26.06.2024 | Philosophische Fakultät, Philosophisches Seminar

Relational moral demands

To act rightly is to act in accordance with moral demands. But what grounds moral demands? Much contemporary moral philosophy tends to take a non-relational approach to answering this question. According to non-relational moral theories, to act rightly is to act in a way that honours or promotes the (non-relational) moral properties of individuals, for example their well-being or their rights. Relational moral theories hold that, at least in some instances, acting rightly depends on moral relations to others – it’s to act in ways demanded by our relationships to others. But what are moral relations? Most contemporary relational theories presuppose that moral relations are determined by relational moral properties of the individuals involved. Call this view individuals-first relationalism. Radical relationalism, by contrast, rejects the normative priority of moral properties of individuals – whether they are relational or non-relational. Instead, it has a relations-first structure. My aim in this paper is to argue that some moral demands are radically relational.