15.01.2025 | Philosophische Fakultät, Philosophisches Seminar

On the Explanatory Interdependence of Epistemic Reasons and Competence

Reasons-first epistemology claims that epistemic reasons alone are explanatorily fundamental relative to all other normative phenomena or statuses, such as epistemic virtue or justification. This claim has come under criticism and alternative views such as reasoning first explain reasons in other, allegedly more fundamental normative terms. This talk focuses on whether epistemic virtues/reasoning competences, which appear to be normative in their own right, are needed to explain epistemic normative reasons.
I distinguish two related questions: (1) Is it epistemic reasons or epistemic competence that is explanatorily fundamental to epistemic all-things-considered standings like justification or knowledge? (2) Are reasons fundamental to competence, or is competence fundamental to reasons? By examining several arguments, I will support the claim that reasons and competences are explanatorily interdependent, and that both are needed to explain epistemic all-things-considered standings.