On January 15, 2026, the ECRF officially presented the “Yearbook of Federalism 2025,” which is dedicated to the interplay between populism and federalism, at the University of Tübingen. The event was a collaboration with the Institute for Research on Far Right Extremism (IRex).

First, Prof. Dr. Gabriele Abels, Speaker for the ECRF Executiv Board and Director of the Institute for Political Science (IfP), welcomed the numerous guests and presented the work of the ECRF as well as the current Yearbook and its focus topic. She then discussed with Katharina Thoms, Deutschlandradio, and Dr. iur. Alexander Gorskiy, LL.M., University of Tübingen, Kehl University of Applied Sciences, and Ludwigsburg University of Applied Sciences, whether the federal structures of the Federal Republic of Germany can counteract the rise of populist parties or whether they can instead be instrumentalized to undermine or even dismantle the constitutional state. The discussion was moderated by Dr. Martin Große Hüttmann, Executive Member of the ECRF Board. In his introductory remarks, he referred, among other things, to the debate on state modernization and a new federalism reform, which is gaining momentum in light of the steady rise of the AfD.

In her opening statement, Ms. Thoms pointed out that the AfD is increasingly succeeding in establishing itself at the local level – for example, in municipal councils – and is perceived as largely “harmless.” This leads the other parties to assume that excluding or isolating the party no longer works. The AfD is also contributing significantly to a radicalization of political discourse, which is increasingly challenging for the media in their reporting. This is also having an impact on other parties, which are also increasingly sharpening their tone.

Dr. Gorskiy then explained which constitutional structures are particularly vulnerable to instrumentalization and called for appropriate adjustments. Specifically, he referred to the statehood and constitutional autonomy of the Länder, which would give a populist state government considerable leeway in implementing its policies. Even one Land in which a populist party comes to power would be enough to shake cooperative federalism in Germany: the consequences would be devastating in the Bundesrat and the conferences of minister presidents and ministers, where unanimity is often required. At the same time, a populist Land government would have the opportunity to restructure the respective political system in its favor. He emphasized that numerous control mechanisms and the separation of powers (e.g., the composition of state courts) in the Länder are often only regulated by state laws and can therefore be easily undermined.

Prof. Abels interjected that populist parties already had the opportunity to obstruct constitutional bodies from the opposition. She referred to her own experience as a judge at the Constitutional Court of Baden-Württemberg, which was often flooded with so many motions from the AfD that they were almost impossible to deal with, significantly hindering the court's work. Ms. Thoms added that the AfD, with its blocking minority in the Thuringian state parliament, would prevent the election of judges and capitalize on this politically. At the same time, she said, it was difficult to deal with these complex issues in journalistic practice. She then criticized the fact that, although there was often discussion before elections about how constitutional structures could be made more resilient, there was never any real progress because the other parties could not agree – until it was too late. She also warned that an AfD-led Land government could withdraw from the State Media Treaty.

Prof. Abels pointed out that many lessons could be learned from comparisons with other countries, citing the regional rise of the Freedom Party of Austria as a specific example. The frequent hope that a right-wing populist and/or anti-system party could be “tamed” in government is a fallacy. Comparisons with other countries show that participation in government does not lead to disenchantment, but rather to recognition. The parties could then act even more confidently and at the same time have the opportunity to push ahead with restructuring the Land in their favor.

Dr. Gorskiy concluded by criticizing the fact that numerous steps to strengthen constitutional resilience at the federal and Land levels (e.g., the anchoring of control mechanisms in a Land constitution) could have been taken long ago – now it may be too late. All three speakers expressed concern and pessimism about the upcoming elections in 2026. Many developments are already becoming apparent, but political decision-makers have failed to prepare for them accordingly. The system of cooperative federalism would continue to exist for the time being, but it is likely to bear scars.

Monday, 17 November 2025,
5 p.m. – 8.30 p.m. CET,
Vertretung des Landes Baden-Württemberg beim Bund,
Tiergartenstraße 15, 10785 Berlin.

After a pre-reception, where specialities from both Berlin (Currywurst) and from the Ländle (Käsespätzle) were offered, Mr. Ulrich Aierstock, Deputy Head of the State Representation, opened the event and welcomed the guests. Prof. Dr Gabriele Abels, Speaker of the ECRF Executive Board, then presented the topics covered in the Yearbook. She paid particular attention to this year's main topic, ‘Populism and federalism – best friends?’ – a question that is becoming increasingly important in light of recent political developments in many different countries.

Prof. Abels then discussed the topic ‘Federalism – obstacle or opportunity for populism?’ with Prof. Dr. Paula Diehl, Christian Albrecht University of Kiel, and Prof. Dr. Sabine Kropp, Free University of Berlin. The focus was on the question of whether federal structures provide a fertile environment for populist forces or whether they are particularly well suited to curbing them.

In her opening statement, Prof. Diehl pointed out that the interplay between populism and federalism depends on three fundamental factors that can vary considerably from country to country: the functioning of the political system, the characteristics of the political culture, and the political level at which populist forces operate (federal, state or local?). At the same time, she reminded the audience that, despite some common characteristics, there is no such thing as ‘one form of populism’ and that populist actors can also evolve over time. Furthermore, populism does not always have to be authoritarian in nature, although this is increasingly the case due to its growing adoption by right-wing extremist forces. Normalising populist messages would only lead to even greater radicalisation. According to Diehl, the question of how populism affects the functioning of institutions is of central importance. She used the image of a drunk guest at a party: just as this guest can liven up the atmosphere, populism has the potential to revitalise democracy. At the same time, it could also destroy it. The role of federalism varies in this regard depending on the country and political level: while in the USA, for example, the states have proven to be an effective bulwark against the right-wing populist policies of the federal government, in Austria the populist FPÖ has succeeded in breaking through the cordon sanitaire of the federal parties by participating in state governments.

Prof. Kropp agreed with the assessment that a distinction must be made between populism and extremism. The central communication strategy of populism is to blame others, who are held responsible for problems, often in the name of ‘the people’. These may be ‘the elite’ (or ‘those at the top’), but also actors at other political levels in general. In this way, a federal government, for example, could pass on responsibility for failed reforms. Accordingly, populist communication is not only reserved for radical actors, but can also be practised by forces perceived as moderate. The federal structure of a country could be used by populist forces as a means of obstruction. German executive federalism in particular offers numerous opportunities for this, for example in the Bundesrat or the Fachministerkonferenzen. Since these usually work in a consensus-oriented manner and often require unanimity for decisions, even if a populist party is only (co-)governing in one state, this can already have considerable disruptive potential. According to Kropp, the key to strengthening the federal state's defences does not lie in small-scale institutional reforms. Instead, federal structures as a whole need to be made more flexible, for example by abolishing unanimity requirements.

When asked whether the rise of populist forces could be reversed, the two panellists came to a sobering conclusion. According to Prof. Diehl, the situation is more likely to worsen. The increasing coarsening of language, especially on social media, is difficult to reverse. Prof. Kropp similarly pointed out that a feeling of permanent crisis has become established in society, which populist forces know how to exploit. When Prof. Abels asked whether populist parties could be disenchanted by participating in government, Prof. Kropp replied that this was difficult to imagine given the growing influence of forces within the parties that insist on their maximum demands. A ‘let them join in’ approach at the state level could have disastrous consequences given the federal interdependencies and the consensus-oriented system of the Federal Republic. Prof. Diehl pointed to the example of the Rassemblement National in France, noting that the normalisation of populist discourse, coupled with an apparent willingness to compromise on the part of the populist party, could encourage other parties to move closer to them and ultimately tempt them to enter into a government coalition.

Afterwards, the audience had the opportunity to ask the panellists questions. A reception with drinks rounded off the evening.