21.01.2026 | Philosophische Fakultät, Philosophisches Seminar

Hegel on the Untruth of Kantian Substance

Is there anything stable or fixed about the categories of Hegel’s logic? Although Hegel claims that his categories are fundamental for thought, his logic tells a tale of categorial change. One category morphs into another, and this is true even of the most basic and general among them.  Hegel explicitly describes the “Denkbestimmungen” of his logic as “plastisch”, but how deep does this plasticity go?  I try to answer this question by considering his charge that Kant failed to grasp that the “truth” of the category of substance is “der Begriff”.  I argue that , in its developed form in Hegel’s Begriffslogik, substance shares with the other categories the feature of plasticity.  At the same time, however, it retains a certain permanence.

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