / my husband's (**3P, X: my sphere**). / *might be mine. / my husband's.'

I used a modal expression in the translation to show the, from our perspective, oddness of the switch. This does not really fit, as the marker **Φ** does not express any epistemic hedging. It is not that the speaker has any doubts. What the speaker indicates is that the belongings or not-belongings of the addressee

do not fall into the speaker's personal sphere.

3. The territory of information

The 'egophoric' markers **X** are non-evidential, but factual *in so far as* they do not specify any particular source or access.

They <u>do not indicate</u> how one knows; whether one 'simply knows' (about one's own acts and one's possessions), whether one has (repeatedly) observed a habit within one's sphere, whether one has inferred a particular proposition or identity through close observation, or whether one has inferred it through a combination of different sources (e.g. being informed by reliable persons and having seen the person in question).

They are non-evidential also *in so far as* their usage or non-usage can be independent of the ego's/ MSAP's knowledge base.

We have seen that in Ladakhi and, to some extent, also in Standard Spoken Tibetan, the 'egophoric' markers **X** *yin* and *yod* may be used for the non-ego, while the 'non-egophoric' markers **Y** *ḥdug* and **Φ** *inok* etc. (to a lesser extent **Z** *rag*) may be used for the ego – comparatively freely.

If Ladakhi appears extreme, this may be due to a poor documentation of similar variation patterns in other Tibetic languages. Bacot (1946: 72–73) states that a chapter on all the exceptions would be longer than a chapter on the rules.

Even if we can say that some or many of these non-paradigmatic usages are highly marked, the question remains:

If it is not personhood that triggers the marking (something we all would agree upon), and if it is not (only) access of knowledge either (as I have tried to show), what is it exactly that underlies those choices?

So far, I have mainly used the expression (a speaker's) 'personal sphere' to indicate that some situation with a subject other than the speaker can receive **X** 'egophoric' marking.

An alternative term has been suggested quite some time ago by Kamio (1997): *Territory of Information*.

It has been coopted by some proponents of CA or Conversation Analysis, and has been referred to by Widmer & Zemp (2017), see above, but it has not been used in the studies of the Tibetic languages, except my own work (Zeisler 2023, 2024).

This term has the advantage that it points to a speaker's *rights* and *obligations* to present a certain situation in a particular manner or, more specifically:

to the speaker's *right* (and to some extent also: *obligation*) to build a linguistic fence around some information by using **X** and to the speaker's *obligation* to respect the fence around information that falls outside his or her own fenced "territory" by using **Y, Z, Φ, EM**.

Kamio puts it computationally:

$$\text{SPk} \begin{array}{|c}1……|….n……….0 \text{ (Addr)}\\ \text{m}\\ 0……|….n…………1 \text{ (Spk)}\\ \text{TOI} \quad \text{m'}\end{array}$$

Addr

If a given piece of information takes the value m (n <) on the speaker's scale while it takes the value m' (< n) on the hearer's scale (as in the above diagram), then that information falls within the speaker's territory to some degree and not the hearer's since n is the threshold value for information to fall into the speaker's/hearer's territory.

In Japanese, then, a neutral or 'direct' form will be used, whereas for information (< n) on the speaker's side different 'indirect' forms must be used.

For the Modern Tibetic languages, one could say: only information with a value > n (and a value < n on the respective interlocutor's side) can receive the 'egophoric' marker, but the 'exact' value or computation depends in part on the respective pragmatic restrictions and in part on the subjective assessment of the communicative situation and one's rights.

The value of n is set differently in the different Tibetic languages, but for Ladakhi I can say,

when talking about "my" job or my sister's, husband's, mother's bag or "our" monastery, the proposition automatically or *by default* has a value > n, when talking about "your" non-property or "their" monastery, the proposition *by default* has a value < n, but there are possibilities for upgrading or downgrading, depending on the situation or one's mood and upon whom one is talking to.

Downgrading appears to be generally somewhat more acceptable, especially in explanations, but it is also more common in the Kenhat (eastern, Upper Ladakhi) dialects, and least possible in the Purikpa-Baltipa dialects in the west. If we go further east to Tibet, downtuning apparently becomes even more frequent and almost obligatory, so that it could be mistaken for a neutral 'factual' representation.

Upgrading is more restricted, as it might imply an infringement of the territory of information of the addressee. Nevertheless, X is used somewhat more neutrally or 'factually' in the Purikpa-Baltipa dialects.

Generally, there are less options for downgrading or upgrading in questions, because one cannot – and should not – try to anticipate the subjective assessment of the addressee. Anticipation in questions works only on the default level.

However, to some extent, it is possible or rather necessary to frame one's question in a downtuned manner using a form of **Φ** to signal friendly curiosity, while the use of **X** might have an inquisitory connotation, shifting the responsibility to the addressee.

4. Conclusion

The Tibetic 'egophoric' markers **X** *yin* and *yod* specify a proposition as belonging to the MSAP's <u>subjectively evaluated</u> and <u>pragmatically conditioned</u> *territory of information*.
Propositions falling outside, take 'evidential' or epistemic markers: **Φ** NON-'EGO', **Y** VISUAL, **Z** NON-VISUAL, or **EM** evaluative/ epistemic markers.

Egophoricity is a category defined in terms of binary opposition. ... On the other hand, evidential contrast occurs only under non-egophoric conditions and functions to code information sources. (Sangsrgyas Tshering 2023: 41)

With respect to the two types of 'egophoric' marking mentioned above: epistemic *argument* marking and epistemic *proposition* marking, one could say that the Tibetic systems are somewhat mixed, but that the latter type is dominant:

Y *byuṅ* and *myoṅ* are 'evidential' and deictic (ego-phoric) = epistemic *argument* marking.

Y/Z *ḥdug*/*snaṅ*, *rag*, and *soṅ* are 'evidential' and non-deictic; they imply that the situation is not part of the MSAP's TOI = epistemic *proposition* marking.

ɸ markers are partly 'evidential' ('indirect'), partly 'non-evidential'/ 'factual' and non-deictic; they positively indicate that the situation is not part of the MSAP's TOI or neutrally indicate that there is no such claim = epistemic *proposition* marking.

X *yin* and *yod* in non-past constructions (incl. identifications, attributes, and existentials) are non-evidential/ factual and non-deictic; they positively specify that the situation is part of the MSAP's TOI = epistemic *proposition* marking.

X *yin* in the past tense construction V-*pa.yin*/ V-*pin* is non-evidential/ factual; it positively specifies that the situation is part of the MSAP's TOI; in most Tibetic languages it is deictic (ego-phoric) = epistemic *argument* marking.

In Ladakhi, however, X V-*pin* can be used for non-ego events (including 1P –ctr) if they happened a long time ago but are well remembered = epistemic *proposition* marking.

Quotation: ideally logophoric = epistemic *argument* marking

Proposition and argument marking in Standard Spoken Tibetan

form	verbal category	deictic ±ego	evidential	rights ± TOI	type
X *yod*	all	✗	✗	✓ (+)	proposition
X *yin*	identity	✗	✗	✓ (+)	proposition
X *yin*	future, past	ego	✗	✓ (+)	argument
Y *byuṅ*	past	ego goal	✓ perceptual	✓ (+)	argument
Y *myoṅ*	past	ego	✓ perceptual	✓ (+)	argument
Y *soṅ*	past	✗	✓ perceptual	✓ (−)	proposition
Y *ḥdug*	all	✗	✓ perceptual	✓ (−)	proposition
Y *bžag*	perfect	✗	✓ inferential	✓ (−)	proposition
ɸ *red*	all	✗	± 'indirect'	✓ (−)	proposition
ɸ *yod.red*	all	✗	± 'indirect'	✓ (−)	proposition
quotation	added	other	✓ reported	✓ (−)	argument

Proposition and argument marking in Ladakhi

form	verbal category	deictic ±ego	evidential	rights ± TOI	type
GRD + *yin*	future	✗	✗	neutral	—
X *yin*	all	✗	✗	✓ (+)	proposition
X *yod*	all	✗	✗	✓ (+)	proposition
Y ø	past	✗	± observed	neutral	—
Y *ḥdug*	all	✗	✓ visual	✓ (−)	proposition
Z *rag*	all	✗	✓ non-visual	✓ (−)	proposition
φ GEM	all	✗	± 'indirect'	✓ (−)	proposition
(Y *soṅ**	past	other	✓ observed	✓ (−)	argument)
(Y *byuṅ**	past	ego goal	✓ observed	✓ (+)	argument)
quotation	added	other	✓ reported	✓ (−)	argument

GRD = gerundive; GEM = generalised evaluative marker *inok* & siblings;
**soṅ* is only used in the Kenhat dialects, *byuṅ* only in some of the northern Kenhat dialcts, neither is obligatory, their usage is more emphatic.

While Tournadre emphatically claims that 'egophoric' marking is part of the 'evidential' system of access and source marking, objecting any binary opposition (most likely as he thinks that this reflects the syntactic conjunct-disjunct approach), there are reasons for disagreeing and there have been other voices:

Nous avons distingué les traits sémantiques prototypiquement évidentiels (perceptif direct, inférentiel et ouï-dire) d'autres traits qui ne sont que marginalement évidentiels ou qui appartiennent à des notions cousines. L'épistémique, la prise en charge, la subjectivité, la volition, l'égophorique, le factuel et le miratif sont ainsi des domaines notionnels […] qui ne peuvent pas être qualifiés d'évidentiels en soi selon la définition que nous avons adoptée. (Mélac 2014: 145 – in the meantime, Mélac 2023 has changed his oppinion.)

Egophoricity is "a binary grammatical category that specifies one's access to mental states as either privileged or non-privileged" and "that indicates whether one has privileged or non-privileged access to the knowledge on which a proposition is based". (Widmer & Zemp 2017: 36)

The Tibetic Egophoric category is not part of the evidential system; it is an independent, and more fundamental, category which affects evidential meanings that come under its shadow. Rather than an evidential category, Egophoric is a category to which evidentiality is not applicable. (Delancey 2018: 584)

Egophoricity is a category defined in terms of binary opposition. Its key semantic-pragmatic oppositions are the 'controllability', and the 'authority', that the speaker wants to express. … [E]gophoricity is not a contrast between person and information source but relates to more complex semantic-pragmatic factors.

Controlability in this context does not refer to objective controllability (volitional verb), but rather to a level of 'controllability' the speaker wishes to express; that is, whether or not the speaker has control over the event in question. … Authority is an attitude that the speaker wishes to express, whether he or she has in-depth knowledge of the event in question and whether he or she has the right to interpret it. Both factors have a strong pragmatic motivation behind them, and emphasize the extent to which one is responsible for or in control of an event. (Sangsrgyas Tshering 2023: 41f., 45).

The use of all markers is grounded in the ego's subjective evaluation of

– his/her epistemic relationship to the situation *and* the addressee (access & insider-outsider hierarchy, institutional settings)
– his/her rights and his/her commitment or identification (empathy) and
– the adressee's knowledge of, and relationship with, elements of the situation (engagement).

In my humble opinion, the term 'egophoric', picked up cross-liguistically, was coined prematurely for the Tibetic languages when the subjective and pragmatic factors were little known.

It is rather ironical that the term 'egophoric', coined in contrast to the 'conjunct-distjunct' pattern set up for Kathmandu Newari (Nepal bhasha), is now used in exact that 'canonical' sense with the standard example of Kathmandu Nepal bhasha as illustration (without even mentioning that the term 'egophoric(ity)' was not used for this pattern).

It is likewise ironical that Dahl's (2000, 2008) use of 'egophoric' is seen as original and the use as 'a label for a kind of epistemic marking that allows the speaker to make reference to his/her own personal knowledge of an event/state based on some form of involvement in a social and/or cognitive sense' is seen as a later or recent develoment (Bergqvist & Knuchel 2017: 35; similarly Bergqvist 2020: 476; cf. also Rumsey 2020).

Redefined as, e.g., *ego-involved perspective* or STANCE, the term 'egophoric marking' (though not the term 'egophoricity') may still serve as a convenient label for most Tibetic languages.

However, if terms based on 'ego-phor-' should be applied cross-linguistically (instead of 'conjuct-disjunct'), and if the idea of a 'canonical pattern' should be narrowed down mainly to epistemic *argument* marking and deixis, and thus to marking only speech act participant subjects (1P/2P), or if the notion of 'egophoric pronouns' (I, you, one) gets fully established also outside Swedish linguistics,

then we should try to find another term for the Tibetic languages, at least in order to describe the special functions of the primary 'egophoric' markers **X** *yin* and *yod* (in non-past constructions including identifications, attributes, and existentials).

E.g. internal (perspective) vs. external (perspective) marking
insider (perspective) vs. outsider (perspective) marking
conjunct *perspective* vs. disjunct *perspective* marking
(ego-) authoritative vs. non-authoritative marking …

Thank you!

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