Prof. Dr. Thomas Sattig

Metaphysics & Philosophy of Mind

• Temporal perception
• Spatial perception
• Perspectival content and de se content in perception and memory
• Time and spacetime
• Material objects and object perception
• Mereology
• Modality
• Vagueness and indeterminacy
• Persons and selves
• Metametaphysics
 

"The Passage of Time” (2022-23)
Funded by the VolkswagenFoundation (Opus Magnum grant)

Monographien

• Material Objects. Cambridge University Press (Elements in Metaphysics), 2021.
• The Double Lives of Objects: An Essay in the Metaphysics of the Ordinary World. Oxford University Press, 2015.
• The Language and Reality of Time. Oxford University Press, 2006.
• How Time Passes. Oxford University Press, under contract.

Aufsätze (Auswahl)

• “Persistence and Structure”, Philosophical Studies (online), 2023.
• “Part, Slot, Ground: Foundations for Neo-Aristotelian Mereology”, Synthese, 198: 2735-2749, 2021.
• “The Flow of Time in Experience”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 119, Issue 3, October 2019.
• “The Sense of Temporal Flow: A Higher-Order Account”, Philosophical Studies, 176: 3041-3059, 2019.
• “Experiencing Change: Extensionalism, Retentionalism, and Marty’s Hybrid View,” in H. Leblanc & G. Bacigalupo (eds.) Anton Marty and Contemporary Philosophy, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 153-74 (2018).
• “The Sense and Reality of Personal Identity,” Erkenntnis 83:1139-55 (2018).
• “Memory-based Personal Identity without Circularity,” in V. Buonomo (ed.) The Persistence of Persons: Studies in the Metaphysics of Personal Identity over Time, Neunkirchen-Seelscheid: Editiones Scholasticae (2017), 117-134.
• “Metaphysical Ambitions in the Ontology of Objects” (Symposium on T. Hofweber’s Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 94 (2017): 481-87.
• “Pluralism and Determinism,” Journal of Philosophy, 111 (2014): 135-150.
• “Mereological Indeterminacy: Metaphysical But Not Fundamental,” in K. Akiba and A. Abasnezhad (eds.) Vague Objects and Vague Identity: New Essays on Ontic Vagueness (2014), 25-42.
• “Vague Objects and the Problem of the Many,” Metaphysica 14 (2013): 211-223.
• “The Paradox of Fission and the Ontology of Ordinary Objects,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85 (2012): 594-623.
• “Compatibilism about Coincidence,” Philosophical Review, 119 (2010): 273-313.
• “Many as One,” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 5(2010): 145-75.
• “Ordinary Objects in the Relativistic World,” in Chronos: Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time Society, XI (2010-2011), 28-61.
• “Identity in 4D,” Philosophical Studies, 140 (2008): 179-95.
• “Temporal Predication with Temporal Parts and Temporal Counterparts,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81 (2003): 355-368.
• “Temporal Parts and Complex Predicates,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CII (2002): 279-286.