PD Dr. Jean Moritz Müller

Metaethics, (esp. epistemology of normativity, reasons), moral psychology (esp. theory of emotion), normative ethics (esp. ethics of compassion)

since 2023: Visiting Professor, Chair of practical philosophy, University of Tübingen

2017: Postdoc, Université de Fribourg

2016 – 2023: Research Associate (post doc), University of Bonn

2015 – 2016: Research Associate (post doc), University of Tübingen

2014 – 2015: Graduate Teaching Assistant, University of Manchester

2014: PhD Philosophy, University of Manchester

Book
[1]    (2019) The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and  Intentionality. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Reviews and symposia:
-    The Philosophical Quarterly, review by Jonathan Mitchell
-    The Review of Metaphysics, review by Rick A. Furtak
-    Emotion Review, symposium with commentaries by Ronald de Sousa, Rick  
A. Furtak, Agnes Moors, Kevin Mulligan, Rainer Reisenzein and Philipp Schmidt, incl. précis and replies

Edited collections
[2]    (in preparation) Reasons and Explanation. Topical Collection. Synthese. (with Irina Schumski und Tobias Wilsch)

Articles in peer-reviewed journals
[3]    (forthcoming). “Motivating Reasons: The State of the Question”. Southern Journal of Philosophy.
[4]    (2023) “Motivating Reasons, Responses and the Taking Condition“. Philosophical Explorations 26(3), 305-323.
[5]    (2022) “Knowing Value and Acknowledging Value: On the Significance of Emotional Evaluation”. Inquiry. doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2022.2126150 (online first)
[6]    (2022). “Sympathy, Interpersonal Awareness and Acknowledgment”. Topoi 41(5), 849-858.
[7]    (2022). “Apprehending Value, Position-Taking and the Manifest Image of Emotion: Responses to Commentators”. Emotion Review 14(4), 279-287.
[8]    (2022). “The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: Affective  Intentionality and Position-Taking”. Emotion Review 14(4), 244-253.
[9]    (2021). “In Defense of the Content-Priority View of Emotion”. Dialectica 75(2), 251-274.
[10]    (2021) “The Spontaneity of Emotion”. European Journal of Philosophy 29(4), 1060-1078.
[11]    (2021) “Perceptualism and the Epistemology of Normative Reasons”. Synthese 199(1-2), 3557–3586
[12]    (2020) “Response-Dependent Normative Properties and the Epistemic Account of Emotion”. Journal of Value Inquiry 54(3), 355-364.
[13]    (2018) “Emotion as Position-Taking“. Philosophia 46 (3), 525-540.
[14]    (2017) “How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes“. Dialectica 71 (2), 281–308.

Further Articles
[15]    (forthcoming). “Emotions, Reations and Rationality”. In D. Sander, D. Dukes & D. Sauter (eds.). Affectivism. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. (with Hichem Naar)
[16]    (forthcoming) “Konstellationen und Rezeptionslinien: Dietrich von Hildebrand“. In K. Hokamp, A. Mina & M. Schloßberger (eds.). Handbuch Max Scheler: Leben, Wirkung, Werk. Stuttgart: Springer.
[17]    (2024) “Which Emotional Behaviors Are Actions?“. In A. Scarantino (ed.). Emotion Theory: The Comprehensive Routledge Guide. Vol. 1. London/New York: Routledge, 561-576. (with Hong Yu Wong)
[18]    (2023). “I Feel You: Toward a Schelerian Conception of Empathy“. In T. Petraschka & C. Werner (eds.). Empathy's Role in Understanding Persons, Literature, and Art. London: Routledge, 272-295.
[19]    (2022). “Minimal Rationality: Structural or Reasons-Responsive?”. In C. Tappolet, J. Deonna & F. Teroni (eds.). Tribute for Ronald de Sousa. Geneva: Swiss Center for Affective Sciences. www.unige.ch/cisa/related-sites/ronald-de-ousa/assets/pdf/Müller_Paper.pdf
[20]    (2020) “Historical Perspectives: Dietrich von Hildebrand“. In T. Szanto & H. Landweer (eds.). Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion. London/New York: Routledge, 114-122.
[21]     (2019) “Motivierende Gründe: Aktuelle Probleme und Kontroversen”. Information Philosophie 4, 16- 28.
[22]    (2011) “Emotion, Wahrnehmung, evaluative Erkenntnis”. In J. Slaby, A. Stephan, H. Walter & S. Walter (eds.). Affektive Intentionalität: Beiträge zur welterschließenden Funktion der menschlichen Gefühle. Mentis, Paderborn, 110-127.

Reviews, Encyclopedia entries and miscellanea
[23]    (2024) Emotion as Feeling Towards Value: A Theory of Emotional Experience, by Jonathan Mitchell (Oxford University Press 2021). Mind 133(531), 842-851. (with Sabine Döring)
[24]    (2020) Emotions, Values and Agency, by Christine Tappolet (Oxford University Press 2016). The Philosophical Quarterly 70(280), 647-650.
[25]    (2016) Emotion and Value, by Sabine Roeser & Cain Todd (Hg.) (Oxford University Press 2014). Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 19(4), 1069-1071.
[26]-[45]     (2015) “Alltagspsychologie”, “Anomaler Monismus”,  “Anpassungsrichtung”, “Antiindividualismus”, “Computer”, “Computationalismusthese”, “Computermodell des Geistes”, “Chinesisches Zimmer”, “Eliminativismus”, “Emergenz”, “Epiphänomenalismus“, “Externalismus”, “funktionale Einstellung“, “Individualismus”, “intentionale Einstellung”, “intentionales System”, “Internalismus”, “Künstliche Intelligenz”, “physikalische Einstellung”, “Symbolverarbeitung“. In C. Demmerling & P. Stekeler- Weithofer (eds.). Sprachphilosphie. (Wörterbücher zur Sprach- und Kommunikationswissenschaft (WSK) Online.) Berlin, Boston: DeGruyter.
[46]    (2009) “Phänomenologie der Gefühle: Einleitung”. In S. Döring (ed.). Philosophie der Gefühle. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 363-368. (with Sabine Döring)
[47]    (2009) “Philosophie der Gefühle und empirische Wissenschaft: Einleitung”. In S. Döring (ed.). Philosophie der Gefühle. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 295-301. (with Sabine Döring)