Wirtschaftstheorie

The current research projects cover the following topics:

Game Theory and Industrial Organization

Experimental Economics

Economics of Innovation and Technological Change

Education, Unemployment and Economic Growth

Natural Resources and Environmental Economics

Credit Contracts and Financial Markets

Game Theory and Industrial Organization

Most industries are characterized by oligopolistic market structures, i.e. by a small number of rival firms which strategically interact when deciding on capacities, cost-reducing investment, R&D, advertising, location, horizontal and vertical product differentiation, information sharing behavior and, finally, prices. The strategic competition of firms in different settings is analyzed in a couple of papers.

Selected publications:

  • Stadler, M. (2022), Manager Delegation, Owner Coordination and Firms’ Investment in Automation. Review of Economics 73, 59-182 (with M. Unsorg)

  • Stadler, M. (2022), Do Output-Dependent Prizes Alleviate the Sabotage Problem in Tournaments? Games 13, 65 (with T. Glökler and K. Pull).

  • Stadler, M. (2022), The Perpetual Trouble with Network Products. Why IT Firms Choose Partial Compatibility. Networks and Spatial Economics (with C. Tobler-Trexler and M. Unsorg).

  • Stadler, M. (2020), Market Structure, Common Ownership and Manager Compensation. Managerial and Decision Economics 41, 1262-1268 (with W. Neus and M. Unsorg).

  • Stadler, M. (2020), Capacity Precommitment, Communication, and Collusive Pricing. Theoretical Benchmark and Experimental Evidence. International Journal of Game Theory 49, 495-524 (with W. Güth and A. Zaby).

  • Stadler, M. (2019), Coordination Failure in Capacity-then-Price-Setting Games. Homo Oeconomicus 36, 111-133 (with W. Güth and A. Zaby).

  • Stadler, M. (2019), Asymmetric Information in Simple Bargaining Games. Theory and Experiment. German Economic Review 20, 29-51 (with C. Klempt and K. Pull).

  • Stadler, M. (2019), Compulsory Disclosure of Private Information: Theoretical and Experimental Results for the ‘Acquiring-a-Company’ Game. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 175, 502-523 (with W. Güth, K. Pull and A. Zaby).

  • Stadler, M. (2019), Location in a Disk City with Consumer Concentration around the Center. Schmalenbach Business Review 71, 35-50.

  • Stadler, M. (2018), Common Holdings and Strategic Manager Compensation. The Case of an Asymmetric Triopoly. Managerial and Decision Economics 39, 814-820 (with W. Neus).

  • Stadler, M. (2017), Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining. A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis. German Economic Review 18, 444-467 (with W.Güth, K. Pull and A. Zaby).

  • Stadler, M. (2015), Piece Rates vs. Contests in Product Market Competition. Review of Economics 66, 273-287 (with K. Pull).
  • Stadler, M. (2015), Game Theory and Industrial Organization. Dynamic Models of Price Competition. In: H.J. Ramser and M. Stadler (eds.), Entwicklung und Perspektiven der Wirtschaftswissenschaft. Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, pp. 283-309.
  • Stadler, M. (2015), Delegation, Worker Compensation, and Strategic Competition. Journal of Business Economics 85, 1-13 (with W. Güth and K. Pull).
  • Stadler, M. (2014), Endogenous Price Leadership. A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 108, 420-432 (with W. Güth, K. Pull and A. Zaby).
  • Stadler, M. (2012), Strategic Delegation in Price Competition. Theoretical Economics Letters 2, 355-360 (with W. Güth and K. Pull).
  • Stadler, M. (2012), Standortwahl und Produktpositionierung. In: H. Enke and A. Wagner (eds.), Zur Zukunft des Wettbewerbs. Marburg, Metropolis, 323-338.
  • Stadler, M. (2011), Exchange of Private Demand Information by Simultaneous Signaling. Working Paper No. 17, University of Tübingen.
  • Stadler, M. (2011), Intrafirm Conflicts and Interfirm Competition. Homo Oeconomicus 28, 367-378 (with W. Güth and K. Pull).
  • Stadler, M. (2010), Market Structure, Spillovers and Licensing in R&D Contests. In: H.J. Ramser and M. Stadler (eds.), Marktmacht, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 9-20.
  • Stadler, M. (2010), Endogenous Merger Formation and Welfare in Asymmetric Markets. In: H.J. Ramser and M. Stadler (eds.), Marktmacht, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 49-65 (mit L. Neubecker).
  • Stadler, M. (2010), Marktmacht. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (edited with H.J. Ramser).
  • Stadler, M. (2006), Path Dependence without Denying Deliberation. A Continuous Transition Model Connecting Teleology and Evolution. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 17, 45-52 (with W. Güth).
  • Stadler, M. (2006), On the Robustness of Concealing Cost Information in Oligopoly. Economics Bulletin 12, 1-13 (with S. Hornig).
  • Stadler, M. (2002), Fusionsdomino: Eine industrieökonomische Erklärung von Fusionswellen. Korreferat zu S. Böckem. In: W. Franz et al. (eds.), Fusionen, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 159-164.
  • Stadler, M. (2002), Fusionen. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (edited with W. Franz and H.J. Ramser).
  • Stadler, M. (2001), Reden ist Silber, Schweigen ist Gold. Zur Relevanz asymmetrischer Kosteninformation im Preiswettbewerb. WIST 30, 219-222.
  • Stadler, M. (1995), Spieltheoretische Konzepte in der Markt- und Preistheorie. Fortschritt oder Irrweg? Homo Oeconomicus 12, 89-124.
  • Stadler, M. (1992), Marktkonzentration, Unsicherheit und Kapitalakkumulation. Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 210, 286-301.

Experimental Economics

One of the first experimental games is the ultimatum game. Two players are allotted a sum of money. The first player, called the Proposer, offers some portion of the money to the second player, called the Responder. If the Responder accepts, he gets what was offered, and the Proposer gets the rest. If the Responder rejects the offer, both players get nothing. This game first attracted attention because the empirical results differed so dramatically from the predictions of traditional game theory which assumes self-interest. If both players are income maximizers, then the Proposer should offer the smallest unit of currency, and the Responder should accept. Instead, offers typically average about 30 to 40 percent of the total, with a 50-50 split often the mode. Offers of less than 20 percent are frequently rejected. Modifications of the ultimatum game are the generosity game and the envy game. The research question is how to interpret this evidence and how to incorporate these findings into a more descriptive version of game theory.

Selected publications:

  • Stadler, M. (2022), Do Output-Dependent Prizes Alleviate the Sabotage Problem in Tournaments? Games 13, 65 (with T. Glökler and K. Pull).
  • Stadler, M. (2019), Compulsory disclosure of Private Information. Theoretical and Experminental Results for the 'Acquiring-a-Company' Game. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,175, 502-523 (with W. Güth, K. Pull, and A. Zaby)
  • Stadler, M. (2016), Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining. A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis. German Economic Review 18, 444-467 (with W. Güth, K. Pull and A. Zaby).
  • Stadler, M. (2015), The Willingness to Pay for Partial vs. Universal Equality. Insights from Three-Person Envy Games. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 56, 55-61 (with A. Bäker, W. Güth and K. Pull).
  • Stadler, M. (2014), Endogenous Price Leadership. A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 108, 420-432 (with W. Güth, K. Pull and A. Zaby).
  • Stadler, M. (2014), Entitlement and the Efficiency-Equality Trade-off. An Experimental Study. Theory and Decision 76, 225-240 (with A. Bäker, W. Güth and K. Pull).
  • Stadler, M. (2013), Creativity, Analytical Skills, Personality Traits, and Innovative Capability. A Lab Experiment. Homo Oeconomicus 30, 209-227.
  • Stadler, M. (2011), Gleich aufteilen oder effizient handeln? Theoretische Ideen und experimentelle Befunde. In: B. Genser et al. (eds.), Umverteilung und soziale Gerechtigkeit. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 39-53. (with A. Bäker, W. Güth and K. Pull).
  • Stadler, M. (2010), Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Games. Games 1, 89-102 (with W. Güth, K. Pull and A. Stribeck).
  • Stadler, M. (2009), Effects of Profitable Downsizing on Collective Bargaining. Comment on S. Fischer, W. Güth and C. Köhler. In: W. Franz et al. (eds.), Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 249-251 (with K. Pull).
  • Stadler, M. (2009), Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (edited with W. Franz, W. Güth and H.J. Ramser).
  • Stadler, M. (1998), Ökonomisches Kalkül und Fairneß. Zur Diskrepanz spieltheoretischer und experimenteller Verhaltensweisen. In: H. Hesse and P. Welzel (eds.), Wirtschaftspolitik zwischen gesellschaftlichen Ansprüchen und ökonomischen Grenzen. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 69-87.

Economics of Innovation and Technological Change

On the one hand, the innovation dynamics of firms depend decisively on the market structure in which firms compete (Schumpeterian hypotheses) but, on the other hand, the resulting product and process innovations induce a continuing process of technological and structural change. The theoretical and empirical analyses focus on the explanatory factors of firms’ R&D decisions as well as on the resulting dynamics of the R&D-based technological change.

Selected publications:

  • Stadler, M. (2015), Education, Innovation and Growth in Quality-Ladder Models of North-North Trade. Modern Economy 6, 1115-1128.
  • Stadler, M. (2015), Innovation, Industrial Dynamics and Economic Growth. In: H.J. Ramser and M. Stadler (eds.), Entwicklung und Perspektiven der Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, pp. 59-92.
  • Stadler, M. (2013), Scientific Breakthroughs, Innovation Clusters and Stochastic Growth Cycles. Homo Oeconomicus 30, 143-162.
  • Stadler, M. (2012), Engines of Growth: Education and Innovation. Review of Economics 63, 113-124.
  • Stadler, M. (2010), Market Structure, Spillovers and Licensing in R&D Contests. In: H.J. Ramser and M. Stadler (eds.), Marktmacht, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 9-20.
  • Stadler, M. (2005), Technological Progress and Market Growth. An Empirical Study Based on the Quality-Ladder Approach. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 72, 413-428 (with H. Grupp).
  • Stadler, M. (2005), Market Structure and Innovation Races. An Empirical Assessment Using Indirect Inference. Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 225, 427-440 (with M. Kukuk).
  • Stadler, M. (2003), Auswirkungen öffentlicher Forschungsförderung auf die private F&E-Tätigkeit: Eine mikroökonometrische Evaluation. In: W. Franz et al. (eds.), Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung: Methoden und Anwendungen. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 213-240 (with G. Licht).
  • Stadler, M. (2001), Financing Constraints and the Timing of Innovations in the German Services Sector. Empirica 28, 277-292 (with M. Kukuk).
  • Stadler, M. (1998), On the Dynamics of Product and Process Innovations. A Bivariate Random Effects Probit Model. Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 217, 401-417 (with G. Flaig).
  • Stadler, M. (1995), Geographical Transaction Costs and Regional Quality Ladders. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 151, 490-504.
  • Stadler, M. (1994), Success Breeds Success. The Dynamics of the Innovation Process. Empirical Economics 19, 55-68 (with G. Flaig).
  • Stadler, M. (1993), Die Modellierung des Innovationsprozesses. Ein integrativer Mikro-Makro-Ansatz. ifo Studien 39, 159-189.
  • Stadler, M. (1992), R&D Activity in a Dynamic Factor Demand Model. A Panel Data Analysis of Small and Medium Sized German Firms. Empirica 19, 161-180 (with A.J. Buck).
  • Stadler, M. (1992), Determinants of Innovative Activity in Oligopolistic Markets. Journal of Economics 56, 137-156.
  • Stadler, M. (1992), F&E-Verhalten und Gewinnentwicklung im dynamischen Wettbewerb. Ein Beitrag zur Chaos-Theorie. Jahrbücher für Nationalökonmie und Statistik 209, 31-46.
  • R&D Dynamics in the Product Life Cycle. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 1, 293-305.

Education, Unemployment and Economic Growth

The two main engines of quantitative and qualitative growth are education and human capital accumulation on the one hand and R&D and technological progress on the other hand. The analyses focus on the explanatory factors of long-run growth and cycles. Since labor markets are imperfect unemployment arises and interacts with technological change.

Selected publications:

  • Stadler, M. (2015), Innovation, Industrial Dynamics and Economic Growth. In: H.J. Ramser and M. Stadler (eds.), Entwicklung und Perspektiven der Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, pp. 5-92.
  • Stadler, M. (2013), Scientific Breakthroughs, Innovation Clusters and Stochastic Growth Cycles. Homo Oeconomicus 30, 143-162.
  • Stadler, M. (2012), Engines of Growth: Education and Innovation. Review of Economics 63, 113-124.
  • Stadler, M. (2008), Managerbezüge. Anmerkungen zur Revision des traditionellen Modells. Korreferat zu H.J. Ramser. In: W. Franz et al. (eds.), Arbeitsverträge, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 67-72.
  • Stadler, M. (2008), Arbeitsverträge. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (edited with W. Franz and H.J. Ramser).
  • Stadler, M. (2007), Globalization, Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Product Cycles. In: W. Franz et al. (eds.), Dynamik internationaler Märkte, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 101-118.
  • Stadler, M. (2007), Dynamik internationaler Märkte. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (edited with W. Franz and H.J. Ramser).
  • Stadler, M. (2004), Endogenous Skilled-biased Technological Change and Matching Unemployment. Journal of Economics 81, 1-24 (with R. Wapler).
  • Stadler, M. (2004), Bildung, Innovationsdynamik und Produktivitätswachstum. In: W. Franz et al. (eds.), Bildung. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 141-155.
  • Stadler, M. (2004), Bildung. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (edited with W. Franz and H.J. Ramser).
  • Stadler, M. (2003), Innovation and Growth: The Role of Labor-Force Qualification. Beiträge zur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung 277, 1-12.
  • Stadler, M. (2001), Demand-Pull and Technology-Push Effects in the Quality-Ladder Model. In: S.K. Berninghaus and M. Braulke (eds.), Beiträge zur Mikro- und Makroökonomik. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 449-460.
  • Stadler, M. (2000), Lange Wellen der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung? IAW-Studien 2, 4-14.
  • Stadler, M. (1999), Dual Labor Markets, Unemployment and Endogenous Growth. ifo Studien 45, 283-301.
  • Stadler, M. (1999), Stochastische Innovations- und Wachstumszyklen. In: W. Franz et al. (eds.), Trend und Zyklus. Zyklisches Wachstum aus der Sicht moderner Konjunktur- und Wachstumstheorie. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 225-247.
  • Stadler, M. (1997), Innovation, Wachstum und Arbeitslosigkeit. Ein prototypisches Modell der Neuen Wachstumstheorie. In: E. Helmstädter, G. Poser and H.J. Ramser (eds.), Beiträge zur angewandten Wirtschaftsforschung. Festschrift für Karl Heinrich Oppenländer. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 97-110 (with B. Gahlen).
  • Stadler, M. (1997), Keynesianische Aspekte der modernen Wachstumstheorie. In: G. Bombach et al. (eds.), Der Keynesianismus VI: Der Einfluß keynesianischen Denkens auf die Wachstumstheorie. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 135-180 (with H.J. Ramser).
  • Stadler, M. (1996), Elemente und Funktionsweise des strukturalistischen Ansatzes zur Erklärung der Arbeitslosigkeit. In: B. Gahlen, H. Hesse and H.J. Ramser (eds.), Arbeitslosigkeit und Möglichkeiten ihrer Überwindung. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 307-326.

Natural Resources and Environmental Economics

After the last cycles of innovation have focused on an improvement of labor productivity, the focus now shifts more and more to natural resources and environmental capacities. To bring this issue to the focus of political decision makers and management, one main research line of environmental economics analyses the potential economic impacts of inaction (e.g. in the field of climate change). Another aspect considers the role of environmental regulation and its impact on eco-innovation. Also, new research in growth theory considers limited environmental resources and develops proposals for a more sustainable growth.

Selected publications:

 

  • Stadler, M. (2012), Wirtschaftswachstum in Zeiten des anthropogenen Klimawandels. In: A. Wager and U. Heilemann (eds.), Empirische Makroökonomik und mehr. Stuttgart, Lucius & Lucius, 133-147.
  • Stadler, M. (2006), Dynamische Anreize umweltpolitischer Instrumente. Korreferat zu Till Requate. In: W. Franz et al. (eds.), Umwelt und Energie. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 151-156.
  • Stadler, M. (2006), Umwelt und Energie. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (edited with W. Franz and H.J. Ramser).
  • Stadler, M. (2001), Umweltpolitik und Wirtschaftswachstum. In: W. Franz et al. (eds.), Wirtschaftspolitische Herausforderungen an der Jahrhundertwende. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 433-449.

Credit Contracts and Financial Markets

Credit markets are typically characterized by asymmetric information leading to moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Fundamentally solvent debtor firms are therefore frequently forced into bankruptcy due to information asymmetries and to creditor coordination failures. A new game theoretical approach deals with global games, defined by a continuum of agents, to account for the coordination problem.

Selected publications:

  • Stadler, M. (2018), Common Holdings and Strategic Manager Compensation. The Case of an Asymmetric Triopoly. Managerial and Decisions Economics 39, 814-820 (with W. Neus).
  • Stadler, M. (2013), Risk and the Role of Collateral in Debt Renegotiation. Economic Notes 42, 273-284 (with W. Neus).
  • Stadler, M. (2005), Signalling Effects of a Large Player in a Global Game of Creditor Coordination. Economics Bulletin 4, 1-10 (with T. Schüle).
  • Stadler, M. (2005), Spekulative Währungsattacken. In: W. Franz et al. (eds.), Funktionsfähigkeit und Stabilität von Finanzmärkten. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 261-282.
  • Stadler, M. (2005), Ansteckungseffekte in einer Zinsfalle. Korreferat zu G. Illing. In: W. Franz et al. (eds.), Funktionsfähigkeit und Stabilität von Finanzmärkten. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 235-240.
  • Stadler, M. (2005), Funktionsfähigkeit und Stabilität von Finanzmärkten. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (edited with W. Franz and H.J. Ramser).
  • Stadler, M. (1997), Two-Period Financial Contracts and Product Market Competition. ifo Studien 43, 367-379.